DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 056 949 SO 002 056

AUTHOR	Blutstein, Howard I.; And Others
TITLE	Area Handbook for Cuba.
INSTITUTION	American Univ., Washington, D.C. Foreign Area Studies.
REPORT NO	DA-PAM-550-152
PUB DATE	Mar 70
NOTE	494p.
AVAILABLE FROM	Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 ($3.75)
EDRS PRICE	MF-$0.65 HC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS	American History; *Area Studies; Communism; Courts; Demography; *Developing Nations; Economics; Ethnic Groups; *Foreign Culture; Geography; Governmental Structure; Guides; History; Institutions; *Latin American Culture; Military Organizations; Religion; Social Structure; Social Systems; Values
IDENTIFIERS	*Cuba; Educational Systems

ABSTRACT

This volume is one of a series of handbooks designed to be useful to military and other personnel who need a convenient compilation of basic facts about the social, economic, political, and military institutions and practices of various countries. It is intended to be an objective description of the nation's present society, especially since the resolution of 1959, and the kinds of possible or probable changes that might be expected in the future. It was compiled from information available in openly published materials. A bibliography of sources of more detailed information is provided in the appendix, as well as a glossary of Spanish words. (Author)

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AREA HANDBOOK
for
CUBA

SO002056

1

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AREA HANDBOOK
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CUBA

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Research and writing were completed on
March 1970

Published
1971

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 75-610124

3

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Washington, D.C. 20402–Price $3.75

FOREWORD

This volume is one of a series of handbooks prepared by Foreign Area Studies (FAS) of The American University, designed to be useful to military and other personnel who need a convenient compilation of basic facts about the social, economic, political, and military institutions and practices of various countries. The emphasis is on objective description of the nation's present society and the kinds of possible or probable changes that might be expected in the future. The handbook seeks to present as full and as balanced an integrated exposition as limitations on space and research time permit. It was compiled from information available in openly published material. An extensive bibliography is provided to permit recourse to other published sources for more detailed information. There has been no attempt to express any specific point of view or to make policy recommendations. The contents of the handbook represent the work of the authors and FAS and do not represent the official view of the United States government.

An effort has been made to make the handbook as comprehensive as possible. It can be expected, however, that the material, interpretations, and conclusions are subject to modification in the light of new information and developments. Such corrections, additions, and suggestions for factual, interpretive, or other change as readers may have will be welcomed for use in future revisions. Comments may be addressed to:

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4

PREFACE

In 1970 Cuba celebrated the eleventh anniversary of the Revolution of 1959. The results of that revolution have made what was once a small, relatively unimportant country a center of attention, a source of subversion in a number of countries in Latin America, and an element of contention in international affairs. Many complex changes have taken place domestically and in the country's world situation in the last decade.

This handbook seeks to present an integrated exposition of the society in order to help understand the circumstances and results of the changes that have occurred since 1959. There are many excellent works concerning the country; most are either specific studies of one aspect of the society or attempts to describe the situation in broad, general terms. This handbook is not intended to replace any of these studies but rather to supplement the available material. Interpretations are kept to a minimum and are based primarily on available data found in documented sources.

Grateful acknowledgment is due many people who have given their time and knowledge in aiding the preparation of various chapters. In particular, the authors wish to thank Dr. Luis Aguilar for his accounts of Cuban society. Responsibility for all facts and interpretations found in the study must, however, rest with the authors.

Spanish usage is based on *Appleton's New Cuyás Dictionary* (Fifth Edition). Place names follow the rulings of the United States Board on Geographic Names. Spanish words are held to a minimum, are defined at first appearance and, if used frequently, are recorded in the Glossary.

COUNTRY SUMMARY

1. COUNTRY: Republic of Cuba. Formerly a colony of Spain (1511–1898) and under United States military government (1898–1902). Independent since 1902.

2. GOVERNMENT: A socialist republic with a president who is chief of state. Council of Ministers serves as both cabinet and legislature. A prime minister appointed by the president is head of government.

3. CONSTITUTION: Fundamental Law of the Republic of Cuba of 1959 was still in effect in early 1970. Replaced the Constitution of 1940.

4. POPULATION: About 8.4 million in early 1970. More than 500,000 persons have emigrated from the country since 1959. About 73 percent of population is white; 12 percent, Negro; and 15 percent, mestizo.

5. SIZE: 44,218 square miles.

6. TOPOGRAPHY: Three low mountain ranges—in extreme west, in center of island, and in east. Rest of country is level or rolling. About 1,400 square miles of swamps located in margins of Zapata Peninsula. Numerous small islands and keys surround the mainland.

7. LANGUAGES: Spanish is official language. Many Cubans have good knowledge of English.

8. RELIGION: No official religion, but Roman Catholic faith is predominant, representing about 85 percent of the population. Numerous Protestant groups have smaller numbers of adherents. Several cults of African origin exist among Negroes.

9. EDUCATION: Elementary education is free and compulsory through the sixth grade. Secondary education is free but not compulsory. Three universities provide higher education.

10. HEALTH: Official death rate recorded as 6.4 per 1,000 inhabitants in 1967. Infant death rate high. Leading causes of death were heart disease, cancer, pneumonia, gastroenteritis, and tuberculosis.

11. CLIMATE: Moderate and stable. Temperature in winter is 77° F. and 80° F. in summer.

12. JUSTICE: Supreme Court, revolutionary tribunals, people's courts, and municipal courts. Jury system not used.

13. ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS: Six provinces divided into fifty-two regions and 344 municipalities. Each level supervises some local services and public works through means of elected committees.

14. ECONOMY: Basically agricultural, but industry is of increasing importance.

15. EXPORTS: Sugar and nickel are two most important exports. Soviet Union and other Communist countries are main customers.

16. IMPORTS: Capital goods, fuel, and food. Soviet Union and other Communist countries are principal suppliers.

17. FINANCE: Peso is unit of currency; divided into 100 centavos. Official exchange rate as of 1970 was 1 Cuban peso for 1 United States dollar. National Bank of Cuba (Banco Nacional de Cuba) is the only bank in the country and is state owned.

18. COMMUNICATIONS: *Telephone and Telegraph.* Over 200,000 operating telephones in early 1970. Telegraph service provided by the government. *Radio.* 120 AM and 27 FM stations in 1969, all owned by the government. *Television.* Nineteen stations, owned by the government.

19. RAILROADS: Rail system owned by the government. Total track over 11,000 miles, mostly standard-gauge.

20. NAVIGABLE RIVERS: All rivers only navigable for short distances in lower courses.

21. ROADS: About 9,500 miles, mostly unpaved.

22. PORTS AND PORT FACILITIES: Havana, main port for imports; Nuevitas, main export port. Many minor seaports.

23. AIRFIELDS: Sixteen airports with regular domestic flights. Major airport is José Martí Airport at Havana.

24. PRINCIPAL AIRLINES: Cuban Aviation Enterprise, owned by the government, is only domestic airline. Also provides international flights to Mexico City. Iberia Airlines operates between Madrid and Havana. Soviet Union and Czechoslovakian airlines connect Havana with Moscow and Prague.

25. MERCHANT MARINE: Forty-nine vessels as of 1969, with total deadweight tonnage of 370,000 metric tons.

26. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND TREATIES: Numerous economic and cultural agreements with Communist and non-Communist countries. Member of United Nations.

27. AID PROGRAMS: Grants and loans from Soviet Union and other Communist countries totaling over 5 billion Cuban pesos.

28. ARMED FORCES: Army, 90,000 men; navy, over 5,000; air force, 20,000; Civil Defense, 100,000; and Workers' Militia, from 100,000 to 150,000 men.

CUBA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
FOREWORD iii
PREFACE v
COUNTRY SUMMARY vii

SECTION I. SOCIAL

Chapter 1. General Character of the Society 1
2. Physical Environment 9
Geographic Regions—Climate—Soils, Vegetation, and Fauna—Mineral Resources—Transportation
3. Historical Setting 23
Cuba Under Spain: 1511-1898—United States Military Occupation—The Republic Under the Platt Amendment: 1902-34—Independent Cuba: 1934-58—The Revolution Since 1959
4. Population 59
General Characteristics—Population Growth—Patterns of Settlement and Internal Migration
5. Ethnic Groups and Languages 71
Ethnic Groups—Languages—Language and Society
6. Social Structure 91
Background—The New Social Structure—Government-Sponsored Mass Organizations
7. Family 105
Family Life—Family Size—Marriage—Divorce
8. Living Conditions 113
Housing—Sanitation—Health—Social Welfare—Standard of Living and Leisure
9. Education 133
Historical Background—The 1959-69 Period
10. Artistic and Intellectual Expression 157
Intellectual and Literary Currents—The Arts
11. Religion 177
Religious History—Catholicism—Protestantism—Other Religious Communities and Groups—Religious Holidays and Shrines—Charms and Magic
12. Social Values 199
Personal Qualities—Contract and Trust Relationships

SECTION II. POLITICAL

Chapter 13. The Governmental System 209
Constitutional Background—Structure of Government—Local Government
14. Political Dynamics and Values 223
Background—Major Interest Groups—Political Parties—Political Values

15. Foreign Relations 247
Background—Policy Implementation—Cuba and the World—Cuba and Latin America—Relations with the United States—Cuba and the Communist Nations
16. Public Information 261
Press and Publishing—Films—Radio and Television—Propaganda to and from Cuba

SECTION III. ECONOMIC

Chapter 17. Character and Structure of the Economy 289
Role of the Government—Economic Growth
18. Agriculture 299
Land Use and Tenure Patterns—Agricultural Production—Postrevolutionary Agricultural Reorganization and Policy
19. Industry 323
Industrial Organization—Extractive Industries—Manufacturing Industries—Power
20. Labor 349
Organized Labor as a Political Factor—Labor Force—Labor Organization—Working Conditions—Government and Labor
21. Domestic Trade 369
Commerce and Services—Transportation—Communications and Power
22. Foreign Economic Relations 383
Background: Economic Relations with the United States—Trade—Role of the Government—International Agreements and Credit
23. Fiscal and Monetary Systems 401
Government Finance—Public Debt—Banking—Currency and Exchange

SECTION IV. NATIONAL SECURITY

Chapter 24. Public Order and Internal Security 417
The Judicial System—Incidence of Crime—Internal Security Forces—Penal Facilities—Antigovernment Activities
25. The Armed Forces 439
Military Background—The Armed Forces and the Government—Manpower—Mission and Organization of the Armed Forces—Conditions of Service—Rank, Uniforms, and Insignia—Military Justice

BIBLIOGRAPHY 463
GLOSSARY 487
INDEX 489

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure		Page
1	Major Physical Features and Administrative Divisions of Cuba	xii
2	Cuban Sugarcane Area and Production of Sugar by Provinces	303
3	Location of Major Cuban Commercial Crop Production Areas	304
4	Organization Structure of the Cuban Ministry of the Interior	430

LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
1	Selected Demographic Data for Cuba	61
2	Cuban Population for Selected Years	62
3	Ten Largest Cuban Cities and Their Growth Rates, 1966	69
4	Daily Newspapers in Cuba, 1969	267
5	Selected Periodical Publications in Cuba, 1969	270
6	Cuban AM Radio Stations, 1969	281
7	Television Stations in Cuba, 1968	283
8	Production of Major Crops in Cuba, 1951-69	301
9	Cuban Land Use for Selected Years, 1945, 1955, and 1965	309
10	Cuban Metallic Mineral Production, 1953-67	331
11	Cuban Nonmetallic Mineral Production, 1960-66	334
12	Petroleum Production in Cuba, Selected Years, 1951-67	336
13	Power Generation in Cuba, 1955-67	347
14	Cuban Trade for Selected Years, 1958, 1964-68	387
15	Cuban FAR Officer Ranks and Insignia	460

10


84
82
80
GULF OF MEXICO
HAVANA
Sierra del Rosario
Sierra de los Organos
CABANAS
MARIEL
LA HABANA
LA ISABELA
MATANZAS
CARDENAS
SABA
MATANZAS
SANTA CLARA
PINAR DEL RIO
PINAR DEL RIO
Bay of Broa
Gulf of Batabanó
Hanabanilla
LAS VILLAS
GUANE
Cape San Antonio
LA FE
Guanahacabibes Peninsula
Zapata Peninsula
CANARREOS ARCHIPELAGO
CIENFUEGOS
Bay of Pigs
ISLE OF PINES
TRINIDAD
Sierra de Trinidad
Sierra de Sanc
22
20
National Capital
Province Capital
Province Boundary
Mountain Areas
Swamps
0 20 40 80
MILES
CARIBBEAN SEA
GRAND CAYMAN (U.K.)
LESSER C (U.K

11

Figure 1. Major Physical Features and Administrative Divisions of Cuba


80
78
76
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Great Exuma
Long
BAHAMA ISLANDS (U.K.)
ATLANTIC OCEAN
ZAS
CARDENAS
SABANA-CAMAGUEY ARCHIPELAGO
MATANZAS
Sagua la Grande
SANTA CLARA
CAIBARIEN
Hanabanilla
LAS VILLAS
Jatibonico
ROMANO KEY
MORON
CIENFUEGOS
FOMENTO
Agabama
SANCTI SPIRITUS
Bay of Pigs
TRINIDAD
Sierra de Trinidad
Sierra de Sancti Spíritus
CAMAGUEY
NUEVITAS
CAMAGUEY
Sierra del Cristal
GIBARA
Bay of Nipe
Sierra de Nipe
JARDINES DE LA REINA ARCHIPELAGO
Sevilla
Jobabo
VICTORIA DE LAS TUNAS
HOLGUIN
NICARO
ORIENTE
Cauto
Gulf of Guacanayabo
MANZANILLO
BAYAMO
SANTIAGO DE CUBA
GUANT
Sierra Maestra
NICARO
RIBBEAN SEA
GRAND CAYMAN (U.K.)
LESSER CAYMANS (U.K.)
80
78
76


78
76
74
Andros Island
Great Exuma
Long Island
BAHAMA ISLANDS (U.K.)
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Crooked Island
Acklins Island
22
PELAGO
ROMANO KEY
MORON
CAMAGUEY
NUEVITAS
CAMAGUEY
Great Inagua
Sierra del Cristal
GIBARA
Sierra de Nipe
Bay of Nipe
VICTORIA DE LAS TUNAS
HOLGUIN
Jobabo
Sevilla
A REINA
NICARO
MOA
ORIENTE
Cauto
Toa
BARACOA
Cape Maisí
Gulf of Guacanayabo
MANZANILLO
GUANTANAMO
BAYAMO
SANTIAGO DE CUBA
BAITIQUIRI
Cuchillas de Toa
20
Sierra Maestra
NICARO
U.S.NAVAL BASE
78
76
74

SECTION I. SOCIAL

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE SOCIETY

Cuba in early 1970 was the only Communist state in the Western Hemisphere. A revolution, led by Fidel Castro, was successful in 1959 in overthrowing the previous government headed by Fulgencio Batista. At first considered to be democratic, the Revolution soon became socialist, and since 1960 it has moved rapidly toward becoming a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship. Castro is in undisputed control, with most members of the Communist Party of Cuba loyal to him and in support of the communist ideology he has adopted and implanted in Cuba (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values).

The Cuban Revolution has changed the social structure and the economy of the country. The most important changes have been social, such as the extension of public health and education facilities to reach more citizens and the abolition of previous social distinctions. Less successful has been the shift from a private enterprise economic system to a state-controlled economy (see ch. 6, Social Structure; ch. 17, Character and Structure of the Economy).

Columbus discovered Cuba during his first voyage in 1942, and the first Spanish colonists arrived in 1511. From then until it gained its independence in 1898 this island—the largest in the Caribbean which is close to the United States—was governed by Spain. Over half a century of independence, close commercial relations with North America, and several United States political-military interventions have done little to diminish the Spanish roots of this insular society.

From 1933 to 1958 Fulgencio Batista dominated the political scene, either directly as president or indirectly as chief of staff of the army. He was chief of staff from 1934 to 1940 and was in a stronger position than was the president. In 1940 he was elected president and served until 1944. In 1952 he again became president but this time through a coup d état. He attempted to legalize his position by holding elections in 1954 and was reelected (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Batista was opposed by numerous groups, each with its own leader, program, and loyalties. As suppression of the opposition became ruthless, the general populace started to give support to the revolutionary movements. By virtue of his strong personality and appeal, Fidel Castro and his 26th of July Movement soon took over the lead of the revolutionary groups. The violence and terror utilized by Batista's police eventually caused the institutions upon which his government relied, particularly the army, to withdraw their support of him. On January 1, 1959, he fled the country, and in February 1959 Castro became prime minister. Since then Castro has become, in effect, the ruler of the country (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values).

By early 1970 the country had over eleven years of government under the sole leadership of Castro. He was prime minister, first secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba, and commander in chief of the armed forces (see ch. 13, The Governmental System).

There was little challenge to Castro's leadership. The country had a president, Osvaldo Dorticós, but he had no authority. There was a Council of Ministers, which acted both as a cabinet and a legislature, but its members were appointed by the prime minister. The Communist Party played an important role in governing the country. Party membership was estimated at about 1 percent of the population, and its members were found in every important sector of the economy, armed forces, and government. Castro dominated the party, and all key members of the party were under his control (see ch. 13, The Governmental System; ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values).

Originally, the Communist Party had been reluctant to work with Castro when his forces were opposing Batista. It only joined with him when success appeared certain. After he came to power, Castro endeavored to diminish the influence of the old guard Communists in the party who were loyal to the Soviet Union. By the mid-1960s he was successful, and the more important party posts were controlled by so-called Castroite Communists (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values).

The Soviet Union has been responsible for maintaining Cuba's economy and military security since 1961. By early 1970 Cuba had one of the largest and strongest military forces in Latin America. Despite Cuba's dependence upon the Soviet Union, it has withstood Soviet pressure and influence and has been able to maintain a degree of independent action.

In 1962 a confrontation occurred between the United States and the Soviet Union over the stationing of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. The result of the confrontation was the dismantling of the missiles and their return to the Soviet Union.

Partly because of the arrest and imprisonment of some of the old guard Communists, and partly because of Cuban-Soviet disagreement caused by the missile confrontation, relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union have been strained. Relations with Communist China have also been difficult. Castro insisted that Cuba is following its own brand of communism and is not subservient to either the Soviet Union or Communist China (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations).

Castro's efforts to export his Revolution to Latin America and to support dissident groups caused all Latin American nations except Mexico to break diplomatic ties with Cuba by mid-1964. These ties had not been restored by early 1970 (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations).

Since the death of one of Castro's leading aides, Ernesto (Che) Guevara, in Bolivia in 1967, Cuban attempts to encourage guerrilla activities in other countries diminished. In July 1969 and again in April 1970, however, Castro denied that Cuba would adopt a more moderate policy in Latin America and would support "revolutionary process" in any country (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values).

Sugar had always been the mainstay of the economy. Castro, however, with an undisciplined approach to economics, has frequently affected the economy adversely. The two more serious mistakes admitted by Cuban authorities were the decision to diversify agriculture at the expense of sugar and an industrialization campaign without a raw-material base. Sugar was considered to be a symbol of the old economic system and was subject to many price fluctuations in the international market. As a result of the diversification campaign, sugar production dropped by nearly one-third within three years after the Revolution. With regard to industrialization, it was soon discovered that imported raw materials for some of the new factories could cost as much as, or more than, the value of the finished product (see ch. 18, Agriculture; ch. 19, Industry).

The economy was in a state close to anarchy until 1963. Few persons in the government understood the limitations of the country's resources. At the same time disruptions were being caused by the agricultural diversification and industrialization programs, the state was taking over control of the economy and replacing private enterprise with inadequate state management.

Most of the new managers had little or no comprehension of the activities they were to administer. In 1968 the approximately 55,000 remaining small private businesses, such as barbershops and newspaper kiosks, were nationalized, and their owners received a salary from the state instead of depending on profits (see ch. 17, Character and Structure of the Economy).

Two basic agrarian reforms occurred in agriculture. The first, in 1959, limited private ownership of land to 1,000 acres, and the second, in 1963, lowered this limitation to 170 acres. By 1970 almost 70 percent of farmland was owned by the state, the balance being held by cooperatives and small private farmers. The first reform affected the large estates, many of which had been owned by absentee landholders. The second reform, however, affected the medium-sized holdings of an estimated 10,000 farmers. Many of them had been in favor of the Revolution, but the loss of their land has diluted their support (see ch. 18, Agriculture).

Since 1963 the economy has been more adequately controlled with attention being paid to details. Early enthusiasm has been replaced by realistic plans to improve economic growth. Sugar has been restored as the key element of the economy. The grandiose industrialization schemes have been dropped, and industrial growth is now based on light industry and sugar byproducts (see ch. 17, Character and Structure of the Economy; ch. 18, Agriculture; ch. 19, Industry).

There has been a total reorientation of trading relationships. Before 1959 the proximity of the United States had made it the major trading partner. There was no need of warehouse and storage facilities. Since 1959 the Soviet Union has become the prime trading partner, with other East European countries participating in considerable amounts. The need to purchase goods from such distant places well in advance of needs frequently causes distribution problems when the goods arrive and jam the docks at the major seaports (see ch. 21, Domestic Trade; ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations).

All of the country's import needs, however, have not been met by the Communist countries, and considerable trade is carried on with Western European nations. The Soviet Union has been advancing trade credits that are estimated to run between the equivalent of US$350 million and US$400 million annually, as the country constantly faces a shortage of foreign exchange. Export capacity is insufficient to pay for the required imports (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations).

The economy encounters periodic crises. Many goods are rationed; food, clothing, and household articles have been rationed for years. Since 1969 sugar has been subject to rationing. Further, even the hours when one can wait in line for rationed items are controlled. Discontent with the economic situation was evident by 1968 and acknowledged by the country's leaders. The government admitted past errors in directing the economy and emphasized that future investment would be in exploiting the country's natural resources rather than building up new industries. Increased investment was planned for agricultural equipment, cattle breeding, fertilizer, rural roads, irrigation, and the training of agricultural technicians (see ch. 8, Living Conditions).

Castro's popularity partly compensates for the discontent over the scarcity of consumer goods. For the supporters of the regime, the important thing is the rejection of foreign, particularly United States, domination of the economy. With certain exceptions, those persons who want to leave the country are theoretically free to do so, but there are very stringent restrictions on the practice. Over a half million persons had done so by 1969. Most of the persons leaving the country in the latter part of the 1960s did not oppose the regime on political grounds. Instead, they left because they could no longer contend with the conditions of living (see ch. 4, Population; ch. 8, Living Conditions).

The population was estimated at 8.4 million in early 1970, with a growth rate during the mid-1960s of about 2.1 percent annually. Emigration held down what would have been a higher growth rate. Most of the emigrants have come from the middle and upper classes, but a growing number of semiskilled laborers are departing. Departure of the exiles does not seem to politically affect those family members who remain in the country. Compensating partly for the emigration of persons with professional and technical skills has been the arrival of several thousand persons with special skills who are dedicated to revolutionary ideas. They come from many countries and constitute the new international community (see ch. 4, Population).

The most popular reform occurred in education. An adult illiteracy campaign had been largely successful in giving adults the initial step toward acquiring a sixth-grade education. Compulsory basic education for all children is required for the first six grades. New schools have been built in rural areas to accommodate them. Secondary education is not compulsory but is available for anyone who can qualify. Many new specialized schools on the secondary level have been erected. Three universities provide higher education (see ch. 9, Education).

The increase in the number of students has not been met by a corresponding increase in the number of qualified teachers. The problem of inadequate teaching has been increased by the departure of many teachers. The curriculum has been adjusted to conform with the government's political objectives, and many teachers cannot accommodate themselves to the new standards (see ch. 9, Education).

There is no official religion in the country, although about 85 percent of the people consider themselves to be Roman Catholics. About 250,000 persons belong to Protestant churches, and there are a number of smaller religious communities such as the Jehovah's Witnesses. There are also cults of African origin, some of which have incorporated items of Catholic ritual (see ch. 11, Religion).

After several years of restrictions on religious activities, tensions between religious leaders and the government had eased by 1970, and many observers noticed church attendance to be at prerevolutionary levels. Of all Communist governments, Cuba has the best relations with the Vatican (see ch. 11, Religion).

There has been no census taken of the population since 1953, and there is little statistical information available concerning racial composition. The 1953 census reported that nearly 73 percent of the population is white; 12 percent, Negro; 14 percent, mestizo; and less than 1 percent, Oriental. This is no longer believed to be a valid breakdown. There is no significant Indian population despite the designation of the term *mestizo*, which customarily denotes persons of an Indian-Spanish mixture. In Cuba the term means a person of any racial mixture, such as a mulatto. Since 1959 there have been reports of an increase in mixed marriages (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

Most of the white population is of Spanish extraction. Negroes, who originally arrived as slaves, have deeply affected the language, cuisine, music, religion, and culture. From emancipation in 1886 until the 1959 Revolution, Negroes suffered social and economic discrimination but not racial segregation. This discrimination was usually the result of a poorer education (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

The national language is Spanish, but it contains many Cuban idiomatic expressions with a distinctive accent. Native Spanish speakers from other countries usually have some initial difficulty in understanding it. African influence is considered responsible for these special characteristics (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

Class distinctions that existed before 1959 have been changed. Political criteria have tended to become more important than economic and social distinctions. Persons who are in the government bureaucracy and are members of the various government-sponsored national organizations, and administrators of state-owned industries have higher social status than do persons not belonging to such groups. There is a campaign to create what is called a new Communist man: a person who does not think of material rewards, who works selflessly, and who is a revolutionary (see ch. 6, Social Structure).

The government has attempted to equalize general living standards of the entire population. Health and medical facilities have been expanded, and most services are provided free. Laws relating to housing make it possible, theoretically, for every family to eventually own its home or apartment. Tenants pay rent to the state for a number of years, after which they receive title to the property. Social security programs provide benefits to every worker, including a retirement pension. Castro's eventual goal, as stated by him, is an egalitarian, moneyless society with all services and needs provided free (see ch. 8, Living Conditions).

Social and recreational life has changed. Much free time is spent doing volunteer work, such as working in the countryside or helping to carry out activities of national organizations such as the Federation of Cuban Women. Gambling and prostitution are outlawed, and state-owned night clubs and bars are open only three nights a week. The government believes that time taken away from rebuilding the society is wasted (see ch. 6, Social Structure; ch. 7, Family).

The government had not established a firm policy on artistic freedom by early 1970. Many writers and artists of the 1940s and 1950s were still active in the 1960s. Their activities were supervised by a number of state agencies that have the dual functions of granting subsidies and of inducing artists to serve the government. These agencies exercise varying degrees of influence, and most intellectuals are free to express their own ideas as long as the ideas are not considered counterrevolutionary (see ch. 10, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

CHAPTER 2

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

Cuba, the largest and most westerly of the Caribbean Islands, has an area of 44,218 square miles, about half the land area of the West Indies (see fig. 1). Strategically located, the island commands important narrows that are the sea lanes to parts of North and Central America. Many excellent harbors dot the island's deeply embayed coastline and have played an important role in the economic and political life of the area. Cuba was a convenient base for Spanish explorations into Mexico and Florida and a way station for ships returning to Europe via the Gulf Stream, whose current skirts the north shore. Its position gave it prominence in the struggles of the colonial powers for mastery of this part of the Americas and assures it a continuing importance in world politics. It has remained for the most part, however, isolated from trade and political relations in the Western Hemisphere since 1959 and has had to establish new, less convenient trade links with other parts of the world (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 18, Agriculture; ch. 15, Foreign Relations).

It is bounded on the northwest by the Gulf of Mexico, on the north by the Florida Straits, and on the northeast by the old Bahama Channel that separates it from the Bahama Islands. On the east the Windward Passage, 48 miles wide, separates it from Haiti. On the south the Straits of Columbus, 87 miles wide, separate it from Jamaica. On the west the Yucatán Channel, 130 miles wide, separates it from Mexico's Yucatán Peninsula.

Cuba forms part of a chain of partially submerged mountaintops that stretch across the Caribbean, arch down toward South America, and form a continuation of the mountain chain of northern Venezuela and Central America. The geological forces that produced these mountains also produced the Bartlett Deep located just off Oriente Province. The mainland of Cuba is surrounded by numerous islands and keys that form four major groupings: the Colorados Archipelago, north of the province of Pinar del Río; the Sabana-Camagüey Archipelago, north of the provinces of Matanzas, Las Villas, and Camagüey; the Jardines de la Reina Archipelago, south of Camagüey; and the Canarreos Archipelago, which includes the Isle of Pines, the nation's largest satellite island. The two northern archipelagos are bordered on their northern sides by long barrier reefs, 250 miles long in the case of the Sabana-Camagüey

Archipelago. This island chain includes Romano Key (the second largest satellite island), which is important for its hardwood, pastureland, and salt industry. Some of the other islands and keys support a few fishermen and charcoal makers; still others are completely uninhabited. Numerous varieties of fish, sponges, and crustaceans abound in the waters around the islands.

The mainland of Cuba has an overall length of about 745 miles from Cape San Antonio in the west to Cape Maisí in the east. Its average width is about 60 miles, narrowing to 22 miles in the west and widening to 124 miles in the east. Its coastline is about 2,175 miles long. Water backing up into former valleys and riverbeds formed numerous fine harbors and bays such as those at Havana, Mariel, and Cabañas, but much of the submerged land is capped by coral reefs that present great hazards to navigation.

Most of the country's terrain is level or rolling, a condition that has aided the development of a good overland transport system. Because there are so few mountainous areas to complicate the rainfall and temperature patterns, climatic conditions are remarkably similar throughout the country. Most rivers are short and important primarily as sources for water, although a few are navigable in their lower courses. A few others can be harnessed for power generation. Rich and generally well-drained soils, rolling terrain, and a wet-dry pattern of moderate rainfall provide nearly ideal growing conditions for sugar, the mainstay of the island's economy. Only about one-quarter of the island is considered mountainous. There are three separate, relatively low mountain regions; one is located in the most western province of Pinar del Río, another is in the center of the island in Las Villas Province and the third is in Oriente Province. Rich reserves of iron, nickel, copper, chromium, and magnesium are found in these highland regions.

GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS

Cuba is divided administratively into six provinces which are, from west to east, Pinar del Río, La Habana, Matanzas, Las Villas, Camagüey, and Oriente (see ch. 4, Population). The country can be divided into four distinct, though by no means uniform, geographic regions. These regions overlap provincial boundaries. The western region is perhaps the most varied, comprising mountainous areas, stretches of plain, and extensive swamps. The region of Las Villas is mountainous for the most part, although fertile valleys and coastal lowlands break the monotony. The region of Camagüey comprises a vast plain that is especially important for its sugar and cattle. The region of Oriente, rich in mineral resources, is the most mountainous in the country. It contains the renowned Sierra Maestra, the mountain range from which Fidel Castro staged his revolution.

The Western Region

The western region extends from Cape San Antonio to the city of Santa Clara and includes the provinces of Pinar del Río, La Habana, Matanzas, and part of Las Villas. Pinar del Río is one of the most rugged provinces of the country. Two principal mountain ranges, the Sierra de los Organos and the Sierra del Rosario, run virtually its entire length, parallel to the coast and close to the north shore. The highest point is the Pan de Guajaibón in the Sierra del Rosario with an elevation of about 2,400 feet.

The Sierra de los Organos is comprised of limestone mountains heavily eroded and dissolved by surface water to form odd haystack shapes that stand isolated or in groups. Between these mountain forms, called *mogotes*, are fertile valleys, often completely enclosed and accessible only by air, underground caves, or narrow river canyons. Some are more isolated pockets but others, like the Valley of Viñales, attain considerable size and are easily accessible through the mountains. The northern highway from Pinar del Río to Guane passes through several such valleys. The population of the area is largely restricted to the sizable valleys, where soil fertility and easier communications afford good farming conditions. The population in the Sierra del Rosario, just east of the Organos range, is less dense. Valleys in the area have been considered potential zones for coffee production (see ch. 18, Agriculture).

The remaining part of the western region is a large plain that follows the south coast and stretches from Guane to Cienfuegos. The Central Highway runs along this plain just south of the two mountain ranges. This flat or gently rolling terrain constitutes one of Cuba's most important economic assets; it is interrupted by mountains in Las Villas Province but is encountered again farther east in the Camagüey region. Parts of the western plain have soils that are the best in the country for sugarcane. Cuban sugar production was actually initiated on this plain and eventually expanded into the eastern provinces. Tobacco, too, is an important crop in this region. Pinar del Río Province rates first in the quality of the tobacco leaf produced; the most famous comes from the Vuelta Abajo area, near the city of Pinar del Río (see ch. 18, Agriculture). Soils there are for the most part too poor for sugar cultivation, and there has consequently been little competition for their use, in contrast with some other areas—most notably the Partido area south of Havana—where the rich red soils have been largely turned from tobacco to winter vegetables and sugar.

The region contains the city of Havana, the national capital (called La Habana in Spanish). East of Havana, the plain is cut off from the north coast by two hilly regions which stretch into Matanzas Province. Sugarcane is grown in some of the valleys. A small quantity of petroleum is produced at Bacuranao, and various minerals are found at Guanabacoa.

Proceeding east, the great plain follows the south coast as far as the Bay of Broa, but is separated from the ocean by a long narrow belt of thick mangrove swamps. It then continues on to Cienfuegos and the Sierra de Trinidad, skirting the Zapata Peninsula and the swamps on its periphery.

Swamps on the margins of the Zapata Peninsula west of Cienfuegos render much of the area virtually uninhabitable. The center of the peninsula has a higher elevation but is very rocky and hard to penetrate. The Zapata swamp covers about 1,400 square miles of territory, and together with the Zapata Peninsula is one of the most undeveloped areas of the country. The few people who live in the area have traditionally been among the poorest in the country, building their huts on the higher ground and earning their livelihood by producing charcoal from mangrove wood and by hunting crocodiles. Plans for draining the swamp to provide new land for agricultural use, particularly rice cultivation, were being implemented during the 1960s. Playa Girón, on the Bay of Pigs where the ill-fated Cuban exile invasion of 1961 took place, is just east of the Zapata Peninsula. Swamps flank the bay, but the north end is near the more solid, rocky area of the peninsula (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

The Isle of Pines is separated from the mainland by about sixty miles of the shallow Gulf of Batabanó, whose average depth is only fifty feet. Administratively part of La Habana Province, the island is one of the richest townships (*municipios*—see Glossary) in natural resources, yet is one of the least populated. The island has a northern zone of relatively high elevation composed of mineral-rich rock and marble and covered with pine trees, and a southern zone of low elevation composed of limestone and covered with broadleaf forest. The Lanier Swamp stretches across the entire island from west to east and completely isolates the two areas. The southern zone is very sparsely populated by fishermen and producers of charcoal, some of whom came from the British Cayman Islands farther south and speak only English. Since 1959 the government has encouraged the migration of young people to the island to establish what it hopes to be model socialist agricultural communes. The island is also called the Isle of Youth by members of the revolutionary government. The cultivation of citrus fruits, particularly grapefruit, has for decades played a major role in the island's economy, and plans for expanding production have proceeded in the 1960s. The high cost of freight, however, and the isolation of the island from the Cuban mainland have retarded its development.

Region of Las Villas

The geographic region of Las Villas is the second most mountainous area. Its western boundary follows a line running from eastern Matanzas Province to Santa Clara and then southwest to the Bay of Cienfuegos. Its eastern boundary runs approximately from Morón in northern Camagüey southwest to Sancti Spíritus and Trinidad. Besides several hilly regions, this area includes two mountain ranges, the Sierra de Trinidad and the Sierra de Sancti Spíritus. Collectively known as the Escambray, these two ranges are located just north of Trinidad and extend east and west for about fifty miles and about ninety miles inland from the southern coast. The Agabama River flows south to the sea between the two ranges.

Most of the Trinidad mountain area is too rocky or steep to permit anything other than exploitation of mountain forests. Some coffee, corn, vegetables, and fruit are grown in the small and isolated mountain terraces, but cacao cultivation, which was formerly practiced, has been abandoned. Sugarcane is grown in the larger river valleys, among them the very fertile Agabama Valley and the Valley of Trinidad. Sugar once formed the principal wealth of Trinidad, but the city's geographic isolation eventually favored other ports.

The Sancti Spíritus mountains, located just east of the Trinidad mountains across the Agabama Valley, are lower and more undulating. The clay soil is very fertile, supporting tobacco, sugarcane, and minor produce. The Sancti Spíritus area is also one of the major cattle regions.

North of the Escambray is a long chain of hills that generally parallels the north coast for about 125 miles between the Sagua la Grande River to the west and the town of Morón to the east. Sugarcane is grown everywhere in this area, but tobacco is also grown in the higher valleys. In fact, the tobacco produced in the Remedios zone surpasses in quantity that of any other region, but is poorer in quality than that of the Vuelta Abajo area of Pinar del Río.

Region of Camagüey

The region of Camagüey consists of a vast plain stretching from the Sancti Spíritus mountains and the Jatibonico del Sur River in the west, to a line connecting the Gulf of Guacanayabo with the Bay of Nipe. Fertile red limestone soils formed by ancient marine deposits cover much of this plain that is an extension of the great western plain; however, a band of relatively infertile soils is found on the interior central plain. The widest and most populated part of the Camagüey plain is located west of Camagüey and extends from coast to coast. Known as the Plain of La Trocha, it assumed importance as a sugar region only after the sugar boom of World War I, when virgin forests were cut down to make room for cane. The large sugar mills of La Trocha were built almost entirely between 1915 and 1921.

Near the city of Camagüey the flat terrain gives way to the Sierra de Cubitas on the north and the Sierra de Najasa on the southeast, both low mountain ranges. The Sierra de Cubitas contains large caverns where deposits of bat manure have been exploited since 1926. Other hilly regions extend to the east.

The main Camagüey plain splits into two branches as it meets the somewhat higher central plain around the city of Camagüey. The northern branch extends east to Gibara; the southern branch extends east to the Sevilla River and the Jobabo River. Both areas have fertile soils covered with patches of forest. These, however, are not nearly as extensive as the great forests of the past that were cut down to make way for sugarcane. The southern branch is devoted almost entirely to cane, whereas the northern branch also supports bananas and coconuts.

The part of the central plain with the poorest soils, from Camagüey to Victoria de las Tunas, supports grasslands that are ideal for cattle. Since colonial times the Camagüey savanna has been the principal cattle-breeding region. The soils of the central plain improve and become greatly varied farther east, supporting the cultivation of cane, tobacco, corn, beans, and a variety of other products.

Region of Oriente

The geographic region of Oriente comprises all of Cuba east and south of the depression that stretches from the Gulf of Guacanayabo to the Bay of Nipe. It is the country's most mountainous region and contains Cuba's largest river, the Cauto, which rises in the Sierra Maestra and flows for about 140 miles north and west to the Gulf of Guacanayabo.

The Sierra Maestra, the country's highest and most rugged mountain range, actually made up of several chains, extends along the southern coast of Oriente as far as the Guantánamo basin. The country's highest mountain, Turquino Peak (about 6,500 feet high) is located in this range. Slopes are so steep along the southern coastal side that little can be grown on them. To the north, especially approaching the Cauto River valley, the descent is more gradual. Some of the rivers, like the Cautillo (little Cauto), support a flourishing agriculture in the lower valleys. The populated areas of the Sierra Maestra are found mostly on the north side where rain is more abundant, the slopes less steep, and the land more fertile.

The Sierra Maestra has rich mineral resources including copper, manganese, and iron. The mountain chain has also figured prominently as a natural fortress. The rugged terrain and impenetrable forests were a factor in protecting the Castro forces from government troops. By the same token the Revolutionary government has been well aware that these mountains are a potential base for counterrevolutionary activity and has paid particular attention to the special needs of the area.

The Baracoa region, east of a line running between Nicaro to the north and Guantánamo to the south, is made up of several mountain groups whose rugged relief and thick, tangled vegetation make overland transportation into the area extremely difficult. Baracoa, on the coast, is consequently the most isolated city on the island.

Steplike terraces along the coast near Cape Maisí are often perforated with caves in which remains of Taíno and Siboney Indians can sometimes be found (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). Water is not held by the porous soils, and it escapes to enormous underground caverns. Local farmers either collect rainwater in large tanks or use natural cisterns for water storage.

The Cuchillas de Toa mountains are rich in chrome and iron, and their excellent soils, combined with sufficient altitude, provide a good environment for growing coffee. The Toa River may ultimately become a major source of power for exploiting the mineral riches of the Cuchillas de Toa. Its flow is considerable, especially during the rainy season, and it descends very abruptly from its mountain source to its outlet near Baracoa.

West of the Cuchillas are the Sierra del Cristal, named for its quartz deposits, and the Sierra de Nipe, noted for its wealth in pine forests, sugarcane, and minerals. The high region contains one of the world's richest iron deposits.

The Oriente region also contains five areas of low terrain: the area just south of the Bay of Nipe; the Central Valley; the Cauto Plain; and the large bays of Santiago de Cuba and Guantánamo. Most of the area between the Bay of Nipe and the foothills of the Sierra de Nipe is planted in cane, but the rich clay soils also favor tobacco and coffee cultivation.

The Central Valley, composed of low foothills and traversed by several rivers, joins Guantánamo Bay to the Cauto Plain and the flatlands of the west. About sixty miles in length, it is an important means of communication to Guantánamo and Santiago de Cuba, which are otherwise surrounded by mountains; both the Central Highway and a railroad go through the valley. Economically the region is important for manganese deposits, sugarcane, which grows well in the fertile alluvial soils, and coffee, which grows in the higher altitudes.

The depressions of Santiago de Cuba and of Guantánamo on the south coast are surrounded by the peaks of the Sierra Maestra and connected to the Central Valley by narrow mountain passes. The sea has invaded the bottom of the depressions to form excellent harbors. The depression of Santiago de Cuba is about nineteen miles long and nine miles wide; the bay itself is six miles long and two miles wide, with a very narrow mouth. The city of Santiago de Cuba, one of the largest urban centers of Cuba, thrives on commerce and industry made attractive by the excellent harbor. Soils in the area are poor and not suitable for agriculture. The region is susceptible to earthquakes; a particularly severe one occurred in 1932. The Guantánamo depression, part of which is occupied by the United States Naval Base, is larger than that of Santiago de Cuba, being about twenty-five miles long and fifteen miles wide. It is made up of several levels. The lower level was invaded by the sea and forms the floor of Guantánamo Bay. On the edge of the bay, clay soils support sugarcane, and in the highest parts of the basin coffee is grown. Lack of rainfall along parts of the southern coast, which are in the rain shadow of mountains to the north and east, make the area south of the city of Guantánamo the country's driest region. The southern part of the Guantánamo depression is especially arid and is covered with large cactuses. Conditions are ideal for evaporating sea water to produce salt and, consequently, most of the Cuba's salt production comes from this area.

The Cauto Plain takes up most of the western part of the Oriente region. The city of Bayamo, located on the plain, is the center of one of the richest cattle regions. Although sugar and cattle form the principal wealth of the Cauto Plain, rice cultivation has become increasingly important. It is grown along the Cauto River between Manzanillo and Bayamo.

CLIMATE

The surrounding waters give the country a moderate and stable climate. The mean temperature is about 77° F. in the winter and 80° F. in the summer. July and August, the hottest months of the year, register a median temperature of only slightly over 80° F.

The island lies in the trade-wind belt and receives breezes from the northeast in summer and from the southeast in winter. The land surface heats and cools faster than the surface of the ocean, creating perpetual breezes that further moderate the climate.

Cuba has two distinct seasons based on rainfall. The rainy season lasts from May to October inclusive, August being the month of least rain. During the rainy season there are almost daily afternoon downpours, especially inland. The dry season lasts from November through April, with December and February being the driest months. Average rainfall ranges from about 8 inches in June to 1½ inches in February.

The fact that most of the country is flat or rolling serves to reduce the overall rainfall by affording few cool higher areas where rain-bearing winds are induced to shed their moisture. Cuba, in fact, receives less rain than most other areas of the same latitude. The average yearly rainfall is about fifty-five inches, but it may vary critically from year to year. For example, in 1967 and 1968 one of the worst droughts of the twentieth century hit the country. It was particularly severe in the three eastern provinces where most of the sugarcane is grown and was a factor in the reduced harvest of 1968. In other years too much rain has produced floods. There are also local variations in rainfall. Of the six provinces, Pinar del Río usually receives the most rain and, in general, less rain falls as one progresses east. One exception to this is found just west of Baracoa in Oriente Province, where the mountains are high enough to induce greater precipitation during the summer months.

The most notable and destructive feature of the climate is the tropical hurricanes that hit the island, most frequently in August, September, and October. Pinar del Río and La Habana provinces usually suffer most, especially on their south coasts where wind-driven flood waves sweep over the low coastline. Two major hurricanes that struck the island in the fall of 1963 and the fall of 1966 did extensive damage to the sugarcane and coffee crops of Oriente and Camagüey provinces. On the whole, however, hurricanes are fewer and less severe as one progresses east.

SOILS, VEGETATION, AND FAUNA

The soils are for the most part varied and fertile. Of eight soil groups, only three are not being cultivated; these are the thin soils on steep slopes, very rocky soils, and the peat soils of offshore islands, including parts of the Isle of Pines.

Only a few soil types occur over extensive areas. Among these is the Matanzas red clay, which covers much of the plain in the western region and in Camagüey; it is the best type of soil for sugarcane. The sandy soils such as are found in the central plain of Camagüey are poor for crops unless abundantly fertilized, but support grasses for cattle.

The most varied soil types are found around Holguín and support the mixed agriculture of the region. Sandy clays are found in the western region and make the best soils for tobacco. Heavy gray clay comprises most of the watershed of the Cauto River and makes good sugarcane soil. In mountainous areas, very fertile soils are found in the river valleys. In the plain of Manacas north of Cienfuegos the sandy soil is so porous it holds little water, and the vegetation is of a drought-resistant type. In the mountains of Pinar del Río, the Isle of Pines, and the Sierra de Nipe, the soil is thin and poor—containing sand, gravel, and limonite—but is well suited to pine trees.

An estimated 8,000 species of trees and plants grow on the island, making it a natural botanical garden. The island lies in the path of tropical hurricanes and of North and South American bird migrations, both of which facilitate the dispersal of seeds. Native plants include tobacco, pineapple, and yucca.

Cultivated plants introduced into the country have replaced a large part of the original vegetation; of these sugarcane is the most important. Other nonnative cultivated plants include bananas, potatoes, coffee, rice, mangoes, and several types of citrus fruit. A most unfortunate introduction was the *marabú* plant, of South African origin, which has choked hundreds of square miles of good pasture and farmland. Efforts to eradicate it have not been entirely successful because it is a hardy plant. Destructive methods have been severe, and they erode the soil cover.

Many wild plants are of great economic usefulness, especially the varied species of palms that are particularly important to rural dwellers. Palms provide thatch for houses; fibers for hats, shoes, and ropes; and food for swine. Other important wild trees are the mangrove, from which charcoal is often produced, and the guava.

Before the Spanish conquest, forests covered about 60 percent of the island. Now they cover less than 10 percent and are found almost entirely in the mountain zones of Pinar del Río, Las Villas, and Oriente provinces. The government has put some emphasis on reforestation projects, particularly of economically important trees, such as the coconut palm, eucalyptus, and Caribbean pine.

Forests used to grow on the red soils of Cuba's large plains from Pinar del Río to Camagüey, but they were destroyed to make way for sugarcane. Because of the wet-dry aspect of climate, most forests are semideciduous. Only in parts of the region of Baracoa, where the rains do not follow the same pattern as in the rest of the island, are broadleaf evergreen forests to be found.

Savannas cover much of the country. Depending upon the soil type, they support different species of grasses, low vegetation, and small trees. Sandy savannas cover large parts of Pinar del Río Province north and south of the Sierra de los Organos, the Manacas Plain of Las Villas, and other smaller regions. Water seeps too rapidly to allow luxuriant growth, but permits grasses, scrub, and many varieties of palm trees to flourish. Serpentine savannas composed of grasses and shrubs can be found around Santa Clara, Camagüey, and Holguín. The more extensive clay savanna is the most fertile and water-retaining land. Formerly covered by luxuriant forest, it now supports crops of sugarcane, bananas, grain, and vegetables.

Cuba has approximately 30 species of mammals, 300 species of birds, 100 species of reptiles, 30 species of amphibians, 1,000 species of fish, 300 species of spiders, 12,000 species of insects, and

4,000 species of mollusks. There are no large game mammals, carnivorous animals, or dangerously venomous reptiles. The surrounding waters have many varieties of commercially valuable fish, sea turtles, and crocodiles.

MINERAL RESOURCES

The country is endowed with significant deposits of nickel, iron, copper, chrome, manganese, tungsten, and asphalt. Despite extensive investigation no major petroleum deposits have been discovered, though some minor deposits do exist and are being exploited (see ch. 19, Industry). Very extensive low-grade nickel deposits are found around Nicaro and Moa on the north coast of Oriente Province. These deposits could potentially supply a good proportion of the world's nickel requirements if extensively worked. In the 1960s nickel replaced declining tobacco exports as the second most valuable after sugar.

The Sierra de Nipe contains one of the most extensive iron ore deposits in the world, but the country has not been able to exploit it adequately, partly because of poor technology and a lack of coal. Coal is found near Camagüey, Guantánamo and Mayarí, but its inferior grade does not warrant mining.

Copper is extracted in minor quantities from mines in Pinar del Río and is also found near Cumanayagua, Fomento, and Sancti Spíritus, in the Sierra Maestra, and on the Zapata Peninsula. Important deposits of manganese are found in the Sierra Maestra, in the Sierra de los Organos, and in Las Villas Province. Other minerals include: chrome, a scarce metal found in unusual abundance in Cuba but mined only to a limited extent; tungsten, which is exploited on the Isle of Pines; marble, an important resource of the Isle of Pines and other islands; and asphalt, which is found all over the island but is not extensively exploited. Salt is evaporated from sea water at Guantánamo, Baitiquirí and La Isabela.

In the late 1960s the country's oil production amounted to less than 5 percent of her consumption, but there was hope that this proportion could be increased (see ch. 19, Industry). Attention was being given by joint Cuban-Soviet Union teams to searches for petroleum deposits along the north coast.

TRANSPORTATION

For many years Cuba had one of the best transportation systems in Latin America (see ch. 21, Domestic Trade). The narrowness of the island, which permits no place to be far from the sea, the rolling or level terrain, the many excellent harbors that dot the coastline, and the international interest in sugar are all elements that contributed to the development of the island's transport system.

The transport system deteriorated in the early 1960s, largely as a result of short-term economic dislocations and the unavailability of spare vehicle parts. The entire transportation system is currently owned by the government and administered by the Ministry of Transport. Nevertheless, the system retains many of the characteristics that it exhibited before 1959, when many of its parts were privately owned and operated.

Before the advent of rail and road systems, much intraisland trade and communication was facilitated by the presence of the good natural harbors. Small items of trade could be hauled over trails and cart roads from the harbors to interior parts without too much difficulty. Because of impenetrable mountainous terrain, the Baracoa region in Oriente Province still depends to a large extent upon coastal shipping for its trade requirements. Since the development of adequate overland transport routes, however, most ports have been engaged primarily in international trade. Havana, with its excellent pouch-shaped harbor and harbor facilities, docks, and warehouses, handles the largest overall volume of trade, but it ranks second to Nuevitas in northeast Camagüey Province as a port of exit. Many other ports handle significant amounts of import and export produce. Thus the nation does not rely on only a few ports but coordinates use of its good natural harbors with overland transport to agricultural hinterlands to provide the most convenient means for moving goods.

The advent of large-scale international trade in sugar naturally required an expansive system and sophisticated methods for overland transport. Aided by the generally level terrain, the rail system began to develop in earnest after the turn of the century when the sugar industry began its period of greatest expansion. New railroad track served to open up hitherto undeveloped lands in Camagüey and Oriente. Public service railways handled both passenger service and general freight, but transport of sugar was and is still master of the railways. The rail system is not entirely national in character. It was developed as and remains rather more a collection of local systems of narrow-gauge track, each designed to serve the area of a few plantations or state farms and to carry the produce of the sugar mills to nearby ports. Nevertheless, public service railroads do stretch the entire length of the island; branch lines connect with coastal areas.

The highway network is also relatively well developed and serves the nation adequately. Built between 1927 and 1931, the Central Highway runs for more than 700 miles from Pinar del Río to Santiago de Cuba. It serves as the chief connecting link between the major cities of the island. Secondary roads connect lesser towns with the Central Highway except in the Baracoa region. An inadequate system of farm-to-market roads, however, has served to isolate certain rural areas, particularly in Camagüey and Oriente provinces, preventing produce from being marketed easily.

The nation has good facilities for domestic and international air travel. Good overland and sea communications have limited the need for any significant air cargo system. Many cities all over the island are served by domestic flights. International travel within the Western Hemisphere, however, has been severely restricted since 1962. Nevertheless, so-called mercy flights ferry refugees almost daily from Cuba to the United States. Most other flight connections are between Havana and Madrid, Mexico City, Prague, and Moscow.

CHAPTER 3

HISTORICAL SETTING

In 1969 Cuba was under the control of Castro and a "socialist" government that came to power as a result of the Revolution of 1959. Undertaken with the professed intention of ousting Fulgencio Batista from power and restoring constitutional rule, the Revolution accomplished the first aim but abandoned the second. Instead, a major transformation of the society was instituted that turned control of the economy and other, formerly private, endeavors over to the state. Support came primarily from what had been the lower classes, groups that before had been on the margins of political life.

Throughout its recorded history Cuba has been ruled by or dependent upon outside powers. The Revolution did little to change this. As relations with the United States worsened in the 1960s, Cuba turned increasingly to the Soviet Union for economic and political support. Governed by Spain from 1511 to 1898, it was one of the first colonies in the New World to be established by Spain and the last to be lost. Cuba gained its independence from Spain in 1898 with the aid of the United States, but the country was then placed under a United States military government for four years. Cuba formally became independent in 1902, but the United States retained the right to intervene in Cuba to protect the island's sovereignty and to preserve public order until 1934. Between 1934 and the Revolution of 1959 Cuba was politically independent, but the United States continued to exert much influence because of its strategic interests and because of the large American investments in the island.

During the long period of Spanish rule, Spanish political and social institutions were transferred to Cuba, and the pattern of its export economy was shaped. Spanish law and policy kept the government highly centralized and, along with trade, in the hands of Spaniards. Virtually no industry was developed. Sugar and, to a lesser extent, tobacco were the major crops.

Cuba did not join the general Latin American colonial revolution early in the nineteenth century. Later in the century, however, political development centered on the growing nationalist movement demanding either autonomy within the Spanish Empire or complete independence.

At the end of the United States occupation in 1902 the Cubans instituted a republican form of government and adopted a constitution that provided for a democratic form of government. Political history in the twentieth century, however, was characterized by recurrent rebellion arising from political rivalries, having only tangential relationship to social or economic questions. The economy became increasingly dependent on the export of sugar and subject therefore to the wild fluctuations in the world sugar market. Foreign private investment, most of it from the United States, increased tremendously. The United States intervened numerous times in Cuba, under the authority of the Platt Amendment.

The world economic depression of the 1930s hit Cuba particularly hard. Political life changed, and there was a growth of new attitudes toward the role and responsibilities of government. The year 1933 marked a major turning point, when the repressive government of Gerardo Machado was overthrown. The following year the United States abrogated the Platt Amendment. After 1933 political aspirants paid heed to public demand for social change, although they failed to accomplish many changes.

From 1933 to 1958 the political scene was dominated by Batista, who rose to prominence in the chaos that followed the overthrow of Machado. Like most of his contemporaries he was a nationalist and accepted the idea that the government must play a larger role than before in regulating economic life. After eight years in which some halting progress was made in instituting reform in some areas, Batista returned to power in 1952 by coup d'état; his return proved a major setback to political development. Although opposition to his regime was disorganized, Batista was unable to create a wholly successful structure of support. With his increasing reliance on police powers, his support dwindled; groups, formerly acquiescent, moved into the opposition.

In Castro, who from 1956 to 1958 gradually came to lead the opposition, a great many Cubans of almost all classes thought they had found a leader who could not only defeat Batista but could also accomplish essential reforms. Soon after he took over in 1959, however, Castro turned his back on the promised return to constitutional government and instituted a radical change in the country's economy. The government undertook a program of nationalization that eventually led to a break in economic and political relations with the United States, state control of the economy, and increasing dependence on the Soviet Union as a crucial trading partner and provider of economic aid. Many of Castro's early supporters, particularly those in the middle and upper classes, soon became disillusioned and fled the country. The break with the United States and the alliance with the Soviet Union led to several crises of international proportions.

CUBA UNDER SPAIN: 1511—1898

Columbus landed on Cuba during his first voyage in 1492, but the colony was not established until 1511. The first Cuban settlers gradually were drawn by the greater promise of the new regions of Central and South America, leaving Cuba an underpopulated, unimportant part of the empire until the late eighteenth century, when an era of economic expansion was ushered in. The population increased rapidly, and the growth of coffee and sugar plantations made the island an asset to, rather than a drain on, the imperial exchequer. The nineteenth century was witness to two prolonged developments: the independence movement, which culminated in 1902; and the tremendous expansion of the sugar industry, which relied on the United States for both its markets and investment capital.

Early Importance of Cuba: 1511—40

Columbus's son, Diego, was governor of Hispaniola; he sent the expedition led by Diego Velázquez to take Cuba in 1511, but Velázquez had relative freedom in organizing a government. Velázquez and his followers landed at Baracoa on the eastern end of the island and moved west, taking the land peacefully or by conquest according to the nature of the Indians encountered (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). Many Indians fought and were killed or enslaved. Some fled to the hills or to offshore islands from which they harassed the Spanish settlements for years. Most, however, were settled farmers who had little means for combat and who were easily brought under control.

Velázquez's first organization of government and economic institutions was modeled on the experience of Hispaniola in adapting Spanish institutions to the colony. He divided the island into seven municipalities. In each he appointed a council (*cabildo*) consisting of three councilors (*regidores*) and two mayors (*alcaldes*). The new officials divided land and Indian laborers among the colonists. All allotments and official appointments were made upon the basis of the individual's investment of capital and risk in the venture of conquest. The recipients of land grants (*vecinos*) had full rights of participation in municipal affairs. The early Spanish emigrants sought gold, of which there was an easily accessible, if not large, supply in Cuba. Apart from mining, the main occupation was stockraising. Although many crops were introduced from Spain, farming was neither as profitable nor as prestigious.

The Spanish crown assumed the responsibility for protecting the Indians from undue exploitation in the interests of converting them to Christianity. The system adopted in Cuba and throughout the empire came to be known as the *encomienda*. Indians were assigned to lots (*encomiendas*) of from 40 to 200, and in return the colonists were required to treat the Indians well and instruct them in religion. Despite precautions, however, the Indian population rapidly declined.

Spanish administrative policies were formed during the first half of the sixteenth century when much of Central and South America was added to the realm. They reflected the two main interests of the crown, wealth and the propagation of Catholicism. According to mercantilist theory, accepted by all the European colonialist powers, a country's major economic objective was to ensure a favorable balance of trade. The Spanish colonies, therefore, were permitted to trade only with Spain and were valued primarily for the wealth, especially gold, that they dispatched to Spain in taxes and in the purchase of necessary goods. The Spanish monarchs were equally interested in the propagation of the Christian faith. A great deal of the early political conflict between the crown and the colonies arose from conflict between the dual Spanish interest in exploiting the Indians in the interest of wealth and protecting them in the interest of religion.

The institutions of colonial government were devised to protect the interests and responsibilities of the crown. The Royal Council of the Indies was the highest authority in drawing up colonial legislation, appointing officials, and hearing appeals from colonial courts. Checks to prevent either deviation from crown instruction or abuses of privilege were provided mainly by judicial processes, by appeal to higher authority, or by the judicial investigation (*residencia*) that marked the end of every major official's tenure.

The elaborate system, intended to ensure control of an empire whose distance from Spain facilitated evasion of the royal will, did not always function as intended. In Cuba the institutions of government ranged from the councils of the municipalities to the island governor and treasury officials. Either directly or indirectly, depending on the issue, island government was responsible to the councils in Spain and to the crown.

The first municipal councils actively sought greater autonomy. For a short time each elected a representative to meet annually at Santiago to consult on island affairs. Several times they directly petitioned the Council of Indies and the king, but these early privileges were lost as government became more centralized. Social and political position and access to wealth depended mainly on retaining favor with higher officials.

Economic decline, however, brought about the eclipse of Cuba. The gold supply was quickly exhausted. The Indian population steadily declined because of disease and maltreatment. Although the first Negro slaves were imported in 1517, their numbers were not sufficient to prevent a labor shortage. The expedition of Cortez to Mexico, in 1519, was organized in Cuba and drew heavily for participants on the Spanish population. By the mid-sixteenth century the population had declined to about 1,200 Spaniards, about 3,000 Indians, and a few slaves.

Decline, Isolation, and Piracy: 1540—1762

The island's chief importance to Spain lay in its position at the entrance to the Gulf of Mexico, whose shores were all Spanish territory, and as an outpost against impinging Portuguese, French, and English interests in the Caribbean. Visits by foreign ships were usually welcomed by the colonists, who bought smuggled slaves and European products at prices well below those charged by Spain. The same smugglers, however, often turned raiders, either on their own initiative or because they were in the employ of a government currently at war with Spain in Europe.

Against these threats the Spanish crown, in the mid-sixteenth century, devised the fleet system for protecting its commerce. Havana increasingly supplanted Santiago as the commercial center of the island. The capital was officially transferred to Havana in 1589, and from the late sixteenth century, island governors usually were military men with the title of captain general. The captains general constructed the great fortresses that still guard the entrances to Havana and Santiago harbors.

Internally, Cuba remained economically underdeveloped and suffered the political problems found throughout seventeenth-century Latin America. Stockraising remained as the principal occupation. Some copper had been mined in the sixteenth century, and some food crops were raised for domestic consumption. Hides and tallow were major exports.

The successive captains general varied greatly in talent and in degree of corruption; each was the subject of accusations at the end of his three- or four-year tenure. Most subordinate officials were not salaried but received their income from certain property or a proportion of fees of various kinds. As was true in the rest of the empire, most of these offices were sold, as were the rights to collect various taxes. Although the political system was corrupt, the island was not prosperous enough for the accumulation of great fortunes. Offices were sought as much for their social benefits as for revenue.

Throughout the period the Church added moral and spiritual sanction to the dictates of government and provided, as well, nearly all existing social services. By the seventeenth century, many orders, including Franciscans, Dominicans, and Jesuits, were represented. They maintained hospitals, cared for orphans, and gave rudimentary education to children. Some students went on to universities abroad, usually in Santo Domingo or Mexico.

During the eighteenth century Cuba gradually became more prosperous. Piracy abated and immigration of Spaniards gave impetus to new agricultural pursuits, particularly in tobacco. Sugar cultivation was also expanded. Although it was first planted early in the sixteenth century, sugar did not become an important crop until the eighteenth century.

With the increased production of tobacco and sugar, the breakup of the enormous cattle ranches was begun; this process continued well into the nineteenth century. The founding of the Navy Yard at Havana in 1723 gave a boost to the city's economy. But smuggling continued and the colonists chafed under the repressive trade policies of the crown. Early in the eighteenth century, there were three unsuccessful revolts against the crown's enforcement of a monopoly on tobacco exports.

The Seven Years' War (1756–63) between Great Britain and France, in which France was aided by Spain, opened a new era in Cuba. The British captured Havana in 1762. Their occupation lasted only ten months, but trade restrictions were relaxed; the opening of the North American markets rapidly expanded trade. The Treaty of Paris returned Cuba to Spain in exchange for Florida; but the impact of the defeat on the Spanish crown, followed by the rapid succession of revolutionary changes in North America, France, and Latin America during the next sixty years created a new society in Cuba.

Growth and Prosperity: 1763–1823

The accession of Charles III of Spain (1759–88) inaugurated a period of governmental reform and intellectual freedom in Spain. French advisers influenced many administrative changes and introduced the intellectual currents of the French Enlightenment. Charles III effected major changes in colonial administration. Thousands of sixteenth-century decrees were amended by new laws. His reforms were intended to both tighten the administrative system and prevent the abuses that drained revenue from the royal treasury. The intendancy system was first tried in Havana in 1764. The intendant, second in rank to the captain general, was appointed to oversee the two departments of treasury and war. His primary function was to enforce trade laws, collect revenues, and encourage all agricultural and other economic measures that would increase prosperity and revenue.

The new system was implemented at the same time that trade restrictions were liberalized, and the effect was the intended

38

increase in prosperity. The monopoly on the import of slaves was abolished in 1791; some products were freed of import duties, and Havana and Santiago were opened for free trade within the Spanish Empire. Early in the nineteenth century the monopoly on tobacco was abolished, and for a time prohibitive restrictions on trade with foreigners were removed. Incentives were offered to encourage immigration. New immigrants from Europe, French from Martinique and Haiti, and Spanish refugees from the revolutions elsewhere in Latin America made possible the rapid economic development of the period.

The new immigration particularly favored development of the coffee and sugar industries. Tobacco production declined after reaching a peak in 1788. The American Revolution, however, greatly increased the North American market for coffee and sugar. A major technical innovation, the introduction of steam-powered mills in 1819, gave impetus to the tremendous expansion of sugar cultivation and the development of larger estates in the following years. Coffee production also increased rapidly until 1833, after which it declined.

The labor demands of the growing sugar and coffee industries caused a tremendous increase in the importation of slaves. Since the sixteenth century, slaves from West Africa had been imported regularly in small numbers. The trade expanded rapidly after 1790, reaching a peak in 1817. In that year Spain agreed by treaty with Great Britain to prohibit further trade in slaves after 1820. Although the number imported declined, the treaty was not enforced.

The liberalism of the reign of Charles III and the prosperity that resulted in Cuba were reflected in the development of a more lavish social life and of Cuban interest in the intellectual ferment of Europe. The increasing slave population and free colored population and the immigration of Spaniards without means or status contributed to the perpetuation of a sharply stratified society. But wealthy Spaniards enjoyed a leisurely pursuit of social and cultural activities.

A number of unusually capable Spanish officials encouraged the establishment of cultural societies modeled on those in Spain. The new organizations quickly became the centers of intellectual life. Patriotic societies were founded in the 1790s. The Economic Society of Friends of the Country (Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País), founded in 1795, remained the focus of economic and political liberalism through most of the nineteenth century.

The economic society underwrote technical experiments and publications, particularly on agriculture, and sponsored much of the educational reform of the period. It assumed the direction of a number of "free schools," usually endowed by private bequest and on occasion aided by the government. The economic society also continually sought greater freedom of trade for Cuba.

After the French Revolution the crown increasingly saw absolutism as the only defense against complete loss of power. When the reforms were not forthcoming, the Spanish American colonial revolution began in Argentina, Peru, and Venezuela.

The Spanish government did promise political reforms, including colonial representation in the Spanish legislature. Three Cubans participated in drawing up the Spanish Constitution of 1812, which became the symbol of liberal hopes for the rest of the century. On the issue of slavery, however, the Cubans and others successfully opposed the abolitionist proposals of Spanish liberals.

Political developments in Cuba thereafter closely followed the bitter conflict between the liberals and conservatives in Spain. Upon his restoration after the defeat of Napoleon in 1814, King Ferdinand VII abrogated the Constitution of 1812. The revolutionary wave swept the colonies, and by 1823 only Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines were left in the Spanish Empire.

The king was forced by the Spanish Revolution of 1820 to readopt the 1812 constitution, and for three years the Cubans again elected representatives; but absolutism was soon reestablished, and Ferdinand was freed of constitutional restrictions. In Cuba the liberal era was over.

During this period there had been several small groups who were actively working toward independence from Spain. Despite their limited support and the ineffectiveness of their actions, they early defined the main characteristics of the independence movement that were to develop in the second third of the nineteenth century. Their experiences were repeated many times during the next fifty years.

Leadership in the independence movement tended to come from the intellectuals, and during the long struggle for reform the country produced two generations of prominent men who were at once poets, philosophers, teachers, publicists, and conspirators. They were deeply committed to educational reform. Freedom of education from state or clerical control became a major issue. Nationalism was anticlerical in reaction against the close alliance of the government and the Church.

The *criollos* (persons born in Cuba but of Spanish ancestry—see Glossary) were loath to give up hope that liberalism would triumph in Spain. Moreover, each attempt at revolt and, to a lesser extent, any attempt at reform raised the spectre of race conflict. *Criollo* fear of the Negro majority and the problems of coping with a revolution on an island effectively prevented Cuban unity; only years of increasingly despotic government, a decline in the general prosperity of the early part of the century, and the emancipation of the slaves gradually augmented the number of firm advocates of independence.

Reaction, Revolution, and Sugar: 1824–98

By the middle of the nineteenth century all distinctions between civil, military, and fiscal authority had been removed. Under the governor general were provincial governors, intendants, and lieutenant governors of districts; all were Spaniards, and each was vested with military, administrative, and some judicial authority. For the Cubans the turning point was the administration of Governor Miguel Tacón (1834–38). Although he made a number of improvements, he earned the undying hatred of the people. During his tenure liberal hopes were repeatedly raised and dashed, and arrogance compounded every injury. After his administration the political lines drawn prevailed throughout most of the century. Social communication between Spaniard and *criollo* virtually ceased, and Cuban girls no longer regarded marriage to a Spaniard as the main step toward social advancement.

The *criollos* were united in their opposition to Spanish despotism and corruption in the government, but were divided into reformists and radicals according to the degree of change they considered necessary. The reformists, or autonomists, desired Cuban self-government within the empire. The radicals, or separatists, generally desired complete independence, although a few were interested in annexation to the United States.

The autonomists included most of the leading intellectual and literary figures in the country and were active in the Sociedad Económica and the education movement. Prominent Cubans served also on the Board of Public Works and on the Board of Public Instruction, which administered the public schools founded after 1841. In the 1850s, however, after the first insurrections had occurred and failed, government became more reactionary, and the boards were reduced to advising the governor-general.

In the years before the American Civil War, the question of Cuban separatism was complicated by the slavery issue, both in Cuba and in the United States. The first insurrections were carried out by those Cubans who wanted annexation to the United States in order to obtain the desired political liberty and freedom of trade, and at the same time to preserve the institution of slavery. After 1845 the United States made a number of requests to buy Cuba, but they were flatly rejected by Spain.

Officially, the United States upheld its treaty obligations with Spain, but Cuban annexationists were able to get support from individuals within the states of the South. Narciso López, the leader of the first attempted revolution in 1848, was opposed to the abolition of slavery and obtained most of his support for later ventures from prominent southern families. He managed to land a small force in Cuba in 1850, but very few Cubans joined him. In 1851 he tried again after a small group, the Liberating Society of Puerto Príncipe, began an insurrection in July. Both revolts failed, and the leaders were executed. Their martyrdom cemented the hostility between Spaniard and *criollo*. The government became more watchful and *criollo* participation was still further limited. In addition to their exclusion from political influence, the Cubans chafed under restrictions on trade and under an elaborate and heavy system of taxation.

The economy, however, prospered; total trade doubled between 1825 and 1850. Sugar increasingly became the major source of wealth; exports rose from 41,000 tons in 1800 to 223,000 tons in 1850. Coffee was still a major product in some areas, but production declined after 1833. Tobacco, however, began to prosper again. The breakup of large estates continued as the economy shifted from cattle raising to the production of coffee, sugar, and tobacco.

By the mid-nineteenth century, when importation of slaves had nearly ceased, the population had reached almost 1.5 million. The 1846 census listed 565,000 whites, 220,000 free Negroes and mulattoes, and 660,000 slaves. Of the white population, about 27,000 were natives of Spain, most of them officials or merchants who remained aloof from *criollo* society.

Spain's restrictive emigration policies were yet another source of friction, as Cubans increasingly feared a Negro majority. Slave revolts occurred sporadically and were usually suppressed with excessive brutality. As the century progressed, however, and the concept of slavery became untenable, the Cuban separatist movement became increasingly abolitionist. The nationalists blamed Spain for its restrictive emigration, for greater white immigration would reduce the danger of Negro supremacy.

From 1865 until the achievement of independence in 1898, Cuban history is primarily a chronicle of political woes interspersed with rebellion. The crown recognized the need for reform, but each step was made reluctantly and with little evidence of good faith.

The ensuing disenchantment led to the beginning of the Ten Years' War. The first revolutionary effort, led by Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, was initiated with his reading of a Declaration of Independence from Spain at Yara in Oriente Province, October 10, 1868. He was joined by a group that included planters, large numbers of students, Negro freemen, and recently freed slaves. The movement declared Cuba to be independent from Spain, but the leadership also considered annexation to the United States. The war began with successes by the rebels. They formed a provisional government, which included Tomás Estrada Palma, first president of the Republic after independence, and adopted a constitution. Militarily, they came to command half of the island. Spain responded by sending reinforcements and using a volunteer militia, composed of Spaniards, as police and as spies. As the Spaniards began to regain territory, the war degenerated into guerrilla fighting.

The war was concluded by the Pact of Zanjón in 1878. Spain made a number of concessions and promised widespread political reforms. A few of the reforms were carried out. An emancipation law was enacted in 1880 under which slavery ended in 1886. Cubans were represented in the Spanish Parliament during the next years, but they were gradually disillusioned once more. Two political parties, the Conservatives (Spanish) and the Autonomists, contested seats. The franchise was so restricted that the Conservatives won nearly all of the regionally distributed seats, while the Autonomists regularly elected only members from the Economic Society of Friends of the Country. The promised amnesty did not last long. José Martí, later called the "apostle" of the independence movement, was one of several who returned to Cuba in 1878 only to be exiled again the same year.

The center of political action shifted to New York City after 1878. After the unsuccessful attempt of Máximo Gómez to launch another revolution in 1880 (The Little War), the Revolutionary Junta in New York City became the nucleus of revolutionary action. Contact was made with groups of Cubans in the major cities of the United States, and the revolutionists worked with the colony of Cuban tobacco workers in Key West, Florida collecting money, arms, and recruits.

In Cuba 1895 was a year of low sugar prices and much unemployment. The economy had been unstable since the Ten Years' War, and the coffee and tobacco industries of the eastern part of the island had never recovered. More important was the dislocation within the sugar industry. In 1868 the sugar crop had been produced by slave labor mainly on moderate-sized Cuban-owned plantations, each with its own mill. The crop accounted for over 80 percent of total exports. In the 1870s, however, the growth of the beet sugar industry in northern Europe began to offer serious competition. At the same time the devastation of the Ten Years' War, followed by the emancipation of the slaves, caused financial loss to producers from which many had never recovered. To reduce labor costs, many owners with sufficient capital made technical improvements in milling and extraction processes, but many were forced to sell their land as larger scale production became essential for the economy. The number of mills declined from 1,500 in the 1860s to 400 in 1894. American sugar merchants were among the leaders in introducing the technological changes. Formerly buyers from Cuban agents, they bought land and began to operate their own plantations.

Dependence on the American market made the Cuban economy extremely sensitive to changes in world price-levels as well as to Spanish and United States tariff policies. The McKinley tariff of 1890 put sugar on the free list, and total production increased from 632,328 tons in 1890 to over 1 million tons in 1894. The depression in 1893, however, forced prices down, and Spain raised tariffs on imports into Cuba. The United States responded by reimposing a duty on sugar. The price that was paid producers for the first time fell below US$0.02 per pound.

In 1895 Martí recognized a propitious time to launch the final rebellion. Since 1892 the Cuban Revolutionary party in New York City had collected funds and carried out a highly successful propaganda effort under the leadership of Martí, Estrada Palma, and others. Military leadership was provided by the heroes of the Ten Years' War—Gómez and Antonio Maceo, a mulatto general. Communications and smuggling systems were organized from Florida to Cuba with the sympathy and support of many Americans, especially those of the New York journalists.

Martí and Gómez landed in eastern Cuba in April 1895. Although Martí was killed in May, the revolutionaries were generally successful through 1896. Starting in Oriente Province where support was greatest, they remained mainly in rural areas, whereas Spanish forces were concentrated in the towns. During 1896 they moved west, taking no major cities but raising rebellion in every province. They burned sugarcane to destroy Spanish wealth and to drive the unemployed into their ranks. The Spaniards brought in more troops, and with the death of General Maceo in December 1896, the rebels began to lose ground. Increased government suppression of all *criollos* led many who were previously uncommitted to support the revolution.

The policies of the Spanish military commander General Valeriano Weyler, known in Cuba as "the butcher," were equally effective in drawing American support to Cuba. Until 1898, however, the United States government stood firm against rising popular pressure to intervene. The sinking of a United States ship, the *Maine*, in Havana harbor forced a reversal. The United States Congress had earlier passed a resolution in favor of intervention, and there was considerable agitation for it within the executive branch. On April 11, 1898, President William McKinley asked for a declaration of war. By Joint Resolution of Congress the president was authorized to use American forces to terminate the war in Cuba. The Teller Amendment specified that after pacification the United States would "leave the government and control of the island to its people." The Spanish-American War lasted less than four months. The armistice in August was concluded by the Treaty of Paris, effective April 11, 1899, by which the United States acquired Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippine Islands.

UNITED STATES MILITARY OCCUPATION

American intervention quickly ended the war but left considerable confusion in Cuba and in the United States regarding United States intentions. The Cuban revolutionaries were not wholly enthusiastic, having desired recognition of belligerency rather than the sending of troops. McKinley resisted annexationist pressure from business interests, but he was not prepared to recognize the government proclaimed during the revolution. A military government, first under General John R. Brooke, and then under General Leonard E. Wood, was instituted and was not terminated until May 20, 1902.

The island had been left with virtually no government, and the Spanish had looted as they left. Disease and starvation were everywhere, the sugar mills were largely destroyed, and the population had declined by an estimated 12 percent. After the initial steps of food and medicine distribution and after basic sanitation measures had been completed, General Wood gave special attention to education and sanitation. He appointed the physician Walter Reed to direct medical experiments that proved the validity of the theory of mosquito-transmission of yellow fever—held by the Cuban, Carlos Finlay—and the campaign against mosquitos virtually ended incidence of the disease within a year.

Roads, bridges, hospitals, communications, post office, and customs were put in order. A public school system was established. General Wood reorganized the judicial system, placing the judges on a salary for the first time in Cuban history. The revolutionary army was disbanded, but many of the men were incorporated into a system of rural guards.

Preparations for the creation of a Cuban government began in 1899. After consultations with Cubans, General Wood proclaimed an electoral law that gave the franchise to adult males who were literate, who owned a small amount of property, or who had served in the revolutionary army. The first elections for municipal officials were held in June 1900, and in September the same law was applied in the election of thirty-one delegates to a Constituent Assembly. Three political parties were important contestants. The two that represented factions of the revolutionary army won nearly all the seats; they were the Nationalist party and the Republican party.

The Constituent Assembly convened in November 1900 and completed its work in February 1901. Wood instructed the convention that its responsibility was to frame and adopt a constitution, to provide for an agreement with the government of the United States stating the intended relations to exist between them and to provide for the election of officers under the constitution and the transfer of government to them. Of these, only the second caused much difficulty.

The constitution itself was quickly drawn up. The delegates agreed to adopt a presidential system of government similar to that of the United States (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). Although many conservative Cubans and Americans felt that the constitution was unduly liberal, it was accepted. The United States government made specific stipulations concerning its relations with Cuba. American demands were eventually made the price of independence. These stipulations were made final in United States law when they were enacted as the Platt Amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill of 1901. The provisions of this amendment were reluctantly accepted by the Constituent Assembly as an appendix to the Cuban constitution and were incorporated into the permanent treaty between the United States and Cuba in 1903. They provided the basis for later American intervention in Cuba and became a focus for Cuban nationalist reaction against the United States. The provisions that were eventually to be most troublesome were Articles III, VI, and VII, which in the view of many Cubans were clear impairments of Cuban sovereignty. The controversial articles stated:

> III. The Government consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the government of Cuba.
>
> VI. The Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto being left to future adjustment by treaty.
>
> VII. To enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United States.

Conservatives in Cuba approved of the provisions, but the delegates in the Constituent Assembly opposed them strongly. The Isle of Pines provision apparently was included to ensure that the United States would preserve a military base in the area, and it gave rise to much controversy. A treaty, however, was signed in 1904 by which the United States recognized Cuban sovereignty over the island. It was not ratified until 1925, but the island was administered by Cuba throughout the period.

46

Article VII was implemented in 1903 by a treaty in which the Cubans ceded small territories at Guantánamo Bay in Oriente Province and at Honda Bay, west of Havana, for United States naval use. In 1912, in return for an additional cession at Guantánamo Bay, the United States relinquished the territory at Honda Bay.

After acceptance of the constitution, including the Platt Amendment, on June 12, 1901, the country went on to choose the Congress and a president. Both the Nationalist and Republican parties endorsed Tomás Estrada Palma after Máximo Gómez refused to run. Estrada Palma had been a prominent figure in the independence movement. He returned to Cuba to take office, and the Cuban flag was raised on May 20, 1902.

THE REPUBLIC UNDER THE PLATT AMENDMENT: 1902–34

Estrada Palma's administration, from 1902–06, successfully carried on the work begun by General Wood in sanitation, roads and public works, and education. He had the confidence both of the United States and of the Cubans. Immigration laws were liberalized, and this period marked the beginning of the sizable immigration of Spaniards that continued until the 1920s (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). The sugar crop reached the prewar totals. Plantations, formerly concentrated in Santa Clara and Matanzas provinces, developed rapidly in the provinces of Oriente and Camagüey. His administration also negotiated treaties with the United States that gave Cuba sovereignty over the Isle of Pines and provided for United States naval bases and reciprocal tariff reductions.

The Reciprocity Treaty of 1903 provided for a 20 percent reduction in United States tariffs on all Cuban exports. As a result United States buyers purchased practically the entire Cuban sugar crop. A similar reduction was made by Cuba on imports from the United States.

The apparent stability of Cuba and the benefits to be gained from reciprocity attracted large American investments after 1902. Total United States investments in Cuba were estimated at US$200 million before World War I but were nearly equalled by other foreign investments that made possible a rapid expansion of the whole economy. The sugar industry of Oriente Province was totally dependent on the railroad built across the eastern part of the island by a British subject, William Van Horne. Mining and the development of telephone, streetcar, and electrical services were all begun with foreign capital.

Estrada Palma's administration ended with increasing economic prosperity, but politically Cuba was plunged into the first of many political crises to plague her during the next half-century. Laws were still needed to provide for municipal elections, an independent judiciary, and a civil service. But none of these was enacted. Instead, older Spanish laws were used, which gave the executive control over municipal and judicial appointments.

Party realignments before the 1905 election resulted in the nomination of Estrada Palma for a second term by the Moderate party. After the Moderate victory, the Liberals appealed to the courts to annul the election and, failing that, in August 1906 took to rebellion. Faced with choice of civil war or making concessions to the Liberals, Estrada Palma asked for United States intervention under Article III of the Platt Amendment. The United States government concluded that the elections had been dishonest, suggested a remedy, but finally felt forced to intervene on September 29, 1906. The main purpose of the intervention was conceived to be the enactment of laws that might prevent the recurrence of civil war. Secretary of War William H. Taft became provisional governor and was soon succeeded by Charles E. Magoon. Cuban historians have been extremely critical of Magoon and attribute many of the later ills of Cuban politics to him. Magoon's administration drew up organic laws of the executive power; the judiciary, the provinces, and the municipalities; laws of municipal taxation and accounting; civil service law; military penal law; and procedural law.

Magoon was unsuccessful in solving the basic political problems. Because he felt that much of the trouble stemmed from the Moderates' control of office, Magoon appointed Liberals to vacant offices until a balance was secured. He relied upon the advice of a committee representing both parties, which pressed for the appointment of their representatives regardless of qualifications or even need in the government.

New elections were held for municipal and national offices in 1908. The Moderate party had disappeared, and a new Conservative party was formed. The Liberals were divided into two factions for the municipal elections, but collaborated in the national election, nominating José Miguel Gómez and Alfredo Zayas. The election produced a solid Liberal majority, and on January 28, 1909—Martí's birthday—the United States withdrew.

The major trend in political life from 1910 to 1933 was increased corruption of successive administrations that culminated finally in dictatorship. As political struggles became more intense, the weapons of exile, economic and judicial persecution, school expulsions and closings, and assassinations became familiar risks of political participation. Economically, sugar production increased, but wild fluctuations in price during and after World War I created great hardships for laborers and small businessmen. Unemployment and the great poverty of most of the population during the economic depression that marked the latter part of this period was reflected in an atmosphere of labor bitterness and the growth of radical political movements.

Accompanying these developments was a growing hostility toward the United States. The Platt Amendment, never used after 1909 for full intervention, permitted the United States to send troops into Cuba a number of times "to protect United States property," and it was a constant threat to Cuban governments pursuing policies of which the United States did not approve.

Leadership in Cuban political life and government was the special province of a relatively small group of men who had achieved prominence in the war of independence; their chief political interest was in gaining and keeping control of the spoils of office. Those who had opposed independence were effectively barred from political office. A large proportion of the men so barred were well educated and had a substantial economic stake in the country. Other groups that did not actively participate politically included the great number of new immigrants from Spain and the Canary Islands and many of the prerevolution Spaniards who remained in Cuba. As a result Cuban politics was almost divorced from the main social and economic developments of the country.

The political aspirants were grouped into two political parties, Liberal and Conservative. In their appeals to the public, the Liberals adopted a more critical attitude toward the United States, particularly regarding the Platt Amendment, than did the Conservatives. The Liberals tended to draw the urban vote, made stronger appeals to the Negro population, and emphasized their revolutionary inheritance. The Conservatives had greater support from business interests and the rural population. Individuals at the top of each party, however, had little difficulty in shifting their allegiance according to the relative advantages of alignment with either party. There were six national elections between 1908 and 1933, of which each party won three. With each change of the party in power, the victor had the support of the outgoing administration.

In the 1908 elections held during the United States occupation, the Liberal candidates, José Miguel Gómez and Alfredo Zayas, won an overwhelming victory over the Conservative nominees, Mario García Menocal and Rafael Montoro. Gómez (1909–12), Menocal (1913–21), and Zayas (1921–25) occupied the presidency in turn. All were from prominent families whose fortunes had declined, and all retired from political life with great wealth. Each was an extremely effective political organizer and used all the techniques available in Cuban life in the attainment of power, including vote buying, the distribution of patronage, cultivation of the army, and appeals to the United States government.

In 1912 President Gómez, angered by Zayas' winning of the Liberal nomination, supported the Conservative nominee, Menocal, who subsequently served two terms. In 1920 Gómez again won the Liberal nomination. But President Menocal allied himself with Zayas, who was elected by a coalition of his followers with the Conservatives.

Political change in Cuba posed peculiar problems because of the Platt Amendment. United States business interests in Cuba sought to use it to protect their investments, and Cubans at times appeared to regard it as the final weapon in their political arsenal.

When the Liberals revolted against what they felt to be the false election of Menocal in 1917, they did so on the assumption that the United States would intervene as it had in 1906, and that honest elections would then be held. United States Latin American policy, however, had gradually shifted since the 1906 intervention. The United States now took the position that it should intervene to prevent loss of life and property, rather than to wait until the government had disintegrated.

The Wilsonian policy that the United States would not recognize governments established by other than constitutional means served to deter the use of violence and thus gave further United States support to whichever government was in power.

When the Liberals had recourse to arms in February 1917, the United States made clear that it opposed revolution and landed Marines at Guantánamo, although they took no part in the fighting. The entry of the United States into World War I in April increased its concern for the safety of the sugar crop, the burning of which had always been a weapon of antigovernment insurrectionists; pressure developed for extending military action. But the government won a number of military victories over the rebels, and by May the rebellion had subsided.

Menocal's second term of office was an era of unprecedented prosperity in the sugar industry and of strong personal government. From 1919 to 1924 United States Marines were stationed in the eastern provinces to protect the sugar crop from rebel bands. When Zayas was elected president in 1920, largely as a result of a political deal with Menocal, the Liberals protested and succeeded in obtaining a degree of United States intervention. President Warren Harding sent General Enoch Crowder as his personal representative to investigate the elections. The election of Zayas was validated, but as a result of the economic crash that followed the boom in sugar after 1920, Crowder remained as financial adviser until 1923.

In the years following the end of United States administration, the Cuban economy experienced a boom and then a collapse in the sugar industry. The sugar crop increased from 1.38 million tons in 1911 to 5.1 million tons in 1925. Total trade volume quadrupled, and government revenues more than doubled. Population rose to over 3 million in 1922 and immigration, particularly of Spaniards, was heavy. United States investments in Cuba increased from about US$200 million in 1910 to US$1.5 billion in 1924.

During World War I the European beet sugar industry was nearly destroyed, and demand for Cuban sugar rose accordingly. The price in the United States was controlled throughout the war at US$0.055 per pound, of which some 25 percent was clear profit to the producers. More and more land was planted to sugarcane and excellent forests were burned to clear the land. The entire economy expanded rapidly. Immigration of Spaniards was encouraged, and laborers were brought in from surrounding islands. As labor remained in short supply, the workers organized under Spanish immigrants with syndicalist experience and won higher wages. The island appeared a haven of prosperity for all. Heavy indebtedness was incurred by thousands who hoped to benefit from the larger pie, and banking services multiplied as the demand for credit rose.

The era that ended in 1920 is known in Cuba as the Dance of the Millions. Huge fortunes were made in sugar and in speculation. But the newest fortunes had been made possible by the end of price control in the United States. Early in 1920 Cuban sugar prices soared, reaching US$0.225 per pound in May, but it became apparent that the world was oversupplied with sugar; in December the price fell to below US$0.04 per pound. A run on the banks was stopped by the declaration of a moratorium on October 11.

Early in 1921 the Cuban Congress, with General Crowder's encouragement, enacted emergency banking legislation that lifted the moratorium in several stages. During the next months eighteen banks failed, although they met from 60 to 70 percent of their liabilities. Thousands of small businesses went bankrupt, and unemployed laborers rioted in several cities. The United States banks took over a number of sugar mills and other businesses that could not meet payments on their indebtedness.

From 1921 to 1923 General Crowder directed much of the Cuban government. He achieved reductions in the budget and facilitated a substantial loan of US$50 million from the United States J.P. Morgan Company. In 1923 the sugar industry revived, and the price averaged US$0.05 per pound. The Cuban government was thus successful in surviving the crisis.

In 1924 Zayas lost his party's nomination to Mario Menocal and shifted his support to Gerardo Machado, another Liberal who had been active in politics since 1900. Menocal's record was sufficient to ensure Machado's election.

Machado had pledged honest government and a single term of office. He found, however, that Congress was pliable, and he obtained constitutional amendments during the period 1927–28 that lengthened the president's term of office to six years, abolished the vice presidency, and extended congressional tenures. To silence opposition he deported or had assassinated a number of labor leaders, political opponents, and critical students. Few cared to lead the opposition, and in November 1928 he was elected without opposition to a six-year term.

Machado's tenure coincided with the world economic depression. After a brief revival of the economy from 1923 to 1925, the sugar market declined again and collapsed with the depression in 1930. The enactment of a higher United States tariff on Cuban sugar in 1930 harmed the Cuban sugar industry. Machado made several efforts to spur economic revival, including a program of agricultural diversification. His public works program, of which the main projects were the construction of a highway the length of the island and the building of a new capitol, required large new loans from United States banks.

Convinced that sugar production must be regulated to prevent wild fluctuations, the government joined in the Chadbourne Plan for worldwide control. Under the quotas established, Cuba had to reduce output by about 36 percent. The plan failed to restore the price to a profitable level, and further unemployment in sugar and a decline in all commercial activity resulted.

The difficult economic situation gave rise to political dissatisfaction and unrest to which the government responded with repressive and terroristic measures. The University of Havana became a center of opposition to the regime, and it was declared permanently closed in 1930, along with all high schools and normal schools.

After the failure of a rebellion led by Menocal in August 1931, a war of terror began in earnest. Political assassination was not without precedent, but Machado's strong-arm men, the *porristas*, murdered hundreds of suspects. Organized reprisals against Machado were begun in 1930 by the underground ABC revolutionary group, composed of students and professional men, and by 1933 the island was near civil war.

The election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt as president of the United States brought about a change in United States policy that aided the Cuban rebels. Sumner Welles was appointed ambassador to Cuba by President Roosevelt and arrived there in May 1933 with instructions to attempt mediation. The Cubans hoped that intervention would ensue. In August a strike among bus workers spread until it became a general strike. On August 11, the army commanders withdrew their support from Machado, "to save Cuba from foreign interference. . . ." Machado fled the country and Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, son of a hero of the Ten Years' War, was named president and selected a cabinet including four prominent members of the ABC.

The revolution saw the emergence of a new generation of political leaders who were to remain prominent in public life until 1958.

Their ideological approach to Cuban problems was in sharp contrast to the pragmatic concerns of earlier political leaders.

The new political aspirants, usually termed left-wing nationalists, were concerned with economic and social problems and convinced that the government must take the initiative in raising the economic, social, and cultural levels of life. Their nationalistic and economic orientation led them to make the United States the chief target of their resentment of conditions on the island. The Platt Amendment was the most immediate target, but criticism was extended to the role played by private United States companies, many of whose managers had supported Machado.

The new generation of students emerged from the university with an eclectic array of nationalist and socialist convictions, and labor also had developed into an organized force. During the 1920s the first major unions were formed. The first central labor group, the National Labor Confederation of Cuba (Confederación Nacional Obrera de Cuba—CNOC), was founded in 1924. Sporadic strikes during the Machado regime had resulted in the elimination by deportation or assassination of a number of the original labor leaders, which facilitated the efforts of Communists to gain leadership in the labor movement. By 1930 Communists were prominent in CNOC leadership, which was then illegal but was active underground.

During the early 1930s the emerging left wing was bitterly divided. Socialists and Communists competed violently for leadership in the labor movement and for intellectual support. The small Communist party, founded in 1925, pursued a strictly proletarian revolutionary policy until 1935, when it joined in the worldwide adoption of popular-front tactics. As a result, although the Communists participated in the strikes that preceded Machado's downfall, the party was prevented by contemporary strategy from allying with any other left-wing or liberal group, and instead directed its most vehement criticism against them. The revolution thus neither brought to power a united group nor removed from power all of the older political leaders.

A radical group of students and professors, under the leadership of Ramón Grau San Martín, a physician and professor at the University of Havana, formed the Student Directorate (Directorio Estudiantil). They demanded the immediate purge of all persons with any connection with the former regime as well as the rapid implementation of large-scale reforms. Another similar group of young men gathered around Antonio Guiteras, leader of the Young Cuba party. The Communists, unable to ally with any of the more powerful parties, concentrated on the labor organizations, where they met sharp opposition from socialist organizers who tended to favor Grau San Martín.

The Céspedes government, in office for less than one month after Machado's flight, conceived its task as the restoration of order and a return to constitutional government. The cabinet appeared weak to most observers, and Céspedes vacillated among the many political groups. The radical groups were completely dissatisfied and grew frightened, as the army chief of staff—appointed by Céspedes—named Menocal supporters to the top military commands in the provinces. Rumors flew that a Menocal coup d'état was imminent. In the prevailing circumstances of intrigue and near-chaos, a group of army sergeants under the leadership of Batista proved the first to take decisive action.

At Camp Colombia, Batista and others agreed to oust the senior officers, many of whom had served under Machado. They were joined, apparently at the last minute, by the Student Directorate. In the early morning of September 4, 1933, the sergeants took over Camp Colombia and appointed sergeants to command army units throughout the country. A five-man commission, headed by Grau San Martín, was appointed to form a new government.

From September 4, 1933, until January 17, 1934, chaos prevailed. The cabinet, announced by the commission government on September 12, was dominated by men chosen by the directorate. But there were constant shifts of personnel in the cabinet, army, and police.

The main lines of the Grau San Martín government's program were nationalistic and reformist. The government immediately enacted progressive labor legislation, including provisions for an eight-hour day and a minimum wage. One of its most controversial measures, opposed by foreign businessmen, Spaniards, and Communists, required all employers to maintain a work force made up of at least 50-percent native Cuban labor (see ch. 20, Labor). The major electrical company on the island, largely United States-owned, was ordered to reduce its rates by 45 percent and was subsequently taken over temporarily by the government. The government continually issued statements promising a future of social justice and equality for the Negro population. It resolutely declared its new-found independence and vehemently criticized the United States.

The government could not maintain support from the Right or from the extreme Left. In November, the ABC staged an unsuccessful revolution. The Communist party directed its most violent criticism against the radical but non-Communist members of the government; they staged violent strikes and in some areas attempted to establish local soviets. The United States refrained from recognizing the government because of its radicalism and because of its inability to restore order.

The growing unrest strengthened Batista's position. Now a colonel and head of an army officered largely by former sergeants, he alone appeared capable of restoring order. On January 15, 1934, he managed to force Grau San Martín to resign. On January 17, Colonel Carlos Mendieta, Batista's original choice for the job, was made provisional president. One of the few prerevolution politicians who had consistently opposed Machado, Mendieta headed the Nationalist (Nacionalista) political party and was regarded as honest and conservative. The United States recognized the new government on January 24.

INDEPENDENT CUBA: 1934–58

Much of the history of Cuba between 1934 and December 31, 1958, centered on the figure of Batista. As chief of staff of the army, from 1934 to 1940, he was stronger than the president. From 1940 to 1944 he was the president. After a lapse of eight years, in 1952 he returned to power in a coup d'état and remained in power by increasingly desperate methods until he was overthrown by Fidel Castro.

Batista shared and, to some extent, used the growing sense of nationalism in Cuba. Like many other Cubans, he resented the Platt Amendment, and one of his first popular successes was the Mendieta government's negotiation to do away with the Platt Amendment. On the United States side the right to intervene was incompatible with the tenets of equality of the Good Neighbor Policy by which President Franklin Delano Roosevelt sought to improve relations within the hemispheres. Thus the Mendieta government was able to announce the abrogation of the Platt Amendment on May 29, 1934. Good relations were further enhanced in August by the signing of a new Reciprocity Treaty that made possible considerable tariff reductions.

Problems stemming from the complex economic relationships between Cuba and the United States were more difficult to solve. As a result of business failures and consolidation during the worldwide economic depression, great tracts of land were held by a few domestic and foreign companies and families—much of it uncultivated. The sugar industry required a large labor force for a few months a year and very little during the rest of the year. The dependence of the economy on the fluctuations of the sugar industry, which was in trouble throughout the world, posed what appeared to be insuperable problems. The reliance on the United States market continued, and Cubans tended to blame the problems of its sugar industry on the United States. Large United States private investments in Cuban mining, public utilities, and banking were similarly resented because profits were remitted to the United States.

The essential problems were those of land tenure, the tax structure and administration, and a government that never achieved a reputation for honesty. Legislation to encourage increased land utilization and agricultural diversification was inadequate. Taxes, as in the Spanish colonial system, continued to be levied on imports and on items of consumption. Legislation for a graduated income tax was enacted in 1942, but it was rarely collected. Government employment was viewed as a gigantic spoils system.

The First Batista Era: 1934–44

Batista's program for the country in 1934 was to break the political power of the students, improve the lot of the soldiers, extend rural education, and establish a constitutional government. But the civilian groups of the revolution had no intention of allowing Batista to become powerful. Throughout 1934 and into 1935, rebellion was constant. After the ABC withdrew from the government in the summer of 1934, Mendieta had the support only of conservative groups and consequently became more and more dependent on Batista. Constitutional guarantees were suspended during most of the period, schools were closed, and conflicts within the cabinet over civilian versus military control led to several resignations.

During February and March of 1935 the opposition became better coordinated and was able to call a general strike. On March 10 President Mendieta suspended all constitutional rights, and the struggle became a direct one between the army and the radicals, which included the Young Cuban party, Grau's party, and the Communists. Gradually the strength of the opposition was broken. The army was used to break strikes, thousands of suspected terrorists were jailed, and a semblance of order was restored.

The government promised elections by the end of 1935. They were held on January 10, 1936, and for the first time women voted. Because most of the radical leaders were in jail or exile, the contest was between former President Menocal, former President Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, and Miguel Mariano Gómez, the son of the earlier president and himself a very popular political leader. Gómez and Laredo Brú were elected president and vice president, respectively, with the support of Gómez' Republican party, the Nationalists, and the Liberals. He took office in May 1936.

Gómez announced a program of general social and economic reform, the reestablishment of civil rights, and a reduction in government expenditures. Many political prisoners were amnestied, and exiles began to return. Gómez, however, quickly came into conflict with Batista, who by 1936 had firmly cemented his army support and had considerable influence over the nomination of congressional candidates; as a result he was impeached. Vice President Laredo Brú took office in December 1936, and Batista's power was secure.

To some extent Batista shared the ultranationalism of many of his contemporaries, but his political approach was opportunist and authoritarian. By 1937 he realized that he needed support outside the army and that labor peace was essential to the establishment of a stable government. From 1937 on, Batista patronized the labor movement. He tended to support labor demands, thus increasing labor's share of national income despite the continuation of the depression, and thereby obtained labor's political support.

By the late 1930s Batista was the most powerful man in Cuba, despite his lack of official position outside the army. His rural education program, organization of mobile health units for rural areas, and sponsorship of labor legislation and organization brought him some popularity. He had restored order in the country and therefore had the support of the business community. No serious efforts were made to attack the basic problems of the economy, but sugar production was regulated and some diversification was encouraged.

Batista, however, wanted to legitimize his position but lacked the support of the intellectuals or of any political party. In April 1938 he announced his intention to convene a constitutional assembly before the 1940 elections. In preparation for the elections he began to court the support of the Communist party, which was illegal but which remained influential in the labor movement. Batista had an interview with the leading Communists, Blas Roca and Joaquín Ordoqui, in the summer of 1938. In September the Communist party was legally recognized for the first time, and in November it supported Batista in the elections to the Constituent Assembly. Communists also were allowed free rein in their labor union activities during the next years.

In the elections for a Constituent Assembly in November 1939, the opposition won forty-one seats and the government won thirty-five. Under the presidency of the country's most respected jurist, José Manuel Cortina, the assembly adopted the governmental change proposed most often since the Machado dictatorship: that the cabinet be responsible, singly and collectively, to either house of Congress. Certain powers reserved for the president, however, were intended to ensure greater stability than might exist under a fully parliamentary system. The president was limited to a single term of office. The most notable provisions included a long bill of rights and sections embodying most of the social and labor legislation enacted since 1933.

In July 1940 elections for a new administration were held. Batista ran as the candidate of a Democratic-Socialist coalition made up of his own Democratic party, the Liberal party, and the Communist party. Opposing parties, the Cuban Revolutionary party (formed of Grau San Martín's supporters), the ABC, and the Republican party, all nominated Grau San Martín. The election was considered relatively honest, and Batista won with a large majority. Certain franchise features of the 1940 constitution, however, were declared inapplicable in the election, a fact which aided Batista's victory.

The new constitution was scarcely functioning when Cuba entered World War II. Emergency legislation conferred war powers on Batista, and for the duration of the war he exercised full powers to institute political and economic controls. Although Cuba did not send troops into action, the government cooperated fully in the intelligence operations required against German espionage and granted several bases to the United States for use in patrolling the Caribbean.

Grau San Martín and Carlos Prio Socarras: 1944—52

Batista, as required by the Constitution of 1940, did not seek reelection in 1944. He backed Carlos Saladrigas, who was nominated by the Democratic-Socialist coalition made up of Batista's conservative Democratic party, the former Liberal party, the Popular Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular—PSP [Communist]) and the ABC. The opposition candidate was Grau San Martín, supported by the Republican Authentic Alliance (Alianza Republicana Auténtica), composed mainly of the conservative Republican party (heir of the former Conservatives) and the Authentics (Auténticos), the group supporting Grau since 1933. Somewhat to the surprise of everyone, Grau San Martín won the presidency by a large majority. Although the Democratic-Socialist coalition won majorities in both houses of Congress, postelection shifts of the ABC and the PSP gave the administration majorities in both houses.

Grau San Martín was distrusted by many as an impractical idealist, but nevertheless he was widely regarded as a symbol of Cuban hopes for democratic government and economic and social reform. The administrations of Grau San Martín and of his successor Prío Socarrás formed a critical period of expectation and disillusionment in the development of Cuban political attitudes.

With Grau's victory a group of largely new people came into government, and the tremendous patronage powers at Grau's disposal were exploited at every level. Labor unrest arising from wage demands was intensified by struggles for union control between Communist and non-Communist leadership. Grau's own political party had the allegiance of most non-Communist labor leaders, but he lost much of his strength when he accepted Communist support. The conflict was resolved only after 1947 when he appointed Prío Socarrás as minister of labor. Prío cracked down on Communist leadership and gave the ministry's support to Auténtico labor leaders. Finally, most of the moderate progress made by Grau in the areas of health, education, and housing was obscured by the tremendous increase in graft throughout the government and by a general decline in public order.

In the 1948 elections Carlos Prío Socarrás successfully ran as Grau's chosen successor, stressing his record as a hero of the anti-Machado movement and a platform based on a combination of promises for reform and progress and opposition to communism. In addition to the conservative coalition against him, a splinter from the Auténticos—the Cuban People's party, known as the Ortodoxos—nominated a third candidate. Although this new party ran third in the election, it was widely regarded as offering a real hope for reform in the future. In the election Batista also won a Senate seat *in absentia* and returned to Cuba from the United States.

The administration of Prío Socarrás differed from that of Grau San Martíns primarily in the greater effort made toward essential economic reforms. The detailed report on the Cuban economy prepared by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development recommended many changes, and some of the legislation enacted in 1950 and 1951 closely followed the report's proposals. For the first time in Cuba, a tax was placed on unused lands as a means of encouraging greater land utilization. A National Bank and other financial institutions were established, and in 1951 the peso became the only legal tender. Prío grew wealthy in office, however, and there was no improvement in public order and no decrease in the prevalence of graft or in the use of government patronage.

As president, Prío continued his anti-Communist moves, removing Communists from unions and closing several of their publications. At the same time he sought to champion the growing Latin American movements against dictatorial governments. As minister of labor in 1947, he had given assistance to a group of Dominican and Cuban youths organizing in Cuba to overthrow the Rafael Trujillo dictatorship in the Dominican Republic. The group also had at least the tacit support of President Grau until the United States asked him to make them stop intervening, in the interests of Caribbean peace.

Most of the young men were arrested but a few escaped; among them was a university student named Fidel Castro. Many of this group supported a rebellion in Costa Rica the next year to which President Prío contributed arms confiscated from the Dominican expedition. The group, known as the Caribbean Legion, made another attempt to overthrow Trujillo but failed and dissolved after Batista's return to power in 1952.

As the 1952 elections approached, the major issue was political reform. The Constitution of 1940 had been in effect for twelve years; gradually many of the institutions that were prescribed to enforce governmental responsibility had been created. The government had made some progress in planning more rational economic policies. The island was benefiting from prosperity induced by the increase in demand for sugar during the Korean conflict. The government had pursued prolabor policies and had strong labor support. Although there was some criticism of the failure to enact more basic legislation to improve education and to raise rural living levels, the Auténticos' main point of vulnerability was government corruption.

In the period of electoral campaigning it appeared that public reaction against corruption would be channeled into support for the new Cuban People's party (Ortodoxo), whose presidential candidate, Roberto Agramonte, was widely expected to win the election. The Auténtico candidate was thought to be running second and Batista, sponsored by a new party that he formed after his return to Cuba in 1948, was third.

On March 10, 1952, Batista, convinced that he had no chance to win the election, returned to power in a quiet, bloodless coup d'état. The coup d'état depended entirely on army support, the element of surprise, and Batista's ability to cement his success by rapid political manipulation. He justified his move by asserting that Prío Socarrás planned to perpetuate his own rule by coup d'état, and that the country required him to save it from degenerating into gangsterism, which had been prevalent in the form of terrorist group activity in the University of Havana during the Grau and Prío administrations.

The Second Batista Era: 1952–58

The major achievement of Batista's second period of rule was the creation of the Sugar Stabilization Fund to prevent economic collapse after the end of the Korean conflict. In the summer of 1953, the Cuban representative at the International Sugar Conference in London succeeded in obtaining for Cuba a quota of 2.25 million tons. This quota, in addition to the 2.7 million tons shipped to the United States, allowed the total crop to remain at more than 5 million tons. Batista's other policies were much as before. He froze wages on some occasions and successfully retained labor and army support. The support of the business community was retained, as before, by noninterference in its activities and preservation of labor peace. The 1950s were relatively prosperous, although the standard of living of most of the population remained low. Batista sponsored some needed public works, including the construction of a good water system for Havana, the promise of generations of political leaders.

The first revolt against Batista occurred a year after his coup. It was led by Castro who in 1952 had been a congressional candidate of the Ortodoxo party. On July 26, 1953, with 165 supporters, Castro directed a suicidal attack on the Moncado Army Post in Santiago de Cuba. Many of the attackers were killed; most, including Castro, finally surrendered.

Castro conducted his own defense. It was an impassioned critique of Cuba's "cruel and shameful despotism" followed by a presentation of his own ideas of reform. These ideas formed the basis for a pamphlet entitled *History Will Absolve Me*, which was first published while he was in prison on the Isle of Pines. It called for the reestablishment of the Constitution of 1940, confiscation of vast amounts of unused land, and distribution of this land to the landless and those being persecuted by Batista. Castro also called for redistribution of 30 percent of the profits of industry to the workers; confiscation of property of all who had misappropriated government funds; nationalization of public utilities and rate reductions; educational reform; agrarian reform; and a 50-percent reduction of rents.

Batista increased his restrictions on the press and suppressed liberties with violence. In 1954 he attempted to legalize his position by holding elections. Grau San Martín was again nominated to oppose Batista, but several parties refused to participate and Grau withdrew before the elections. Batista took office as elected president in February 1955 and declared a wide amnesty later in 1955. Hundreds of his enemies were released from prison, including Castro and his brother, while others, including Prío Socarrás, returned from exile.

Batista measured his success in terms of peace—international peace, labor peace, domestic peace (defined as public order)—and in the number of public works and monuments constructed. His stated program called for an increase in national income—primarily through the creation of an atmosphere favorable to investment, domestic and foreign, and thereby encouraging tourism and new industry. The last three years of Batista's regime were in large part a repetition of the last years of Machado. Opposition centered among the students and intellectuals, and in 1956 there were sporadic bombings.

Castro had spent the year since his release from prison organizing a small force in Mexico, and in December 1956 he landed with his followers on the southern coast of Oriente Province. The rebels, called the 26th of July Movement, were forced to withdraw into the Sierra Maestra where they were unsuccessfully hunted by government troops.

Like the rebels of 1895, they conducted raids on police and military expeditions, attacked army patrols, and burned sugarcane. They also conducted urban terrorism and unsuccessfully, attempted in April 1958 to spark a general strike. In contrast to Batista, Castro appeared to the Cubans to be a nationalist and a humanitarian leader in the tradition of José Martí, willing to risk everything for the political goal of liberty.

Several groups had combined to join the revolution before it was over. Castro's original 26th of July Movement had been joined by the Second Front of the Escambray, the Revolutionary Directorate at the University of Havana, and at the eleventh hour by the PSP, which had shown little sympathy for Castro's tactics because it considered them putschist in nature. Each group to some extent had its own program for the country; each to a large extent had its own leaders and set of loyalties. They were united only in their opposition to Batista and in according Castro the kind of respect held for the many heroes and martyrs of the Cuban struggle for freedom. Later they began to come into conflict over policies and questions of relative influence.

Batista suppressed all opposition ruthlessly. His police arrested, tortured and murdered. The increasing terror and violence used by Batista did more than any action of Castro to draw support to the revolutionary movement. Batista's downfall, however, occurred much as that of Machado, when the most important institutions on which the government relied, particularly the army, withdrew their support.

On January 1, 1959, Batista and his cabinet fled the country. Castro and his army reached Havana on January 8. A cabinet was appointed that included some of the most highly respected men of the country with Manuel Urrutia as president. In February 1959 Castro assumed the office of prime minister.

THE REVOLUTION SINCE 1959

In early 1959 Castro's government had the support of nearly everyone on the island, except the Batista supporters. Gradually, however, as revolutionary economic, social, and political policies became increasingly radical, the support of people whose interests were threatened began to wane; in the ensuing years many either went into exile or were jailed. The United States, too, became increasingly wary. Eventually, political and economic relations between the two nations were completely severed, and Cuba came to rely on the Soviet Union as her most important economic ally. Politically, however, Cuba has retained a degree of independence of the Soviet Union, a fact which sometimes has resulted in strained relations between the two. The Revolution has generally been credited with an expansion of the educational system (though it has been infused with political indoctrination and the quality of education may have declined) and improvements in the public health system. Opposition newspapers and organized public criticism have been silenced, but at the same time there is only scant evidence that artists and writers have been systematically forced to conform to the dictates of "socialist realism."

The first, relatively moderate, period after the Revolution was one of consolidation of power and development of policy. One of the first acts of the new government was to conduct trials of Batista's officials and leading supporters who had not managed to flee the country. Many were executed in summary fashion, which evoked much criticism in the United States. Much land owned by "Batistianos" was confiscated and given to the squatters and tenants already living on it. Political prisoners were released and political liberties were proclaimed. Rents, mortgage rates, and electric and telephone rates were lowered.

The first period gradually faded into a second. The passage was symbolized by the removal of President Urrutia in July 1959. He was replaced by Osvaldo Dorticós, who had in the past been a member of the Communist party. The moderates had become concerned with plans for constitutional government, which never did materialize, and the propertied classes were becoming anxious about their position. Castro had to move to consolidate a position that would ensure sufficient popular support while allowing him to retain his personal power. He chose a policy that eventually ensured the alienation of the middle and upper classes—many of whose members went into exile—and the support, in general, of the peasants and the working class.

The Economy

The first Agrarian Reform Law was passed on May 17, 1959. It had the support of a majority of the people and served notice that the Revolution had been transformed into a mass movement to change the socioeconomic structure of the country. Among other things, the law established, with some exceptions, a maximum limit on landholdings; remaining land was to be expropriated, with compensation, and redistributed. Little compensation was paid, however, and most of the land affected was eventually given over to state farms. The law provided for the setting up of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria—INRA). INRA was initially to become responsible for virtually the entire economy until new ministries were formed from its departments (see ch. 18, Agriculture).

The Agrarian Reform Law of 1959 was really the first of many measures that largely turned control of the economy over to the state. It was followed in 1960 by confiscation of the oil refineries and the nationalization of all United States properties and most other important enterprises. A second Agrarian Reform Law that was promulgated in 1963 limited still further the permissible size of private landholdings. The Urban Reform Law of 1960 provided tenants with the means to buy their dwellings; proceeds were to go to the government, which would use them to build new housing (see ch. 8, Living Conditions; ch. 19, Industry).

A central Planning Board (Junta Central de Planificación—JUCEPLAN) was established in February 1960, which later assumed responsibility for coordinating the various elements of the economy. The first goals of the economic planners were to diversify and industrialize the economy in order to substitute domestically produced goods for costly imports and to reduce the country's almost total dependence on the fluctuating sugar market. When put into effect, however, these plans proved more costly than had been expected; the economy under them suffered severe reverses. Lower sugar production resulted, the trade imbalance with the Soviet Union was severe, and rationing went into effect in 1962. Consequently, in early 1963 renewed emphasis was put on agricultural production, particularly of sugar, as the only feasible economic policy for many years to come. With the disappearance of the United States market in 1960, Cuba came to depend on the Soviet Union and Communist-bloc countries for her imports, exports, and credits.

Development of the Communist Party

In the first months of the Revolution the government was run largely by members of the 26th of July Movement, most particularly those who had belonged to the Rebel Army. Some of them were Communists, but the PSP itself—although it was loyal to government policy—was not included in this ruling clique. When it became clear in April 1961 that Cuban exiles were attempting an invasion of the island, Castro announced that the Revolution was socialist. A few months later the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas—ORI) was formed, which constituted a move to include the PSP in the government leadership to thereby court the support of the Soviet Union and to create a single government party. The National Directorate of the ORI was eventually to include mostly former members of the 26th of July Movement. These included: Castro; his brother Raúl; Ernesto (Che) Guevara and former members of the PSP, including Blas Roca, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez and Aníbal Escalante (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values).

The development of a single party to represent the Revolution proceeded slowly and was marked by several incidents that revealed the conflict between the "old" Communists (former members of the PSP) and the "new" ones, called the Fidelistas. Aníbal Escalante had proceeded rapidly with plans for organizing the ORI, which included putting many former PSP members into positions of power. Castro felt that if the old-line, Moscow-oriented Communists continued to increase their power, his own bargaining position via à vis the Soviet Union would be limited. He accused Escalante of "sectarianism," of being suspicious of the "new" Communists and therefore excluding them from important positions within the ORI. Escalante was purged from his leading position in the ORI in March 1962. The lower levels of the ORI were also purged, and a new policy for selecting the lower party cadres was announced; they were to be elected by the workers, a process that delayed the organization of the ORI.

In 1963 the ORI became the United Party of the Socialist Revolution (Partido Unido de la Revolución Socialista—PURS), which was formally accepted in the Communist world as a "fraternal" party of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. Organization of PURS was accelerated and was encouraged by good relations with the Soviet Union. In 1964, however, the trial of Marcos Rodríguez constituted an attempt to again limit the "old" Communists' encroaching power in the PURS. Rodríguez was accused of having informed on four revolutionaries during the Batista era while he was a member of the PSP youth group. The attempt failed, however, and the PSP was exonerated from participation in Rodríguez' crime.

In 1965 the PURS became the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba—PCC) and was organized along model Communist lines (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). The number of "old" Communists in positions of high power, however, was less than had been in the ORI and the PURS. Nevertheless, in 1968 Aníbal Escalante and other leading "old" Communists were tried and sentenced to long prison terms for allegedly advocating the Soviet position in differences with Castro.

Cuba, the Hemisphere, and the Soviet Union

As soon as the first Agrarian Reform Law was promulgated, the United States became concerned about the direction of the Revolution. Uncertain just how the law would apply to American-owned lands in Cuba, criticism centered on the matter of compensation, provisions for which were deemed inadequate. The law, combined with earlier provisions regarding United States property, served to increase the disenchantment of United States business interests.

Relations between the two countries continued to deteriorate until the middle of 1960 when they were near the breaking point.

Some United States property had been taken over or confiscated in late 1959, and Cuba had signed a major trade agreement with the Soviet Union in February 1960. This agreement provided in part that Cuba would receive Soviet oil in exchange for surplus sugar. But in June 1960 refineries owned by the United States and Great Britain refused to process the Soviet oil, and the companies were seized. In July the United States deleted the remaining tonnage of that year's Cuban sugar quota. In the ensuing months Cuba nationalized remaining United States properties, in addition to many Cuban-owned businesses. In October 1960 the United States announced an embargo, preventing most exports to Cuba, and in January 1961 relations between the two countries were severed.

The ever worsening relations culminated in the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in April 1961. Because the military buildup on the island appeared to be getting stronger every day and because the government was using stringent measures against so-called counterrevolutionaries, it was felt that, even though exile forces and their sympathizers in Cuba could be better organized and coordinated, the invasion should not be stayed. Exile soldiers who had trained with the material support of the United States government landed on Girón Beach (Playa Girón) in the Bay of Pigs in mid-April. They were soon routed, however, and Castro began making mass arrests of suspected counterrevolutionaries, which eradicated much of the organized opposition to the government.

Subsequent United States efforts to deal with the Cuban problems were to be centered primarily in the Organization of American States (OAS), which proved to be a relatively ineffective instrument. Castro early announced his intention of fomenting revolutions throughout Latin America, and it was largely because of this threat that the Cuban question was brought before the OAS on several occasions. In January 1962 Cuba was suspended from the OAS, although not all hemisphere nations went along with the resolution. In 1964 the OAS recommended the suspension of trade and diplomatic relations with the island; at this point all member countries that had not already done so severed relations, except Mexico.

As relations with the United States deteriorated, relations with the Soviet Union improved and expanded to a point where the island relied to a great extent on Soviet aid to support its economy in the late 1960s. Politically, however, Cuba has proved to be something of a maverick within the "socialist" camp and has followed an independent policy, allying with radical revolutionary groups in Latin America rather than adopting the more conservative views of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union extended important credits to Cuba in the early revolutionary years when the island began to feel the pressures of the United States embargo and the mistakes of her economic planners. It was not until 1962, however, that Cuba was accepted by the Soviet Union into the socialist camp. That year proved to be a crucial one in relations between the two countries. An important commercial treaty was signed in the Soviet Union in May 1962.

Much more important, however, was the decision of the Soviet Union to station missiles in Cuba. Purportedly, they were to be used for defensive purposes only, but in October 1962 United States reconnaissance pilots photographed installed missile-launching pads that had offensive capability. Later that month the United States announced a "quarantine on all offensive military equipment" being shipped to Cuba. Soviet ships, under orders from their government, were stopped at sea, and withdrawal of the missiles and dismantling of the bases was announced. Castro saved face by refusing to allow United Nations observation of the withdrawal, but this was accomplished by air reconnaissance and inspection at sea.

The Soviet Union substituted for its inability to supply these weapons by providing new and expanded trade agreements. Nevertheless, Cuba's confidence in Soviet support was at least temporarily shaken by the missile crisis. For the next few years, it appeared that Cuba was to some extent adhering to the Soviet line in hemisphere affairs by taking a less belligerent tone on exporting revolution. It was widely thought that Ernesto (Che) Guevara, a military exponent of violent revolution, had left Cuba in 1965 at Castro's insistence.

In 1966, however, the first Afro-Asian-Latin American People's Solidarity Conference, known as the Tricontinental Conference, was held in Havana. Delegates from both the orthodox Latin American Communist parties and the more radical groups were invited by Cuba to attend. The tone of Cuba's position at the conference indicated increased militancy. The Latin American delegates convened after the conference and organized the Latin American Solidarity Organization (Organización Latinoamericana de Solidaridad—OLAS). The first OLAS meeting was held in 1967 in Havana. Communist orthodoxy was severely criticized, and Cuba was recognized as the leader of the Latin American revolutionary movement.

CHAPTER 4

POPULATION

Cuba, with an estimated population of about 8.4 million early in 1970 was densely populated but, because of the high proportion of arable land, was not overcrowded. The country was highly urbanized, however, and because of concern over difficulties arising from this circumstance, attempts were being made in the 1960s to stem migration to the cities. The settlement pattern was highly irregular. Certain peninsulas and mountainous areas were thinly populated and desolate, whereas other regions with rich soils displayed high rural population densities. The population growth rate was about 2.1 percent a year in the mid-1960s.

Through much of its recorded history Cuba has depended upon immigration, rather than natural increase, for its population growth. Many immigrants came from Spain, for Cuba constituted a favorite destination, particularly after the Latin American continental independence movement of the early 1820s. Negroes were also brought in to replace the indigenous Indian population that had been virtually exterminated by the severity of early Spanish colonial policies. Immigration and population growth fell off at the end of the nineteenth century because of Cuba's own independence movement but picked up again after 1900, when the growing sugar industry stimulated new immigration. In the 1930s immigration declined significantly and has not since regained any influence on population growth. The birth rate, which increased markedly after World War II, together with the decreasing death rate, have been the primary elements of population growth. The emigration of one-half million Cuban citizens between 1959 and 1969, however, held down what would otherwise be a somewhat higher growth rate.

From the early days of the colony until the end of the nineteenth century, most of the population was concentrated in the area of the western provinces, particularly around Havana. The expansion of the sugar industry after 1900 precipitated a great migration to the east where new farmlands were opened up and sugar mills built. In fact, Oriente and Camagüey were still the fastest growing provinces between 1953 and 1968.

Migration to the cities has probably been the most notable aspect of population movement, despite the agricultural base of the economy. Varying estimates placed the urban population between 53 percent and 65 percent of total population in 1968. Cities of over 25,000 population that are political, economic, and cultural centers have experienced the greatest growth. More people have been attracted to them than could be gainfully employed, and their departure from the rural areas has created a labor shortage there. The government in the 1960s had built some new towns in rural areas to provide agricultural workers with urban conveniences and thus encourage them to remain.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

According to official estimates the population of Cuba was about 8,073,700 in 1968 (see table 1). The last official census was taken in 1953, and the population then was 5,829,029. In 1968 the population density was about 183 persons per square mile. Because of the high percentage of arable land, however, the country was not overcrowded and could support a considerably larger population, provided the economy could supply needed jobs.

The 1953 census provides the most recent data on the ethnic origins of the people. It estimated that 72.8 percent of the population was white, 12.4 percent Negro, 14.5 percent mulatto, and 0.3 percent Asiatic. Some experts, however, have felt that this breakdown vastly oversimplified the racial complexity of the nation and overestimated the proportion of the white population (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

Because the country's population growth depended for so long on immigration, foreigners have, in the past, made up a significant portion of the island's inhabitants. About 12 percent of the population fell into this category in 1919, compared with only 4 percent in 1953. Although figures are not available this proportion has probably not changed much since the Revolution. The national origins of resident foreigners, at least of those newly arrived, have probably shifted somewhat from the Western Hemisphere and western European countries to those of eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Cuba is one of the nations in the world with more men than women. This is so, in part, because of the preponderance of men over women among immigrants. Because heavy immigration was a phenomenon of the early decades of the twentieth century and did not continue after about 1930, the balance is gradually being restored. In 1953, 51.2 percent of the population was male, compared with an estimated 50.9 percent in 1965. In 1965 females outnumbered males in the thirty to fifty-year age bracket, but males outnumbered females in all other brackets. The preponderance of males over females was particularly striking among people between the ages of fifty-five and seventy, a fact that is consistent

Table 1. *Selected Demographic Data for Cuba*

		1968			1964—68	1968	1966	
Province	Area (in square miles)	Estimated Population	Estimated Density (per square mile)	1953—68 Percent Increase	Average Yearly Increase	Population in Urban Areas (in percent	Number of Regions	Number of Municipios[1]
Pinar del Rio	5,213	618,00	119	37.8	2.6	28.2	6	39
La Habana	3,174	2,117,500	655	37.6	1.1	89.0	4[2]	28[2]
Matanzas	3,260	472,900	145	19.5	1.4	50.2	6	32
Las Villas	8,267	1,279,300	153	24.2	2.0	42.7	6	66
Camagüey	10,172	857,700	80	38.7	2.2	47.6	11	53
Oriente	14,132	2,728,300	181	51.8	2.8	39.0	11	88
CUBA	44,218	8,073,700	183	38.5	2.1	53.4[3]	44	306

[1] Similar to townships.

[2] Excluding metropolitan Havana, which had eight regions and thirty-eight subdivisions called sectionals.

[3] Estimates of the proportion of urban population varied widely and are mainly useful for provincial comparisons.

Source: Adapted from Union Panamericana, Instituto Interamericano de Estadistica, *America en Cifras 1967, Situacion Demografica: Estado y Movimiento de la Poblacion*, Washington, 1968, p. 26.

Table 2. Cuban Population for Selected Years

Year	Population	Density (square mile)	Percent Annual Growth Rate (between years cited)
1774	171,620	3.9	
1861	1,396,530	31.6	2.2*
1887	1,631,687	36.9	0.6
1899	1,572,797	35.6	-0.3
1907	2,048,980	46.3	3.4
1919	2,889,004	65.3	2.9
1931	3,962,344	89.6	2.7
1943	4,778,583	108.1	1.6
1953	5,829,029	131.8	2.0
1968	8,073,700	182.6	2.2

*This eighty-seven year annual average is misleading; as the average annual growth rate was particularly high between 1792 and 1817 (over 3 percent per year).

Source: Adapted from Levi Marrero y Artilies, *Geografía de Cuba*, New York, 1966, pp. 142–163.

with the early predominance of immigrant males, who would have reached these ages in the mid-1960s. For this same reason the average age of men was somewhat higher than that of women. The median age of women—between twenty-one and twenty-two—was, however, higher than the median ages of men (between twenty and twenty-one).

The average age of the population has gradually increased since 1899 as the birth and death rates have been reduced. Since World War II, however, the birth rate has shown a marked resurgence, and the advancing age of the population has probably been slowed somewhat (see ch. 8, Living Conditions). About 46.5 percent of the population was under twenty years of age in 1965.

POPULATION GROWTH

Immigration and Natural Increase

The population has grown steadily since the discovery of the island except during the period between 1887 and 1898, when the fight for independence and the consequent disease, starvation, and emigration actually reduced it by about 0.3 percent yearly (see table 2). Much of the increase from the establishment of the colony until about 1930 was the result of the constant stream of immigrants, who were either Europeans in search of new opportunities or Negroes and Chinese imported to meet the demand for labor in the cane fields. About 1 million African slaves were brought to the island during the 300 years of slavery, which ended in the late 1880s. Most of these arrived after 1774 when the sugar industry began to expand rapidly. In 1840 the Negro population outnumbered the white, but the government took steps to encourage white immigration and, by 1861, 54 percent of the population was white. When the slave trade came to an end, the ever-increasing demand for labor was met by the recruitment of Chinese from the Philippines, Indians from Mexico, and later by the seasonal immigration of Haitian and Jamaican Negroes.

After the Spanish-American War the economy, particularly the sugar industry, expanded rapidly, requiring a much larger labor force than the existing population afforded. The rate of population increase leaped to an alltime high, averaging about 3.4 percent per year between 1899 and 1907. New immigration and a decreased death rate, the result of improvements in sanitary conditions, combined to produce this increase (see ch. 8, Living Conditions; ch. 3, Historical Setting). This high growth pattern continued until the early 1930s largely because of conditions in Europe during and after World War I, which encouraged emigration, and to the Cuban sugar boom. Most of the immigrants came from Spain, but there were also people from Great Britain, the United States, eastern Europe, the eastern Mediterranean, and China.

The world depression reduced the demand for labor, however, and in 1933 the Cuban government restricted the employment of foreigners on the island (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). The population growth rate declined to a low of about 1.5 percent in the mid-1930s when many people, particularly the foreign born, emigrated because of poor economic circumstances. The only significant immigration after this time was that of European Jews, about half of them German, who fled persecution in their homelands; most of them, however, emigrated again after World War II.

Between 1940 and 1950 the population growth rate increased steadily mainly because of a substantial increase in the birth rate and a declining death rate. After 1950 the growth rate leveled off at about 2.2 percent per year, which figure represents the estimated average annual rate of population increase between 1953 and 1968; yearly fluctuations have been slight. After 1952, increasing numbers of Cubans emigrated, mostly to the United States and Venezuela. This emigration was insignificant, however, compared to the 1959—69 period—after the Revolution—when 500,000 Cubans emigrated. This emigration has had an impact on population growth; but the birth rate, which official figures indicate has risen somewhat in the 1960s, combined with a relatively unchanging death rate has served to mask its effect. The birth rate rose from 30.5 in 1959 to 34.6 live births per 1,000 population in 1965, whereas the death rate declined from 6.6 in 1959 to 6.5 deaths per 1,000 population in 1965. These figures in themselves are of limited usefulness because infants dying within twenty-four hours of birth have been excluded from their calculation. The figures do serve to indicate trends, however. The difference between the rate of natural increase (2.81 percent in 1965) and the population growth rate (about 2.1 percent), as well as the decline in the death rate, can perhaps be explained in large part by the exodus of refugees, who are often aged.

The Exile Movement

The Revolution of 1959 has had a significant impact on the island's population. The number of emigrants who left the country between 1959 and 1969 represents about 8 percent of the country's population in 1959. About 400,000 of the total 500,000 emigrants went to the United States. Revolutionary policies forced or encouraged much of this emigration. A factor that has made it relatively easy for Cubans to emigrate has been their familiarity with the United States. In addition, the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center, established in Miami in 1960, has provided emergency relief and has assisted refugees in findings jobs and places to live.

The composition of the exile community has changed somewhat as it has grown. In general, however, the exiles have come from the middle and upper classes. Their departure has constituted a considerable drain on the country's economic, educational, and health services. Compared with the Cuban population as a whole (according to the 1953 population census), the refugee community in the United States in the late 1960s was heavily weighted with professional, semiprofessional, managerial, and other middle and upper class types and was underrepresented by laborers, agricultural workers, and others of the lower middle and lower classes.

The first to go into exile were individuals identified with the Batista government, who were immediately threatened by the success of the Revolution and who represented perhaps a rather traditional exile group (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). As the land reform and socialist economic policies were put into effect, the first exiles were followed by wealthy people who sought to liquidate their holdings and to reestablish themselves elsewhere. They in turn were later followed by more people in lower income brackets, including many professionals, and still later by an increasing (though never very large) proportion of blue-collar workers and others.

Transportation for refugees did not become a problem until 1961 when relations between the United States and Cuba were severed. After the missile crisis in 1962 the remaining commercial flights between the two countries were suspended, and departure became nearly impossible except for those people who chose to escape illegally or to go to other countries, either to remain there or to await visas to the United States.

In November 1965 an agreement was reached, with the help of the Swiss embassy in Havana, to permit 3,000 to 4,000 people a month to leave Cuba for the United States. A regularly scheduled airlift, subsidized by the United States government, was initiated in December of that year and was still in operation in late 1969. Those with relatives in the United States have been given first priority for entry.

The only people who have not been permitted to leave are young people of draft age, although there is evidence that others in critical occupations are strongly discouraged from doing so. When an individual makes an application to leave, he may lose his job and be sent to a farm labor camp or be assigned some other task while he waits his turn to leave, which in some cases takes several years. When he finally does leave, his possessions, except the clothing he wears, become state property. If he is going directly to a country other than the United States, he must pay the government for his transportation in advance of his departure.

PATTERNS OF SETTLEMENT AND INTERNAL MIGRATION

The settlement pattern is extremely irregular, depending chiefly on the fertility of the soil, the location and nature of industries, and the ease of communication. The regions of highest population density include the city of Havana and environs and the other large urban centers. High density patterns are also to be found in the tobacco zones of Vuelta Abajo in Pinar del Río, Remedios in Las Villas and Camagüey; the sugar lands in the provinces of northwest Matanzas, western La Habana, central Las Villas, and in the Central Valley in the vicinity of Holguín in Oriente Province, where the best soils are found (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). Regions of low population density are found in eastern Camagüey Province, on the Isle of Pines, in the desolate peninsulas of Guanahacabibes and Zapata, and in the rugged mountainous areas.

Until the late nineteenth century the population was concentrated on the western half of the island, where the modern economic structure was already well established. In fact, in 1861 about 45 percent of the population lived in La Habana Province alone, compared with only 25 percent in the provinces of Camagüey and Oriente added together. The rapid expansion of the sugar industry that took place after 1900, with the influx of United States capital, encouraged diffusion of the population. Some new sugar operations were set up in Pinar del Río, but poor soils and the already heavy concentration of tobacco farmers there served as deterrents. The sugar frontier was instead pushed eastward to the hitherto underused lands of Camagüey and Oriente provinces. The population moved east in response to the new opportunities that developed. The eastward shift of the rural population, however, has been largely offset in terms of total population by the continuing growth of Havana in the west.

Between 1953 and 1968 Oriente Province was by far the fastest-growing province in the country. Its rural population density was relatively high, supported by the diverse agriculture that has developed in the region. Camagüey Province, on the other hand, revealed a low rural population density and a greater proportion of urban population that is perhaps best explained by that province's concentration on cattle raising and sugar cultivation on relatively poor soils. Both provinces have grown primarily because of the continued development of the sugar industry, the extension of roads and railroads, improved sanitation, and the higher birth rates characteristic of rural areas. The growth of La Habana Province is the result chiefly of immigration from other parts of the island to the capital city and its environs.

Urbanization

Increasing urbanization is regarded as the most serious population problem by the Revolutionary government. It has proceeded most rapidly in centers of more than 25,000 inhabitants. There are indications that movement to the larger cities and towns was accelerated during the first few years of the Revolution because of the uncertain circumstances in the countryside. The migrants found jobs in government administration and new industries and, as a result, an acute labor shortage developed in the countryside. The government has responded to this situation in two ways. Some new towns have been built to provide erstwhile rural dwellers with urban conveniences while keeping them close enough to the countryside so that they can provide manpower for essentially rural tasks. In addition, volunteer labor from the cities has been recruited to work at rural tasks, thus providing a kind of substitute rural population.

The 1943 census listed 54.5 percent of the population as urban. The 1953 census indicated that this figure had risen to 57 percent, but these statistics tend to underestimate the increase in urbanization between the two census years; for the 1943 census a grouping of as few as 20 persons could be counted as urban provided they had certain other characteristics. The 1953 census, on the other hand, considered as urban dwellers all persons who lived in population clusters of 150 persons if such clusters either were provided with electricity and medical, legal, and recreational services or were adjacent, and functionally related, to other clusters that were so provided.

These criteria placed in the urban category many communities with an essentially rural character. According to census authorities, however, they served to distinguish two ways of life that are markedly different from one another. Rural life is characterized by the relative isolation of families in scattered dwellings and by the lack of social mobility owing to the lack of social alternatives for those who do not move to the cities. Distributive services are generally confined to the towns, to which the true rural dwellers make visits when they can.

Some estimates indicate that urbanization in the late 1960s had reached 65 percent of the population; official government statistics related a figure of 53 percent for 1968, but this undoubtedly reflected a change in the definition of what is considered urban rather than an actual decrease in urbanization. One United Nations estimate indicated that the rural population in Cuba in the 1960s had declined, not only as a percent of total population but in number as well.

Urban growth in Cuba, unlike much of Europe and North America, does not stem from the development of heavy industry. Rather, it is chiefly a product of the Spanish colonial system, in which land was considered not as a place to establish homesteads but as a raw material base required to feed European markets. The best way to exploit this land was to have large plantations worked by slave labor. The city, usually a port, became a link in the economic chain—the center of culture and European influence. Wealthy landowners established homes in the cities on income from the plantations. Local government was poorly developed; administrative authority was highly centralized, and it also was concentrated in the cities, especially in the capital. As the population grew, laborers, unable to procure small holdings, were attracted to the mills and cities by the prospect of better wages. Accordingly, a dual movement of the upper and lower classes gave a special impetus to urban development.

This pattern outlived not only Spanish rule but many laws intended to diversify the rural economy and broaden the social base of capital investment. After 1870, the multiple agricultural potential was sacrificed to the prospects of the sugar industry. The resulting single crop economy strengthened the predominance of cities. Vast acreages of sugarcane would supply a large sugar mill, and an urban community called a *batey* would develop around it. Distributive services were monopolized by the large investors who owned most of the productive capacity; no substantial rural middle class developed to provide either opportunity or employment.

As road and rail facilities slowly improved during the twentieth century, the migration to the cities increased; men could travel more easily to distant parts of the island during the peak season of agricultural activity, returning to their homes in the city where they and their wives could more easily find work in the off-season. Precisely because of this and because the off-season was considered a time of potential social unrest in the cities, many governments concentrated scheduling of construction projects during these months to provide as many temporary jobs as possible for unemployed agricultural workers.

Urban settlements fall into quite distinct categories: the cities or towns that have grown up because of their strategic location near the sea, along transportation routes, or at the hub of an agricultural area that they serve; the industrial towns of the big sugar mills and other industries, which house the workers and administrators permanently employed there; and the agricultural villages, usually with less than 1,000 inhabitants, which have grown up since the 1930s when peasants abandoned their dispersed homesteads and congregated elsewhere; and the new towns built under the Castro government to provide peasants with some urban conveniences while keeping them close to the land.

The choice of sites for the island's seven original cities proved to have been well justified by the country's subsequent economic development. Their locations were originally chosen on the basis of such considerations as nearness to the sea (at a time when roads were lacking), proximity to fertile soils, and the presence of a sufficiently large local population to work the gold-bearing sands and agricultural lands.

Of the seven original cities, Havana (which was first founded on the south coast but was later moved to its present location) has become by far the largest and most important (see table 3). In 1966 metropolitan Havana accounted for more than 20 percent of the country's entire population, making it one of the largest capital cities in the world relative to national population. It also accounted for about 40 percent of the island's total urban population.

In addition to Havana proper, the metropolitan area included five other municipalities, Marianao, Guanabacoa, Regla, Santiago de las Vegas and Santa Maria del Rosario, which essentially have lost their past separate identities because of their positions within the capital's economic and social orbit. The pull of Havana is felt even further; the city of Matanzas to the east has declined in importance under competition from the capital. As the mercantile, maritime, political, financial, and cultural heart of the country, Havana owes much of its growth and importance to its excellent harbor. The Revolutionary government has tried to slow the influx of people to Havana, but reports on the success of this venture have been conflicting; one official estimate stated that the growth rate of Havana in 1965 was only about 1 percent. Population estimates, however, suggested this figure was closer to 4 percent, although even

Table 3. Ten Largest Cuban Cities and Their Growth Rates, 1966

City	Population (1966)	Percent Increase (1965–66)
Havana (metropolitan)[1]	1,680,000	...[2]
Santiago de Cuba	250,000	3.9
Camagüey	170,000	5.5
Santa Clara	133,000	4.6
Guantánamo	131,000	2.7
Holguín	91,000	8.3
Cienfuegos	89,000	4.7
Manzanillo	87,000	5.0
Pinar del Río	82,000	10.7
Matanzas	81,000	4.5

[1] Includes suburbs.
[2] Approximately 4 percent; estimates varied widely.

Source: Adapted from Unión Panamericana, Instituto Interamericano de Estadística, *America en Cifras 1967, Situación Demográfica: Estado y Movimiento de la Población*, Washington, 1968, p. 37.

this is relatively low when compared with the growth rates of such cities as Pinar del Río, Holguín, and Camagüey.

Of the six other original cities Santiago de Cuba, the original capital, was the second largest city in the mid-1960s and was an important commercial center. Bayamo, known in the past for its flourishing contraband trade, has since developed into one of the major cattle and dairy centers; in the mid-1960s Bayamo was one of the country's fastest growing cities, about 7.2 percent per year. Sancti Spíritus is at the heart of a rich agricultural and cattle region. Trinidad and Camagüey are commercial cities where produce from the rich hinterlands finds exit to markets. Camagüey was originally called Puerto Príncipe when it was founded on the north coast. Baracoa, the oldest city on the island, has not achieved the status of these other cities mainly because of its relatively inaccessible location (see ch. 2, Physical Environment).

Other important cities developed as the country's economy progressed. Guantánamo is an important center for the sugar, coffee, tobacco, chocolate, and salt industries. Manzanillo is a sugar center and rich import center; Ciego de Avila derives its importance from the sugar fields of the fertile Trocha plain; Pinar del Río is a tobacco center. Location at the juncture of important communication routes has been a prominent factor in the development of Camagüey, Morón, and Cienfuegos; the last-named is not only a shipping port for the sugar of Las Villas Province but also has an international airport. Among the newest cities to develop is Holguín, favorably situated in a region of diverse agriculture and developing mineral resources.

Administrative Divisions

Administratively the country is divided into six provinces; these territorial divisons date from 1879. From west to east they are Pinar del Río, La Habana, Matanzas, Las Villas, Camagüey, and Oriente. The boundaries between provinces are roughly parallel, running north to south, and were not decided for any particular geographical reasons. The names of provincial capitals correspond to the province names in all cases except those of Las Villas and Oriente, whose capitals are, respectively, Santa Clara and Santiago de Cuba (both the old province names). The capital of La Habana Province is called La Habana in Spanish, although it is designated Havana in English.

A new dimension was added to local government in 1965 with the establishment of regions as subdivisions of each province (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). Each region comprises several *municipios* (similar to townships in the United States), which in turn are divided into *barrios* (districts or neighborhoods). Many new *municipios* have been created since 1959, when there were only 126. Ideally, the boundaries of each region lie within the sphere of influence of a population center that is connected to the outlying areas by a road system. The government felt it could more efficiently provide certain services and organize certain industrial and agricultural projects on these new regional bases than on either the *municipio* or provincial level. In 1966, however, pilot projects were still being carried out on the regional level to determine the optimum functions for these new administrative units.

CHAPTER 5

ETHNIC GROUPS AND LANGUAGES

Cuba's population has been in a state of flux since the 1959 Revolution, and more than 500,000 people have left the island. No new census has been taken since 1953, although official estimates and partial tabulations have been released by the government. None of these contained percentages of racial groups, nor was a racial breakdown of the refugees available as of mid-1969. It is generally believed, however, that the numerical role of the Negro and lower class mulatto elements is steadily increasing, since the majority of those who are leaving the island are upper and middle-class whites and mestizos (persons of mixed heritage, including Negro-white, Negro-Chinese, and white-Chinese). There is also a high percentage from the Jewish community and an undetermined number of Chinese among the refugee population.

Descendants of Spaniards and Africans, both of whose forebears arrived in Cuba during the sixteenth century, comprise the vast majority of the population. Since intermarriage between the two groups has always been prevalent, there exists a large component of racially mixed persons. A Chinese community was prominent before the Revolution, forming a significant segment of the middle class. There was also a small Jewish population composed of Sephardic Jews (those of Spanish origin) and immigrants from the United States and Eastern Europe. The last reliable census, made in 1953, classified 72.8 percent of the total population as white, 12.4 percent as Negro, 0.3 percent as oriental, and 14.5 percent as mestizo. The census classification was based upon the subjective impressions of the census takers and did not adequately reflect the extent of racial mixture. Other estimates during that period, for example, indicated that only 30 percent of the population was white, 20 percent was mestizo, 49 percent Negroid, and 1 percent oriental.

Although there is no significant Indian population, Cubans describe a large segment of their people as mestizos. In many Central American and Andean countries this term is used to denote physical and cultural traits resulting from an Indian-Spanish mixture. In Cuba the term *mestizo* describes a person of any racial mixture. The most common example of this is Negro-white, which is also called mulatto. The role of the mestizo in Cuban history and culture has been emphasized and praised since the Revolution.

Cuban intellectuals have long stated with great pride that the population represents a mixture of peoples. In the past, however, the emphasis was less on race rather than on loyalty to Cuba. The term *criollo* was used to denote someone of native origin, usually, but not always mixed, who identified himself with Cuba in nationality and outlook. It appears, however, that the element of race has been introduced into the concept of *criollo*, and the popular image of the true Cuban has become a mestizo.

Most of the white population is of Spanish extraction; but before the 1959 Revolution, there was also a large colony of white immigrants from the United States, Canada, and Great Britain. The Spanish, however, have been represented on the island for over 400 years; they are the most numerous and have had the greatest influence upon the Cuban culture. The extent to which Spanish customs have molded the Cuban life-style is rivaled only by the Afro-Cuban tradition. Nonetheless, persons born in Cuba of recent Spanish extraction and who continue to think of themselves as Spaniards are not called *criollo*. The division between Spaniards and *criollos* dates from the Spanish colonial period, when persons born in Cuba usually were denied the most important and lucrative commercial and official occupations.

Negroes, most of whom came to Cuba as slaves, have profoundly affected the Cuban language, cuisine, music, and religion. Intermarriage between Negroes and all other groups except upper class whites has been common, and the racial composition of the island reflects this. From the time Negro slaves were freed in 1886, they have suffered more from social and economic discrimination than from racial segregation. Before the 1959 Revolution, they were usually found in the lower socioeconomic positions and performed, for the most part, unskilled jobs. Since the Revolution, the government has expanded and improved the educational system in predominately black areas and has made its treatment of the Negro population the basis of appeals for support addressed to all minority groups.

Although Cubans have a large and precise vocabulary to describe different shades of skin and hair, particularly of women, they often are vague in ethnic designations. Some Jews are known as Turcos (Turks), a name which also is applied to all persons from the Middle East. Other Jews are known as Polacos (Poles), a name commonly given to all Eastern Europeans, including Germans. The word German, however, is often used to mean Jewish. Congo and Nañigo are among the names given indiscriminately to all things African.

Spanish is the national language that is spoken by all but a few immigrants. It is spoken with a strong, distinctive Cuban accent and is full of highly idiomatic and elliptical expressions, so that native Spanish speakers from other countries at first often have difficulty in understanding it. Certain Cuban groups retain the use of a foreign language among themselves; the English-speaking, Jewish, and Chinese communities have published newspapers, directories, and other material in their own languages. Their own languages were also used in private community schools before the Revolution. Many Cubans of Spanish extraction also have a good knowledge of English, and many English phrases have been given universal currency by the pervasive influence of North American culture.

African influence is considered to be responsible for some of the special characteristics of Cuban Spanish. Several African languages that were introduced by slaves are used principally in the rituals of religious cults. Many expressions from these languages have passed into general usage and into many popular Cuban songs.

Taino, the language of the original Indian inhabitants of Cuba, is no longer spoken in Cuba, but many words and names survive. Taino is a branch of the Arawak language group still spoken elsewhere in the Antilles and in northern South America.

The government has pursued an active literacy campaign, but in order to reach the people it has had to rely most upon direct personal contact, radio, and television. This is the accepted and highly valued pattern, for the ideal Cuban is an orator. At all social levels the rhetorical use of language is noticeable; talk is incessant, very loud and very fast, and is accompanied by frequent expressive gestures.

ETHNIC GROUPS

Criollos

A *criollo* is simply anyone born in Cuba, but the term has complex ethnic and political significance. Since colonial days, a sharp division has existed between two groups: those who by birth and by the primary focus of their interests consider themselves *criollos* or Cubans; and those, born either in Cuba or in Spain, who consider themselves to be Spaniards. Under the Spanish crown, native Cubans could not hold important government positions, and they were discriminated against in the awarding of commercial privileges. After the War of Independence in 1898, Spanish interests—joined with those of groups in the United States—continued to dominante.

Occasionally, the word *criollo* is used to refer to the white Cuban leadership that has provided the ideology for *criollo* nationalist movements. Because so many of the immigrant groups, particularly the Spaniards, included few women, the typical *criollo* is the product of a mixed marriage—that is, a mestizo. *Criollo* leaders, therefore, have always appealed for the support of mestizo Cubans against the dominant foreign-oriented group. Originally Spanish, then Spanish and American, the foreign-oriented groups were characteristically and self-consciously white.

The white element of the population has been continuously reinforced by new generations of Spanish immigrants. Their children, however, characteristically have associated themselves with *criollo* nationalist movements in opposition to their parents. In so doing, they deliberately support the interests of mestizo elements and of the lower class against the upper class. This is an old pattern. During the War of Independence, the Cuban rebels were joined by many men whose fathers had been Spanish soldiers in the Ten Years' War (1868—78). In 1960 Fidel Castro, himself the son of Spanish immigrants, reaffirmed this tradition by asserting that all true Cubans were mestizos in spirit if not in fact.

Cuban nationalists have upheld the virtues and achievements of mestizos as being those of a distinct ethnic group—a new, superior, and peculiarly Cuban product. They identify their opponents as upholders of white supremacy by the following points: to the opposition shown by Spanish slaveowners to independence movements, to proposals of the Confederate States during the American Civil War for annexing Cuba as a province of the South, to racial segregation and discrimination in the United States and in European colonies, and to the racist implications of the Falangist doctrine of *hispanidad* (a movement to reassert the cultural and racial unity of Spain and Latin America).

Spaniards

Since the conquest, there has been a constant traffic of Spanish emigrants to and from Cuba. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, many came from Andalusia as government agents and military personnel. In the nineteenth century, large numbers of Asturians, Galicians, Catalans, Basques, and Canary Islanders arrived; most of these immigrants engaged in agricultural and small-scale commercial activities. Regional differences among these immigrants persisted and were expressed in the regional designations of the many mutual benefit societies they founded. During economic depressions in Cuba, substantial numbers returned to Spain, and workers were sometimes transported across the Atlantic and back solely for the Cuban sugar harvest. Upper class children were often sent to Spain for their education.

A new type of Spanish immigrant began arriving in the late 1930s. They were refugees from the Spanish civil war and included a high proportion of men with urban backgrounds, industrial-technical training, and radical political inclination. Many of these have, in turn, fled since the Revolution, but a large percentage is now extremely useful to the government as both political organizers and operators of the nationalized industries.

Under the Constitution of 1901, Cuban-born children of foreign parents were automatically foreign citizens but could register as Cubans on their twenty-first birthday. Since 1934 they have been considered Cuban but have been able to opt for registration as foreigners. The retention of choice in the 1934 law has permitted some Spanish families in Cuba to maintain their sense of separate, non-Cuban identity. In the everyday lives of long-time residents of the island, distinctions are made such as, "I am Cuban but my husband is Spanish." On the other hand, the shortage of women among Spanish as among other immigrant groups has aided assimilation in the second generation. As they achieve financial security and move up the social ladder, many Spanish families merge with the *criollo* upper class.

Elements of Spanish culture, of which the language is the most obvious example, permeate the whole of Cuban society. Some districts such as Holguín are almost a replica of Spanish towns. It is, however, in their social and economic interests that the Spanish group emerges more distinctly. Because approximately three-fourths of the Roman Catholic clergy are Spanish, nationalist leaders have accused the Church of being an agent of Spanish interests (see ch. 11, Religion). Before the Revolution, Spaniards dominated wholesale and retail trade and the import business. They also owned most of the urban property and many rural estates. Their position in trade has been challenged since the 1930s by *criollo* Cubans, Jews, and Chinese and has been seriously impaired by the restrictions of the trade embargo (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations). In addition, a land reform program and the expropriation of private income-producing housing have significantly affected the economic position of the Spaniards.

In a country notable for the number and variety of its clubs and societies, Spanish regional associations were outstanding as the most tightly organized, exclusive, and conservative. Founded originally to assist new arrivals, these societies expanded into social centers, sources of medical insurance funds, and protective commercial chambers. They also retained a sentimental patriotic interest in the regional affairs of Spain; in the case of the Catalans, this interest was specifically anti-Castilian and anti-Franco. Since the Revolution, many of their activities have been limited, and many of their members have emigrated.

Not all members of the Spanish group, however, had dominant economic positions. The 1934 law, requiring employers to maintain a work force of 50 percent native Cubans, confined many of the poorly educated Spaniards to such jobs as small traders, taxicab drivers, waiters, and domestic servants. Lower class immigrants of this type were collectively known as Gallegos (literally, natives of Galicia) and were stereotyped as close-fisted, stolid, and ambitious.

The Negroes

When the resident Indian population proved unsuitable for the harsh labor required by the Spaniards, the crown authorized the importation of Negro slaves, beginning in 1517. During the next 300 years, almost a million slaves were carried to Cuba, and Havana gradually became an important international slave market. In 1817 the Negro population, including 115,000 who were free, slightly outnumbered the whites; and during the following years, the Negro majority steadily increased. In about 1820 Spain agreed, under pressure from Great Britain, to a series of treaties abolishing the slave trade. The agreements, however, were not enforced.

The Spanish officials responsible for suppressing the traffic made substantial profits from the trade, as the expanding sugar industry depended on plentiful cheap labor. An estimated 200,000 blacks were introduced as contraband between 1820 and 1886; the slaves were finally and effectively emancipated in 1886.

Heavy European immigration in the latter half of the nineteenth century reduced the percentage of Negroes in the total population. Between 1899 and 1943, the proportion continued to fall from a high of 14.9 percent to 9.7 percent. This trend was reversed in 1943, and the census of 1953 revealed that the rate of increase among Negroes was higher than in any previous period. The change was partially attributable to the migration of Negroes to the cities, where improved sanitary conditions lowered their death rate. This upswing in the Negro population has not been adversely affected by the mass emigration from Cuba since 1959. Among the 500,000 who have left the country, only 6.5 percent reportedly are Negro. Although no official statistics exist, estimates have been made that the proportion of blacks in the population has risen to a new high. Oriente Province has the largest Negro population, but concentrations of Negroes are found in Havana and other major cities of the island.

Negroes were brought to Cuba from all parts of West Africa, from Senegal to the Congo, and from the coast to hundreds of miles inland. Cuban Negroes are sometimes referred to collectively as *negros bozales* when their African origin is being stressed. Some of them retain traditions of their homeland, which they think of as a semimythical land called Guiné. There is not, however, a general identification with Africa although, since 1959, the study of African traditions, history, and dance has greatly increased; a few schools now teach the Yoruba and Bantu languages. The largest and most influential documented Negro group in Cuba, as in Trinidad and Brazil, is the Yoruba from southwestern Nigeria. It is not possible to ascertain the tribal origin of all of the groups, because the old slave records list ports of embarkation rather than tribal names.

The Yoruba are known as Lucumí and are distributed throughout the island. Striking similarities exist between the Lucumí and their modern counterparts in Nigeria in such matters as posture, gestures, the hairstyles of women, and agricultural practices. Some typical Cuban dishes are of Yoruba origin. The dominant Afro-Cuban religious cults, although blended with features of Roman Catholicism, are basically the same as those of southern Nigeria.

The second-largest group of Negroes is concentrated in La Habana Province and in the cities of Matanzas and Cardenas in Matanzas Province. They are known as Carabalíes, a name derived from the port of Calabar in southeastern Nigeria, and they come from various tribes such as Efik (known as Efi in Cuba) and the Ibibio (called Bibios). Other Negro groups represented are Dahomeyans, Congolese, Haitians, and Jamaicans. The Dahomeyans, called Ararás, are more numerous in Matanzas than in Havana Province. The groups known as Congos, or Bantus, include some of Cameroun and Angola origin as well as Congolese. The largest numbers of Congos are in the east, particularly in the cities of Santiago de Cuba and Guantánamo. In the past, Haitians and Jamaicans have been imported from their islands to work the sugar harvest and some have settled permanently in Cuba, preserving many elements of their own culture. No information is available on the size of any of these groups, their exact distribution, or the extent to which they consciously maintain a separate identity.

Whatever their previous origin, the various elements of the Negro population have evolved a cohesive tradition composed of their diverse African heritages and of inferences from the Spanish culture. The result is an Afro-Cuban tradition that not only permeates the arts and intellectual spheres of Cuban life but the social and religious aspects as well. The most popular manifestation of this is Afro-Cuban music, which has become internationally famous. Cuba's leading musicians, such as Brindís de Salas, José White, and José M. Jiménez have been predominately Negro; and such well-known dances as the conga and rumba were derived from their music.

Negro poets and writers have created a school of literature called *negrista*, which records the experiences of the Afro-Cuban in both poetry and prose. In addition, the survival of African spiritualism and the existence of hundreds of societies devoted to a syncretic worship of African saints has greatly influenced the religious life of the whole island (see ch. 10, Artistic and Intellectual Expression; ch. 11, Religion).

Before the 1959 Revolution, it was widely publicized that Cuba had no racial problem. Cuban nationalists asserted that the whites, who remembered the achievements in the struggle with Spain of such Negro heroes as Antonio Maceo, regarded all Negroes as brothers. Any existence of discriminatory hiring practices and exclusion of Negroes from upper class hotels, resorts, clubs, and public parks was blamed on American and Spanish financial interests rather than on Cuban prejudices. Opponents of Fidel Castro maintained that he invented the racial issue.

Discrimination is in fact an old problem that has always become more serious in times of political crisis. At the end of the nineteenth century, for example, anti-Negro feeling among supporters of independence was one of the greatest difficulties faced by José Martí, the foremost leader in the struggle for independence. There were numerous slave revolts in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and, in 1912, more than 3,000 Negroes were killed in an uprising. In the 1930s, attempts by blacks to end discrimination were met with violence and riots.

Before 1959, both economic and social discrimination was prevalent. Although some Negroes could be found in all occupations, including the professions and the senate, they were disproportionately concentrated in the lower socioeconomic positions. It was alleged that actual systematic discrimination was practiced in the government service, the diplomatic service, the legal profession, and many private undertakings. In addition, Negroes often received less pay than whites for performing the same type of job. More Negroes than white workers were unemployed, underpaid, or employed in the most menial positions, and were recipients of only the most basic schooling.

Socially, discrimination against the Negro was visible in their exclusion from most of the better hotels, beaches, and places of entertainment patronized by tourists and upper class Cubans. Even in public areas, such as squares and parks, there was often a promenade limited to whites, which was a step higher than the one provided for Negroes. Many social clubs were exclusively and self-consciously white, although some Negro groups retaliated by forming their own exclusive organizations.

Racial discrimination had long been an important preoccupation of some of the more prominent members of the Negro population. Disappointment arising from the persistence of colonial discriminatory patterns following independence from Spain led to the foundation in 1908 of the Independent Color Party (Partido Independiente de Color) and in 1912 led to serious racial disturbances. Later, Negro educational and social organizations throughout the island, led by the Club Aténas of Havana, pressed for legal and constitutional reforms to benefit Negroes. Others turned to more radical ideologies, and many of the most important left-wing leaders in Cuba were Negro. A large percentage of Negroes were members of labor groups and the Communist party. It is also indicative that the rebel stronghold in the fight against Fulgencio Batista (see ch. 3, Historical Perspective) was located in Oriente province, which has the largest concentration of Negroes on the island. In April 1958 Santiago, the provincial capital, was the only major city to successfully implement a worker's strike against Batista.

Nonetheless, the Cuban racial problem was never carried to extremes. Actual segregation was rare, and social intercourse between blacks and whites was common. There never existed any legal prohibition against interracial marriage, and this was a frequent occurence among lower classes. In addition, the size and variety of the mestizo population and the number of whites in the lowest social groups tended to forestall the development of a corporate Negro consciousness. Much of the social discrimination practiced against blacks was experienced by poor whites and mestizoes as well. The Cuban Negro often identified with class lines more readily than with racial grouping. This class identification was intensified by the racial prejudice that existed between Cuban mulattos and Negroes and between Cuban Negroes and all foreign blacks, such as Haitians and Jamaicans.

In the past, it was a frequent political ploy to denounce the existence of racial discrimination in appealing for electoral support. Leaders promised to uphold Negro rights but subsequently failed to institute these promises when in office. The Constitution of 1940 was regarded as an important social advance, but many of its provisions were disregarded in practice. The legislative initiative gradually fell to the Communists and to the Civic Front against Racial Discrimination (Frente Cívico contra la Discriminación Racial), sponsored by the Cuban Labor Federation. Many Negroes, however, resented left-wing efforts to capitalize on the issue.

Shortly after the Revolution, Castro began his own propaganda campaign on behalf of racial equality. He has asserted that freedom is native to Cuba, and that all Negroes in the country can see the social treatment they deserve. Hotels, beaches, and resorts have been opened to all, regardless of race, and tangible evidence of segregation has been eliminated. An extensive literacy campaign was implemented in the Oriente district and other predominately Negro areas, and an effort has been made in the economic sphere to hire Negroes for more responsible positions. The regime has given maximum publicity to the role of Juan Almeida, a Negro who held the position of chief of staff of the army, citing him as proof of the willingness of the leaders of the Revolution to accept a Negro colleague. From limited data it appears that the Negro population generally supports Castro, and only a small percentage of those leaving Cuba are black.

On the other hand, there is also evidence that there is a measure of disillusionment on the part of Negroes. The intervention procedure, by means of which the committees of Negro societies that were devoted to the promotion of racial equality were integrated with the hierarchy of government, in effect took away the right of Negroes to express any corporate opinion except one of wholehearted approval. According to government propaganda, perfect freedom had been established by the mere fact of revolution, and therefore, the societies ceased to have any recognized function. They were encouraged to wither away by administrative actions that deprived them of their income and office space.

The earlier, intense campaign against racial prejudice has been moderated, although there is still evidence of racial bias on a personal level. The percentage of blacks at the middle socioeconomic level has greatly increased, but there is only a small percentage in the upper echelons of society and government. Fidel Castro has asserted that complete elimination of prejudice cannot be accomplished in a few short years; it will take place over a wider span of time as blacks receive advanced education and move into more responsible positions, and as children are raised in a new environment.

The Chinese

There are no available records concerning the number of Chinese who have left Cuba since 1959; however, there were early indications, shortly after the Revolution, that some of the more prosperous members of the community were attempting to emigrate. There was also evidence that a large segment of the Chinese was unhappy over Castro's alignment with Communist China. Before the Revolution, Chinese were found throughout Cuba, but only in Havana did they form an important distinct community. Coming to Cuba in the second half of the nineteenth century as indentured laborers, they steadily advanced to a position of prosperity and considerable commercial influence.

When the slave trade was abolished in 1845, efforts were made to replace the supply of cheap Negro labor with Chinese under contract in conditions little better than slavery. Between 1853 and 1873, 132,435 laborers, of whom 13 percent died on the way, were sent to Cuba from the Philippines and Canton. In 1899 the Chinese population numbered 14,863, or about 1 percent of the total, of whom only 49 were women. After 1902 Chinese immigration was prohibited; but when the sugar boom increased the demand for labor, many thousands more were brought in illegally. Although the 1953 census lists only 0.3 percent of the total population (about 2,000 people) as of the "yellow race," many of those listed as mixed are of part-Chinese ancestry and consider themselves to be members of the Chinese community. In 1960 the Chinese community was estimated to number 35,000 people, of whom 12,000 resided in Havana.

Because of the small number of Chinese women in the island, mixed Chinese-white and Chinese-Negro marriages were common, and the proportion of pure Chinese steadily decreased. Marriage to a white, preferably a Spanish bride, carried high prestige in the Chinese community and was a mark of successful social climbing. Chinese-Negro unions were found largely in the lower class.

In Havana and other major cities, the Chinese achieved much of their success in competition with Spanish commercial interests. They were active in the wholesale and retail food business and were noted owners of restaurants and laundries. In the provinces they were often self-employed as truck gardeners. With the reorganization of the economy, many are finding it very difficult or impossible to continue in their prerevolutionary business.

Havana has an extensive Chinatown in which there is a market, Chinese groceries and drug stores, and a theater that shows Chinese films. There also is a secondary school, a health center, an old people's home, and a cemetery. A Presbyterian Church and an Adventist Church in Chinatown have predominantly Chinese congregations, and there are two Taoist temples. Several daily newspapers in Chinese have appeared from time to time. They usually reflect in their titles, such as *South China News*, the Cantonese origin of the majority and their continued interest in their homeland. As is true of other immigrant groups in Cuba, the Chinese maintain strong links overseas.

The many Chinese political clubs were devoted to the world-wide concerns of Chinese rather than to Cuban affairs; in 1959 the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) maintained an extensive organization with centers in the principal cities. The national federation of Chinese associations, the Centro Chino, had its headquarters in the Chinese (Taiwan) consulate. But as part of their struggle to succeed in an alien environment and to be accepted as Cubans, Chinese leaders have stressed the part played by Chinese heroes in the War of Independence. A monument in Havana memorialized their devotion. The existence of a common tradition has been upheld in the assertion that Sun Yat Sen is "the Martí of China."

During 1960 Chinese Communist influence was greatly strengthened. Opening a China-Cuba People's Friendship Week, Communist

Chinese (Peking) representatives redefined the common tradition: "Now the real China is linked with the real Cuba." The three Chinese newspapers of Havana, all pro-Nationalist, were closed by government order, and a Chinese Communist newspaper was established. Questionnaires regarding family connections with China were circulated. Although the relationship between the two governments has been less fervent since 1960, this has not affected treatment of the oriental citizens. The Cuban government assured the Chinese colony that the Revolution had ended forever whatever racial discrimination might have existed under previous regimes.

Jews

The Jewish population is concentrated in Havana, but is also distributed throughout the island, principally in the provinces of Las Villas, Camagüey and Oriente. In 1959 the size of the community was established at 10,000, but as of May 1969, over 9,000 of these had left Cuba as refugees. The current status of the remaining community is not known but it is believed that the downward trend in the population has continued. Cuban Jews, however, have encountered no special difficulties arising from the Revolution (see ch. 11, Religion).

The Jewish community in Havana forms a distinct group with a life and culture of its own; there is little marriage outside it with other Cubans. Despite its small size, however, no single representative organization has been created, and major rifts arising principally from the heterogeneous origin of Cuban Jews continued to divide it. The community was begun in 1904 by prosperous American Jews who had commercial interests in Cuba and who founded the United Hebrew Congregation. This first group was divided from later immigrants by wide social and cultural differences and has always remained more or less aloof from them. Later immigrants were aided by American Jewish philanthropic organizations, such as the Jewish Committee for Cuba that was founded in 1924.

The earliest large Jewish immigration took place before World War I. It was made up of Jews from eastern Mediterranean countries. These immigrants, often referred to as Turcos (Turks) by other Cubans, once constituted approximately one-fourth of Cuban Jewish population. Their representative organization is Shevet Achim, a congregation formed in 1914.

The major sector of the Jewish community consists of large numbers of Yiddish-speaking European Jews, mostly Russians and Poles, who began to arrive in the 1920s. The word Polaco, sometimes used derogatorily, is now commonly used in Cuba to mean Jewish. Many of these immigrants used Cuba as a temporary halt, while they made arrangements to enter Mexico and the United States. The Yiddish-speaking were welcomed as "Germans" by the strongly pro-German people of Cuba. Anti-Semitic feeling did not develop until the 1930s, when the sympathies of the Spanish upper class element with Franco and Hitler, together with their resentment against the commercial competition offered by the Jews, resulted in a certain amount of official and unofficial persecution.

In 1960 it was estimated that about 75 percent of the working Jewish population was engaged in small-scale retail trade, 15 percent owned larger stores, and 10 percent were engaged in the production of consumer's goods. The extent to which this has changed is not known, but it is believed that the emigration of large numbers from the Jewish community and the substantially altered economic structure under the revolutionary administration has greatly influenced and changed the socioeconomic pattern for the remaining Jewish residents. Several small Jewish manufacturing enterprises, for example, including a diamond industry, have been abandoned by their owners.

The Jewish community in Havana early developed a vigorous cultural program. Educational work, conducted in Yiddish, included lectures, theaters, and schools. A Yiddish press has produced novels and collections of verse by Cuban Jews, and several periodicals have had some success. This has continued under the Castro regime, although on a more limited scale.

Zionism has its supporters particularly in the Centro Israelita, one of the older secular societies with the best claim to represent the whole community. Conservative religious organizations also are strongly supported, along with two important women's groups.

Others

During the period of the Haitian revolt (1789—1804), many French families fled to Cuba, settling mainly in the east. Most were coffee-planters, and for a time during the nineteenth century they formed a distinct community operating plantations somewhat different in type from those of the rest of Cuba. French names survive in parts of Oriente and in Cárdenas.

The Spanish element has always included a number of Irish Catholics, Spaniards by adoption. Some Spanish officials with Irish names, such as O'Reilly and O'Farrill, are remembered in several of Havana's thoroughfares. Many of the Roman Catholic clergy are Irish.

Syrians and Lebanese, both known as Turks, are found in some numbers, but they do not form a distinct group. Most of them are Maronite and Orthodox Christians. Mexicans are found particularly in the Regla district of Havana, and there are approximately 600

Japanese throughout Cuba. The latter do not form a recognizable group except on the Isle of Pines, where they number an estimated 130. These are being slowly assimilated and no longer maintain their Japanese language school or hold yearly Buddhist festivals. The only institution that preserves their separate status from their Cuban neighbors is the Japanese Society, which helps the sick and destitute and maintains a collective cemetery.

Before the Revolution, there was a large English-speaking colony in Havana, predominantly American but including British and Canadians. Members of the group were sometimes referred to as the "ABC's." Most were executives of foreign companies, and others were permanent residents with property in Cuba. Their close social contacts with Cubans were largely limited to the upper class, but their influence was visible throughout Havana. The names Yacht Club and Country Club were always used in English; and the newest and most fashionable residential suburb of Havana was known simply as El Country, from the typical social institution of those who lived there. Since 1959 this district has been renamed Cubanacan, which was the aboriginal Indian name for Cuba, and most of the English-speaking persons have left.

In the southern part of the island, however, there is still a colony of Lutheran, English-speaking farmers who came from the Cayman Islands south of Cuba. They live like, and consider themselves to be, Cubans. In 1960 an educational mission was sent from Havana to teach them Spanish.

The Indians

Indians were long thought to have disappeared from Cuba, but since World War II, expeditions into remote regions of Oriente Province, led by Antonio Núñez Jiménez who since 1959 was a major figure in the Castro regime, have discovered a few families strongly Indian in appearance and culture. These Indians speak Spanish, mixed with a large Indian vocabulary, and dress like other Cuban peasants but have been largely untouched by the modern civilization of Cuba. In some cases they have deliberately resisted recent incursions of strangers into their territory.

When Columbus discovered Cuba, the sparse Indian population (perhaps 200,000) consisted of several different peoples. The oldest inhabitants were cave-dwelling Ciboney Indians, who had occupied the whole island before the arrival of successive waves of Taino-speaking Arawak Indians from Haiti. By 1492 the Ciboney were restricted to the modern province of Pinar del Río and to some of the offshore islands; some were enslaved by the Taino, who had a more advanced technology. The Ciboney were hunters and fishermen using stone implements, but the Taino practiced agriculture and lived in the thatched house (*bohío*), which is still a prominent feature of Cuban rural life. In the extreme east of Cuba, the most recent Taino immigrants remained in contact with their Haitian homeland, from which they drew reinforcements for fighting the Spaniards. Carib Indians, fierce fighters and cannibals, originally resident in the Lesser Antilles, were invading the Greater Antilles at the time of Columbus' arrival. They probably raided Cuba but did not settle there.

After the conquest, the majority of the Indians were divided among Spanish landowners and mineowners under the *repartimiento* system. This system was instituted ostensibly to safeguard the Indians, convert them to Catholicism, and introduce them to Spanish culture, but it actually held them in brutal slavery. Repression and disease combined to kill many of the Indians. Scattered outbreaks of armed resistance continued, however, and became more numerous after the departure to Florida in 1539 of de Sóto's expedition, which considerably reduced the number of Spaniards in Cuba.

In 1550 the Indians officially were declared free. Many of them lived in towns and reservations of their own, associated with Spanish settlements, adopting Spanish culture to a large extent and in time developing a certain prosperity. The process of assimilation was speeded by the scarcity of Spanish women in Cuba, which resulted in many mixed marriages. Thereafter, the Indian population slowly lost its identity and merged with the predominantly white criollo agricultural class. The Indian element was reinforced during the nineteenth century by the importation of some thousands of laborers from Yucatan. Most of them, however, were unable to survive the conditions of their employment.

Most Cuban historians have asserted that the Indian population ceased to exist as an identifiable group in the sixteenth century. Only recently has it become fashionable among Cuban nationalists to point to various Indian chiefs as the first heroes of the centuries-old struggle against foreign domination and to try to identify indigenous Indian traits in modern Cuban culture. The best-known Indian resistance hero is Hatuey, a name better known as that of a popular Cuban beer. Indian culture survives in place names, some plant names, and in the rural *bohío*.

LANGUAGES

Cuban Spanish

In its written form the language of educated Cubans differs little from standard Spanish. In its spoken form it varies greatly from the Spanish spoken by Spaniards and by many other Latin Americans.

It most closely resembles the speech of Puerto Ricans, but is the most difficult Spanish to understand of any in Latin America.

Cuban Spanish basically is Castilian, spoken with the slurred accent of Andalusia, the region from which most of the early immigrants came. The carelessness of Andalusian enunciation has been greatly aggravated, probably by African influence. Cubans regularly omit the terminal and medial letter *s* and *d*, pronounce *r* very lightly, and modify many other consonants and vowels. For example: *Estados Unidos* is pronounced "*E'ta'o Uni'o*"; *el pais* is pronounced "*e'p'ae'* "; and *todo* and *cansado*, becomes "*to'a*" and "*cansá.*" A Cuban lexicographer has described Cuban Spanish as "a disfigured Castilian, without agreement, number, declension or conjugation."

Cuban Spanish is also rendered more difficult for foreigners by the number and frequency of its idioms, derived from local history and circumstances well known to Cubans but not understood elsewhere. For example, shortly after the revolution, Castro began changing the names of resorts, companies, and industries that were not of Cuban origin. Soon the phrase *se llamaba* (it was called) became a highly idiomatic slogan of the revolution. The insular isolation of Cuba has produced relatively more of these expressions than are met in continental countries. For some expressions a significance has evolved that is far removed from the original historical reference; others are constantly being invented. Cubans customarily employ the familiar *tú* form of address with greater freedom than is usual in other Spanish-speaking countries.

The Cuban lexicon includes many words of Indian, African, and English origin. The Indian words include many names of plants; for example, *ceiba*, the name of a species of acacia prominent in the Cuban countryside and noteworthy for its historical and religious associations. The word *tabaco* is used by modern Cubans, as it was among the Indians, to mean not the plant but the cigar made from it. *Batey*, another word of Indian origin, denotes a cluster of buildings on a sugar estate, or specifically a sugar refinery; originally it meant a meeting place. Many place names, such as Guanahacabibes, Jatibonico, and Camagüey are of Indian origin whereas, others are Spanish interpretations of Indian names.

Words of African origin are usually restricted to aspects of African culture found in Cuba. African terminology, however, is also found in place names, such as Cacooum in the Oriente, and in the names of various flora and fauna, such as *afió*, a species of yucca. *mambí*, the names given to revolutionary guerrilla fighters is also an African term, probably a Bantu word.

The proximity of the United States and the constant pressure of American culture on Cuba have introduced a multitude of English words into everyday speech. One class of words includes those accepted in good usage—though perhaps not by purists—because there is no exact Spanish equivalent, or because the English expression has gained international currency. Most words of this class refer to international affairs, politics, and economics. Fidel Castro, for example, is referred to as *lider* (leader), a word widely used in preference to such a word as *caudillo*, which suggests primarily a military dictator.

Another class of words, referring mostly to athletics and popularized by sports writers, is not accepted in good usage because Spanish equivalents exist, or because in many cases the construction and transliteration are bizarre. Nevertheless, these terms are widely used; discussion of such favorite Cuban concerns as baseball, boxing, and automotive mechanics is scarcely possible without them. *Beisbol* itself is accepted by the Spanish Academy in the absence of an equivalent, but *baloncesto* is preferred to the usual *basquetbol* (basketball). Examples of colloquial usage include *un tubey*, a two-base hit; *jonron*, a homerun; and *bloaut*, a blow-out. Before the revolution, newspapers often employed a hybrid language: "Kid Flanagan le soltó dos uppercuts y trés jabs que lo dejaron groggy."

The increasing use of English expressions has been opposed, without effect, both by upholders of the purity of Castilian Spanish and by nationalists who resent the Americanization of Cuba. Many American-owned enterprises which were nationalized in 1960 were given names that the government considered more meaningful to the people.

Castilian

When the kingdom of Castile gained political ascendancy over the other regions of Spain in the late fifteenth century, Castilian became the official language of the whole country; it replaced to a greater or lesser extent, the other regional dialects. Arabic, American Indian, Germanic, French, Italian, and English expressions have been incorporated into Castilian, but the language was stablized in its approximate present form during the eighteenth century. The Castilian language was transported to all of Latin America during the colonial era, but in its older form in which the letter *z* and the soft *c* are pronounced like an *s*, and not like a *th* as in modern Castilian. The older form has become universal throughout Latin America, modified by local customs of pronunciation.

The Cuban Language Institute publishes scholarly papers but has little influence on Cuban usage. Correct Castilian is spoken as an affectation by some members of the upper class. Other Spanish dialects are similarly little used. Members of the regional societies particularly, the Centro Catalán, use them in patriotic and nostalgic contexts; although often only poetic quotations are remembered. A quarterly news-sheet in Catalán, *La Nova Cataluña*, devoted entirely to Catalán history and affairs (including events in Spain) was being published in Cuba during 1959; but its present fate is not known.

English

Before the Revolution, English was usually the first foreign language learned. Many of the upper class studied in the United States; others used it extensively in business or in tourist services. American Protestant mission schools also taught English. American newspapers and magazines in English and Spanish editions were widely read by the educated. There were several English-language newspapers catering largely but not exclusively to the American, British and Canadian community.

The study of the English language has been deemphasized although it still is found in the curriculum of most schools. Cuban artistic and intellectual life, which in the past followed American and British trends, now espouses African or Latin American examples. Since the dominance of the upper class has been removed, the permeation of American patterns, expressed in English terminology, has also been deemphasized. Nonetheless, English remains the second language and is still spoken by a large percentage of the urban population.

African Languages

Of the many African languages introduced by slaves, only three—Yoruba, Fon, and Efik—are of much importance today. Occasional words and phrases of other African languages, including Ijaw, Ibo, and even Arabic are found embedded in the liturgies of the numerous religious cults. Yoruba and Efik are Nigerian languages; Fon is a language of Dahomey. All three belong to the widespread Niger-Congo language family of West Central Africa.

In all of these languages, as in Chinese, words are distinguished from each other partly by raising or lowering syllables to a different musical pitch. This feature has been partly abandoned in Cuba, and certain other modifications have occurred; but the languages are still intelligible to African speakers. They survive primarily because of their religious use; they are not written, and there is no standard form. Pronunciation and usage vary from region to region, and many Cuban writers have assumed that these languages ceased long ago to exist in coherent form.

The most widely spoken language is Yoruba, the language of the Lucumí (as the Yoruba in Cuba are generally called) and is commonly known as Anagó. The name was given by the Fon in

Dahomey to Yoruba slaves exported through the port of Whydah. Throughout Cuba, it is possible to hold conversations in Yoruba, which finds its principal use, however, in the widespread cults known as Santería (see ch. 11, Religion).

Fon (in Haiti, the principal language of voodoo) is called Arará. As with Efik (Carabalíe), its use is probably largely restricted to the rituals of the religious cults, Arará and Carabalíe.

Chinese

The Chinese spoken in Cuba is a composite version of the many subdialects of Canton. The Cantonese dialect itself is the most important of the several non-Mandarin dialects of South China. The Chinese colony in Havana has in the past supported several newspapers as well as theatrical productions and movies. Few Chinese words have been accepted into general Cuban usage.

Yiddish

Since their arrival in Cuba, Yiddish-speaking European Jews have maintained a vigorous educational and cultural program. A Yiddish press printed poetry, novels, and periodicals; Yiddish was the principal language used in Jewish schools, tehaters, and lecture halls. The continued use of Yiddish by Jews of European origin strengthened the cultural barrier between them and the Sephardim, Spanish Jews whose own language was Ladino, a form of medieval Spanish. After arriving in Cuba, the Sephardim adopted Spanish instead of using Ladino. Items of interest to Sephardim in Yiddish papers were printed in Spanish.

Yiddish, from the German Jüdish (Jewish), originated in Germany in the ninth century and subsequently became the principal language of Jews in Eastern Europe. It includes elements of Hebrew, Aramaic, Romance, Slavonic, and other languages; it now differs markedly from German in form, word order, and style, although words of German origin are distinguishable. In Cuba, Yiddish-speaking immigrants of the 1920s were generally known as Germans. Yiddish is written in Hebrew characters and has an extensive literature.

LANGUAGE AND SOCIETY

The personal loyalty shown by the people to their leaders, rather than to the institutions of government, give speechmaking and other forms of personal communication particular importance. Command of language, especially spoken language, is the mark of the educated and able man of affairs; and above all it is the mark of the politician. Scholars are respected as men who understand the world, and their eloquence is regarded as an indication of their ability to master not only ideas but facts. Rhetoric and power are thus closely related. Fidel Castro is considered to be the best speaker in Cuba, and his four to seven-hour speeches are followed by vast audiences.

Training in rhetorical skills is an important part of education at all levels. Schoolchildren are frequently required to give recitations, and university examinations are largely oral, especially in the popular field of law. A student is expected to convince his professors of his ability as much by his eloquence as by his knowledge. In ordinary life, speaking ability is an essential part of the public bearing of every successful man and most women. Declamation is more persuasive than statement, and some distrust is felt for taciturn individuals and those who express themselves simply, without repetition or flourish. Poetry is frequently quoted by people in all walks of life, and many of Cuba's best-known political heroes have been noted poets.

CHAPTER 6

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

By 1970 the lines on which social division had been drawn before the Revolution had largely disappeared although a new elite had been developing. Class distinctions had been officially abolished. The principal social division lay between managers of state-owned industries and farms and between members of the many government-sponsored national organizations and the rest of the population. Persons who belonged to such groups had higher social status and more privileges than others. They also had greater access to educational and other opportunities, as well as certain privileges and benefits. By 1971 political orientation and membership in the Communist Party of Cuba usually determined who was chosen for leading roles in the mass organizations and as managers of the state enterprises.

The government's official policy was to replace both the economic and social basis of class distinctions with political ones. Before the Revolution urban upper and middle classes not only controlled all major domestic business interests but also held the great majority of administrative, managerial, and professional positions. They also determined who had access to certain social, recreational, and housing facilities. In the countryside the upper class owned large landholdings. With the implementation of the agrarian and urban reform laws in the early 1960s, members of the old upper and middle classes lost all of the economic and social advantages by which they had previously been set apart.

The Revolutionary government also initiated plans to reduce the difference in living conditions between urban and rural populations. Rural inhabitants were mainly unskilled laborers or small farmers and were largely illiterate. Chronic seasonal or annual unemployment was widespread in rural areas, and recreational and sanitary facilities were lacking.

All efforts to raise the standard of living or increase production are the responsibility of government organizations or specific groups working in coordination with each other. Chief among them are the Communist Youth Organization (Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas—UJC), the Pioneers Union, and the Federation of Cuban Women.

In early 1970 the UJC was responsible for the mobilization of youth. At the schools and universities, members controlled the political orientation of the students and assured student loyalty toward the government. They deployed students and other youth to voluntary work brigades and sent graduates in technical fields where they were needed. Technical brigades were sent to administrative and teaching posts in various industries including agriculture. In sparsely populated areas, the farming-youth brigades were responsible for agricultural production, voluntary labor, and signing up of individuals for the rural militia.

Another subordinate group of the UJC was the Pioneers Union, whose members were taught the uses of natural resources, the implementation of efficient production methods, the importance of national ceremonies and symbols, and the importance of loyalty to Marxist-Leninist ideals. Both groups were steppingstones to membership in the Communist Party.

Mobilization of women into the labor force was the responsibility of the Federation of Cuban Women. Women who joined the organization first worked in teaching and sanitary brigades in rural and urban areas. As membership increased, they branched out into other fields including social work. In early 1970 members were working in agriculture, government, and industry.

BACKGROUND

Before the Revolution Cuban society was divided, according to sociologists, into upper, middle, and lower classes. According to the majority of the people, however, there were simply the rich and the poor. Although there were a number of other differences between the classes, the main criterion was economic.

Three classes could be distinguished on the basis of the economic criterion: a lower class, consisting mainly of urban and rural unskilled wage workers; a middle class, almost entirely urban, consisting of skilled workers, self-employed and salaried persons, and small proprietors and landowners; and an upper class made up of those in the upper ranks of government service, in professions, and owners of large estates, mills, and businesses.

Rural Society

Rural structure differed considerably from that of urban areas. The vast expansion of the largest enterprises, partly at the expense of smaller ones, and a shift from individual to corporate ownership rendered the rural upper class insignificant. Most of the rural upper class had been replaced by professional managers, and the rural landowners either sold out to corporations or became absentee landowners residing in urban areas.

The rural middle class consisted of owners and operators of farms large enough to require hired labor, and of managers, schoolteachers, and shopkeepers. At the bottom level were the wageworkers and the peasants who made up the bulk of the rural population. The lives of these people either depended on employment in one of the large enterprises or on familial initiative as applied to smallholdings.

A number of other differences between the classes coincided with the economic one. Members of the upper class had a degree of political power and were in responsible administrative positions on the largest estates. They were better educated and often lighter skinned than the lower classes (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). One of the differences between the rural middle and lower classes was that the former imitated the social conventions and ideals of the upper class, whereas the latter did not. The ability of the middle class to hire labor, however, was the principal criterion dividing the two classes.

Although many members of the rural lower class owned their own land (generally twenty-five acres or less), standards of living and education were low. Politically and culturally, they were marginal to the rest of the society. Within the lower class, Negroes were more often laborers and sharecroppers than were persons of mixed origins, who generally owned some land.

In most rural areas the population was very widely dispersed rather than concentrated in villages. Poorly developed roads and other communications facilities contributed to rural isolation and hindered access to whatever social and educational opportunities were available in the towns. The social advancement of individuals began with their emigration to the cities and abandonment of the rural economy.

Urban Society

In 1902, at the beginning of the republican era, urban society already revealed the chief features that characterized it until the Revolution. It included almost all of the national upper class, which was further concentrated principally in the capital city, and the bulk of the middle class.

The upper class consisted of the wealthiest landowners and professional people, the higher ranking government employees, and a number of representatives of foreign commercial and industrial interests. In their political activity members of the upper class dealt directly with the government in power rather than with the political parties.

Many of the upper class were families claiming direct Spanish descent who had lived in Cuba for centuries; some claimed Spanish titles of nobility. More recent arrivals were exiled Spanish insurgents. Whether native or foreign born, the upper class was largely foreign in the orientation of its social and economic interests.

The upper class possessed both education and money. It lived principally in a series of suburbs west of Havana, successively vacating each one to the middle class as a new neighborhood was built on the outskirts. Just as the lower class sought public schooling for their children and the middle class sought private schooling, the upper class frequently sent its children to schools outside the country. Intellectuals came from the upper and middle classes.

There were innumerable social clubs, set in grandiose buildings in downtown Havana, which catered to the recreational, educational, and cultural activities of the upper and middle classes. For two or three Cuban pesos a month (1 Cuban peso equals US$1—see Glossary), members could attend dances and other social functions, as well as special classes in a wide variety of subjects. Some of these clubs were medical insurance societies that maintained their own clinics for members. The lower class was excluded from most such clubs. In addition, there were numerous nightclubs, casinos, and private beach resorts that dealt strictly with the wealthier classes.

The economic interests of the relatively small middle class lay chiefly in commerce, real estate, and the professions. Frequently, these sources of income were combined; many merchants owned rooming houses, and lawyers had country estates. All members of the middle class observed the social amenities common to the upper class. Middle class families expected to have domestic servants; their sons were trained academically and by upbringing to consider themselves capable of administrative responsibility and public office, and they were chiefly employed accordingly.

University-educated middle class men formed the core of the middle sector of political life, a sector characterized by intense competition for political and economic privileges; by radical reformist politics, socialist programs, and a tendency to resort to violence; and by the success of many individual members in advancing themselves from a precarious position on the lower margin of the middle class to a position of great wealth and influence. Fidel Castro is a prime example of this class. The middle sector included prominent members of labor unions who saw in politics a means to social advancement and whose position as intermediaries between the government and organized labor gave them special privileges in the distribution of government patronage. It also included the younger generation of the upper class, men whose own efforts had raised them to economic and political independence but who were not wholly able to disassociate themselves from party politics. The lower class provided the middle class with the mass support necessary to win elections and to undertake other forms of political struggle, including mob violence, general strikes, and public demonstrations.

The urban lower class, including the industrial workers of the sugar *centrales* (mills), were much better organized than their rural counterparts and enjoyed a higher standard of living. Although the entire economy to some extent followed the seasonal rhythm of the sugar industry, employment was steadier in the cities, and there was a greater choice of occupation. Women could find wage labor in the cities but not on the farms. Organized urban labor, unlike farm labor that was nonunionized and without a political voice, exercised a strong influence in national politics.

It was in the middle class that color was of some importance. In general, the middle class considered itself white and practiced a certain degree of social segregation; friendships with Negroes were not sustained publicly, and private schools and the newer residential areas were closed to them. As a result, the predominantly urban Negroes lived in slum dwellings surrounding suburban residences.

Before 1959 there were some urban lower-class clubs, called *cabildos*, where people met to play dominoes, gamble, dance, and entertain friends. They were particularly prevalent in Negro neighborhoods; members were usually associated by African tribe. The *cabildos* had both religious and recreational aspects; some took on the characteristics of benefit societies common to upper class clubs (see ch. 11, Religion). Every large town had one or two of these clubs that were grouped into provincial federations and finally into a national federation.

Changes in the status of the Negro were generally acquired in one principal way: Negroes with exceptionally high standards of living and education were accepted in white schools and neighborhoods. The means for acquiring the money necessary for a high standard of living and a good education was often through trade unions.

THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE

International observers noted that by early 1970 the old social order had been destroyed through government legislation, institutes, and other means of control. The principal instruments of this destruction were the Agrarian Reform Law of May 1959 and the Urban Reform Law of November 1960.

For the rural peasant, agrarian reform meant the abolition of dependence on large private estates by the substitution of the state for the large landowner. It also meant that the old managers and absentee landlords have been replaced by representatives of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria—INRA). At least 60 to 70 percent of the farms are administered by the state. In the first postrevolutionary years expropriated enterprises that were best operated as single units, such as the sugar *centrales*, remained under state control. Some of them operated as cooperatives in which a number of the poorest local peasants held shares. As members of the cooperative, they are paid for their labor and are entitled to a share of the profits. Management, however, remains in the hands of INRA. On a few smaller estates, tenants were given title to their holdings during the early years of the Revolution. However, both governmental statements and actions indicate that a return to the concept of huge state farms is underway.

Some improvement in housing and a great deal of school construction have taken place in the countryside. Thousands of peasants who were previously illiterate are now estimated to have a sixth-grade level education. Moreover, technical instructors have been brought into the area to teach and train the peasants in modern techniques.

In addition, the government has deployed medical students to rural areas, although their training is incomplete and the facilities are limited. Special sanitary brigades have taught basic methods of personal hygiene in many areas and successfully completed inoculation campaigns.

Isolation, which had been the principal handicap of the rural population, reportedly is gradually being erased through planning and evolution of the state farm system. Population has shifted to accommodate new state farms and crop diversification. Through regional cultural offices the government is operating rural recreational activities and is bringing national culture to the countryside. Dramatic and artistic exhibits are presented. Peasants are asked to contribute their ideas to local productions. A number of peasants are being hired locally to fill administrative positions in these centers.

Indications are that social mobility among peasants and rural wage earners in early 1970 was increasing, according to government reports. The rural population, through formal and technical training, was expected to fill the void left by exiled technicians and managers. Outside observers have commented on several examples of the implementation of this policy, such as the case of a day laborer who was promoted to administrator of a state farm employing 4,000 workers. The observers note that political orientation plays a primary role in who is chosen.

In an effort to combat the lack of interest in agriculture by the youth, the government planned "naturalist circles" for rural primary and secondary school children. Small children were to plant and experiment with garden plots and be provided with films and literature on agricultural topics. Older students were to act as teachers after completion of the program.

In the cities the government toppled the economic strength of the upper class and attacked the great disparity between upper and lower class standards of living. It successfully managed the first by wholesale expropriation of all major income-producing capital investments, the removal of the upper class from managerial positions, and induced exile.

Housing was one of the principal areas in which the government sought to change the standard of living. Residential construction had always been one of the nation's most active industries, but the upper class was the major beneficiary before the Revolution. Much urban housing was in very bad condition, slums proliferated, and the supply of new housing was inadequate to meet urban population growth.

The National Institute of Savings and Housing (Instituto Nacional de Ahorros y Vivienda—INAV) was established in 1959 to meet housing needs. It was given responsibility for the development of urban housing and began production of modern housing units. Many upper-class houses were appropriated; some were allotted to government officials, others were used to house students. After the nationalization of all rented housing by the Urban Reform Law of 1960, INAV became the nation's landlord. Rent is paid to INAV according to the tenant's income and is treated as an installment payment toward the purchase of the specific property (see ch. 8, Living Conditions).

Coincident with the nationalization of all businesses was the reduction of high salaries. Pay scales have been reduced to the point where managerial salaries are only slightly above those of shop assistants. Rationing has initiated an equitable, although meager, distribution of goods for the majority of the population outside the government. The social amenities that accrued to middle and upper class status, especially in the cities, have largely been abolished along with the economic holdings. Salaries are not important since money has little effective purchasing power. By early 1970 private clubs had been nationalized and converted into workers' social clubs and made accessible to the lower classes, along with the private beaches and swimming pools. The number of nightclubs had declined.

In the early years of the Revolution, an attempt was made by Negro clubs to strengthen their organization, but this was thwarted by the government. By 1970 all proceeds from festivities had to be turned over to the government; in addition, parties could only be held on Saturdays and Sundays. The national federation of these clubs has been abolished along with their provincial headquarters. Most of the previously existing 526 Negro societies have closed.

Government initiative in destroying color, as well as economic, social and attitudinal, barriers has resulted in conflicting opinions regarding racial discrimination in Cuba. Some United States and Latin American observers, as well as the foreign press, claim there are a disproportionate number of Negroes attending universities in relation to their population percentage but that few are permitted to become teachers and even fewer are found in managerial positions. Some observe that Negroes receive lower echelon jobs simply on the basis of color and that the government, in an attempt to integrate the whole nation, has actually exacerbated racial differences.

The government, because it has given the Negro special considerations, considers Negro emigration a direct affront. Since early 1968 an increasing number of Negroes who are skilled laborers (carpenters, plumbers, mechanics), and even some unskilled, have emigrated. A United States Negro leader who visited Cuba in 1969 held that Negros were discriminated against in occupation and housing.

The Negro situation highlights the government program for a new society. In early 1970 it was inappropriate to discuss Cuban society in terms of class or race membership. Rather, status was drawn from being a member of one or more nationally oriented, politically indoctrinated groups, such as the militia, committees for the defense of the Revolution, or student organizations.

GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED MASS ORGANIZATIONS

In early 1970 one government-sponsored national organization was the militia. Through it, popular support for the regime was organized and a comprehensive program of popular education was begun. Peasants in rural districts, wearing as part of their uniform the straw hat of the *guajiro* (peasant), and workers from industrial plants were formed into militia companies. Professional and trade associations formed support units, such as the medical corps, which have been gradually integrated with the regular militia. In this way every important occupation group has been reconstituted as a branch of an armed movement. By joining the militia, men and women who had not fought in the Revolution itself could actively associate themselves with the Revolution's symbolic figure, an armed peasant or factory worker defending his right to build a better future. People who were unable to fill prestigious roles in the old order, including a noticeably high proportion of both Negroes and middle-aged women, could see themselves as members of a new elite. In early 1970 militia members numbered over 250,000.

Among industrial employees another special group was the Vanguard Workers. These were individuals whose punctuality, assiduity, and quantity and quality of production, as judged by plant management, distinguished them from fellow workers. Along with the status of the title Vanguard Worker came a period of paid vacation in either Cuba or another Communist country. Those workers selected were expected to set the pace for their fellow workers. Their production was the yardstick for judging output. However, increasing absenteeism has forced the government to discuss new means for solving production problems.

Youth

The recurrent theme of the Revolution in 1970 was the creation of a new man, embued with social consciousness and revolutionary spirit and performance, and a sense of internationalism. Particular emphasis was given to the country's youth who were to build the new society. Youthful energies were being directed into revolutionary channels by means of military, political, and educational programs.

Although some of the youth were thoroughly immersed in the Revolution by late 1970, many others were becoming discontented. Reports were being made by reliable witnesses of increased delinquency, drunkenness, and sporadic violence on the part of young people. Some of these occurrences were even reported by the government.

Students

Educational differences that had separated rural and urban populations before the Revolution were gradually being reduced. A university degree was no longer coincidental with membership in the upper classes nor with light skin.

A number of students were drawn from rural areas to attend urban universities. University students receive free room and board, clothes, and tickets to the theater, concert, and ballet. They also received pocket money.

Various mass organizations and government ministries plan free vacations and nationwide recreational activities for students. Included in the program for 1970 were plans for national sports events, national and international camping excursions, and ceremonies (including cane cutting) organized around topical weeks.

The Communist Youth Organization

The country's youth groups have been merged into a single giant organization, the Communist Youth Organization (Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas—UJC), formerly known as the Union of Young Rebels. Among those groups that it has absorbed is the National Federation of University Students, which had played a leading role in Cuban student affairs before the Revolution.

By 1970 members of the UJC, ranging in age from fourteen to twenty-seven, were responsible for the mobilization of all youth. Membership in the organization offered the participant almost the only opportunity for advancement.

To belong, a youth must provide testimony of political reliability, good grades or work, eagerness for work, and apparently acknowledged atheism. Each application is voted upon by the unit of the organization to which it is made. A committee of that unit then questions the applicant in depth and, if the results are favorable, he or she is voted a member.

New members proceed through an initiation period that involves attendance at lectures and the performance of minor tasks under the supervision of an older member. The applicant is judged primarily on attitude. At the end of this period the student or worker is given an annual membership card. Student dues at 25 centavos (1 centavo equals US$.01) a month; a worker pays one-tenth of his monthly salary. In 1970 thousands of young persons were working to qualify for full membership in the organization, but even larger numbers were avoiding it.

Technical Brigades

So-called technical brigades, affiliated with the UJC, were formed beginning in 1964 as a means of making maximum possible use of the country's skilled labor supply. The brigades utilize radio and television broadcasts, lectures, and bulletins to mobilize technicians. The technicians in turn teach methods to workers. By 1966 membership was nearly 8,000, 25 percent of whom were full members in either the UJC or the Communist Party; many were rural youths.

In order to incorporate more graduates into national programs, in 1966 the UJC was made responsible for mobilizing technicians for construction and animal husbandry. In accordance with plans to build 100,000 new homes in 1970, the UJC had already signed up 10,000 participants in 1969. They were being taught masonry, carpentry, construction, and machine operation in various national schools. However, because of the diversion of manpower to the sugar crop in 1970, this ambitious plan was not achieved.

Farming Youth Brigades

Another subsidiary of the UJC are the farming youth brigades. The brigades organize sports and cultural activities in rural areas and attempt to interest rural youth in national goals. In places where revolutionary activity had been particularly weak, the brigades have been able to organize militias, mobilize the settlements and villages for voluntary labor, and open educational facilities. In 1965 there were 741 farming youth brigades with over 10,000 members.

In the rural areas youth organizations are trying to bring young girls into the labor force. Before the Revolution few young women in the countryside received any education, and almost none were employed in productive labor. In early 1970, along with employment in more traditional areas, some girls were replacing men in the fields of aviculture, horticulture, and animal husbandry.

The Isle of Youth (Isle of Pines)

The UJC has also undertaken to develop the Isle of Youth, formerly known as the Isle of Pines, into a model socialist community (see ch. 24, Public Order and Internal Security). The first group of youths settled there in 1967. By 1968 the island population was 40,000. The early arrivals constructed dormitories, barracks, and dining halls. Later they built agricultural buildings and restaurant and recreational facilities.

The first group was followed by 4,500 agricultural workers, who had agreed to stay for two years. They received free room and board and medical and dental care, and 85 pesos a month. These were joined by students who were contributing their forty-five-day period of voluntary labor and by a number of nonstudents who wanted to participate in the program. The island was also used as a repository for delinquents and other youths being "rehabilitated." In addition to studying and implementing new agricultural and animal husbandry methods, an extensive citrus fruit program was undertaken.

The UJC recruits and supervises all the island's manpower. The island has its own budget and staff but works closely with the government. Militant UJC members hold most of the responsible positions. By 1968 the permanent population, primarily adults, was 23,000. There were, in addition, 5,000 students at the island's Institute of Applied Science (for agriculture and animal husbandry) and another temporary 12,000 youth and regular workers. Government estimates projected a population figure of 90,000 for 1970.

Pioneers Union

The Pioneers Union, founded in early 1961, had spread throughout the nation by 1970. It was an adjunct of the UJC and a springboard to its membership. Participants are from ages seven to fourteen and are either membership applicants or full-fledged members.

Leaders, known as guides, are assigned to every school and, optimally, to every classroom to form pioneer groups. They are selected on the basis of their revolutionary qualities, their desire to fill the position, and their attendance at a series of lectures over a period of between fifteen and forty-five days. Some of the scholastic requirements have been dropped and, in general, the academic level of the guides is not high. Leaders are directed to instruct the children in revolutionary goals: to study; to learn to love people; to be healthy and strong; to defend the socialist revolution by all means, even reporting deviations by friends; and to hate imperialism.

Leaders supervise such activities as the collection of raw materials, the planting of trees, the cleaning of parks, harvesting of crops, and group discussions on revolutionary, scientific, and technical subjects. Frequently, there is a lack of cooperation between teachers and guides.

Guides are also responsible for a number of pioneer activities in civic ceremonies and recreation. Pioneers march before visiting dignitaries. In addition, they compete in intramural and national sports events.

In April 1966, out of 700,000 children in the population between the ages of seven and fourteen, 14,396 were full members and another 185,000 were applicants. According to government statistics, over 500,000 children were full members by 1970; there were 25,000 guides.

Federation of Cuban Women

The Federation of Cuban Women seeks to give women a role in national development. Founded in August 1960, its president in early 1970 was Vilma Espin (Raúl Castro's wife), a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and chairman of the National Committee of Social Work and Crime Prevention.

The first responsibility given the organization was that of training young peasant girls from agricultural and fishing cooperatives and rural farms in sewing, dressmaking, and socialist culture and attitudes.

Most of the organization's work was done in the cities. Members replaced urban primary and secondary teachers who went into the countryside to teach. In addition, they found living quarters for scholarship students, participated in night schools that trained former domestics in technical specialties, and taught farm girls in the School for Agrarian Technification at El Caney, Oriente Province. The organization also ran nursery schools for children of working and student mothers.

In 1962 the organization branched out into the field of health and gave instruction in preventive hygiene methods in people's health schools and sanitary brigades. In 1964 the organization had 409,455 members and served in national vaccination campaigns.

Starting in 1969, the organization was extensively involved in a social work program that originated from a pilot plan in La Habana Province, between July 1965 and 1966. Under this program, women with at least a fifth-grade education visited families and held parent assemblies to combat pupil absenteeism and delinquency. Delinquency cases were sent to them by public order officials.

CHAPTER 7

FAMILY

By early 1970 the means with which families could influence politics, social patterns, and the economy were limited. Most previously influential families had emigrated; those remaining had had to alter their patterns of living. The importance of the individual as against that of the family was being stressed by the government, however, and persons whose families had been discredited, through emigration or opposition to the government, were judged on their own merits and not on those of their relatives.

Government activities that would create new roles for women and indirectly affect family life were still being resisted by a large percentage of the population in 1970. Programs for integrating women into the labor force were in conflict with traditional ideas that the male should be the wage earner, and that the woman's place was at home. Parents believed that girls should be groomed for becoming housewives and mothers and, ideally, should be chaperoned and supervised before marriage. Even among revolutionaries, husbands often objected to wives taking jobs and daughters being unchaperoned. The majority of women still preferred to remain at home. Young women, on the otherhand, were apt to value their new civil rights and seek freedom from traditional familial patterns in new educational and job opportunities.

Children whose parents sent them to day care centers and boarding schools were less pampered than those of the majority of parents who kept them at home as was customary. Children, however, continued to be a source of pride to all parents.

Both the marriage and divorce rates have increased since 1959. Although civil committees have been dispersed throughout the nation in an effort to foster legalized unions, the government has also made divorces more easily available. The size of the family has remained about the same since the Revolution, although the government plans for a reduction in the birth rate during the decade that began in 1970.

FAMILY LIFE

The Revolution has fostered the emigration of many families, divided many others, and altered previously existing familial social patterns. Families that belonged to the upper and middle classes have been most adversely affected.

When the government first started to appropriate upper class business investments and socialize private club facilities, many more affluent husbands sent their wives and children abroad. Men with investments outside the country joined their families almost immediately; others remained in Cuba until they could liquidate assets. Some children emigrated alone and were cared for by relatives or by the charitable offices of the Catholic Church. Persons of draft age, however, were not permitted to emigrate until they had fulfilled two years of military service.

Upper and middle class women were generally limited to the roles of wife and mother before the Revolution. The few activities in which they participated were welfare and cultural promotions. The majority remained at home. They could not negotiate a business transaction without their husband's permission.

Wealthy families that have remained find it difficult to maintain traditional family life with women in a subordinate and reclusive position. The Revolution has given particular attention to equalizing their rights. The Fundamental Law of 1959 gives women full civil liberties, including control over their own property. Coincidental with legislation that allowed women to pursue the profession, trade, or craft of their choice, the government proposed to integrate those women into the national labor force.

Among the lower classes, women before the Revolution had been much less subordinate to men than had been their counterparts among the upper and middle classes. Women and children necessarily were wage earners in urban areas where male unemployment was chronic. If a husband could not support his dependents, the wife often did. Women were frequently heads of households. Common-law marriage was prevalent. In 1970 greater economic security has resulted in a higher number of marriages among the lower classes, and many common-law unions have been legalized.

The Revolution has had less impact on rural lower-class family life where families worked together on their own land, and where women were not wage earners. Women who did work outside the home worked for relatives without pay.

The ideal male before the Revolution was the antithesis of the female. Where she was preferably chaste, subservient, and sexually innocent, he was uninhibited, dominant, and virile. Men were frequently four to five years older than their wives. Husbands were not condemned for infidelity, nor was it a cause for divorce unless a public scandal ensued.

Government legislation and campaigns for integrating women into national life have caused premarital and family crises even among those men and women who support the Revolution. Life styles for men and women are no longer as clearly distinguished as they were before the Revolution, and women who actively participate in government programs have led what Castro has labeled the revolution in the Revolution.

The New Role of Women

A United States writer who visited the country in 1968 reported that the most widely discussed topic in the country at that time was the so-called new relationship between men and women. Since the Revolution, nearly one-half million women have joined the labor force, chiefly in services; of nearly 100,000 that were incorporated in 1969, some 20,000 replaced men in their jobs.

Young girls more than women, however, have broken with tradition. Women largely fill daytime administrative, clerical, and teaching jobs. Girls, however, attend evening classes alone, room away from home, and work overnight on armed-guard duty. Many more than before the Revolution are interested in sports; more are university-educated, and some have gone abroad to study. Girls who have assumed their new freedom look for husbands who accept their new roles.

Even young activists, however, find it difficult to break with traditional ideas of male dominance. Divorces have resulted from political differences and female activism. Some women complain of unequal employment opportunities and that men treat them as inferiors on the job.

The government has found that the biggest obstacles to integrating women are some women's own ideas of their roles. Over two-thirds of more than 300,000 women interviewed by the Cuban Federation of Women in 1969 said that a woman's place was in the home and a man's on the street; work was considered unfeminine. Reporters who have visited Cuba have noted militiawomen on duty applying makeup. In the Havana traffic-directing school for women, morning classes include weapons and self-defense instruction, whereas afternoon classes include cosmetics.

A Ministry of Labor report released in 1969 said that many housewives over thirty who took jobs as a result of government campaigns, left after a few weeks' complaining of overwork. Among young girls, who filled more physically demanding jobs, the proportion who left was much lower.

Children

Children, especially boys, are a source of pride to parents. Before the Revolution all children were generally pampered. Early in youth adult-like activities were encouraged by parents. Upper class parents were particularly anxious that their children assume the dress, manners, and accomplishments of adults.

According to Cuban government publications, the first years of the Revolution were particularly difficult for children. Parents frequently divided over the Revolution, and families and relatives were split. Women were more frequently in agreement with the attitudes of their parents than with those of their husbands. When it became rumored that children would be taken away from their parents and brought up by the state, many mothers and children emigrated. State facilities for the care and education of children have in fact decreased parental control over children among those who use them. This is particularly true in state-subsidized day care centers and boarding schools.

To facilitate the incorporation of women into the working force, the Federation of Cuban Women provides two types of free day care centers: nursery schools (*círculos infantiles*) and kindergartens (*jardines*). Children can be brought to these centers from the age of forty-five days. By 1970 there were over 160 day care centers with an enrollment of 15,000 children.

Instructors are responsible for the physical and social development of children in the center. They familiarize the children with their country's history and that of other Communist countries by celebrating holidays with revolutionary songs and native costumes.

Some mothers find day care centers a relief from overcrowded households. Others object to them on political grounds. Most mothers, however, prefer to keep young children at home.

Parents who are unable to care for small children can send them to orphanages operated by the Ministry of Public Health. Whenever possible children are returned to their parents.

Some young students attend schools away from home. Many are youths from rural areas where population dispersion has made it inefficient to build many small local facilities and where the government considered it easier to change traditional ideas in absence of parental influence. Parents may visit students on weekends, but students are rarely allowed to go home during the school term.

Students at such schools find their outlook often conflicts with that of their parents. One United States observer found much greater solidarity between the nation's students and its leaders than between parents and students.

Adults

Older persons have traditionally been respected by younger generations. Many older adults however, believe that there is no place for them in the Revolution. Both United States and Latin American journalists have commented that there is a prevalence of persons under thirty in jobs, and a predominance of men and women under forty-five in leadership positions.

FAMILY SIZE

The average size of the family decreased between 1900 and 1959; during the first years of the Revolution, however, live births increased from 204,000 in 1959 to 264,000 in 1964. Since 1964 the birth rate has been stabilized. About thirty-seven out of 1,000 children born alive die within one year.

The average size of the family reported in the 1953 census (the last such census) was 4.86 persons, with 4.35 the urban average and 5.75 the rural average. In 1970 a rural family with five children, however, was not considered larger than average. The family generally consists of the husband, wife, and two to three children.

The government is trying to reduce the birth rate from 2.1 to 1.5 percent during the 1970 decade. Because children are a source of pride to parents and a sign of masculinity to men, however, free birth control methods have not been well-received either by men or women and are not highly advertised by the government. An educational program, however, was planned for the future.

MARRIAGE

Until almost the end of the colonial period, only marriages performed according to the rites of the Roman Catholic Church were legally recognized. Between 1885 and 1898 civil marriage was valid for non-Catholics. After the end of Spanish rule, majority opinion favored the complete secularization of the marriage contract in conformity with the separation of church and state. A vigorous protest from the Catholic Church, however, led to the compromise that marriage be regarded as essentially a civil contract, whether a religious or civil ceremony was performed. From 1919 to 1970, civil marriage was required of almost everyone.

Before the Revolution an additional church ceremony could be performed if the couple desired. Because of the expense involved in the ceremony and reception, however, generally it was upper class couples who had church weddings (see ch. 11, Religion).

Civil marriages were more common among the lower classes than church weddings in general, but poor couples favored common law marriages. Civil officials expected payment for their services, and frequently lower class persons could not afford the cost. Moreover, a formal marital commitment required a certain stability and closer contact with civil authorities than many lower class couples were willing to assume.

Common-law marriages also imposed certain legal obligations. Parents, for instance, were obliged to support and educate their children. In a common-law situation, men were more likely than women to forget their responsibilities and less likely to consider themselves married.

Under the Fundamental Law of 1959, marriage is generally valid only when performed by civil officials. Church weddings without a concomitant civil ceremony ordinarily have no more legal validity than common-law marriages. Parents, regardless of their marital status, are required to support and educate their children. The legal age for marriage is fourteen for boys and twelve for girls, but parental consent is required when either one is younger than twenty-one.

The government has encouraged legal marriage. The Ministry of Justice has formed committees in every rural district to marry common-law couples, in some areas by mass ceremonies. In a number of cities, buildings have been converted into Marriage Palaces (Palacios de Matrimonios). One such palace in Havana had a grandiose waiting parlor on the ground floor with a marble and velvet decor. Around the waiting room were offices for purchasing rings, perfumes, and cosmetics, and for arranging for wedding pictures and receptions. Although the official service was free, the receptions given upstairs varied in price according to the room chosen and the refreshments served.

Aside from providing free services, a more positive government inducement for marriage has been the refusal of a land-title to unmarried peasant couples. The government has further encouraged legal marriages by nationalizing some previously private and expensive resort areas and making them available to rural couples for inexpensive honeymoons. Some intermittent campaigning for marriage has been undertaken by the government: in 1961 couples were encouraged to honor their mothers on Mothers' Day by taking part in collective wedding ceremonies.

The government's concern for legalizing marriages has inspired a rapid rise in the number of legal unions, chiefly among common-law couples. In 1961 the government estimated that 400,000 such marriages eventually would take place. Between 1959 and 1965 marriages per year jumped from 32,000 to 67,000. By 1970 the marriage rate in rural Oriente Province had increased by 300 percent.

DIVORCE

Under old Spanish law, adultery by a woman was one of the few grounds admissable for divorce. The 1919 law of civil marriage, however, recognized legal divorce on other grounds, including that of mutual disagreement. The Roman Catholic Church and its supporters campaigned against this provision but without effect. The

Constitution of 1940 enlarged the grounds for divorce. During the 1950s an increase in the divorce rate was attributed to the growth of discord, lack of discipline, and juvenile delinquency.

The Castro government has reaffirmed the 1940 grounds for divorce. Both Fulgencio Batista and Fidel Castro have been divorced, and it is now accepted at all levels of society with little or no stigma attached. Since 1959 the divorce rate has tripled; in 1970 about one out of every thousand marriages ended in divorce. Many divorced couples had been married before the Revolution. The press noted that the principal reason for divorce was infidelity.

The procedure for obtaining a divorce was relatively simple. The couple announced their intention in a civil court. Less than a month later they returned to swear they had not lived together during that time. Soon after, the papers were finalized. If the divorce was contested by either party, the case went before the judge. Men paid alimony and child support.

CHAPTER 8

LIVING CONDITIONS

In early 1970 government programs relating to health, housing, social security, and general living standards were aimed at providing the entire population with at least minimum coverage. Most medical services were provided free; housing was supposed to become free eventually, and social security programs provided benefits to all workers, including those in the agricultural sector, many of whom had been excluded from such programs before 1959; also, the right and duty to work was guaranteed by the state. Nevertheless, rationing of food and other items was still in force, and regimentation permeated work and recreational activities.

After the Revolution the health situation deteriorated in the early 1960s. A medicine shortage caused outbreaks of contagious diseases. The rapid influx of people from rural areas to the cities put pressure on urban facilities, and doctors left the country in protest against the increasing restrictions placed on their profession.

Two new medical schools were opened after 1962, and newly graduated doctors began replacing those who had left; in 1967 the ratio of physicians was one for every 1,000 persons. Hospitals were built in rural areas where there had previously been none; plans were implemented to make it easier for rural people to gain access to specialized facilities in Havana, where medical services were still concentrated in 1970. In 1966 there were 159 hospitals throughout the country with a total of 42,000 beds.

Mass campaigns were waged against communicable diseases, many of which were brought under control or virtually wiped out. Less success was registered against diseases such as gastroenteritis, which is one of the five major causes of death, caused by unsanitary environment and intestinal parasites. There have been recent reports of a high incidence of malnutrition among the under-fourteen age group. People in rural areas lived with only minimal water and sanitary facilities. Urban dwellers were considerably better off in this respect, but they also endured frequent water shortages, many being without modern sanitary facilities.

The Urban Reform Law of 1960 was intended to provide means by which everyone would eventually own his own housing unit. Housing not occupied by the owner was taken over by the government; the occupants were to pay the government the amount of their monthly rentals, and after a certain number of years, depending on the age of the house, the property would become the occupants'. The government also sponsored construction programs, which were very ambitious during the first three years of the Revolution but which fell off after 1963. An estimated 32,000 units had to be built annually in the 1970s merely to keep up with population growth, but there was little evidence that the government was prepared to devote the necessary resources to solve a problem of this magnitude.

In early 1970 the government provided an array of social insurance services. Most were similar in kind to those in effect before the Revolution but were considerably expanded. The private programs in existence in 1958 were taken over by the government and consolidated under the Ministry of Labor. Because the government was obligated to provide jobs for people desiring them, there was technically no unemployment and therefore no unemployment insurance. The government grants disability and retirement benefits as well as maternity, sickness, and accident insurance.

HOUSING

The Revolutionary government regarded the housing situation as one of the most critical social problems that confronted it. Two initial steps taken were the reduction of rents by 50 percent and, for the first time, the setting up of a public housing program. Later, rents were set at 10 percent of the combined salaries earned by household members. The National Institute of Savings and Housing (Instituto Nacional de Ahorros y Vivienda—INAV) was assigned the responsibility for carrying out the urban housing programs; the Rural Housing Directorate of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria—INRA), the rural program. Later the Ministry of Construction took over responsibility for some housing construction. Other agencies were made responsible for such things as repairs, water and sanitation, and housing distribution. There is a single coordinator, however, for all construction.

Before 1959 most housing construction was privately financed. Real estate was a favored and highly profitable form of investment. Many new upper-class and middle-class residences were constructed during the building boom that followed World War II. But the new construction did little to relieve the deterioration and congestion of low-income housing.

After the Revolution, with the proceeds of social security funds and the national lottery, INAV built single-family dwellings and large apartment units for sale on long-term payment plans. Payments were collected from the new tenants in place of rent and were applied toward the purchase price.

The Urban Reform Law, enacted in October 1960, was a far more drastic housing measure. It proposed to make it possible for every family to live in a house or apartment that was in acceptable condition and to own the premises within twenty years. Housing not occupied by the owner was taken over by the state.

The urban reform program meant that the state would become the nation's only landlord. Tenants were to pay the state a monthly sum equivalent to their former rent. After a number of years—from five to twenty, depending on the age of the house—they would receive title to the property. In 1965 the first titles were transferred to more than 7,000 homeowners; by 1967 approximately 66,000 tenants had received such title deeds.

In compensation, the original owner of the house was to receive a monthly check from the state for the same amount that the tenant was paying and for as long as these payments continued, but only up to a total of 600 Cuban pesos monthly (1 Cuban peso equals US$1—see Glossary). After the tenant's payments stopped, the state would pay the original owners lifetime pensions equal to what they had been collecting provided they had no other income, had reached a certain age, and that the amount did not exceed 250 Cuban pesos a month. Such compensation has been paid except to former tenement owners (who were excluded under the law) and exiles. Amounts of compensation have little to do with real property values, however.

Although private homebuilding nearly ceased, the construction industry was busy with government programs. Between 1959 and 1963 the Revolutionary government claimed to have constructed about 55,000 housing units (about half of them in rural areas, including those on state farms), and private companies constructed an additional 30,000. Much of the new housing, such as the workers' housing project in eastern Havana, was overly ambitious and therefore uneconomic. After 1962, however, new priorities were established, and housing construction was slowed considerably (see ch. 19, Industry).

Despite the progress reported by the government, housing conditions did not change much between 1959 and 1969; government programs continued to turn renters into owners, but the new Urban Reform Law of 1967 provided that, with certain exceptions, the state had to be given first option to buy for-sale property, to be used in furthering the housing program. It became difficult for people to move. Programs have provided some new housing but not enough to keep up with population growth, much less to replace inadequate housing constructed previously. An estimated 32,000 new houses yearly were needed just to keep up with the anticipated population growth in the 1970s. It was hoped that the three prefabrication plants in operation in 1966 and the many more scheduled to be built would help ease the situation. Moreover, plans were under consideration in the late 1960s to provide long-term loans, blueprints, and technical assistance so that individuals in rural areas could build their own houses and thus ease the pressure on the construction industry.

Although no comprehensive housing census was taken between 1954 and 1969, a study undertaken in 1962 estimated that there were about 1,458,000 residential dwelling units; each unit housed an average of 4.8 people. Only 50 percent of urban dwellings and 3 percent of rural dwellings were considered suitable for occupancy; such units had walls of stone or concrete, roofs of metal or tile, floors of stone or mosaic, and basic sanitary and water facilities. Most wood used in Cuba for housing construction was said to be inadequate for such purposes. About 10 percent of rural housing units were equipped with electric lighting, compared with 87 percent of urban units (95 percent in Havana).

Before the Revolution upper class families lived in fine old tile-floored townhouses or in modern residences in the suburbs. Many of these houses have since become dormitories for scholarship students attending school in Havana and houses for needy workers. Smaller stucco or wooden buildings housed middle and lower income families. Very poor families in the cities lived in shacks strung along alleyways or rented rooms in one of the many large old houses that had deteriorated into tenements; tenement dwellers were the first to receive titles to their housing units under the Urban Reform Law. Neighborhoods of modest brick or concrete houses have been built for workers on the outskirts of many cities and industrial towns.

The typical *bohío* (rural house), providing only minimal protection from rain and sun, contrasts sharply with the solid Spanish architecture of some of the old city residences. Constructed entirely from local materials, it consists of a skeleton of poles, enclosed with lumber or strips of royal palm bark, which supports a canopy of cane or royal palm leaves. The floor is usually hard earth. The more elaborate *bohíos* have interior partitions and a separate, but connected, area for cooking. Furnishings are limited to a few stools, a cot or two, and a kerosene stove.

A few families in rural areas enjoyed somewhat better living conditions. Small houses and barracks, originally provided for migratory workers and their families by a few of the prerevolutionary sugar companies, were equipped with modern facilities. Similar housing has been built for state farm workers. A number of independent farmers were in a position to build small cement or wooden houses. Roofed with tile, some had running water and toilet facilities and, in rare instances, even electricity and mechanical refrigeration.

SANITATION

The level of sanitation during the 1960s showed marked improvement over conditions existing at the beginning of the century. Nevertheless, it continued to fall far short of making a positive contribution to the well-being and strength of the people. The persistently high incidence of intestinal parasites is an example of a serious health problem directly attributable to the standard of sanitation.

Sanitary conditions are worst in Pinar del Rio Province, followed by Oriente and Las Villas provinces. The better conditions prevailing in La Habana and Camagüey reflect urbanization of those provinces and the fact that sanitary conditions generally are somewhat better in the urban areas than in the countryside. Whereas 74 percent of the urban population in 1964 lived in houses with piped water, only 2 percent of the rural population did. Approximately 57 percent of the urban homes and 4 percent of the rural had flush toilets.

In rural areas most people live without running water, without bath or shower facilities, without garbage disposal facilities, and with only the most rudimentary toilet facilities. They generally do not have a safe, abundant, and easily accessible water supply; it is usually exposed to contamination and pollution. Drinking the water without first boiling it holds the same serious risk of infection as the custom of river bathing. Garbage is left exposed or fed to the chickens, pigs, and other animals raised by rural households. Refuse is allowed to collect at the back of the house, sometimes in neat piles but often scattered by the animals.

In the rural areas fields and roadsides are used as latrines that are dug with little thought given to problems of drainage or fly control. Deposits of night soil, seepage from privies, the continued prevalence of dirt floors in rural homes, the custom of letting pigs run unpenned, and the habit of children to go barefoot contribute greatly to the high rate of infestation of rural people, especially children, with parasites.

Havana has always suffered a lack of ample water supply, as have other fast-growing cities and towns. Most of the water supply lines to Havana were installed around 1875. The population increase has put tremendous strain on this system; in 1964 an estimated 30 million gallons of water were lost daily through leaks. In the mid-1960s the National Institute of Water Resources was making plans to control the leakage and to increase the supply of water flowing to the capital, which suffered periodic water shortages. New aqueducts and reservoirs have been built in other cities, but evidence suggested that the water problem was far from being solved by 1970.

HEALTH

Diet and Nutrition

In the mid-1960s the daily per capita caloric intake of about 2,700 calories was higher than the estimated requirement of 2,460 calories. The diet, however, was high in carbohydrates—particularly starches—and low in proteins, minerals, and vitamins. During the 1950s an estimated 30 to 40 percent of the urban population and 60 percent of the rural population suffered from nutritional deficiencies, manifested in small bone structure, overweightness, general physical weakness, anemia, and low resistance to diseases. Statistical indications were not available in the late 1960s, but there was evidence that, although this estimation may have improved somewhat, nutritional deficiencies still existed; much of the population was infected with intestinal parasites. The government was sponsoring nutrition-education schemes and, reportedly, provided 800,000 free meals daily to children, hospital patients, voluntary laborers, and others.

Because agriculture is heavily concentrated on producing sugar for export, many basic food products, such as wheat flour, rice, beans, and lard, must be imported. When the break in relations between the United States and Cuba forced a change in Cuban trading patterns, its lack of foreign exchange may have caused the average diet to suffer. In fact, at one time (1962) a doctor's prescription was needed to purchase oranges. Rationing was first put into operation in July 1961 to provide more equitable distribution of goods in short supply and was still being continued in late 1970. Although domestic production of certain food products, such as eggs, milk, and fish, has increased rapidly since the mid-1960s and new import markets have been established, shortages of basic foods are common because of seasonal decreases in production, distribution problems, bad weather or, sometimes, matters of foreign policy. In 1966 China reduced exports of rice to Cuba, and the rice ration was cut in half.

The average diet includes rice and red, white, or black beans at least once a day. They are the foundation of the heaviest meal, the *almuerzo*, served around midday, and also of the *comida*, served in the evening. Other starches are served with them—white bread, green corn, cornmeal or ricemeal fritters and, especially in the rural areas, starchy vegetables, such as white and yellow *yautía* (sweet potatoes), and breadfruit. *Malanga* (a tough vegetable root) and *yuca* (a root) are served less frequently. Soups containing noodles, rice, potatoes, or other starches also are frequently served.

Sugar is rationed, as is coffee. Before rationing white sugar was used in very generous amounts to sweeten coffee and to make preserved fruits and fruit pastes, such as guava paste and mango paste, which were common desserts.

There is a large proportion of fat in the diet. Meats are often fried, and deep-frying is the customary way of preparing most starchy foods that would otherwise be unpalatable. Rice is commonly plain-boiled with lard. Salt pork and oil also are used in cooking, but on a far more limited scale. Beans are prepared in a rich sauce made with fat, salt pork, lard, and other ingredients.

Cubans eat insufficient amounts of meat, poultry, fish, eggs, and dairy products. Pork and chicken, historically preferred protein foods, have become increasingly difficult to obtain through rationing. Owing to an expanded fish industry, fish becomes a substitute. Chicken is now a relished luxury. The ideal Sunday meal for almost all people would be chicken with rice.

Eggs form a part of the diet of many urban people, who like them served for breakfast. Rural people, many of whom are egg producers, eat few of them, preferring to sell them instead. Eggs are rarely fed to babies or small children, as it is commonly believed that they are harmful to the young.

A typical light breakfast (*desayuno*) consists of white bread or crackers and *café con leche*, made with condensed or evaporated milk. Fresh milk is rationed and is available only to children and elderly people. Babies are breast-fed for about six months and then, before being introduced to the solid foods, are put on a diet of bean broth, fruit juices, and mashed starches to which some urban families add vitamins or cod liver oil.

Green vegetables play a minor role in the diet. The people have not developed a taste for them, and many have a positive dislike for some green vegetables such as lettuce. Even though many varieties of fruit such as oranges, guavas, and bananas are grown, not much is eaten. Citrus fruit is used chiefly for seasoning.

Methods of food processing and preparation rob food of some of its nutritive value. An estimated 50 percent of the minerals and vitamins contained in rice, for example, is lost through milling, polishing, and washing. The custom of washing meats such as pork and beef is still practiced in some families and is believed to result in the loss of some food value. The Vitamin C content of milk is destroyed in many homes by boiling.

Low income and scarcity encourage the persistence of the starch-oriented diet. The availability of foods is an important factor underlying the nutritional imbalance in the diet. The type of work the farmer performs on the state farms or in his own fields demands that he eat a lot; emphasis is consequently placed on being filled, and starches are more filling and less expensive and more readily available than other foods.

Apart from economic considerations, Cubans enjoy eating. This is reflected in such popular sayings as "Barriga llena, corazón contento" (Full stomach, contented heart) and "El amor empieza por la cocina" (Love enters through the kitchen). Standards of masculine and feminine beauty encourage the consumption of weight-producing foods. Plump women are more highly appreciated and courted than slender ones.

Health Services

Health programs in the 1960s were aimed at providing the entire population with medical coverage. Facilities were built in remote areas and doctors sent to serve there. Medical education was expanded, and hospital care was provided free, although payment was still required for some medicines. Extensive vaccination and inoculation campaigns were undertaken to eliminate endemic diseases, with mixed results.

Before the Revolution the ratio of physicians to population was one of the highest in Latin America. The country had some excellent hospitals and health care plans, but most such services were concentrated in the larger cities and without considerable effort and on an emergency basis, were unavailable to much of the population. In fact, the cities had a surplus of doctors. Many doctors did not have enough patients to support their standard of living but were reluctant to venture into the countryside. Like other members of the professional classes, they sought other remunerative activities, the most rewarding of which was politics.

Modern health services and facilities were provided by the government as well as by private organizations and individuals. The private sector, however, provided higher quality care than did the government. In private practice, it was the long-established custom for small groups of physicians to join together in medical insurance cooperatives that offered medical plans through which the public could receive care and medication in return for fixed monthly membership payments, usually about 3 Cuban pesos.

People who did not belong to these cooperatives and who could not afford private care could apply for free assistance at government centers and some private facilities. Often, however, access to a clinic or a hospital bed could be obtained only through the political organization of the town. Services were channeled to the rural population through leaders of the party in power. Those using the health services and facilities were strongly reminded of the source of the benefits, and many were required to vote accordingly. Public health jobs, like other government jobs, also were subject to the patronage system.

Medicine was one of the most highly regarded careers, ranking with law, engineering, and architecture in a country where the professions bestowed far greater prestige than any other specialization or skill. Cuban doctors were among the world's best but not necessarily because of the training available in Cuba. The medical school of the University of Havana, the only such school in the country before the Revolution, had neither a full-time faculty nor modern equipment and training facilities; moreover, the school was often closed during periods of political unrest, as between 1956 and 1959.

Soon after the Revolution the first steps were taken to socialize the practice of medicine. As early as 1959 the government began to take over the private and cooperative clinics, hospitals, and drugstores, a process that was virtually completed by 1964. Displaced doctors could choose between working for the state and entering private practice; the new government, however, announced its intention to eventually abolish private medical practice. By 1970 only 709 physicians were engaged in private practice. Doctors in the employ of the state could be assigned to serve in remote rural regions. In fact, since 1964 a requirement for a medical degree has been a pledge renouncing private practice and willingness to serve two years in the Rural Medical Service; this pledge virtually constitutes the right to practice medicine.

The medical school was reopened in 1959. In 1960, however, about 70 percent of the faculty were dismissed and were replaced by doctors whose sympathies toward the Revolution were unquestioned. Unsympathetic medical students continue to be purged from their studies: the likelihood that such students will eventually leave the country is high, and the government believes that allowing them to continue their studies constitutes too great a drain on state resources. This concern with political reliability, coupled with emigration of doctors, does little to enhance the level of available medical talent.

Because of these and other circumstances, more than 2,000 doctors (about one-third of the 1958 total) left the country during the decade between 1959 and 1969, most of them in the early years of the Revolution. Measures, some of an emergency nature, were undertaken to replace the departed physicians. In 1961 the number of years required to complete the medical course was reduced from seven to five and the dental course from five to three; however, a sixth year of medical school was later restored. Completion of secondary school was no longer a requirement for admission, although premedical courses were required in many cases. Just how these factors affected the quality of doctors produced is not known, but it did increase their numbers.

Moreover, two additional medical schools were established; one at the university in Santiago de Cuba (Eastern University) and the other at the Central University in Santa Clara, as part of the plan to decentralize medical facilities. A total of about 500 students annually were graduated from the three schools during the late 1960s; over 900 were graduated in 1969. New emphasis was placed on courses in epidemiology and hygiene (though courses in dialectical materialism were also required), in order to stress preventive medicine as the best approach to the country's medical problems.

After the two-year tour of rural duty, the doctor returns to complete two or three years of residency training in one of eighteen (the number existing in 1966) teaching hospitals where he begins to specialize. In 1967 there were 7,115 physicians and 1,348 dentists practicing, providing a physician-population ratio of about 1 to 1,100. By 1970 the number of physicians rose to 8,000. Attention has also been given to increasing facilities for medium-level medical education. By 1970 there were at least 11,700 nurses and nurses' aides, 800 laboratory technicians, 465 X-ray technicians, and 200 hygiene workers practicing, providing the bulk of medical experience available.

The new organization of the Ministry of Public Health was put into effect in 1962. Operating at three levels—national, regional (each province constituting a region with the exception of Oriente, which constituted two), and local (municipality)—the ministry presided over four vice-ministries and a Division of Relations and General Affairs. The Vice-Ministry of Hygiene and Epidemiology was responsible for labor, environment, school, and nutrition hygiene and for the antimosquito and antimalaria campaigns. The Vice-Ministry of Medical Assistance was responsible for the operation of all general and specialized hospitals, polyclinics and dispensaries, for the programs of the Rural Medical Service, and for all medical instruction. The Vice-Ministry of Medical Supplies was responsible for the production, acquisition, storage, and distribution of medicines and other supplies. The Vice-Ministry of Economy and Planning took care of the ministries' financial and planning requirements and statistical records. At least one additional vice-ministry was added after 1962—the Vice-Ministry of Teaching, which was established in 1964.

One of the first moves to decentralize the provision of medical services came with the establishment of the Rural Medical Service in 1960. Doctors, nurses, and volunteers from such organizations as the Federation of Cuban Women and the committees for the defense of the Revolution have been sent to isolated parts of the island to check facilities for sewage disposal and cleanliness of drinking-water supplies; to oversee garbage disposal, and to locate, isolate, and care for sick people, particularly those with communicable diseases; and to conduct vaccination campaigns against a variety of diseases including poliomyelitis and tuberculosis.

In conjunction with this program, rural hospitals, the first of their kind, were built on the periphery of large rural areas so they would have access both to rural patients and supplies from the cities. In 1969 there were forty-eight such hospitals, about half of them in southern Oriente Province. Each had from 10 to 100 beds, or a total of about 1,300 beds. Many were women's hospitals that provided obstetrical care and mother-child hygiene, so that women could have their children born in a hospital rather than at home. Personnel employed in these rural hospitals were increased during harvesttime to provide for the influx of workers. Rural areas were also serviced by about an equal number of smaller dispensaries that took care of minor problems and dispensed vaccinations.

Despite such improvements, about half of all medical services were still concentrated in Havana in the late 1960s. The establishment of these minimal rural services and the polyclinic plan, however, improved access to the more extensive facilities found in Havana and other large cities. Patients diagnosed in the rural hospitals may be referred to the large urban hospitals for specialized treatment.

The first integral polyclinics were established in the mid-1960s on the recommendation of the World Health Organization to relieve urban hospitals of the responsibility of providing for outpatient care. The plan calls for the eventual creation of one polyclinic for each 30,000 to 50,000 people in the country. People in need of medical treatment are seen by a doctor in the polyclinic of the district in which they live. If a patient needs specialized treatment, he is sent to the regional polyclinic. If he requires hospitalization, he is sent either to a nearby regional hospital, in which case he is cared for by the same doctor who saw him at the regional polyclinic, or to one of the specialized hospitals in Havana or elsewhere. When a patient leaves the hospital, he is referred back to the polyclinic in his district for outpatient care. The polyclinics also provide emergency medical treatment, and personnel are responsible for educating people of the district in sound health practices.

According to official statistics, there were 159 hospitals in the country in 1966—50 urban general hospitals, 46 specialized (tuberculosis, leprosy, and mental), 19 industrial, and 44 rural hospitals. These hospitals provided about 42,000 beds in all. In addition, there were more than 6,000 beds provided in homes for infant recuperation, homes for deformed and retarded children, homes for the elderly, and nurseries.

Life Statistics and Disease

The relatively favorable health situation in the mid-1960s was reflected in World Health Organization statistics (derived from official government sources) on overall death rate, infant mortality, and life expectancy. There is evidence that the health situation deteriorated during the first few years of the Revolutionary regime because of the rapid influx of people to the cities, where health facilities were insufficient to meet the increased needs. The country suffered outbreaks of various communicable diseases such as diphtheria and infectious hepatitis. Medicines were in short supply; the prisoners of the Bay of Pigs invasion were ransomed for the equivalent of US$53 million worth of medicine furnished by private United States citizens.

After 1962, however, the prerevolutionary level of health was regained and improved in many areas. The overall death rate in 1960 was 6.3 per 1,000 population; it rose to 7 in 1962 and dropped to 6.4 in 1967. Children who died within twenty-four hours of birth were not counted in these statistics, so the figures are not comparable to those of most nations; however, they do indicate trends. In addition, underregistration of births and deaths serves to increase the inaccuracy of figures. Death rates for men were higher than for women in all age brackets, which accounted for the distinct difference between life expectancy for men (fifty-six years) and that for women (sixty-two years). The infant mortality rate stood at 38 per 1,000 live births in 1962 and dropped slightly to 37.7 in 1966. These figures also excluded children who died within twenty-four hours of birth. The most impressive death-rate reduction occurred among children one through four years of age, probably the result of the mass vaccination and inoculation campaigns.

The major causes of death were in a way indicative of the nation's relatively advanced state of health. Most of the leading causes were primarily degenerative in nature, such as heart disease, malignant neoplasms (cancers), and vascular lesions of the central nervous system. Diseases in these three categories were responsible for about 40 percent of all deaths in 1964; such diseases predominate in advanced industrial societies. On the other hand, diseases of early infancy, such as pneumonia, gastroenteritis, and tuberculosis, were together responsible for about 20 percent of all deaths; these diseases are primarily the result of a poor sanitary environment.

Inroads have been made against gastroenteritis (the single most important cause of infant death), malaria, intestinal parasites—which, although not major killers, afflict and debilitate a large portion of the population—and communicable diseases, some of which have been virtually wiped out. The most successful attacks have been made on infectious diseases that are vulnerable to elimination by vaccination and inoculation. Similar campaigns were undertaken before the Revolution but on a smaller scale. Various organizations, including the trade unions, the Federation of Cuban Women, and the committees for the defense of the Revolution, have been enlisted to help in the continuing campaign against such diseases.

In 1963 nearly 90 percent of young people under age fourteen were vaccinated against poliomyelitis; between 1965 and 1969 not a single case was reported in the country. Similar campaigns against smallpox, tuberculosis, tetanus, diphtheria, whooping cough, and typhoid fever have experienced various degrees of success. In the mid-1960s tuberculosis appeared to be on the increase; however, improved case-reporting may have been responsible for this. In 1968 an outbreak of typhoid fever hit the Bayamo region in the Cauto River valley of Oriente Province; this wet lowland region has remained vulnerable to many diseases that have virtually disappeared from the rest of the country. The incidence of diphtheria was reported to have dropped from 20.9 cases per 100,000 population in 1962 to 8.5 in 1965.

To eliminate intestinal parasites and such diseases as gastroenteritis and malaria, extensive environmental changes are required, including improvements in water supply, sewage disposal, and eradication of mosquito-breeding places; consequently, diseases that result from inadequate attention to these costly programs have proved the most persistent. Although malaria has been the object of eradication campaigns since the beginning of the twentieth century, it still remained endemic in the mid-1960s in the Bayamo and Baracoa regions of Oriente Province. Teams from the National Service for the Eradication of Malaria were sent to fumigate houses and spray breeding areas and to locate cases. Reported cases fell from 3,519 in 1962 to 127 in 1965.

The great majority of deaths from gastroenteritis occurred in children under four years of age. Education in proper hygiene, sanitation, and nutrition and improved health facilities reportedly helped to reduce the death rate for gastroenteritis from 50.8 per 100,000 population in 1962 to 19.6 in 1966, but it was still one of the five major causes of death.

Popular Beliefs and Practices

Many persons, particularly rural and urban poor, hold a wide variety of traditional, nonscientific beliefs concerning the causes and cures of ill-health. Sometimes an accident or illness is viewed as punishment meted out by God or by a saint whose wrath has been aroused by commission of a sin or by failure of the person to carry out a religious vow. Accidents or sickness are attributed commonly to a spell or to the evil eye of some harmful spirit or person.

Attacks of a hysteric nature are often thought to be caused by spirits entering the body. Belief in these causes motivates the patient to seek a diagnosis and cure from a priest of one of the many Afro-Cuban cults (see ch. 11, Religion).

Some illnesses are attributed to the disturbance of the normal equilibrium of the body because of imprudent contact with "cold" objects or foods when the patient was "hot" and vice versa. This explanation is based upon the belief, common in many rural areas of Latin America, that objects and foods are intrinsically hot or cold without reference to their actual temperature. Bananas, pork, and sweet potatoes, for example, are considered cold foods, whereas yellow *yautía*, codfish, and *manioc* (cassava) are hot foods. It is dangerous to eat a cold food when the body is in a hot state because of overexercise, menstruation, or some other cause. Similarly, the consumption of hot and cold foods together is believed to cause severe stomach pains, cramps, and *pasmo*, an ill-defined complaint manifesting itself in minor muscular paralysis.

Illness is commonplace, and much popular discussion centers around it. A knowledge of folk medicine is common property of the society, particularly of its older rural members, and there is a prevailing tendency to depend upon home remedies. Colds and coughs are most commonly treated with teas, syrups, baths, rubs, and ointments. Indigestion, diarrhea, colic, and vomiting are treated with laxatives and enemas, teas, and alkaline and pectine substances. Wounds, burns, skin eruptions, insect bites, and swellings are doctored with disinfectants and ointments. Relief from headaches and menstrual pains is mainly sought through the use of sedatives. Children with fever are advised to wear red and black rags. Medals, chains, and other similar charms and amulets are frequently relied upon as preventatives.

The expansion of health services into the countryside has served to erode traditional beliefs. Nevertheless, the prevalence of the do-it-yourself approach discourages frequent and timely use of the nation's modern health services and facilities. Faith in modern medicine is established, however, and when the family does look for outside help it often turns to the physician. For many rural patients in the late 1960s, however, a visit to the doctor still involved a long and arduous trip by animal or bus.

The doctor has great prestige and commands respect. People look to him for injections, which are popularly believed to cure all but the most minor ailments. To a lesser extent and for less serious disorders, the people take their troubles to the pharmacist. The *curandero* (herbalist) and the *espiritista* (spiritual healer and diagnostician) are preferred for the most minor illnesses.

SOCIAL WELFARE

Many welfare and insurance programs provided by the pre- and post-revolutionary regimes were quite similar as far as institutional facilities were concerned. Before the Revolution, however, many of them were provided by private or religious organizations; virtually all of these were taken over by the government and expanded during the early 1960s. Prerevolutionary governments did little to attack the sources of poverty that provided the continuing demand for many of these services. In the 1960s programs to provide inexpensive housing and free education and medical care were aimed at remedying the situation. Moreover, employment came to be required by the government, which was required to provide everyone with a job, salary, a ration passbook and, in some cases, work clothes and shoes (see ch. 20, Labor).

Before 1959 the wealthy upper class supported many charitable undertakings, recognizing a social and religious obligation that was also an important means of expressing social status. Gift giving was done conspicuously, focusing attention on the social distinction between those giving and those receiving aid.

Small groups of wealthy Spanish expatriates had formed charitable organizations to extend assistance to newcomers so that they should not become public charges. Each organization concerned itself with immigrants from a particular region of Spain. Their clubs, many of which continued operating until the early 1960s, were cooperatively organized for mutual aid and social purposes. The largest clubs maintained schools, homes for the aged, mausoleums, and some of the finest hospitals and clinics in the country; most members were interested chiefly in the free medical privileges to which they were entitled. Many other secular organizations sponsored welfare services. Upper class women in Havana were particularly active.

The government operated various health and welfare institutions including hospitals, dental and maternity clinics, and detention homes for juveniles. The level of care in the institutions appears to have been fairly good, although many apparently suffered from poor administration and the lack of operating funds. There was also the problem of overconcentration of such facilities in Havana.

Members of the urban middle class and the organized wage earners in the lower class were the principal beneficiaries of the social insurance plans that existed. Through their unions and professional associations, these groups were able to wrest special concessions and guarantees from the government.

Laws and decrees providing for retirement, disability, work injury, and maternity insurance programs were enacted between

1916 and 1958, but health insurance was available only under the privately run programs of the clubs. There was no unemployment insurance.

The most important programs were the pension and retirement funds; there were great varieties, organized by occupation, which, together, afforded financial protection against old age and disability to about half the working population. The retirement funds were independent institutions but subject to the general supervision of the Ministry of Labor.

Mismanagement and faulty handling of reserves caused almost all of the retirement funds to have financial difficulties. Many persons were collecting benefits to which they were not actually entitled, a problem that also plagues the Castro government.

The privately owned and operated insurance, medical, and welfare institutions—including hospitals, cooperative medical schemes, homes for the aged, and orphanages—were taken over by the government in the early 1960s. By 1964 all social insurance plans had been incorporated into the Ministry of Labor, including maternity, sickness, accident, and disability in addition to retirement plans.

The Social Security Board of the Ministry of Labor was responsible for the administration of the system; the commissions of claims were the basic administrative units. Located at work centers, each was composed of about twenty-five workers, who were supervised by three titular members: one chosen at a general assembly of the workers, another by the enterprise itself, and the third by agreement between the trade union section and the enterprise. The commissioners were responsible for investigating the validity of all claims made by workers. An individual could be denied social security benefits by an assembly of workers if his attitude toward work was not considered sufficiently "revolutionary."

The Social Security Law of 1963 provided that all workers would receive uniform treatment, in contrast to the situation prevailing before the Revolution, when workers from different sectors were entitled to a range of benefits. The 1963 law also extended coverage to all salaried workers, including 250,000 agricultural workers.

Under the law as amended in 1964 and which was still in effect in 1970, a worker who fell ill or had an accident (off the job) received payments for up to twenty-six weeks a year, which could be extended for another twenty-six weeks if it was thought the condition could be remedied in that time. If the illness continued beyond a full year, the worker might be pensioned for permanent disability. The amount of payment was 50 percent of the worker's salary if he did not require hospitalization, but only 40 percent if he did. A vanguard worker (one who worked long hours but refused overtime pay) was entitled to 100 percent of his salary. For work-related illness or accidents suffered on the job, the daily payments were increased by 10 percent but were held within the same limits. Accidents suffered by a worker who was attempting to save someone's life, was defending public property, or was performing volunteer work were considered work-related accidents.

The yearly pension given for total permanent disability could amount to no less than 50 percent of the worker's average annual salary for his last five years of work. An additional 10 percent was given if the disability was work-related.

Maternity benefits provided women with daily payments of between 1.50 and 8 Cuban pesos for thirteen weeks, to be taken anytime after 7½ months of pregnancy; neither they nor their husbands had to be employed a minimum amount of time to be eligible for these benefits. For rural women, the government operated homes near hospitals so they could be cared for before giving birth. Moreover, mothers unable to care for their young children because of job responsibilities left them in the daytime "infant circles" after they were 45 days old; in 1969 there were reported to be 356 such day-care centers catering to more than 42,000 children.

A worker was entitled to an old-age pension if he had worked at least 25 years and was at least 60 years old. The minimum pension was forty, and the maximum, 250 pesos a month.

Social security benefits in the first year of the law, 1963, amounted to 174,310,000 Cuban pesos, or about 8.3 percent of the nation's budget. By 1966 this had risen to 250 million Cuban pesos. The provisions of the Social Security Law were not all immediately implemented; nevertheless, the International Labor Organization recognized that Cuba has one of the four most advanced social security systems in Latin America.

STANDARD OF LIVING AND LEISURE

Compared with the situation existing before the Revolution, the general standard of living in the late 1960s was generally uniform and relatively egalitarian. Any able-bodied person between ages eighteen and sixty was entitled to a job if he so desired. For the most part necessities were available free or at moderate prices; housing was inexpensive, and education and most medical care were given free. Food was rationed to provide equitable distribution of goods in short supply because of import restrictions caused by a lack of foreign exchange, but official prices were reasonable. In addition, the government paid for such things as public phone service, sports events, wedding banquets, and funerals. On the other hand, luxury goods and services were prohibitively expensive. These conditions eased the plight particularly of those agricultural workers who, before the Revolution, remained unemployed and impoverished during the cane-growing season.

The average annual income dropped from about 422 Cuban pesos in 1958 to 415 Cuban pesos in 1968. The minimum wage was about 85 Cuban pesos a month; this was paid to agricultural workers, but room and board were usually provided free in such cases. The maximum wage was about 700 Cuban pesos, but few earned this.

Rationing was begun in 1961. Items appearing on the ration list have varied at different times depending on their availability, but most foods have appeared at one time or another; sugar has even been put on the list to curb domestic consumption and create more foreign exchange, but the ration has been more than ample except in bad harvest years. Private farmers were required to sell their produce at government-fixed prices (see ch. 18, Agriculture). Nevertheless, there has been a black market where food could be purchased for three or four times the state-fixed prices. In the late 1960s a great proportion of a family's income, between 50 and 80 percent, was spent on food alone.

Clothing was also rationed. In 1969 everyone could purchase two pair of shoes; women were entitled to about twenty-three yards of cloth and men to two suits; people who went abroad as diplomats or in other capacities were allowed more. Most women sewed their own and their children's clothing. The domestic production of cotton cloth and rubber footwear increased significantly between 1958 and 1968; before the Revolution more such products had to be imported. However, production has never been able to satisfy demand. The warm weather reduced the need for expensive outlays for clothing. Many people, especially rural children, went barefoot; but this practice was being discouraged because of the danger of intestinal parasites that can enter the body through the soles of the feet. Other items such as soap, beer, toilet paper, and bicycles were also rationed.

The ration book carried the names and ages of all family members. When a rationed item was purchased, it was noted in the book to be checked at the end of the month to see that no more than the proper amounts had been given. The ration set a maximum limit on what could be bought; it did not assure the availability of supplies. Housewives sometimes had to spend long hours waiting in line for items that quickly disappeared from store shelves.

Pleasures that used to be a hallmark of the Cuban nation in the eyes of foreigners have been severely restricted. Gambling and prostitution have been outlawed. At one point all nightclubs and bars were ordered closed on the grounds that they were scenes of "bourgeois pleasures" (antigovernment activity). This order was modified, however, so that nightclubs could remain open three nights a week.

Much "free time" was spent doing "volunteer labor" or participating in "organized recreation." Urban workers were "encouraged" to spend their weekends working in the countryside. University students spent some vacation time and three of every four weekends in the fields, participating in military training or directed recreational and cultural activities. Young people participated in the Pioneers Union of Cuba. Others belonged to such groups as the committees for the defense of the Revolution, which in addition to continuous surveillance activities, participating in the vaccination campaigns, and the Federation of Cuban Women, which provided numerous social services.

This pattern of hard work and inattention to pleasure-seeking was intensified during 1969, the Year of Decisive Effort, in preparation for the 1970 harvest (see ch. 18, Agriculture). May Day festivities were canceled for the first time since the Revolution. Christmas and New Year's Day celebrations were postponed until July 1970 when the harvest would be over (see ch. 11, Religion).

CHAPTER 9

EDUCATION

In late 1969 the government was continuing its efforts to adapt the educational system to meet its economic and social goals. Control of what was taught and how was entirely in the hands of the government. The traditional curriculum had been modified to conform with its political objectives and the academic calendar had been redesigned to ensure a labor supply for the sugar harvest, the success of which was essential to the economy. General education at all levels was being made more widely available, and specialized institutions, designed to provide additional persons with greatly needed technical and professional skills, were being further developed.

All students are encouraged to remain in school to complete at least a sixth-grade education. To help working mothers, there is a preprimary program for children between ages four to six, and day nurseries for younger children.

A basic secondary school was established for grades seven through ten; a higher secondary school provides preuniversity training and incorporates grades eleven and twelve. New types of secondary schools for industrial, agricultural, and other technical subjects have been created.

Adult education has received special emphasis. A nationwide literacy campaign, conducted in the early 1960s, was the initial step in this program. The goal is to give adults the equivalent of a sixth grade education. Most of the adult schools are evening programs, but there are also correspondence courses for those in rural areas and a special program of boarding schools for women.

The number of universities has decreased, but total enrollment has increased. Curricula have been altered to train more technicians and specialists rather than educate students in liberal arts.

Difficulties exist in providing the number of teachers required for the expansion of education. The problem has been compounded by the departure from the country of hundreds, if not thousands, of qualified teachers trained before the Revolution who have been reluctant to adjust to the new standards. The government is forced to utilize teachers who have not received adequate training. They continue their own education on Saturdays and between school terms.

The minister of education stated at the end of the 1968/69 school year that the number of students had increased substantially over the past decade, and as a result, the number of school buildings and teachers had to be increased too. He also stated that the number of yearly graduates of the teacher training schools was insufficient for the country's needs.

The most important goal of education as stated by the Cuban Ministry of Education is the following: "Parallel to the construction of the material base for socialism and communism, we are preparing or forming, through the dynamics of revolutionary struggle and work a new type of man, whole and complete. This is the highest and most fundamental objective of revolutionary education."

Privately owned secular and religious schools were confiscated and nationalized, and their teachers were replaced by state-approved teachers. Although these schools and the personnel used in them are included in the budget for education, the percentage of the national budget devoted to education is lower than the percentage before 1959. In 1967, 16.4 percent of the national budget was spent on education. In absolute figures, however, the amount spent on education is higher, because the total national budget is higher.

In 1967 an official report stated that 1,315 Cubans were using scholarships in foreign countries. Foreign instructors were imported in an attempt to replace the thousands of educators, technicians, and professionals who left their country.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Colonial Period from 1511 to 1898

During most of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there were no schools in the country. The Spaniards did not start colonization until 1511, and the first settlers were concerned with the acquisition of more territory and gold. The island was always considered a port of call in the long voyages from Spain to the more attractive areas of the Western Hemisphere and as a place for organizing and launching new expeditions for the discovery of more and richer lands for the Spanish crown (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

There were few or no children during the early colonial years, and the situation in the field of education in Spain was such that the lack of schools and teachers was no cause for concern. Education in Spain and in the world in general was reserved for a few: clergy (especially in the upper hierarch of the Roman Catholic Church); royalty; and the nobility. In the sixteenth century a philanthropist in Santiago de Cuba bequeathed a large estate for the purpose of teaching latin, linguistics, and Christian morals. The Dominican friars administered the estate, but the royal treasury later absorbed it when convents were abolished. Toward the end of the seventeenth century, the first school was established in Havana by the Bethlehemite fathers with the generous patronage of a wealthy Spaniard. These were the only two institutions of learning recorded in Cuban scholastic annals during the early period, and both were the result of individual initiative.

The children of wealthy families usually were taught at home and, when old enough, were sent to Europe, the United States, or Mexico to further their education. Spain was against this practice and finally forbade it, in spite of the fact that there were already some 500,000 inhabitants in Cuba to whom the colonial government had not made available public instruction of any kind. Representatives of various Catholic religious orders in Cuba, such as the Dominicans, the Bethlehemites, the Jesuits, and the Piarists of the Order of the Pious Schools, together with the clergy, provided some education in the capital city and in the larger towns. They gave formal instruction in reading, writing, and arithmetic.

When Don Luis de las Casas was governor, the Economic Society of Friends of the Country (Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País) was founded in 1793. This organization became the center of all cultural, educational, and nationalist activities of the island and had a royal charter to further education. It conducted a school survey and found out that there were forty schools in Havana. Only seven of them were for boys with a total of 403 white and 144 free Negro students being instructed in reading, writing, and arithmetic. The other thirty-three schools were for girls.

These schools afforded a source of income for the few mulattoes and some whites who devoted their time to teaching, as the parents paid for the tuition of their children. The teachers, however, had a limited education themselves. There was only one tuition-free school run by the Reverend Father Zenón, and the only Spanish grammar teacher on the island was Lorenzo Léndez, a mulatto, in Havana. The poor were at the same level as slaves, having no economic means to pay for their children's education.

The society raised private funds and obtained a meager state appropriation with which to establish two free schools in the capital, one for each sex. The society was authorized to discuss with the bishop of Havana the best way to raise additional funds, but the bishop expressed his opposition to educational projects. The society nevertheless went ahead with its plans, although between 1793 and 1816 it was able to carry out only a small part of them.

By 1817 there were ninety schools on the island; nearly all of them were private and offered the same type of teaching. Some outstanding Cubans, concerned with the school situation, donated funds and school buildings in several of the larger towns.

A new Spanish governor, Don Alejandro Ramírez, gave a powerful impulse to education through the society beginning in 1816.

Schools were improved, and white and Negro children were educated together, although boys and girls had separate schools. In 1826 there were 140 schools in Cuba. In 1824 municipal aid was revoked, but in 1827 the society again obtained funds from the treasury equivalent to US$8,000 per annum. In 1836 there were only 9,082 children, including both sexes and races, in elementary schools.

Foremost educators taught in these schools, instilling in their students the prevailing liberal ideas and nationalistic feelings. The best was José de la Luz y Caballero, whose school El Salvador (The Savior) is remembered with veneration by all Cubans as the school in which José Martí, the "apostle" of Cuban independence, was educated.

It was not until the year 1841 that Spain recognized the obligation to provide the poor classes, white and Negro, with some kind of free education. The Spanish government realized that it must provide state schooling in order to maintain a certain amount of influence in education. A Board of Education and committees of public instruction, general and local, were organized.

Local governments had to provide for the free schooling, and it was under their direction that several hundred public schools were established during the rest of the nineteenth century. Yet, the public school system never acquired the prestige and influence of the private schools because there were too few for the student population and, in general, the quality of the public school education was poor.

The number of schools supported by the municipalities rapidly reached 283 for white students but only 2 for Negro children by 1860; and by 1883 there were 768 primary schools, both private and public, in the country. The percentage of children attending school, however, was proportionately smaller than the number of those attending in previous years because of the increase in population.

Two seminaries, both devoted to the study of theology, also existed during the colonial period. One was in Havana, the Seminary of San Carlos and San Ambrosio, and another in Santiago de Cuba. The former became a Pontifical University under the rectorship of the Dominicans. Cuban nationalists were interested in the expansion of secular education; as a result, in the year 1825, courses in anatomy and economics were added and the teaching of law was brought up to date. In 1842 the university was reorganized and secularized, becoming the University of Havana. Enrique José de Varona, leading scholar, philosopher, and professor at the university, continued with the program of modernization until the end of the century.

142

The Republic from 1902 Through 1958

Improvement of education was one of the main planks in the platform of all parties in all political campaigns. Although considerable progress was made, the country at the end of 1958 had not yet attained its ideal of universal education. In 1899, 72 percent of the population did not know how to read and write. By 1958 the illiteracy rate had fallen to an estimate of less than 16 percent.

In 1899 children of school age numbered 552,928, but only 87,935 were enrolled. School enrollment reached the highest level in the history of Cuban education during the 1925—26 period, with 63 percent of the school-age population enrolled. In 1955 the enrollment had fallen to 51 percent of the school-age children, yet this percentage placed Cuba in fourth place among Latin American countries. By 1958 school enrollment was 1.1 million students in both public and private schools, and the number of teachers in active service was 34,000. The budget of the Ministry of Education was 75 million pesos (1 Cuban peso equals US$1—see Glossary), or 19.8 percent of the total national budget.

1902—33

When the Spaniards left the island, the United States occupation forces started immediately to reestablish an educational system, since the one in existence before the Spanish-American War had practically disappeared as a result of the struggle. The Constitution of 1901 declared education free and compulsory for all Cubans between six and fourteen years of age.

Between 1898 and 1902 Enrique José de Varona reorganized education on a national and uniform basis. Varona had the collaboration of two outstanding American educators, Alexis Frye, who was named national school superintendent, and Mathew Hanna. United States universities—Harvard among them—granted scholarships to Cuban teachers, and since then English has been taught in the Cuban national schools. The system established during the American occupation was modified on four different occasions: 1902, 1914, 1921, and 1926.

Boards of Education were established in the municipalities, and six superintendents supervised teaching at the provincial level, aided by a corps of district and provincial inspectors. At the top was the Department of Public Instruction, which had the final word in educational matters through the advice of educational technicians.

Elementary schools of six grades were created throughout the territory in proportion with the school population and budgetary appropriations. Besides the usual subject matter, such as the Spanish language, reading, writing, history, geography, science, arithmetic, and health practices, the public schools also offered English, music, home economics, drawing, and physical education. At first there were separate schools for boys and girls, but later they became coeducational. These were taught by specialized teachers.

Six coeducational secondary schools (*institutos de segunda enseñanza*) were established in 1880, one in each of the provincial capitals. At the end of six years of elementary school the students took an admission test to enter secondary schools. Four years of academic preparation in the arts and sciences were offered at these schools that led to higher studies. In 1940 a new plan was adopted, adding one more year of studies. Annexed to these were schools for surveyors. By 1958 there were 21 public secondary schools and 150 private schools with the same curriculum, whose students had to take their examinations at the public schools. Students at these schools were the only ones to pay a matriculation fee, and in many cases this was waived.

Schools of agriculture (*granjas escuelas*) were created in 1909 for boys and granted master of agriculture (*maestros agrícolas*) diplomas. There were six agricultural schools. The students, who were boarders and scholarship-holders, could continue their education at the university level at the schools of veterinary medicine and the School of Agronomic Engineering. Most of the graduates of these schools came from peasant families; they continued their education and became veterinarians and agronomic engineers.

During the administration of the first president, Tomás Estrada Palma (1902—06), the Department of Public Instruction initiated a series of intensive courses to train young teachers who were sent to the countryside and the small towns to teach. This was the first time after independence that such a campaign was carried out.

The first normal school for the formal training of classroom teachers was founded in Havana at the beginning of the administration of Major General Mario García Menocal (1913—21). At the start, there were separate schools for boys and girls, but later on they merged. Soon after, others were established in the rest of the provincial capitals. A Mexican educator, Leopoldo Kiel, was brought in to help organize them. By 1959 there were fourteen normal schools. The first two years of the plan of studies were devoted to general culture, and the remaining two were used for educational courses and practice teaching. By 1940 all teachers (about 50,000) in the elementary schools were graduates either of the normal schools for teachers or of the university, and those at the secondary school level had a doctor's degree in the field in which they were teaching.

The normal schools for kindergarten teachers (*escuelas normales de kindergarten*) were founded during the Menocal administration. Kindergartens had been in operation since the American occupation, and the need was felt for formal training of kindergarten teachers. These schools became very popular with girls, and graduates found steady employment in public and private kindergartens after a three-year course of studies. In 1959 there were seven such schools, with 18,088 students enrolled.

Home economics schools offering courses for girls were founded in 1918. These schools provided training in dietetics, interior decoration, and childcare. In 1959 there were ten public schools of this type and many such private schools. Registration was limited to a hundred in each school, and the applicants had to have their eighth-grade certificate. Education was free at all of these secondary schools.

In 1926, shortly after the inauguration of President Gerardo Machado (1925—33), an intermediate school, the higher primary school (*escuela primaria superior*), was created. Fifteen of these were built throughout the country and provided seventh and eighth grades. The subject matter covered was the same required for admission to the secondary schools. Students were admitted either at the secondary level of education after receiving their certificates from the higher primary schools or through the traditional entrance examination from the elementary schools; the teaching was tuition free, as it was at the elementary level.

The School of Arts and Crafts established in Havana during colonial days was reorganized during the American occupation, and four more such schools were added in different cities. These schools were only for boys. In 1928, another reorganization took place, and two new technological schools were created: the José B. Aleman school for boys and the Rosalía Abreu school for girls, both located in Rancho Boyeros, in La Habana Province. After 1940, when the separate civic-rural schools were integrated into the general system, these and the nonboarding arts and crafts schools adopted a new name, technological schools (*escuelas tecnológicas*). By 1958 there were twenty-two technological schools where students were trained in carpentry, plumbing, masonry, ceramics, construction, industry, and agriculture.

In 1925 a new type of coeducational school was created that later developed into vocational schools of commerce, which trained officeworkers in a diversity of specializations. In 1958 the total of commercial schools, public and private, was 168. Graduates of these schools were employed in banks, insurance companies, utility companies, business, and industry.

The first school of fine arts was started in Havana as an annex of the Colonial Academy of Fine Arts. After independence five other academies were established as private institutions in other cities, and in 1941 they became part of the state schooling system. They were divided into two branches: painting, which granted diplomas in drawing and painting; and sculpture, which granted diplomas in drawing and modeling. There were six-year courses, and the applicants were required to have completed elementary school and to pass an entrance examination.

The University of Havana (Universidad de la Habana), founded in 1728, became the National University (Universidad Nacional) and continued to be the only one in existence in the nation. It was the center of cultural and intellectual life of the country. The university offered courses in philosophy, pedagogy, sciences, engineering and architecture, medicine, pharmacy, dentistry, veterinary medicine, and law.

There were no private universities during this period, but there were many private elementary and secondary schools. Cuban national, cultural, and welfare societies operated schools, and various religious groups acquired fame for the quality of education offered in their institutions. Among them were Belén, La Salle, Sacred Heart, Ursuline, and the Pious and Marists schools run by Roman Catholic orders; Candler and Pinson colleges, La Progresiva, and the International Schools belonging to different Protestant denominations; and some secular schools such as Edison, María Luisa Dolz, María Teresa Comellas, and El Porvenir. Many private conservatories of music also existed; one of the most famous was the National Conservatory (Conservatorio Nacional) founded by a Belgian.

In 1930 as a result of the political opposition to President Machado, the government closed the university and secondary institutions of learning from 1930 to 1933, assuming that this measure would put an end to the political activities of students and educators. Private and elementary public schools were permitted to operate (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

1933—58

The government thought it had put an end to the subversive activities of the students and the educators with the closing of public school activities. With no classes to attend or teach, however, there was more time to devote to the revolutionary activities that finally ousted Machado.

After Machado's ousting, the university and all secondary public schools were reopened. At the suggestion of Fulgencio Batista, who ruled the country either directly or indirectly for many years, a new type of school was created called civic-rural (*cívico-rurales*). The teachers within this separate school system were army sergeants. The school buildings were erected by the army in rural areas and were under the Welfare Corporation of the Army (Corporación de Asistencia Pública); agricultural subjects were taught as part of the curriculum. The students were brought up in the Batista cult, which allegedly was the real purpose behind the creation of the civic-rural schools.

In addition, rural home-boarding schools (*hogares rurales campesinos*) were also established, which offered scholarships for the seventh and eighth grades to outstanding students who had finished sixth grade in the civic-rural schools. Graduates of the rural home schools who wished to continue their education at the secondary level went to a boarding school called the Civic-Military Institute (Instituto Cívico Militar). This was a coeducational technological institute with facilities for over 1,000 students, all scholarship holders. The first Civic-Military Institute was established in 1936 in Ceiba del Agua, La Habana Province. Later, two other such schools were built; one in the Province of Matanzas and the other one in Holguín, Oriente Province. After Batista became president in 1940, he took measures to have all of these army-sponsored schools integrated into the national school system.

A new constitution was enacted in 1940, and education in general benefited from it. Elementary education continued to be tuition-free and compulsory for all Cubans between six and fourteen years of age. Secondary education was also free except for those schools that granted bachelor degrees (*bachillerato*), and a nominal fee of 5 Cuban pesos per school year was paid. Teachers for primary and secondary schools had the right to tenure, paid vacations, transfers, retirement benefits, prompt payment of salaries, and the right to promotions. They also had to be members of their respective professional associations, and in order to be admitted to such membership they had to have a university or normal school diploma; therefore, no one could teach who did not have previous academic training.

Every summer, teachers who were not yet employed in the public schools participated in competitive examinations from which waiting lists were formed. These lists were made public, and vacancies were filled from them. Separate lists were prepared for each teaching subject.

Teachers in active service were also rank listed in accordance with grades given them by the district inspectors, and from which they were selected for promotions. Teachers were entitled to salary increases for every five years of active service. Up to ninety days' maternity leave was available, with full salary.

Teachers at the elementary school level worked on a part-time basis. Some taught during the morning, others during the afternoon, and still others at night; those in the English centers taught during the early evening. All earned the same basic salary, 129 Cuban pesos monthly plus a bonus for seniority.

School buildings, most of which had originally been rented quarters in the cities and the typical peasant huts in the rural areas, were slowly replaced by modern, functional school buildings. In 1944, 10,500 classrooms, model elementary schools, higher elementary centers, and 1,500 rural schools were built. Many others were in need of adequate housing, but additional school construction had to wait for budgetary appropriations. School buildings were used to a maximum; in the urban areas there were a morning school, an afternoon school, a night school, and an early evening English center operating in the same building.

Textbooks had to be approved by the Board of Provincial Superintendents of Schools (Junta de Superintendentes Provinciales). Without this approval, no book could be used in public or private schools. The Ministry of Education selected the textbooks that it planned to buy for the public schools from those approved by this board. Many Cuban textbooks were adopted by several Latin American countries as official textbooks for their own school systems.

In 1935 a new type of service was created, school health services. Medical and dental care was provided for all children in public schools and for those in private schools with less than a hundred students. Those private schools with a larger enrollment had to provide the same health services themselves.

In addition, education missions (*misiones educativas*) toured the country offering various services. These traveling groups included physicians, dentists, laboratory technicians, home economics teachers, and masters in crafts and in agriculture. Aside from these, there were also mobile library units that toured the country. At the beginning of the 1930s a program of free breakfast was established in elementary schools, and in 1954 free school dining rooms were also started.

At the end of 1958, there were 30,000 public classrooms with 34,000 public school teachers serving them and 1.3 million students registered. The national budget for that year was 75 million pesos; almost 20 percent of it was devoted to education, of which 61 percent was devoted to elementary education.

In 1942 the first of the six schools of journalism was created in which training was offered in every phase of newspaper publishing. Applicants had to have an eighth-grade certificate. Newspapers could not employ persons who were not graduates of these schools; their plants were also used for the training of the students. Another specialized school created during this period was a school of forestry, which trained its students in the conservation of the country's natural resources. Applicants had to be graduates of the *bachillerato* schools, or hold a surveyor's diploma, or be a master of agriculture. All these secondary schools had a day and night section to give an opportunity to those students who were working during the day hours. They also had specialized libraries.

Night adult education was started within the public schools, including the rural areas. The welfare associations had night schools in operation since the nineteenth century, and this was considered one of their most important contributions to the development of the country. The curriculum of the newly established public night schools (*escuelas nocturnas*) was the same as the one in force for the rest of the school system. Teachers in the adult education program had the same status, salary, rights, benefits, and qualifications as those of the day schools.

In 1944 a preprimary grade was added to precede the first grade in elementary schools, and public schools for the handicapped were also created in that year. Previously only private schools were devoted to teaching handicapped children.

By 1958 the nation had acquired a high standing in education among the Latin American countries. A report of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), published in 1960 entitled, "The Educational Situation in Latin America," listed Cuba in first place in the proper training of teachers at the elementary and secondary levels. It ranked second in teacher-pupil ratio, and third in the percentage of literates.

The University of Havana was known for many years as the National University, but with the founding of Eastern University (Universidad de Oriente) in Santiago de Cuba in 1949 and the Central University Marta Abreu (Universidad Central Marta Abreu) in Santa Clara, Las Villas Province, in 1952, the name reverted to University of Havana. Some private universities were made state universities, such as the Ignacio Agramonte in Camagüey, the Universidad del Norte de Oriente in Holguín, the Universidad de Occidente Rafael Morales in Pinar del Río, and the Universidad de Cienfuegos in Las Villas Province.

After 1949, the year in which the Cuban Congress passed a law authorizing the creation of private universities, several such institutions were established. The first one was a Roman Catholic university, Santo Tomás de Villanueva, followed by the Methodist Candler University and the Catholic Belén University, all located in the suburbs of Havana. Three others were begun within the city of Havana; a secular university named José Martí, the Masonic University, and another Roman Catholic university, La Salle. By the end of 1958 there were thirteen universities in the country with over 17,000 students enrolled, 50 percent of whom had scholarships.

THE 1959–69 PERIOD

Administration of education is decentralized; several districts in the country are responsible for the fulfillment, within their territories, of directives issued by the Ministry of Education. On the local level the responsible agency is the Municipal Council of Education, which is composed of representatives of the various mass organizations.

The national system of education includes various types of schools. General education, preceded by a preschool program for four- to six-year-old children is divided into three levels totaling twelve grades. These consist of primary education (grades one through six); basic secondary education (grades seven through ten), and preuniversity education (grades eleven and twelve).

Special education of various types include technical and professional training, vocational training in agriculture, industrial arts and administration, language teaching, fine arts, and preservice training of primary school teachers. Adult education is offered at various levels, including a first course (up to the third grade), a second course (up to the sixth grade), a third course (equivalent to the first year of basic secondary education), a worker-farmer faculty (preparatory course), and higher education (university). In addition, there are various special education schools for the handicapped.

Preschool Education

Kindergartens were abolished after the Revolution, and the schools that trained kindergarten teachers were closed. The teachers themselves had to take new intensive courses in order to become elementary school teachers.

The public school system continued to provide a preprimary grade within the elementary school, preceding the first grade, for children between four and six years of age. In addition, a new type of institution, the day nursery, was added. Before 1959 there were no institutions of this type except those that were operated by a few municipalities and some others managed by religious orders, in both cases free-of-charge. The necessity for day nurseries was not great before 1959 because the majority of the women in the workforce did not need them.

At the beginning of the new regime, when women began to leave their homes and take military training and were sent as "volunteers" to cut sugarcane in the countryside, the need was felt for institutions where they could leave their children. Day nurseries had to be established by the state if the labor force was to be increased.

These nurseries were not free at first. Parents were charged in accordance with their income; charges varied from 5 Cuban pesos to 45 Cuban pesos a month per child. Beginning in January 1967, this service was offered free. Children are admitted after they are forty-five days old and can stay through six years of age. Between the ages of four and six years they are trained and engaged in kindergarten activities combined with preschool learning, using "key themes" based on the syllabi supplied by the Ministry of Education.

The day nurseries are under the Federation of Cuban Women, although the Ministry of Education is responsible for the teaching. Teaching personnel receive a fifteen-week training course. There is a National Department of Education for Day Nurseries, which issues guidelines for all nurseries. In 1967 the number of day nurseries increased to 301, with 38,008 children registered.

Elementary Education

The largest increase in enrollment occurred in the elementary schools because of the population explosion taking place in the country. In 1967 the registration was about 1.4 million children, an increase of 32,131 since 1965. Elementary education was free and compulsory for children between six and twelve years of age. Elementary education consists of six grades. The children are admitted to the first grade when they reach six years of age and continue through the sixth grade. Thirty-eight thousand completed the sixth grade in the 1962/63 school year, but an estimated 90,000 graduated from elementary schools in the 1967/68 school year.

Between the first and fourth grades, education is carried out only in the classroom. In the fifth and sixth grades, however, teaching is also done in workshops and on farms, a practice followed in secondary schools as well. The regional educational centers make arrangements with factories, workshops, and farms in each province for frequent interchange of workers, students, and teachers, thus combining classroom activities with practical work. Study teams composed of the students are formed at the beginning of each term to learn about agriculture, education, public health, navy, and fishery; during the last part of the school years, emphasis is placed on stockraising and farming. Special study commissions in the urban areas and "Collectives in charge of inspectors of elementary instruction" in the rural areas orient the fourth and fifth grades toward their acquaintance with the secondary schools, the community, and the labor world. These activities are encouraged by the mass organizations that are members of the "councils of education." Tests to determine promotion are given for the fourth, fifth, and sixth grades by provincial educational authorities.

In its report for 1967/68 the Ministry of Education stated that "the teaching of reading was being strengthened through new methods which were applied during the previous five years . . . a new method for the teaching of reading and writing in the first grade was under experiment in one of the provinces, which according to the results obtained up to that date were expected to surpass all others."

The latest trend is toward boarding schools for all students at the elementary level. The government started slowly by preparing facilities for the sixth graders in rural areas. In the 1966/67 school year, fifth-grade facilities were added, and the fourth graders were accommodated the next year. In the 1969/70 period, it appeared that there were still difficulties in convincing parents to accept the boarding school plan.

By use of boarding schools, the Ministry of Education expects to achieve the following objectives: to assure the complete fulfillment of the grade syllabus with morning and afternoon classes, plus one hour of supervised study in the evening; to make better and more efficient use of manpower and orientation given to teaching personnel; to create the conditions necessary to adapt rural students to disciplinary and working norms that prepare them for the eventual stage as scholarship students; and to secure integral training through several additional activities.

Three complete rural boarding schools were in operation in 1969, and the number of semiboarding schools has increased not only in the rural sections but in urban areas as well. Boarding school facilities for public elementary school children were not available before 1959, except for orphans who were admitted, usually since birth, to a special institution operated by a religious order in cooperation with the Ministry of Education.

Secondary Education

Secondary education is divided into two levels: basic secondary schools, incorporating grades seven through ten; and higher secondary schools, incorporating grades eleven and twelve. A thirteenth grade was added in 1967 in some of these schools by expanding the subject matter and adding military training and political indoctrination.

Inspectors for secondary schools appointed in the early years of the Castro government had their roles changed in 1967; they became specialists aiding in educational activities and were also in charge of guidance, supervision, technical inspection of the teachers' work and teachers' inservice training.

A new school was created at the secondary level in the Sierra Maestra, where students of secondary schools who have shown symptoms of undiscipline are sent as boarders until they become rehabilitated or graduate.

Productive industrial work, productive agricultural work, including farming and stockraising, and work of social utility are part of the goals established for polytechnical education. Secondary schools have experimental farm lots within the premises or near them for practical teaching. Students are taken to farms and factories to establish a link between theory and productive work. A new subject, the fundamentals of industrial production, was added to the curriculum in 1963. Circles of students with scientific and technical interests were begun during the 1964/65 period in the elementary basic and higher secondary schools. In the 1969/70 school year 100 secondary schools began to offer practical shopwork to train students who might continue their technical education at one of the technical institutes.

In 1967—68 period, measures were gradually adopted to eventually bring about a change in the teaching of mathematics. One-third of the tests given to ninth graders and to students completing their preuniversity courses are devoted to mathematics. Mathematics courses of 196 hours are offered in schools for skilled workers, and 480 hours are distributed in five semesters for medium-level technicians. The study of mathematics encountered serious initial difficulties because of the lack of suitable textbooks and appropriate teaching personnel. It was necessary to provide special cadres without diplomas in mathematics, such as university graduates in other professions and primary teachers who were given inservice training.

Until the 1967/68 school period, the year had been divided in two semesters of 80 days, totaling 160 school days; but the 1968/69 school year was divided into five two-month periods. Four of these are devoted to classes and the fifth to agricultural work by the entire student body. The school year thus has been adapted to the agricultural and production needs of the country, since students from the fifth grade and higher are used in labor activities. In the 1969/70 period, two months of agricultural work was devoted to sugarcane cutting in an effort to reach the goal of 10 million metric tons of sugar (see ch. 18, Agriculture).

Technical and Professional Education

Industrial Education

At least twenty-six technical schools and eleven technical institutes were in operation in 1969. Over 12,000 students attended courses in the technical schools and 4,000 in the technical institutes in 1964, the only year for which enrollment data were available. Students who have completed one year of basic secondary education are eligible to enroll in the technical schools. Three years of basic secondary education are required for admission to the technical institutes.

Eight centers of construction technology were in operation by late 1969. Another center had been established for the training of workers in the use of heavy equipment and hydraulic works. The Technical School for Geology trains geologists and topographers. The Institute of Fuel Technology trains skilled workers and technicians on an intermediate level in oil drilling, geology, geophysics, and extraction. This institute also trains mechanics for railroad cars, steam and diesel locomotives, airbrake equipment, boilermaking, sugar mills, and machine repair and maintenance. In 1968 a plan was adopted under which students study during a six-month semester in the classrooms and spend six months in the workshops or working in a factory or on a farm until completion of their studies. The workshops in most of the technical schools perform practical work such as producing spare parts for state-owned factories.

Agricultural Education

In 1968 an Institute of Phytosanitation established operations for the training of technical personnel specialized in plant diseases and pest control. There are also three institutes of citriculture, one for rice cultivation, and one for livestock production. Entrance requirements for the agricultural institutes are based upon a ninth-grade education.

Schools of Fishing

Several schools exist whose students eventually become fishermen. The facilities of the former Naval Academy at Mariel in Pinar del Río Province are used for the School of Fishing, where boys begin at the elementary school level and earn certificates as deckhands, ship and refrigeration mechanics, and coxswains. At the secondary level, the knowledge of the students in these subjects is expanded. A second secondary school was established in 1965 in Marianao, La Habana Province to accommodate 1,200 students. Another, for 1,600 students, exists at Playa Giron. After secondary school, the students enter the senior fishing school at Mariel where they obtain certificates as merchant marine pilots, captains, chief and assistant engineers, and technicians in naval communications.

Economic and Administrative Education

The minimum age for enrollment in the schools of administrative education is seventeen. The students attend evening sessions at these schools and since the establishments of a new plan have had their schedule changed and the number of class hours reduced. Based on the premise that students will study more by themselves if the classtime is reduced, the students have a schedule of three class nights a week instead of five. Specialists were studying the structure of this type of school in 1967 in order to give them a new orientation and to reorganize the schools in accordance with the economic direction of the country.

Language Education

To replace the language schools at the university level and the several hundred English centers that existed before 1959, the

Maximo Gorki Institute was created as a boarding school for the study of the Russian, English, French, and German languages for teachers, translators, and interpreters. Twenty-three language schools also exist for day students and provide training in English, French, Italian, Portuguese, Russian, Czech (Slavic), Chinese, Hungarian, and German. Spanish for non-Spanish-speaking foreigners is also provided at these language schools. Candidates for the day schools must be at least fourteen years old and have an eighth-grade education. Seventy percent of the places available are reserved for workers recommended by their unions.

Art Education

The responsibility for the training in this field is the National Council on Culture, a department of the Ministry of Education. This type of education is given at the National School of Art and at other schools. The duration of the courses depends on the type of career chosen. The courses in the School of Dramatic Arts, for example, lasts four years and includes language training in English and Russian.

Teacher Training

Elementary Education Teachers

The training of elementary school teachers is five years, which are divided into three stages in boarding schools. The training is started when the prospective teachers have the equivalent of a sixth-grade education. The first year is spent at Minas de Frío, Oriente Province, in a rural school center built before 1959. Two years are then spent in the Manuel Ascunce Domenech School for Primary Teachers in Lopes de Collantes in Las Villas Province. There the students complete their eighth-grade schooling, although the curriculum is devoted fundamentally to the subjects that will be taught in primary schools. It appears that these three years of study correspond with the sixth, seventh, and eighth grades of the traditional system.

The third stage takes place at the Makarenko Teachers Institute in Havana. There the students acquire a general education at a higher intermediate level and further experience in vocational teaching. During the first of these two years at Makarenko Teachers Institute, they also teach in the classrooms of about 250 selected schools adjacent to Havana. During the second year, they practice teaching at the elementary boarding schools and do not attend classes. The Makarenko Teachers Institute also has a section to train preschool teachers, who have been selected for this training, during the fourth year of their primary school teacher courses. They teach in a preschool and in the first grade of a boarding school during what is supposed to be their fourth and fifth year of training in the institute.

Other than the professional elementary school teachers trained at the teacher's institute, there are other kinds of teachers in the elementary schools; numbering about 20,000 are the *Populares* (amateurs) who participated in the literacy campaign of 1961 as "volunteers." When the campaign was over, they were given nine months of intensive, introductory courses, after which they were sent out to teach in the rural areas. They continued their formal training on Saturdays and for forty-five days in boarding schools at the end of the school year.

Another form of training teachers was started in 1965. Government officials who were removed from their positions as a result of the government's attempts to streamline operations in the ministries were asked to enroll in fifteen-day intensive courses to prepare them for teaching; initial response was not great. Factory or agricultural workers with a third-grade education are given short intensive courses and then become instructors to their fellow workers.

Secondary School Teachers' Training

Teaching personnel for secondary schools and the Makarenko Teachers Institute are trained at any one of the pedagogical institutes that were created to replace the former schools of education, sciences, philosophy and letters, and modern languages of the universities. They were reorganized and renamed several times since 1959 and as of 1969 were divided into two sections, one for basic secondary schools and the other for higher secondary schools. There were four of these institutes: one in Havana, with both sections; one in Las Villas Province, also with two sections; one in Camagüey, with just the basic secondary section; and another in Santiago de Cuba, also with both sections.

Basic secondary teachers are trained for seventh, eighth, and ninth grades; and higher secondary teachers for tenth, eleventh, and twelfth grades. Each of the courses lasts five years. For basic secondary training the enrollee must have a ninth-grade education and must pass the equivalent grade-level test. For the higher secondary day course, available to scholarship students only, the applicant must have an eleventh-grade education or be a primary school teacher selected from those who are taking basic courses at the institute. All nongraduate personnel teaching at secondary schools are accepted for night courses. Basic secondary school training is offered in seven specializations, from which the student can choose, but most of them are actually a combination of two subjects, such as: mathematics and polytechnical education; mathematics and physics; physics and chemistry; biological sciences and production; agriculture, geography, and history; Spanish and history; and Spanish and English. For those applying for courses in the higher secondary schools, nine specializations are available: physics, chemistry, mathematics, biological sciences, geography, Spanish, English, French, and history.

The universities formerly held a summer session for the benefit of those secondary teachers who wished to keep current their knowledge and practice in their field of specialization. For this purpose, foreign university professors frequently were hired for these postdoctorate courses. In 1969 the summer school of the university at Havana resumed its activities with a registration of 400.

Adult Education Teachers

The training of adult education teachers is considered a part of the adult education program known as Worker-Farmer Education. These teachers are "instructors" with intermediate schooling, who are trained through a program of two seminars. The first one, called the Internal Training Seminar, lasts two or three months and is devoted to an intensive, general preparation. The other one is known as the Permanent Seminar and is held every week.

Special Education Teachers' Training

Special education teachers are trained at the Makarenko Teachers Institute, where elementary school teachers finish their training. They then can take courses in training the blind and amblyopics, the deaf and hypoacoustics, the mentally retarded and emotionally disturbed, simultaneously teaching children with these handicaps. After the first year of this type of training, the enrollees take ten months of evening courses.

Physical Education Teachers

Prospective physical education teachers are selected from among the students who have been outstanding in various sports. These are trained at the Manuel Fajardo Higher School of Physical Education, formerly the Instituto de Educación Física y Deportes. During the month of July they participate in the inservice training given to elementary school teachers. Further, all elementary teachers receive short courses in physical education.

Salary Scale and Enrollment

The teachers' salary scale consists of five steps for each of sixteen positions. Trained teachers after their graduation begin earning a salary of 140 Cuban pesos monthly. With each promotion, they are granted an increase in salary. There are no more salary raises after reaching the fifth step; bonus for seniority is no longer paid. A teacher may be promoted to a higher position, however. The *populares* and amateur teachers are not included in this scale. The *populares* begin at a salary of 98 Cuban pesos monthly; after the second year they receive 114 Cuban pesos and upon obtaining their teachers certificate receive 140 Cuban pesos monthly. Official data are unavailable on the salaries paid the improvised teachers; nevertheless, newspaper stories indicate that they receive salaries of between 25 Cuban pesos and 40 Cuban pesos a month.

The number of students enrolled at the teacher training institutes seems to have decreased. In 1965, 30,640 students were enrolled in these institutions, but in 1967 registration had fallen to under 25,000. The number of teachers instructing the future teachers also diminished in this period from 1,429 to 1,395.

University Education

University education and its administration have been drastically changed since the 1962 enactment of the Higher Education Reform Law. Only three of the thirteen universities that had been in existence in 1959 were functioning in late 1969. Those were: Western University (Universidad de Occidente); Central University (Universidad Central); and Eastern University (Universidad de Oriente), where most of the educational administrators of the new regime taught.

On December 13, 1962, the Union of Latin American Universities resolved to suspend relations with the University of Havana, the only Cuban university belonging to the union. This measure was adopted after a thorough investigation of the activities affecting university autonomy and academic freedom.

The total enrollment at the three universities, however, is higher than the enrollment of the thirteen prerevolution universities combined. This is partially because the requirements for registration have been lowered since 1959, and partially because of the creation of the secondary teachers' pedagogical institutes that are administratively under the universities plus the creation of the Workers-Farmers School with branches in cities and factories throughout the country. In 1967 the number of students enrolled at the universities was 29,539. Over 70 percent of the university students in the country were registered at the Western University in Havana.

There were seven schools at the universities in 1967; humanities, sciences, technology, agricultural sciences, medicine, pedagogy, and economics plus the Workers-Farmers School. The school for workers and farmers is a six semester preparatory school designed to prepare workers and farmers for a university course of studies in the field of technology. Applicants must be between the ages of eighteen and forty and must have been outside the regular educational system for at least one year because of work. The schools of technology receive the greatest emphasis by the government. It is estimated the country will require 11,500 engineers and architects by 1980, whereas only 2,000 engineers had been trained between 1946 and 1966.

The university school year is divided into two semesters, each one consisting of eighty school days. A minimum attendance of 80 percent is required for promotion. Tests were abolished, and an individual evaluation replaced them. The duration of many courses was decreased. For example, the courses at the schools of medicine that previously lasted seven years have been reduced to four; dentistry was reduced from five years to three; and agronomic engineering was reduced from five years to two.

The admission requirements have been eased. For example, applicants for accounting courses at the schools of economics need only the equivalent of an eighth-grade education or a certificate from their supervisor, which states that it would be in the best interest of the government for his subordinate to be admitted. In 1964 almost 3,800 students were in the School of Economics at Western University, nearly half of whom were studying accounting.

Professors are hired under short-term contracts, and tenure was abolished. Foreign professors are hired if there are not Cuban specialists. In 1964, for example, a number of Soviet Union professors were teaching economics at Western University. The Higher University Council (Consejo Superior Universitario), under which universities previously operated independently and autonomously, was replaced by the Centralized National Council of Universities. Three vice rectors were added to each university administration. The individual University Council (Consejo Universitario), which administered each of the universities and which was composed of the deans of faculties, has been replaced by the University Advisory Board; the board has only advisory functions because the Ministry of Education has taken over the authority to govern the universities. This board is made up of the faculty deans and two more members, the president of the Federation of University Students and a representative of the Communist Youth Organization.

The university faculties are governed in a similar manner; an advisory council composed of the head of departments together with the president of the student association and the representative of the Communist Youth Organization. In general, the universities had to comply with the new educational concepts, methods, structure, organization, and dynamics. Before 1959 the curricula had been the responsibility of the faculties; since then, specialists of government agencies set the curricula. In order to attain a closer coordination between schools and state agencies, the teaching staff and the students of medium-level professional and technical training are assigned to jobs in government agencies as a part of their training.

Literacy Campaign

In October 1960 Castro announced at the United Nations that on January 1, 1961, the government was going to launch a literacy campaign. Preliminary work began in November 1960 with a census of illiterates and with the training of literacy teachers. The number of teachers was not considered sufficient to carry out the campaign, and 100,000 students, including a large percentage of fourth-graders, were enrolled in special teaching brigades. Eventually 280,000 literacy teachers were trained to use the basic teaching manual and started their chore with groups of twenty-five to fifty. Each group had a peasant or worker acting as the leader, a teacher who was responsible for the technique, and one more member in charge of political orientation. The teacher determined whether an individual within his unit had become literate or not. Three tests were given: the first, at the time of the census; the second, during the teaching cycle; and the third given at the end of the course, decided the literacy of the student. This test consisted of reading one or two short paragraphs chosen from the primer, taking a simple dictation, and writing a sample letter to Castro.

At the end of the campaign, it was claimed that illiteracy had been reduced to 3.9 percent, the smallest percentage in the world. Of the estimated 979,000 illiterates, 894,000 were enrolled. Of the number enrolled, only 272,000 failed to become literate. In addition, about 100,000 had been taught to read and write by the armed forces during 1959 and 1960, before the literacy campaign officially commenced. About 25,000 illiterate Haitians residing in the country were excluded from the campaign because they did not speak Spanish.

Cuban educators who have left their country assert that the illiteracy rate was not in fact reduced to 3.9 percent, pointing out that the measurement for literacy as accepted by international educators and by UNESCO was not followed.

In 1964 a UNESCO Mission, which analyzed the Literacy Campaign and its followup, stated that "The Campaign was not a miracle, but rather a difficult victory achieved through work, technique, and organization. As a more and more perfect structuring of and for the Campaign was developed, the Campaign became more and more an instrument of revolutionary integration."

160

Adult Education

When the literacy campaign was over, a followup plan was developed under which the new literates and those who had dropped out of elementary school in the early grades would be taught until completion of the sixth grade. With this purpose in mind, the night schools were reorganized, and instructors were trained to teach in the adult education program, which was begun in 1964. More than 500,000 adults enrolled in these courses in 1964 and 30,000 finished the sixth grade. About half the students, however, attend classes irregularly, with the lowest attendance rate occurring in the rural areas.

Three courses of education in this program are offered, including a correspondence course. When the student finishes the equivalent of sixth grade, he may continue studies in technical schools. Those students who finish the equivalent of seventh grade in the basic secondary schools may go on to university preparatory courses taken at the Worker-Farmer Faculty, where they follow a plan of studies identical in all of the three universities.

The improvement plan for women is also part of the adult education program. Women may participate in the regular adult education plan, but they also have a special program carried out in boarding schools, where they study and work under the guidance of teachers and specialists from the Makarenko Teachers Institute. To help carry out adult education an extensive use of mass media is used. Radio, television, and audio-visual aids are employed.

In addition to the libraries at certain school centers, there are other libraries easily accessible for students who need them. Textbooks have been reprinted, and others have been prepared specifically for certain courses. The list of textbooks includes about one-third by Russian-Slavic authors. Another third have been prepared collectively by Europeans and Cubans, and only one-third are by Cuban authors.

Scholarships

One of the claimed innovations of the new educational system was the creation of scholarships for everyone who wanted to study. Although statistics are scarce, it is evident that at the onset of the program, many scholarships were granted; but by 1967 (when the latest figures were available), the number had been drastically reduced. The original emphasis on scholarships for rural students seem to have lagged since the number of rural elementary school scholarship-holders was only 2.6 percent of the total in 1967, and the same percentage prevailed for rural basic secondary school students. Scholarship-holders at the university in Havana were 37 percent of the total in 1967. Scholarships for university students include lodging, clothing, food, books, and a monthly allowance, which varies from 50 to 150 pesos.

The figures supplied by the Ministry of Education regarding the scholarship program reveal that there must have been a change in policy concerning scholarship-granting. In 1962 the rural students at the basic secondary level were granted 20,000 scholarships, whereas in 1967 the number of scholarships for both basic and higher secondary students was only 17,600. Girls receiving scholarships in the domestic science program in 1962 numbered 14,000, but there is no mention of this program in 1967. Rural teachers were granted 3,000 scholarships in 1962, but in 1967 there is no information regarding scholarships for student-teachers in this program.

CHAPTER 10

ARTISTIC AND INTELLECTUAL EXPRESSION

Many of the prominent writers and artists of the 1940s and 1950s were still active in early 1970. No substantial departure from previous intellectual traditions came about as a result of the Revolution. Intellectual currents have been most compelling during times of political or economic unrest. The revolutionary era of the late nineteenth century and the depression years of the 1930s produced bursts of intellectual and creative activity. The intellectual themes from the 1959 Revolution through 1970 were similar to those of the earlier decades.

The government's social and economic policies were aimed at changing exactly those conditions that had been the subject of the critical social literature of the preceding eras. Thus, much of the literature during the 1960s contained high praise for the Revolution and the changes it brought about. Social conditions and Afro-Cuban traditions were still popular themes (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Socialist realism, however, did not take hold as the public proved to be more receptive to abstract techniques.

The first vital intellectual movement came at the end of the eighteenth century, when all of Latin America was being stirred by the desire for independence. In Cuba this desire spanned the entire nineteenth century and culminated in the person of José Martí, whose active life and creative works are considered the epitome of Cuban greatness. With the spread of romanticism to Cuba, poetry became the main vehicle of the artist. The themes were indigenous and included slavery, pre-Columbian Indians, and local customs; but much literature was written from exile, and the forms and moods were European in inspiration. Intellectuals stressed the uniqueness of the national culture; it was considered an Afro-Cuban culture, a blend of Spanish and African elements, best illustrated in Cuban popular music.

In the 1930s writers revived many of the themes of the nineteenth-century revolutionary period to express their discontent with the results of independence and to give further substance to uniquely domestic forms of artistry. The mood was more critical and less romantic than in the earlier period. An Afro-Cuban tradition was rediscovered by composers, writers, painters and sculptors and was incorporated in modern forms.

Literature has proved to be the most important medium for intellectual expression. Since 1959 emphasis in the school curricula has been placed on science, but scientific thought has never been of primary importance. Film-makers were particularly active during the 1960s and a few feature films have been praised by international critics for their artistic excellence. The government has attempted to make the arts readily available to the public by sending theatrical, dance, and musical groups, plus cultural exhibitions, on tour throughout the island and by publishing books in large numbers at inexpensive prices (see ch. 16, Public Information).

The government's position on artistic freedom had not been firmly established by 1970. Various state agencies established to oversee artistic endeavors had the dual function of giving material aid and of encouraging artists to serve the Revolution through their work. The government, however, has been reluctant to force conformity, and the agencies exercise varying degrees of influence.

INTELLECTUAL AND LITERARY CURRENTS

The Awakening of National Consciousness

Life was hard for the colonists until the late eighteenth century. Spain devoted few of her resources to Cuba. Intellectual and artistic life mirrored that of Spain to the best of the abilities of a small group of educated persons. Tales of chivalry, heroic adventures, and historic ballads were very popular. The works of Lope de Vega and Cervantes, representative of Spain's Golden Age, also were known in the colony.

During the latter part of the eighteenth century, when the colony began to grow and prosper, increasing numbers of students were sent to Spain, where they were exposed to eighteenth-century philosophy and natural science. The newly liberal atmosphere of Spain was transferred to Cuba by Don Luis de las Casas, who came in 1790 as governor and captain general (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). He founded Cuba's first newspaper, *Papel Periodico*, the proceeds of which were used to finance the first public library, established in 1793. Under the patronage of de las Casas, the Economic Society of Friends of the Country (Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País) was founded in 1795. It brought together the foremost educators and intellectuals of the island. Regional economic societies became the intellectual centers for the independence movement throughout the nineteenth century.

Cuban intellectuals date the beginning of indigenous intellectual and literary life from the end of the eighteenth century. The trio of teachers, essayists, and political activists who initiated the development of a Cuban culture, distinct from that of Spain, were Father Félix Varela y Morales (1787-1833), José de la Luz y Caballero (1800-1862), and José Antonio Saco y López (1797-1879). In his biography of José Martí, Jorge Mañach (b. 1898) calls these men the three forefathers of Cuban national consciousness. All three were professors of philosophy and were eloquent spokesmen for Cuban freedom and justice within the Spanish Empire. They worked through essays, from the lecture platform, and in conspiratorial activity to arouse the nation and free it from Spanish hegemony. They broke the bonds of medieval classicism and scholasticism and helped to introduce the questioning spirit of the French Encyclopedists to the small band of intellectuals who were to lead Cuba's battle for independence.

A number of Cuban poets preceding Martí created a body of literature memorized by succeeding generations, which passionately sang of the love of country. A characteristic common to poetry of this and future periods was the identification of the poet's personal well-being with the welfare of his homeland. Much of it, written from exile, had a quality of unreality and sang of a country only dimly remembered, whose unity was idealized, whose peasants could be loved from a distance, and whose slaves could be freed.

One of the most frequently quoted poets of this period, the last to write in the neoclassical style, replete with classical allusions and verse styles but nonetheless lyrical, was José María Heredia y Heredia (1803-39). He wrote and published most of his work in the United States and is best remembered for his *En el teocalli de Cholula* (In the Temple of Cholula), written in 1820 and *El Niágara*, written in 1824 after a visit to the waterfalls.

Other poets of this genre were Diego Gabriel de la Concepción Valdés, a mulatto known as Plácido (1809-1844), and Gertrudis Gómez de Avellaneda (1814-73). Plácido, one of the early romanticists, favored such themes as medieval legends, Moorish Spain, idealized pre-Columbian Indians, and political freedom. He was a forerunner to the specifically Cuban brand of romanticism called *ciboneyismo*. Gertrudis Gómez spent most of her adult life away from Cuba and nostalgically extolled it in her poetry in a restrained romantic manner. Her poems *Al Partir* (On Departing), a sonnet in which she describes the sorrow she felt upon leaving her homeland, and *A las Cubanas* (To the Cubans), are popular recitation pieces.

Revolutionary Romanticism

The philosophy of eighteenth-century rationalism provided intellectuals with the stimulus for political and social progress, but eighteenth-century romanticism inspired them with a sense of personal and historic destiny. In the writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau, the revolutionaries, best exemplified by Martí, found the philosophical and emotional rationale for their struggle. Rousseau's attribution of man's corruption was easily applied to the corruption of the Spanish authorities; his concept of man's "natural state" of goodness permitted the Cuban revolutionaries to retain what they felt to be the principles of Christianity and yet reject the Church, which had allied itself with the Spanish oppressor (see ch. 11, Religion).

Romanticism provided a visionary dream of the future of Cuba after independence. The romantic emphasis upon nature was combined with the political needs of the hour. Writers idealized the free life of so-called natural men—the Ciboneys in Cuba and the Negroes in Africa— and contrasted it with their own lives under the Spaniards.

José Martí (1853—95)

Martí was the personification of revolutionary romanticism, but he was also one of the forerunners of the Latin American modernist movement to follow. His essays, poems, plays, and children's stories were often written hurriedly, between speaking engagements and in the midst of organizational activities, but he could excite even a public that did not understand his classical allusions or philosophical references.

Martí reserved his poetry primarily for the expression of his inmost thoughts, his loves, and his increasing preoccupation with death. In *Ismaelillo* (1882) he recorded his tender feelings for his son and homeland, expressed in regular meters but with verbal textures that presaged the coming of the modernists. His *Versos Libres* (Free Verses), written around 1882 but published posthumously, was a collection of compact, introspective poems.

Martí went beyond those who believed in art for art's sake, proclaiming "the moral power and transcendental purpose of beauty." He felt that most literature should carry a social and ethical message. He wrote many political essays and seventeen volumes on life in the United States. As did other Cuban intellectuals, Martí favored universal education. He argued for diversification of the economy as a way to avoid colonial status and desired that all citizens receive a scientific and moral education.

Martí was born of poor Spanish immigrants. He received an education largely because his godfather paid the tuition for his early schooling and then entrusted his education to the poet and teacher, Rafael María Mendive, who gave him a foundation in the classics and encouraged him to participate in the independence movement. In January 1871 he went into exile in Spain where he found other

168

Cubans and Spanish liberals who sympathized with the independence movement that he expounded. He attended the universities of Madrid and Saragosa and received degrees in law, philosophy, and letters. After spending time in Paris, Mexico, New York, and Guatemala, he returned to Cuba in 1878; he was again exiled by the Spanish authorities in 1879. In 1880 he reached New York, where he worked as an art critic and served as North American correspondent for a variety of South American newspapers.

After devoting much of his time in bringing together the many diverse and squabbling exile groups, this was accomplished in 1892. He then devoted himself to maintaining the often precarious unity of the group and collecting funds to finance an expedition. Criticized for remaining aloof from the actual fighting, he returned to Cuba in 1895 and was killed in a conflict on May 19, one month after having set foot on his native soil.

After his death his stature as a national hero grew slowly but was fostered with increasing zeal from the 1920s onward by nationalists and revolutionaries anxious to present their own struggles as the continuation of the unfinished battle for independence. In modern Cuba, Martí is known simply as El Apóstol (the Apostle).

Costumbrismo, the Slave Theme, and Ciboneyismo

Because magazines and books were subject to strict censorship, many revolutionary themes had to be disguised. The *costumbristas* (depictors of local customs) wrote rich, descriptive, often satirical accounts in a romantic vein with an overlay of realism in the form of long novels and short sketches about everyday life in the early nineteenth century. The best known was Cirilo Villaverde (1812-94), who in 1882 wrote *Cecilia Valdés o la loma del ángel* (Cecilia Valdés or the Angel's Hillock), a depressing but compelling novel; in it he makes observations of the customs and mannerisms of the different social classes and races and exposes the harsh life of Cubans in the 1830s. Ramón de Palma y Romay (1812-60) and José Antonio Echeverria (1815-55) were two other writers in this genre. In 1960 the Castro government republished several *costumbrista* works including those of Ramón Meza y Suárez Inclán (1861-1911), who in 1886 wrote *Mi tío el empleado* (My Uncle, the Civil Servant), which satirized the bureaucracy and upper class Spanish life.

Another school of writers turned to Cuba's aboriginal inhabitants and to the slaves. The major writer on the slave theme was Anselmo Suárez y Romero (1818-78), whose *Francisco* (1839) was calculated to raise emotions akin to those produced by Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. Another theme was *ciboneyismo*, contrasting the presumably happy, sin-free life of the Ciboney Indians before the Conquest with their destruction and slavery under the Spaniards. The foremost contributor to this school was the poet José Fornairs (1827-90).

Modernism, widely popular in Latin America, did not attract any important following in Cuba. One precursor of this trend, however, was the poet Julián del Casal (1863-93), whose verse, affected by his timidity and ill health, was increasingly concerned with death. He wrote three books of poetry—*Hojas al viento* (Leaves to the Wind), *Nieve* (Snow), and *Bustos y rimas* (Busts and Rhymes)—written in 1890, 1892, and 1893, respectively. The principal exponent of the related symbolist school was Federico Uhrbach (1873-1932).

The Twentieth Century

With the success of the independence movement, literary effort lost its chief inspiration. From about 1925 on, however, growing discontent among middle-class intellectuals was accompanied by an increased literary output. The philosophy employed to rationalize the new discontent was not the anarchic liberalism of Martí but, rather, a Marxist historical and economic determinism adapted to place the blame for Cuba's troubles on the forces of capitalism and imperialism and to sanction revolutionary efforts. Nevertheless, natural science and romantic liberalism continued to find favor among the more privileged and better established writers and the upper class to which they securely belonged.

Enrique Varona, 1849-1933

Cuba's outstanding philosopher, Enrique José Varona, spanned the revolutionary years and more than three decades of independence. An early proponent of autonomy, Varona eventually joined Martí in the United States and worked for independence. Influenced by numerous European philosophers, Varona looked to science for an ethical system, in the same manner that Martí considered economics to be a branch of ethics. Varona's reputation as a philosopher is based on his three-volume *Conferencias filosóficas* (Philosophic Lectures), written in 1880-82, in which he expounded the principles of experimental and scientific positivism. In addition, Varona was a poet who in numerous essays, critiques, and philosophical studies dissected the Cuban character.

Varona taught his disciples to investigate their own society and let themselves be overcome by the "illusion of liberty" so that once given the economic, social, and political freedom to act, they could set themselves free and embark upon the road to national greatness. Varona, however, suffered the disillusion of the postrevolutionary years and critically attacked his own class for their love of ostentation, for eschewing business and industry, and for being interested only in quick profits.

168

Complacency and Natural Science

Although Varona pressed for a practical orientation in the school system, manipulation of abstract concepts rather than laboratory experiment and practical application continued to characterize thought and education. Much of the imagination and energy that had formerly gone into literary activity and philosophical speculation was taken up with social studies. Most of the small amount of poetry written was frankly nonpolitical and often morbidly introspective.

Naturalistic studies carried out by French-educated Felipe Poey (1799-1891) are the foundation for any study of Cuba's native fauna and flora. Cubans point with pride to Carlos Finlay (1833-1915), the discoverer of the mosquito vector of yellow fever. Nevertheless, Cuban science remained little developed. The members of the Economic Society of Friends of the Country, to whom zeal for progress no longer seemed necessary, remained content with the economic theories of the early nineteenth century.

Social science in the aftermath of revolution was not devoted to the study of society as it actually existed in Cuba. More than ever, intellectuals regarded themselves as a social and political elite. Their studies confirmed this estimate by demonstrating the applicability in Cuba of neo-Darwinian theories of social evolution, in which the elimination of the unfit resulted in the steady march of the best elements of society toward perfection. Negroes were used to illustrate failure in the evolutionary competition—not, as in the nineteenth century, to portray idealistic primitive happiness.

Under the general heading, "The Cuban Underworld," Fernando Ortiz (b. 1881) published the two best-known studies of the history and culture of Negroes in Cuba, *Los negros brujos* (The Black Sorcerers) (1906) and *Los negros esclavos* (The Negro Slaves) (1916). In later years he produced works on Cuban History, ethnography, linguistics, archaeology, law, and political affairs. In 1923 he established the Society of Cuban Folklore (Sociedad del Folklore Cubana) and in 1926, with Nicolas Guillén, the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies (Sociedad de Estudios Afrocubanos). Ortiz concerned himself increasingly with the artistic aspects of Negro culture and with writing essays on music and dance in which he abandoned the evolutionary approach.

Discontent and Marxism

After 1920 many intellectuals discovered that their social position was not as strong as they had thought and that real power lay in the hands of the landowning and industrial upper class. Once again political protest inspired poets and essayists, who abandoned both romanticism and introspection in favor of social themes. Agustín Acosta (b. 1886) in 1926 wrote *La Zafra* (Cane Harvest), a poem depicting the life of the sugarworker. Still widely known in Cuba, this poem presaged the emergency in the 1930s of a self-consciously proletarian literature.

In 1927 Jorge Mañach (b. 1898) founded a literary magazine, *Revista de Avance*, which articulated the concern of the new generation of poet-politicians. His career, like that of many other middle-class Cubans, showed a shift toward conservatism from radical leftist beginnings, corresponding to his steady advance upward in the social scale. He left Cuba six months after Castro came to power. Mañach's biography of José Martí, written in 1933, was one of several contributing to the Martí legend, which was part of the revived nationalism of the 1930s. Other conscious attempts to reassert the validity of the antiauthoritarian tradition included a renewed interest in the culture of the Negro and the Indian; attempts were made to trace contemporary Cuban folklore to the aboriginal Ciboneys or through West Africa to Egypt, but a few articles and lectures gave evidence of firsthand observation. Demagogic politicians appealed to the masses by glorifying Cuban culture as the distinct achievement of a mestizo race (Cubans born of mixed parentage), drawing on the best in all the contributing races (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

Historians of the conservative school, absorbed in the chronicle of white, urban, and Spanish civilization, had previously written off the Indian as having become extinct in the sixteenth century. In the 1930s and 1940s, however, a revived *ciboneyismo*, under the guise of anthropology, became popular. Actual Indians were rediscovered by the geographer Antonio Núñez Jiménez in the course of explorations in the remote Toa Valley in Oriente Province. Nuñez later became prominent in the Castro government.

Factual studies of Afro-Cuban culture and the history of Negroes in Cuba were written only when Negroes and mestizos themselves turned their attention to the matter. In the 1950s, for example, the poet Lydia Cabrera published excellent studies of Afro-Cuban religions.

Many of the group, originally formed around the magazine *Revista de Avance* (Forward Review) and possibly encouraged by the color prejudices of Cuban society, became thoroughgoing Marxists. Nicolas Guillén is credited with originating the *negrismo* school in poetry, using Afro-Cuban forms and settings to write strongly political proletarian literature, portraying the bitter life of the lower classes, both Negro and white, and their exploitation by those in authority. Typical of the group is the work of Regino Pedroso, who has been called "one of the hemisphere's most powerful proletariat poets." In Guillén's *Motivos de son* (Motives of Sound), written in 1930, he translated the musical form of the *son* dance rhythm (originating in Haiti) into a literary form. In this and later poems he imitated African drums, using repetition and alliteration in a style reminiscent of the United States poet, Vachel Lindsay. In his *West Indies, Ltd.* (1934) and *Cantos para soldados y sones para turistas* (Songs for Soldiers and Dances for Tourists), written in 1937, the hopes and frustrations of the exploited classes are expressed. Juan Marinello, a mulatto of humble origin, who became the leader of the Popular Socialist Party, was another poet of *negrismo*.

Not all the literary effort of this period was preoccupied with nationalism and politics. Many authors of the time were involved in a movement called *criollismo*, which expressed a kind of local patriotism. Its principal organ, the magazine *Orígenes* (Origins), was edited by the poet José Lezama Lima (b. 1912) from 1944 to 1957. The literature of this movement, however, despite its local imagery and Caribbean subjects, was eclectic, derived from numerous European sources and concerned with transcendentalism. Alejo Carpentier (b. 1904) created a wide audience in the United States and Latin America with his romantic, fantastic novel *Los pasos perdidos* (The Lost Steps), written in 1953, which is set in a semimythical jungle country. Virgilio Piñera (b. 1914) in 1956 wrote *Cuentos fríos* (Cold Stories), a volume of brief fantasies through which he exposed what he saw to be the absurdity of life. For discipline and economy of style the younger writers of the 1950s and 1960s owe a debt of gratitude to this group of artists.

The Socialist Revolution

Leaders of the Revolutionary government, in accordance with the Marxist assertion of the primacy of economic facts, declared that economics, the physical sciences, industrial engineering, and community studies were to carry as much prestige as letters, law, architecture and philosophy. New emphasis was placed on science courses in secondary schools and universities; nevertheless, little original work has been produced by the scientific community since the Revolution.

The Castro regime, as part of its new design for Cuban society, redefined the role of the intellectual and his relationship to the government. Before the Revolution many members of the artistic and intellectual community were alienated from the government and from popular attitudes toward race, class, foreign domination, and other aspects of the society. The literary output of the decades preceding the Revolution was revealing in this respect; for the most part it was a proletarian, Afro-Cuban oriented literature that championed the cause of the workers and peasants against the government.

To circumvent this traditional disaffection of intellectuals, the Castro regime established organizations to integrate them into government, claiming that since the oppressors had been overthrown by the Revolution, the rightful role of the intellectual community was to cooperate with the government instead of being at odds with it. The National Council on Culture, headed by Alejo Carpentier, was founded to oversee the arts through such agencies as the National Union of Artists and Writers of Cuba (Union Nacional de Escritores y Artistas Cubanos—UNEAC), the Cuban Institute of Cinema Art and Industry (Instituto Cubano del Arte e Industria Cinematografico—ICAIC), the Book Institute (Instituo del Libro), and the Casa de las Américas (House of the Americas) an institute for cultural exchange with the rest of Latin America. The council, however, has exercised only loose control over the various agencies, and they have established reputations for different degrees of liberalism toward the arts. In addition to their imprecisely defined regulatory function, the agencies subsidize artistic endeavors and are responsible for the comprehensive workings of their respective industries.

The clamor for "socialist realism" in art arose when it appeared that the Cuban Communist state was to be modeled quite strictly on the Soviet one (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Proponents of socialist realism or representational art argued that workers and peasants would be unreceptive to, and unaffected by, the more sophisticated modes of artistic expression; this proved to be untrue, however. Ernesto (Che) Guevara, the Argentinian who joined Castro in the Sierra Maestra and later became prominent in the government, believed that socialist realism was essentially a nineteenth-century art form, irrelevant to contemporary life. Abstraction in the graphic arts is popular and, since it is difficult to read political motives into different styles of painting, such artists were allowed freedom of expression.

The issue of socialist realism has been consistently subordinate to the one concerning the substance and purpose of art. This has resolved around the question of whether or not artistic endeavor should have the single purpose of serving the state, an issue that had not been firmly decided by 1970. The government's position has been ambivalent. It has intervened on occasion, although at times the controversy seems to have involved personality conflicts more than the actual issue of artistic freedom.

The first controversy arose in 1961 when several films were suppressed, including *P.M.*, which showed Havana night life in an unfavorable light. Its suppression was opposed by Guillermo Cabrera Infante (b. 1929), author of the highly praised novel *Tres tristes tigres* (Three Sad Tigers) and the founder (in 1959) and editor of *Lunes de Revolucion* (Monday of Revolution), a cultural journal that was banned in 1961 because of "a shortage of paper" (see ch. 16, Public Information). Cabrera was one of the few writers who went into exile. In the late 1960s he published, from abroad, numerous articles criticizing the government for the pressure it was applying to artists.

In response to the uneasiness that the government suppression elicited among intellectuals, Castro himself gave a speech before a meeting of artists and writers that was later printed under the title "Words to the Intellectuals." In it he said: "No one has ever imagined that all men, or all writers, or all artists, have to be revolutionaries. There can be, of course, artists and good artists, who do not have a revolutionary attitude toward life . . . . Let each one write whatever he wishes."

The arts were free from overt government interference in the middle 1960s; the absence of any antirevolutionary literature, however, reveals that pressure did exist. Cabrera went into exile because of it. Others have disguised their criticisms, a practice that has been necessary in other eras. Nevertheless, a number of high government officials, including President Osvaldo Dorticós and Haydée Santamaria, head of the Casa de las Américas, expressed concern that polemic and dogmatic literature was becoming too predominant.

The subject of much literature in the 1960s has been the Revolution, and it has in some cases been treated with great sensitivity, pride, and imagination. Literary themes have much in common with those of the writings of the decades preceding the Revolution. Pablo Armando Fernández (b. 1930) in his *Libro de los heroes* (Book of the Heroes), written in 1964, expresses his feelings for the heroes of the Revolution, whose spirits live on in the world of Afro-Cuban myth. Reynaldo González in 1964 authored *Miel sobre hojuelas* (Honey on Cakes), a book of short stories describing life in a small town before the Revolution.

Many eminent writers of the prerevolutionary era were still active in the 1960s. Most of them had spent time in Europe or the United States, and their work shows these influences. Among them were Nicolas Guillén (president of UNEAC in 1969), Alejo Carpentier, Lezama Lima, and a number of former exiles, including Heberto Padilla (b. 1932), Fernández Retamar (b. 1930) and Fayad Jamis (b. 1930). In the collection of poetry *Vuelta de la antigua esperanza* (Return of Old Hopes), published in 1959, Fernández applauded the struggles of the Revolution. Jamis won the Casa de las Américas literary prize for poetry in 1962 with his *Por esta libertad* (For this Liberty), a collection of revolutionary poems written in 1962; since then his work has become more personal and less political.

Lezama Lima wrote a novel entitled *Paraiso* (Paradise) in which homosexual experience is described in detail; it was published at a time when homosexuals were being sent to work camps for rehabilitation (see ch. 24, Public Order and Internal Security).

Opposition to its being published was reportedly overruled by Castro himself, who felt it somehow improper to deny publication to an author of Lezama Lima's renown.

Some of the younger writers demonstrate more affinity with other Latin American artists. One of them is Rolando Rigali (b. 1941), a poet whose principal themes are poverty and childhood. One of the most sensitive novels written in postrevolutionary Cuba (1965) is *Memorias del Subdesarrollo* (Memories of Underdevelopment), published in the United States as *Inconsolable Memories* by Edmundo Desnoes (b. 1931) in which the question of whether or not people who grew up in a bourgeois atmosphere could really adapt to life after the Revolution.

The issue regarding artistic freedom flared again in 1968. In October a congress of writers and artists issued a statement called "The Declaration of Cienfuegos," which said in part: "The writer must contribute with his works to the development of the Revolution. This implies a vision of literature as an arm of struggle against all the weakness and problems which . . . can impede this development."

The controversy was further compounded when the international jury, which biennially selects recipients of the Casa de las Américas literary prizes, chose Antón Arrufat for his play *Siete contra Tebas* (Seven Against Thebes) and Heberto Padilla, for his collection of poems titled *Fuera del juego (Out of the Game).* Padilla was a former editor of *Granma*, the official newspaper, who had been dismissed for commenting favorably on Cabrera's work, comparing it favorably with a novel by Lisandro Otero, who was vice president of the National Council of Culture (see ch. 16, Public Information). The choices were criticized both in *Verde Olivo* (Olive Green), the armed forces weekly newspaper, which suggested that Padilla's verses were counterrevolutionary, and later in *Granma*.

Nevertheless, the works were published, each with two introductions: one by members of the selection committee; the other by members of UNEAC, disclaiming the works. Haydée Santamaría suggested that an all-Cuban jury be substituted for the previously international one to prevent a recurrence of the 1968 experience. It was not known in early 1970 whether or not the suggestion had been acted upon. Thus, the future of the literary competition was left in doubt as was the government's attitude toward artistic freedom.

THE ARTS

Music

Cuba's music is a mixture of many traditions from Spain, Africa, France, and North America, which have been blended together to make a unique and pervasive contribution to world culture. The traditions have not been kept separate; classification of the various types and schools therefore depends upon the degree of mixture rather than the purity of form or expression. The basic musical types are Euro-Cuban, Afro-Cuban, popular (or mulatto), and concert music, which utilizes classical, neoclassical, and modern forms.

The ability to sing and accompany oneself on the guitar is considered a manly attribute. The guitar most used is the small Spanish guitar (*tiple*). Folk music and dancing are favorite recreational activities, particularly in the rural areas. The guitarist often is accompanied by someone playing the *claves* (two hardwood sticks that make a clacking sound), and the *maracas* (gourds filled with seed or metal shot).

Euro-Cuban and Afro-Cuban music developed somewhat separately until the twentieth century. Euro-Cuban music was confined largely to white groups in the countryside and to the upper class in the cities. Their music, played at formal balls and elaborate social gatherings, was based on Spanish forms and melodies. The instruments used were the small guitar, voice and, occasionally, violin.

The Spanish forms were modified: the tempo was slowed and the beat shifted until new Cuban rhythms emerged—the *punto*, the *guajira*, and the *zapateo*. The meter of the Spanish bolero also was changed from 3/4 time to 2/4 and became the Cuban bolero. Perhaps the best known of the Cuban-developed rhythms is the *habañera*, although it is a more stately dance than is suggested by Bizet's use of it in the opera *Carmen*.

Although the stately *habañera* was being danced by the white upper class of Cuba's sharply stratified society; the lower class, almost entirely Negro, was maintaining and elaborating its own varied African musical heritage to the beat of the drum and other percussion instruments. Initially, Afro-Cuban music had primarily a religious function and was an integral part of popular rituals.

The most widespread ritual is that practiced by the Lucumí (Cuban descendants of the Nigerian Yoruba) (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). The Yoruba drum (*bata*) is hourglass shaped and is held across the knees while the player hits both ends. The drum body is made from a tree trunk hollowed by fire, and the skins are permanently attached so that tension or pitch is not adjustable.

Early in the nineteenth century a secular Afro-Cuban music developed that gradually came to the attention of the white population. Lower class benefit societies, largely Negro, began to appear in public to drum, sing, and dance in masks and costumes on such feast days as the Epiphany. Some of the religious societies also developed a secular tradition and began to play an important part in the pre-Lenten carnival celebrations. The many Negro societies that participated came to have their own distinctive songs, dances, and costumes.

Spanish melodies were superimposed on the secular Afro-Cuban music, and the guitar was added to the drums, producing, in the words of the writer Fernando Ortiz, "love affairs of the Spanish guitar with the African drum." The dances and rhythms that resulted from this mingling—the rumba, conga, *son* (perhaps the oldest of these blends), and bolero—spread to much of the world. The *son* is thought to have come to Cuba from Haiti. The rumba that is known outside Cuba actually is more closely related to the *son* and the Cuban bolero than to the rumba which is a much faster, more dramatic dance, usually confined to exhibition dancing.

After independence Negroes increasingly moved to the major urban centers, and their music was performed and assimilated by professional musicians, composers, and poets. It was scored for additional instruments—piano, trumpet, and trombone; the resulting popular, or mulatto, music came to override completely the Euro-Cuban forms that had flourished previously. Many of the more stately dances of the rural and urban upper class are now found only among poorer groups in the countryside.

Cuban popular songs composed in the twentieth century include "Malagueña," "Siboney," "Siempre en mi Corazon," all composed by Ernesto Lecuona, who also devoted himself to more serious works. To these must be added such dance forms as the mambo and the *pachanga*, which closely resembles the conga in rhythm and form.

Cuban concert music has not received the recognition accorded to other types of music either inside or outside Cuba. Formal compositions that antedate independence either drew upon, and then entered, the Euro-Cuban tradition or have been completely forgotten and have not served as a source for later composers.

Between 1898 and 1930 Cuban composers, as did poets and writers, went through a cosmopolitan period that was influenced by foreign composers and wrote in a variety of styles ranging from the impressionism of Debussy to the atonality of Stravinsky and Schoenberg. The two great composers of the period who were given considerable recognition after 1959 were the composer-violinist Amadeo Roldán (1900-39) and Alejandro García Caturla (1906-40). Roldán admired Nicolas Guillén and consciously wove African rhythms into his music. Like other Cuban composers, he wrote overtures, ballets, and pieces for chorus, piano and percussion.

Caturla, like Roldán, was an admirer of Guillén and was caught up in the rediscovery of Afro-Cuban music. Caturla finally turned from the Negro influence and sought inspiration from the Euro-Cuban music of the colonial past. In this regard he followed in the footsteps of such earlier composers as Eduardo Sanchez de Fuentes (1874-1944), who composed many popular *habañeras*, and Joaquín Nin (1879-1944).

In the 1930s there was a movement away from both cosmopolitanism and Afro-Cubanism, led by José Ardévol (b. 1911). From 1932 to 1945 Ardévol led a group of composers known as the Renovation Group, which returned to the rigidity of classical and neoclassical forms. Few of the group made any attempt to draw upon the Cuban idiom. The turning point came in 1945 when many composers, and eventually Ardévol himself, returned to Cuban sources for inspiration. He was still active in 1969 and was on the governing board of the Cuban National Symphony Orchestra.

Before 1959 the audience for concert compositions was very small and confined to Havana. The sole orchestra, the Philharmonic Orchestra of Havana, did not tour the country. In the 1960s there were three orchestras—the National Symphony Orchestra, the National Chamber Orchestra, and the Symphony Orchestra of the National Theater of Cuba. The National Symphony Orchestra was created after the Revolution to offer concerts for all the people. It has toured the country giving free concerts in the major cities. Programs have included works by Cuban, European, Russian, and both North and South American composers.

Ballet and Modern Dance

By early 1970 there were at least five dance companies, ranging from modern and folkloric to classical ballet, all subsidized by the government. The National Ballet became the Academia Nacional de Ballet (National Academy of Ballet), which the internationally known prima ballerina Alicia Alonso formed in 1948. She has danced with her own company as well as with companies in the United States. In 1959 she was invited to help form the National Ballet, and her husband, Fernando Alonso, was named director. The National Ballet has toured throughout the provinces.

One modern dance company is supported by the government as a department of the National Theater. The troupe is headed by Ramiro Guerra, who is its director and choreographer. He has choreographed and presented several works that draw heavily upon Cuban materials. His ballet *Yoruba*, for example, deals with an Afro-Cuban cult, and his *Mambí* portrays the struggle for independence. This group has also toured extensively.

Theater and Films

Cuba has a very weak theatrical tradition. During the colonial period some religious and imported Spanish plays were put on in the National Theater in Havana.

The theater received official attention when Governor Miguel Tacón in 1834 imposed a tax on every slave imported into Cuba and used part of the fund to build the Tacón Theater, completed in 1838. The most noted Cuban dramatist at the time, Francisco Covarrubias (1774-1850), wrote many dramas for this theater. He imitated the popular Spanish plays of the period, particularly those of Ramón de la Cruz, who wrote comic plays and operettas. Covarrubias and other dramatists adapted the Madrid forms of the Spanish theater to the New World and thereby created a distinctive Cuban comedy. Similar plays and operettas were produced in the Alhambra Theater in Havana.

After independence, playwrights continued to imitate Spanish models and also incorporated many European techniques and conventions. José Antonio Ramos (1885-1946) stands above the others of his time. He incorporated his reformist ideas in his plays, the most notable (written in 1917) being *Tembladera* (a kind of bowl or cup of very thin metal or glass); in it he explored the personal and social problems that arose from foreign domination of the economy.

Since 1959 the government has supported the National Theater of Cuba and has awarded scholarships and prizes to playwrights. It has mounted plays by authors, including Abelardo Estorino, who wrote *El robo del cochino* (Theft of the Pig) in 1961 and *La casa vieja* (The Old House) in 1964, both three-act plays with revolutionary themes.

Attendance has not been good at performances, even though there is no charge. The press has criticized new plays on artistic grounds. *Siete contra Tebas* (Seven Against Thebes), a play written in 1968 by Antón Arrufat (b. 1935), was criticized by the UNEAC for the pacifistic stance it takes in treating two brothers who battle to the death, a theme that UNEAC felt referred to the struggle between the Cuban revolutionaries and the exiles. The play had not been staged by 1970 although it was published by the writer's union.

The government has also sponsored a number of plays by foreign authors in Havana and in the provinces. Authors represented have included Federico Garcia Lorca, Bertolt Brecht, Anton Chekhov, and Tennessee Williams. Choral readings of Cuban poetry have also been staged.

Film-making has taken on new significance since the Revolution (see ch. 16, Public Information). Although many of the best films produced have been documentaries, a number of feature films have received plaudits for their artistic merit.

The ICAIC, established in 1959, is responsible for all film production and distribution in the country. Under the directorship of Alfredo Guevara as of 1970, ICAIC has maintained a fairly consistent liberal stance toward the issue of artistic freedom, possibly because of his flexible policies during the early precarious years and because of his personal friendship with Castro. When Aníbal Escalante was prominent in the United Party of the Socialist Revolution, socialist realism in graphic and film art was espoused to the exclusion of abstract and new wave techniques (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). After the Escalante episode had passed, the respectability of artistic freedom was reinstated. Nevertheless, some intellectuals were suspicious, feeling that Guevara was merely pragmatic, that his flexibility served better to protect his own position than to shelter the ideal of artistic freedom through the momentary storm. After the 1968 controversy over the literary awards of the Casa de las Américas, some artists who had been prominent in the UNEAC moved to ICAIC, believing that fewer restraints would be put on their work there.

Under ICAIC's auspices two particularly sensitive films were produced in the late 1960s. *Lucía*, directed by Humberto Solas, is a story about three women's problems in different historical periods—1895, 1932, and the 1960s. Intellectuals have given the highest praise to the first two episodes; the third has propagandistic overtones but has been praised for the note of ambiguity concerning woman's relation to man in a revolutionary society in which the *machismo* (masculinity) ideal is still revered (see ch. 12, Social Values). *Memories of Underdevelopment*, based on the novel by Edmundo Desnoes and directed by Tomás Gutíerrez Alea, is a study of the complicated feelings and motives of a successful writer after the Revolution. Documentary shots, interior monologues, flashbacks, and avant-garde techniques are used to create the sensitive and intelligent mood that the film projects.

Plastic Arts

Cuban architecture, sculpture, drawing, and painting were evolving throughout the twentieth century. According to contemporary Cuban critics, drawing and painting are moving toward development of a unique Cuban style and great popular appeal.

Architecture during the colonial period generally imitated Andalusian and Castillian forms. Because Cuba was a backwater for about thirty years after the Spanish conquest, it lacks the magnificent churches and public buildings to be found in other areas of Latin America, such as Mexico and Peru. In addition, the native labor force had no craft tradition with which to embellish Spanish artistic tendencies and consequently developed no mestizo art based on a mixture of Spanish and native art. Local stone was porous and encrusted with fossils and proved a hindrance to any extensive monumental architecture.

After independence, architecture was one of the most popular courses of study at the university, because it led to lucrative contracts and positions with the Ministry of Public Works. Generally, modern Cuban architects have used functional, monolithic concrete or marble forms, ill-adapted to the subtropical setting. There are exceptions to this, notably, the Tribunal de Cuentas (Court of Accounts), known as one of the most "felicitous" buildings in all of Latin America. It was designed by Aquiles Capablanca y Graupera and displays the influence of Lé Corbusier. Built between 1952 and 1954, it incorporates various textures of stone; an exterior mural of ceramic tile by Amelia Peláez is an integral part of the building's design.

Since 1959 many new schools and playgrounds have shown considerable ingenuity and lightness. The National School of Art, designed by Ricardo Parro, is actually a complex of buildings that houses facilities for students of art, drama, dance, and music. Rounded, domed structures of brick and concrete are connected by covered walkways and narrow open courtyards.

Cuban sculpture had a late beginning. The major modern movement began when José Gómez-Sicre (b. 1916), Cuba's most renowned sculptor, returned to the country after many years of study in Europe and introduced European forms, largely French neoclassical. His best pupils are the contemporary sculptors Alfredo Lozano, Roberto Estopiñán, and Agustín Cárdenas. Estopiñán makes great use of the intricate patterns of Cuba's tropical vegetation, whereas Cárdenas' work is more simplified, tending toward elongated shapes. Alfredo Lozano has created sculpture for a play-park in Havana. Sculpture too has its exponents of Afro-Cuban themes, the most representative of which is Teodor Ramos Blanco.

The first art academy, the San Alejandro Academy, was established in 1818 as the successor of a school of painting organized by the French painter, Jean Baptiste Vermay. Until the 1920s, however, Cuban painters were largely trained in the academic school and followed Spanish and eighteenth-century French models. After Cuba gained independence, its artists turned away from Spanish and colonial culture, and many sought to absorb the latest European developments. In the 1920s Leopoldo Romanach, who finally broke with the academic tradition, headed the academy. Many students returning from Paris joined him, and the result was a rapid blossoming of a vibrant, rhythmic and colorful art movement.

Cuban contemporary artists (as did their predecessors) draw upon all schools for their technique and method of handling color, but in terms of subject matter they divide into two schools: a *criollo* group that draws upon the vestiges of colonial life with the natural landscape and people; and an Afro-Cuban group that uses material drawn from Negro life, particularly magic and religion.

The most noted exponent of the *criollo* group is Amelia Peláez, who studies with Picasso and Braque. Her work, which has been widely exhibited, is cubist in form and uses elements of Cuba's vegetation and its colonial architecture.

The *criollo* painters referred chiefly to a Spanish and upper class culture increasingly irrelevant to modern Cuba, refreshed erratically by modern Spanish, French, and Mexican art. Its uncertain inspiration is evident, for example, in the work of Mario Carreno (active in Chile since 1958); it reveals the influence of the various schools with which he had been in contact. He has, however, been primarily a geometric abstractionist. In the 1960s he painted organisms mutated by the atomic bomb, as in his *Love*, done in 1964.

In contrast, the work of the best-known painter of the Afro-Cuban school, Wilfredo Lam, shows the steady development of a highly personal idiom. The influence of Picasso and other Europeans, classical and modern, is evident, but in all except the early painters it is subordinated to the artist's own experience and an unmistakable regional inspiration. Popular Afro-Cuban rituals and costumes contributed strongly to the symbolism employed. Lam was born in 1902 of Chinese and Negro parents. He studied in Madrid and Paris, returning to Cuba during World War II. Leading museums, including the Museum of Modern Art in New York, have purchased his work.

Leading painters in the 1960s include pop artist Raúl Martínez, a painter of political portraits, and Antonia Eírez, an expressionist painter whose subjects are tortured-looking people, akin to those of the British painter Francis Bacon. Cuban engravings in wood, metal, and linoleum are of excellent quality and show imaginative and full use of their respective materials.

CHAPTER 11

RELIGION

As of early 1970 about 85 percent of the people consider themselves to be Roman Catholics. In the urban areas where churches are located, only a small proportion were practicing Catholics. Because of the lack of churches and mixture of Catholicism and African tradition in the rural areas, very few rural persons were practicing Catholics. Most of the people, nevertheless, consider themselves Catholics.

There were, moreover, a number of Protestant churches predominantly in the urban areas serving a religious body estimated at 250,000 persons. Among the smaller religious communities were about 17,000 Jehovah's Witnesses and about 150 Jewish families. The Witnesses and the African cults were the only religious groups other than Catholics located in the rural areas where the government draws its main support.

There was no official religion or national church in the country in early 1970. The government was avowedly atheistic but was more nonreligious than antireligious. Only the Jehovah's Witnesses were the object of government pressure.

The Roman Catholic Church has never been as powerful in Cuban national life as it was in other countries of Latin America, and Church and state have been constitutionally separate since the beginning of the twentieth century. The general attitude toward the clergy has ranged from indifference to active hostility. Nevertheless, since most of the people are of Spanish extraction and have been influenced by Spanish Catholic culture, attitudes, and values—expressed in innumerable details of thought and observance—are those of a Catholic country. The strongest supporters of the Church have always come from the wealthy, Spanish-oriented upper class, which believed in the maintenance of the status quo. Leaders of the principal revolutionary movements made the Church one of their major targets.

Both before and during the republican years, competing moral systems were offered by the rationalism of many middle-class intellectuals, Protestant missionaries, and the African traditions brought in by slaves. Anticlerical rationalism, in the form of freemasonry, was aligned with independence sentiments and competed on equal terms with Catholicism through parallel institutions. Protestantism, which offered a philosophy not only relatively new to Cuba but in many respects culturally and morally alien, continued to compete with Catholicism.

Catholicism, rationalism, and Protestantism were principally associated with the middle and upper classes during the republican years. In the urban lower class, cults resulting from the synthesis of African and Catholic traditions grew in importance. These cults are regarded by their devotees as orthodox Catholicism, but the Church itself regards the cults as a degenerate composite of popular superstitions. Many other less-developed cults had sporadic influence in the urban lower classes. In the relatively unevangelized rural areas where communities are either indifferent to, or cannot finance activities, religious activity of any kind has been minimal.

Between the period of the founding of the country and independence, the Catholic Church was active in education and charitable organizations and had an important voice in political affairs. With independence, the Church was separated from the state, education was secularized (although the Church retained its private schools), charitable organizations became the concern of the government, and the Church was stripped of its political influence. Protestant missionary activity began, but Catholicism was still the national church and diplomatically aligned itself with incumbent administrations. After the 1952 coup by Fulgencio Batista and until late 1958, the attitude of the Church continued to encourage the status quo; only in late 1958 and 1959 did some Church members, along with some Protestant groups, recommend opposition to government policies. A few members of both the Catholic and Protestant clergy became active in the 1959 Revolution.

As the Castro administration leaned increasingly left, the Church saw its centuries-old position threatened. A confrontation ensued that resulted in severe restrictions on religious activities, the expulsion and flight of a large percentage of the clergy, and the confinement of the Church to strictly devotional functions; its schools and many of its buildings were nationalized. The Protestant community, less outspoken in either its support or condemnation of Castro, suffered equally under government restrictions and nationalization laws. A number of its clergy and laity were jailed or exiled. Almost the entire Jewish community went into exile.

For most of the religious communities, the tensions that existed in relations between church and state in the early years of the Revolution had eased by the end of the 1960s. The improved new relations are, for the most part, the results of efforts of a few individuals in the church hierarchies and do not necessarily reflect the attitudes of the clergy or the laity. Only the Jehovah's Witnesses remain the object of government surveillance, and at times, persecution.

Although many observers believe that interest in religion is in the process of shrinking, there are an equal number who foresee a religious revival. Churches retain their congregations at about prerevolutionary strength, and some clergymen maintain that this support is more than nominal.

RELIGIOUS HISTORY

Colonial Era to 1952

The Spanish Colonial Empire in the Americas was carefully regulated in a manner intended to create societies subservient to the Spanish crown. Under the system of *patronato real* (papal grant of royal patronage), the Church was entrusted with the moral and spiritual guidance of the people. In lieu of the king, local authorities were privileged to appoint clergy to their benefices and to exercise other ecclesiastical prerogatives, including the collection of tithes. Because of this system, religious and political affairs were never clearly separated. In Cuba however, lack of indigenous support restricted the Church to its primary function, which was to advise and assist the governor, and it did not accumulate great wealth. The first head of the Church in Cuba was Bernardo de Mesa, a Dominican from the Province of Toledo, Spain. Appointed by Cardinal Jiménez after the death of Ferdinand in 1516, he limited himself strictly to ecclesiastical duties.

Because the colonial population was chiefly comprised of Spaniards or slaves under the authority of Spanish masters, the island was rapidly inundated with missionaries, but this immigration tapered off in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. After the first cathedral was built in Santiago de Cuba under the joint authorization of Carlos V and Pope Adrian VI in 1522, relatively few churches and church schools were constructed (see ch. 9, Education). The ratio of priests to inhabitants in 1778 was 1 to 168. But by 1837 there were only thirty-five sparsely populated religious communities on the island representing one of the following orders: the Franciscan; Dominican; Saint John the Divine; Angels of Mercy Merced; Bethlehemite, a Mexican order; Capuchin; Carmelite; and Ursuline.

The population caused few disturbances in Church and state relations. Those which did erupt were concerned primarily with the institution of slavery, which the Church was instrumental in abolishing. Drawing chiefly on the legislation adopted by the First Dominican Provincial Synod in 1622, the Church immersed itself in evangelizing the African segment of the population. It not only provided the slaves with practical and religious instruction, but also guaranteed the free time and opportunity necessary to work for

184

wages and buy their freedom. A master, moreover, could free a slave by publicly acknowledging his intent while attending mass.

Statistics confirm that the Church was successful in its mission; by as early as 1560 the free colored population was sizable enough to elect its own constable in Havana and by 1600 to field a full company of militia. By the early 1820s, the number of baptisms and marriages among slaves equalled those among Spaniards. By 1861 the free colored population accounted for nearly 40 percent of the entire Negro community.

Nevertheless, the clergy never managed to cleave the African from his traditional background. His truancy in religious activities was often accountable to participation in one of various *cabildos* (Negro societies). An eighteenth century bishop, Pedro Augustín Morel de Santa Cruz, was primarily responsible for the eclectic nature of the African cults that still exist. Imbued with a strong sense of Catholic morality, he visited the *cabildos* frequently, administered the sacrament of confirmation to the members, and prayed before the image of the Virgin he carried with him. He named a specific clergyman to each of the *cabildos*, requiring him to visit there on Sundays and holidays to teach its members the Christian doctrine; he also placed each *cabildo* under the care of a particular Virgin whom it was to venerate. He went so far as to propose that his clergymen should learn the various African languages spoken by the slaves.

Although local authorities did not always agree with the benevolent management of Church-Negro relations, no major internal differences altered the symbiotic relationship between Church and state throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The opposition that separated Church and state came from external forces, the introduction of nineteenth-century, French-oriented rationalism, chiefly centered in the Freemasonry movement.

Adopted chiefly by the independence-minded *criollos* (see Glossary), Freemasonry came to Cuba with the British occupation of Havana in 1763 and existed legally until 1811 when membership was declared a crime against the state; thereafter, it existed clandestinely as a revolutionary movement until after independence.

Masonic doctrine asserted the existence of universal moral truths that were accessible to the individual intellect without the intervention of ecclesiastical tradition. The initiation procedures, the lodge structure, and the custom of secrecy provided ready-made facilities for subversive intrigue. Until 1891 a few lodges professed loyalty to the Spanish government and to the Masonic hierarchy in Madrid, but most others were centers of revolutionary sentiment. Some lodges even included in their initiation oaths a pledge to fight for independence. Most leading revolutionaries, including José Martí, became Masons (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Although in the early 1800s the Church had adopted some rationalist ideals, in the second half of the century the conflict between the *criollos* and Spanish authorities resulted in a similar split between the rationalists and the Church. When the challenge of independence came in 1898, the Masons and some of the African *cabildos* lined up on the side of independence, and the Church was on the side of colonialism. Cuban Catholics deny that the Church was opposed to the independence movement, but during the Revolution, in 1898, the Bishop of Havana issued a pastoral letter praising colonialism and associating independence with barbarism. The Church's attitude toward independence led to its immediate discredit and its future lack of popularity.

The success of the independence movement in the struggle with Spain in 1898 represented a triumph for rationalism. The Constitution of 1901 separated Church and state and was designed to deprive the Catholic Church of its tax revenue, government support, and its voice in the direction of official policy. Civil marriage was made compulsory in 1918. The rationalist viewpoint in education, moreover, fostered the constitutional provision of compulsory, free, and secular education. Religious instruction in public schools was forbidden. The Church was denied state subsidies and was not compensated for properties seized by the previous colonial government for its needs during the independence struggle.

Although the immediate constitutional provisions that affected the Church had no influence on Freemasonry, during the republican years this movement lost its revolutionary purpose and became increasingly more conservative. Although Masons could allude to their revolutionary antecedents and continued to denounce the Church as the suppressor of liberty, Freemasonry evolved into a prominent middle-class association used by members to establish personal connections and influence opinion.

It was during the republican years, in addition, that Protestantism established foundations. Chiefly emanating from the United States it sided with neither the Church nor the rationalists. It remained generally nonpolitical and chiefly sought to obtain the support of the lower middle and lower classes; but its rituals and methods in many ways conflicted with its goals. Nevertheless, the small support it did attract remained strong.

Despite the establishment and growth of a number of Protestant missions, Catholicism remained the dominant religious influence, although its political outlook fluctuated between conservatism in the 1920s to reformism in the 1940s. After the foundation of the Christian Social Democracy Movement in 1942, efforts were made to demonstrate the relevance of the Church to the life of all segments of the population, but particularly to the urban lower class, and to obtain a voice in the political forum. These ideas were not radical for the time, and were supported by conservatives. The Church remained principally aligned with the upper class, upper class values and conservative press, although its influence spread to other classes through the expansion of such lay groups as Catholic Action (Acción Católica) and related clubs and health clinics.

One other important introduction made during the first half of the twentieth century was the immigration of Jewish and Chinese refugees and entrepreneurs. Settling chiefly in Havana, the Jewish community had, by the time of Batista's second regime, grown to approximately 12,000 members and increased its religious facilities from two to six synagogues. The Chinese supported two Taoist temples, but many Chinese were Catholics and others belonged to Adventist and Presbyterian churches.

1952 to 1959

Religious history between 1952 and 1959, with some important exceptions, was characterized more by passivity than activity. Although Protestants, chiefly the Southern Baptists and other religious sects, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses and Gideonites (white-robed street corner preachers), were evangelizing the lower classes, they were conspicuously absent from any discussion of political events. The Catholics, on the other hand, paid scarce attention to the rural lower classes with the exception of sending a handful of priests into the countryside. Because of the poverty and indifference of the rural peasant, these priests were forced to accept the financial support of local sugar mill magnates, to their eventual discredit.

According to Catholic historian Leslie Dewart, Batista's last regime "enjoyed an unprecedented degree of episcopal benison during six and half of its not quite seven years." Much of the credit for this circumstance has been attributed to the largess bestowed on the Church by Batista's second wife and to the nature of the Catholic hierarchy and the Catholic clergy in general. Archbishop Manuel Arteaga, head of the Havana diocese, preferred diplomacy to opposition; he congratulated Batista upon assuming power and was seen with him on ceremonial occasions. Other leading Church authorities collaborated with the regime or held the opinion that politics was none of the Church's business.

Only the archbishop of Santiago de Cuba, Monsignor Enrique Pérez Serantes and the Bishop of Matanzas, Monsignor Alberto Martín Villaverde were outspoken opponents of Batista. Among the regular clergy sides split predominantly along national lines. With the exception of Basques, Spanish priests who were accustomed to the stature of the Church in Spain and who outnumbered Cuban priests by a considerable ratio, sided with Batista. For the most part, however, it was the Catholic hierarchy's position that characterized the Church during this period.

Exceptions to the position established by the Church commenced barely a week after Batista's March 10, 1952 coup. Anti-Batista statements were issued publicly by some clergy and lay leaders, including the president of Catholic Youth (Juventud Católica). By June 1952 government repression of open critics had begun and continued into 1953. After the unsuccessful Moncado Barracks episode the archbishop of Santiago de Cuba secured from the government a promise of trial for the survivors; but for the next four years the hierarchy was generally silent (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Supported by various members of the clergy, Catholics nevertheless actively opposed the government. The participation of the Workers Catholic Action in the unsuccessful antigovernment strike of 1955 resulted not only in a raid on their headquarters but also in a slander campaign against their chaplain. During this period, along with other antigovernment activists, many lay Catholics fell victim to the government's Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activities. Defending the victims, the National Council of Catholic Action, the supreme lay authority, openly criticized the government's retaliation.

In late 1956 as antigovernment activities attracted more sympathizers, government response became more direct; this, however, only forced more clergy and laity into the Castro underground. In Manzanillo, one pastor became a contact for revolutionary couriers; two others, in Holguín and Santiago de Cuba, became treasurers for the rebels; others stored arms; and still another broadcast coded messages to Raúl Castro in religious radio programs. In 1957 the first Catholic priest, Father Guillermo Sardiñas, joined Castro in the mountains. By the time Castro came to power six priests and one protestant minister were directly attached to rebel units.

In December 1958 the Catholic clergy and lay opinion attempted to force the hierarchy into open opposition with the government. A letter was sent to the bishops asking them to oppose the government and accused them of leaving the Catholic community undefended. No such opposition appeared, and the fact that innumerable clergymen and nonecclesiastics had participated in the revolutionary movement did not counterbalance the Church's position in the next ten years.

The Castro Years

During its first decade the Castro government's attitude toward organized religion varied between the extremes of retaliation and government coercion. Chronologically, these two extremes were fairly evenly divided into five-year periods, which began with retaliation. The division held especially true for the Catholic and Protestant religions, although other religious sects like the Jehovah's

Witnesses were the continual object of government derision and reprisal. The Jewish community, even though sizably reduced by 1970, remained relatively free from government attention throughout the decade.

At the triumph of the Revolution when the majority of the people welcomed Castro's success, some priests agreed with the people, but the Catholic hierarchy and the clergy were still split along national lines. Three of the six national dioceses were under the direction of Spaniards, and at least half of the 728 clergy and monks were Spanish. Of the remaining clergy and monks, probably about half were Cubans; the others were Canadians, Americans, Belgians, and other foreign nationals. The traditionally conservative Spanish were hesitant in their approval but influenced by the Vatican's recognition of the new government and by the display of religious medals and rosaries that the rebels carried. The split between the Church and the people left it somewhat discredited during this period as it had been at the time of the independence movement.

Catering to the middle and lower classes, as the Protestant Churches did, their attitude was more representative of the majority, especially among Baptists and Presbyterians. A few protestant chaplains had been with Castro in the mountains, and many Baptists and Presbyterians had given him direct support before his success. Later in the decade, however, rather than becoming adamantly anti-Castro as did the Catholic church, the Protestants became ambivalent. Protestant documents similar to the outspoken Catholic pastoral letters are nearly nonexistent.

The first historical event to stir religious circles was the March 1959 announcement of the agrarian reform program. In the name of the Catholic hierarchy it was approved by Monsignor Evelio Díaz, the new archbishop of Havana, Monsignor Martín Villaverde, bishop of Matanzas, and Monsignor Pérez Serantes, archbishop of Santiago de Cuba, the anti-Batista elements of the hierarchy. About the same time, however, Raúl Castro prohibited religious teaching in the Managua area by chaplains who had been there with the rebels. Clerical support waned and was further reduced by a rumor in late 1959 that (Che) Guevara had come back from Communist China with the Chinese strategy for replacing the Catholic Church with a national one. Monsignor Evelio Díaz denied existence of any anti-Church conspiracy, but on January 20, 1960, Castro accused the Spanish clergy of complicity in counterrevolutionary activities.

Partly because of the reprisals being taken against the old Batista supporters, and partly because of the increasingly anticlerical tone of the government, previous church-supporters of the government became less than a year later, outspoken critics of government policy. On Easter, in 1960, Eduardo Bozo Masvidal, then parish priest of Caridad but later auxiliary bishop of Havana, wrote an

189

article that appeared in a local daily publication praising the revolutionary benefits to the poor, but criticizing the violence and communizing methods of the government. In a succeeding article, he criticized communism as a negation of all the ideas for which the revolution had fought. Archbishop Pérez Serantes, who had virtually saved Castro's life after the Moncado Barracks' invasion, claimed in a popular speech that communism was not "knocking at the doors of the revolution but was already within its very walls."

Church-government confrontations became more numerous. After a commemorative mass honoring the anniversary of Franco's victory in Spain, Castro accused the Spanish clergy of fascism, and auxiliary bishop Bozo Masvidal, in June 1960, criticized the excess of state control in economic and social life, at the time when Castro was nationalizing United States property.

On August 7, 1960, the Cuban episcopate prepared a collective pastoral letter heralding the idea behind the agrarian reform, the plans for industrialization, lowering of prices, construction of schools and hospitals, and the elimination of corruption, but warning about the dangers of communism. Castro countered by suppressing the hourly "Catholic Worker Youth" radio program on September 19, 1960, and a Catholic television program, one week later. Archbishop Pérez Serantes issued a personal pastoral letter listing the two alternatives: Catholicism or communism. The government publication *Bohemia* and speeches before the National Institute of Agrarian Reform called the Church a fifth column and the Vatican a financial potentate. The government supported the campaign of Father Germán Lence against the Catholic hierarchy under the slogan With the Cross and Country (*Con la Cruz y con la Patria*). He was eventually discredited but not before he had influenced some of the population.

A pastoral letter signed by all the bishops on December 4, 1960, directly accused Castro of communism, citing in detail repressive measures that had been taken against the Church as a whole and against the hierarchy and members of the clergy specifically. The clandestinely distributed pastoral letter occasioned a four-hour speech by Castro in which he accused the clergy of treason and of overextending their devotional function into the political and social realms, which was improper if not illegal. Raúl Castro accused the Church of harboring fascist reserves. On December 16, 1960, the Directorate of University Students issued a statement referring to the bishops as "imperialists."

Within the Protestant community, as early as February 1959, the Cuban Council of Evangelical Churches had directed a committee of its laymen to study the situation and provide guidelines for the future. Nineteen months later, in November 1960, they suggested that, at least for the time being, the churches limit themselves to their devotional functions. Critical of both capitalism and communism, their report said that the rise of communism reflected laxity in the Church's work, and urged that Protestants "approach Communists with love, since Jesus Christ died also for them." The document was well received by some, but there were many Protestants who were opposed to the collaboration that the document implied and who were, shortly after the Bay of Pigs incident, to acquire the leadership of the Protestant churches.

In January 1961 Archbishop Pérez Serantes, in a pastoral letter, accused the government of initiating a battle against Christianity. Castro answered in February by accusing the Church of being antinational and antisocial. In a hypernationalist era, some Cubans believed that the Church was a threat to the Revolution.

The Bay of Pigs incident in April 1961 greatly affected the Church's position. In a speech on May 1, Castro announced the nationalization of private schools, predominantly religious (both Catholic and Protestant) and concluded with a condemnation of foreign priests.

On September 10, a religious procession erupted into an anti-Communist demonstration. Castro ordered his minister of interior to escort Bishop Bozo Masvidal and about 130 of the island's priests and monks to a ship embarking for Spain. Of those deported, according to the bishop, 46 were native Cubans; the rest were predominantly Spanish. The 160 priests who remained were warned that similar incidents would result in their expulsion.

In addition to incarcerating a number of activist leaders, from Catholic Action and Young Christian Workers, Castro proscribed all religious processions, and demanded that priests acquire a work permit to give religious instruction in the home. Most of the monks fled; of 3,000 nuns, only about 200 remained. Some were threatened, but most left voluntarily or on orders of their superiors. Some of the Protestant clergy and laity fled with them; it was about this time that the Cuban Council of Evangelical Churches fell to leaders many of whom later became refugees.

The acting Papal Nuncio was replaced by Monsignor Luis Centoz, whose diplomacy eased Church-state relations. Under his leadership, the Catholic hierarchy and clergy reoriented itself to its new situation, and in October 1962, during the missile crisis, sent diplomatic missions to the Vatican Ecumenical Council in Rome. Pope John sent an official greeting to the Cuban Catholic community appealing to its members to have faith, hope, and courage. By 1963, with a severe reduction in force and influence, Catholicism had ceased to be a threat to the government and was no longer the object of government derision and reprisal.

Although the small Protestant community (estimated to range between 85,000 and 200,000) had never been outspoken or activist, it nevertheless found itself the object of government persecution that began in April 1965. Forty-seven Baptist ministers and thirteen Baptist laymen were jailed, including two Americans. All were arrested on charges of conspiring with the United States government in gathering political, economic, and military information in return for financial support. Two hundred Protestant pastors and at least 13,000 members of the small Protestant community had fled the island by 1966.

By 1966 the 12,000-member Jewish community, most of whom were refugees from other Communist countries had been reduced to 150 families. Other small religious groups have been of some importance since 1966—the Pentecostals, the Gideonites and, chiefly the Jehovah's Witnesses. Until the Pentecostals, a fundamentalist group, joined the Cuban Council of Evangelical Churches in 1965, they were subject to incarceration for counterrevolutionary activities. The Gideonites, unrelated to the Gideons in the United States, are a Bible society of street-corner preachers working mostly among the Cuban lower classes. With a few exceptions these have remained unmolested.

In contrast, the proselytizing Jehovah's Witnesses have made small but apparently strong inroads into Castro's main source of strength, the rural lower class. The government finds their beliefs opposing overt allegiance to the state, threatening. During 1967 they reported in their yearbook that some of their brothers had been arrested, beaten, and had been warned against field ministry under threat of imprisonment. In Las Villas Province, forty of their places of worship, called Kingdom Halls, were closed.

According to their yearbook in November 1967, 300 young Jehovah's Witnesses of military age were arrested and sent to camps under military control; in 1968, 150 were imprisoned in Camagüey Province. By 1969 they were being imprisoned for failure to comply with military-service regulations; a group in Oriente Province was imprisoned for ten years.

CATHOLICISM

Organization and Activities

As of 1970 the island was divided into two ecclesiastical provinces or archdioceses, the western one was in Havana and the eastern in Santiago de Cuba. The Havana diocese was created on September 10, 1787, and elevated to an archdiocese on January 6, 1925. A diocese was founded in Baracoa in 1518, transferred to Santiago de Cuba, April 28, 1522, and elevated to an archdiocese on November 24, 1803. Under the jurisdiction of the archdiocese of Havana are the dioceses of Pinar del Río and Matanzas; under Santiago de Cuba, the dioceses of Cienfuegos and Camagüey. There were two archbishops serving in the two archdioceses and four bishops in the dioceses. In addition, between 1967 and 1968 two auxiliary bishops were appointed to the archdiocese of Havana and one to the diocese of Cienfuegos.

Beneath the dioceses are some 200 parishes, served by some 240 priests, 90 are Cubans and the remainder are foreigners. Eighty-seven of the foreign born arrived and established missions after the expulsion and voluntary exodus of most of the clergy; Belgian missions are located in Camagüey, and Canadian missions are in Matanzas and Havana. Of 3,000 nuns living on the island before the Revolution about 200 are left, who work mainly in hospitals and homes for the elderly.

According to Church officials, all of the parishes are functioning, although as few as 32 priests in Oriente Province, for example, are serving a population of 2 million people.

Aside from a severe reduction in force of both clergy and laymen which has extensively reduced its influence, certain governmental decrees have placed restrictions on Church activities. Teaching of the catechism requires a permit, religious radio or television broadcasts are proscribed, street processions or outdoor masses are banned, and religious instruction in the parishioner's home requires a work permit fifteen days in advance. Certain collective ecclesiastical meetings also require an advance permit.

Nevertheless, Church attendance, remarkably reduced the first half of the 1960–70 decade, was in 1970 approaching the 1959 level. Although the island is nominally Catholic, never more than 11 percent of the population has regularly attended church; this substantial lack of popular support was exaggerated during 1961 to 1965 and reflected the flight of the upper middle and upper classes to whom the Church catered. Although it has attracted new support and can approach the prerevolutionary level, few of the island's youth attend services, and the Church has no support among the rural masses who remain unevangelized. As before, Church congregations are made up largely of women and children.

Church and State

A number of concessions have been made on both sides to lessen the tension in relations between Church and state, primarily through the activities of a new Papal Nuncio, Monsignor Zacchi, appointed in late 1963. In 1966 he stated that relations were cordial, that he was a friend of Castro's, and that the Church had come to understand the change that had taken place in the country. Castro publicly agreed that relations between the Church and government were normal and that the Papal Nuncio had a clear understanding of the Church's place in the new system. When Zacchi was made a bishop in 1967, Castro attended the celebration.

Zacchi said that he believed in the developmental ideals supported by papal encyclicals and that the Cuban system was one way of achieving those ideals. He believed in immersion in the Revolution and that a Catholic could be a revolutionary. He encouraged young people to join in the militias and in other revolutionary activities and saw no harm in a Catholic embracing Marxist economic theory.

Zacchi described Castro as ethically Christian. Among the Cuban hierarchy, Zacchi's influence has been extensive. On April 20, 1969, eight members of the hierarchy issued a pastoral letter, read in all the churches, appealing for collaboration with the government's developmental plans, and protesting the economic boycott of the nation. By his own admission, however, Zacchi's reforms have not been widely accepted by the clergy who he feels have, in most cases, remained under middle class influences. But at least a few of the younger priests are voluntarily immersing themselves in the work of the Revolution and collaborating in its social reforms.

The government has responded favorably to Zacchi. It has provided the Church with automobiles, parts, and materials and paints for the upkeep of Church buildings. It permits ecclesiastical conferences and meetings (with some difficulties), masses, retreats, and the publication of parish bulletins, and the continuance of two Catholic seminaries—although their collective student bodies number only 100. On Sundays, a list of religious services for the day is carried in one government publication.

As long as the Church restricts itself to ecclesiastical duties, its activities are permitted by the government. What is not permitted is any action or word that could be construed as being against the system or any of its officials. The Church is adjusting its mission to meet, what appear to the Papal Nuncio, to be irreversible requirements. Despite some progress, devout Catholicism is generally considered to be a handicap in pursuing most careers, especially in government administration.

PROTESTANTISM

Organization and Activities

Protestantism was first introduced in 1884 by a Cuban Presbyterian convert who began mission work in a tobacco factory, but it remained insignificant until the United States occupation in 1898 encouraged missionary efforts. Thereafter, about forty Protestant denominations in the United States established missions varying widely in size. Although nearly all of them depend on their parent organizations for money and staff, the leading groups—Southern Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian, and Episcopal—are described as well established and apparently financially sound.

In the past, foreign support enabled Protestantism to demand less from its congregations for the material support of its clergy and the upkeep of its buildings. Whereas Catholic clergy usually made a charge for the performance of marriages and baptisms, the Protestant offer of "free religion" assisted the missions in winning converts. Most of the missionary effort was directed toward the lower and middle-income groups, chiefly in urban areas. In rural areas the poverty of the majority was such that even the Protestants could not afford to establish churches. A further difficulty in rural areas was popular resentment at the contrast between peasant living standards and even the humblest standard acceptable to a missionary accustomed to life in the United States, and the comparative austerity of the doctrines. Missions did, however, make rapid progress in recruiting Cuban personnel.

Many of the missions have concentrated their efforts in particular areas from choice, lack of resources, or past circumstances. By agreement the Northern Baptists restricted themselves to the eastern provinces, and the Southern Baptists (a much larger group) settled in the western provinces. Southern Baptist efforts were directed chiefly toward the lower class; few Baptist ministers were Cubans. The Society of Friends was limited to Oriente Province.

Most of the missionary bodies participate in the Cuban Council of Evangelical Churches founded in 1945. Members include the Methodist, Presbyterian, Friends, American Baptist and Free Baptist, the Salvation Army, the Pentecostals (two churches joined in 1965), the West Indian Mission, the Evangelical Theological Seminary at Matanzas (multidenominational), and the United Bible Societies.

In the early years of the Revolution, over 200 Protestant pastors and missionaries fled the island along with numerous members of the laity. By June 1962 there were only a dozen Methodist ministers in Cuba. Since the crisis years, however, there has been a marked increase in membership in Protestant congregations, and the Protestant community was estimated between 85,000 (members) and 250,000 (sympathizers) in 1970. The pastoral community has also enlarged; by 1964 there were thirty Methodist ministers on the island, and fifteen persons were studying at the multidenominational seminary in Matanzas to become Methodist preachers. In January 1967 the Presbyterian community founded a new church, the Reformed Presbyterian Church of Cuba.

Like the Catholic Churches, the Protestant churches are subjected to the same government restrictions against outdoor processions, religious instruction, and anything outside their devotional functions. Outside the main cities Protestant clergymen are permitted to visit small towns, but are not allowed to visit rural areas predominantly inhabited by the lower classes, the new farm and fishing cooperatives, and new housing projects. In all, the rural areas remain unevangelized by organized religion. Nevertheless, religion is practiced in a more relaxed fashion than it was during the early years of the Revolution, and Protestantism is witnessing a rebirth in youthful membership among the Cuban Federation of Evangelical Youth and the Student Christian Movement (a university group).

Church-State Relations

With a few exceptions, Protestantism has benefited from the cordiality in church and state relations. The government has licensed the importation of new cars for the use of Protestant clergymen who have been permitted to request new clergy arriving in the area to bring automobile parts. Urban churches are about as well maintained as any other buildings in the area. Seminarians are not subjected to military service. Protestant, as well as Catholic services are listed in the Sunday newspapers.

On the other hand, because Protestants have not been outspoken in their support of the Revolution, they are subjected to greater difficulties. Work permits and permits for holding retreats are not so easily available as those for Catholics. They cannot obtain building permits for rural areas, and in some places their few churches in the countryside have been closed. They are also allegedly subject to a 1 percent tax on church income and a 12 percent tax on ministers' salaries. They complain of lack of contact with founding organizations (chiefly based in the United States) and with the World Council of Churches, from which they received the majority of their literature. They must ask permission to hold national and regional meetings; sometimes permission is denied and at other times permission is granted too late (without an official reason).

In contrast to the Catholic Church, moreover, Protestant churches have repeatedly pressed the government to take a legislative stand regarding religion. The legislation has not been enacted; according to the director of religious affairs, the government officially prefers to deal with religion pragmatically rather than be condemned for the suppression of Christian churches. Like the Catholic Churches, however, the Protestant ones are gradually adapting to the new relationship.

OTHER RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES AND GROUPS

The five Jewish congregations that existed before the Revolution are still functioning, three in Vedado (a coastal suburb of Havana) and two in Old Havana. These five include the Beth Israel temple which offers liberal services in both Hebrew and English; the Union of the Hebrew community, oriented to the Ashkenazi tradition; the Sephardic Center (all three are located in Vedado); and the Dat Israel and Shevet Achim congregations (in Havana). Saturday services are held regularly in all the synagogues, and several of the centers hold weekly dinners. For these occasions, and during the holiday season, the government provides the necessary kosher foods. The small youthful congregation is given special absences from work during the holiday season.

No recent information is available on small religious sects, such as the Gideonites. On the other hand, the Jehovah's Witnesses continue to be the object of government persecution. In 1970 they were estimated to number 17,573.

Estimates of the influence of African religions in Cuban life are rendered difficult by the impossibility of the distinction between these religions and Catholicism in lower class practice. In the lower class, especially among colored people, cults of African origin have survived in an alien environment. They are strongest in towns where the Negro population is relatively stronger and the standard of living higher. Full-time priests are supported by the cult groups.

Particular Afro-Cuban religions are associated with specific ethnic groups and African homelands, although in the course of time smaller groups have been absorbed and devotees have been attracted from other groups and from the white population. The principal religion, known as Santería (things of the saints), is that of the Lucumís, descendants of the Nigerian Yoruba (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). In the cities of Havana and Matanzas, and perhaps elsewhere, there are *Náñigos*, whose beliefs originated among the Efi of eastern Nigeria. In Oriente Province, much of which is heavily Negro, Bantus and Congos are said to be numerous; presumably their religious practices differ from those of the Lucumís and Náñigos, but nothing is known of them.

This obscurity was the result of the class consciousness of wealthier and better educated Cubans, who had been indifferent to lower class culture in general, contemptuous of things African in particular, and inclined to repress paganism as a social and moral evil. Popular Afro-Cuban religious observances have been shrouded in the secrecy appropriate to sacred mysteries. Some of the festivals are celebrated publicly; hundreds of people appear in the streets of Havana with music and costumed dancers, yet many Cubans have no idea what the significance of the occasion is, who the participants are, or even whether the holiday is religious or secular.

Santería

In Nigeria, the Yoruba religion centers around a hierarchy of gods, each with distinctive powers and attributes. The description of their attributes and the relative emphasis given to a particular spirit vary a little from region to region; there is no fully consistent body of Yoruba doctrine. This diversity becomes more marked when the beliefs of neighboring tribes are included; these neighbors speak different languages but accept the same pantheon and practice similar rituals. In Cuba a corresponding situation exists, modified by the new environment.

All versions of Santería have incorporated items of Catholic ritual and mythology. Their devotees regard themselves as Catholics and believe that the names of the Catholic saints are translations into Spanish of the Nigerian names of African gods. Catholicism is viewed as the Spanish tribal version of Santería; the alternative loyalty to Santería thus is not Catholicism but Protestantism.

The association between Catholic and African belief is based largely on the superficial similarity between the Yoruba pantheon and the Catholic saints, particularly in the emblems pictured with each saint or spirit as an indication of the particular field in which he has power. The spirits are called indifferently *santos* (Spanish, word for saints) or *orishas* (Yoruba, word for spirits). Alternative term for Santería is Regla de Orisha (rule or religion of the *orishas*). The parallels between saint and spirit ignore difference of sex—some Yoruba spirits are bisexual, and many Catholic saints are shown wearing apparently feminine robes. The *orishas* are the spirits of important men now dead, most of whom were kings and founders of tribes.

Each worshiper has his own patron saint, chosen by divination or to suit his personality or because his family regards a particular *orisha* as its ancestor and guardian. He belongs to a cult-group or congregation (sometimes called a *cabildo*), which holds regular meetings. An important feature of these meetings is the music, consisting chiefly of songs and drumming. The songs are hymns and prayers in the Yoruba language. The drumming, which serves to raise the emotional tension of the proceedings, is done according to fixed patterns that are themselves hymns and prayers, employing the rising and falling tones of the Yoruba language to convey actual meanings (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

The *santero* (leader) of each cult-group (*santera*, if it is a woman, which is often the case) achieves his position through inheritance or by being an apprentice to another *santero* at an early age as a means of securing the protection of the *santero's* particular patron saint. He maintains his position by manipulating divination procedures and dispensing advice and magical charms in such a way as to retain the confidence of a congregation, who in return support him through the fees they pay and the offerings they make.

The duties of the *santero* include consultations with his clients, some of whom are not regular members of his congregation but visitors with special problems or even tourists. He must look after the shrine in his house, decorated with effigies derived equally from Nigerian and Spanish culture. He must also take care of the sacred stones in which the power of the *orishas* is thought to reside, and which must be baptized with a potent mixture of herbs and the blood of sacrificed chickens. Unbaptized stones and unconsecrated things in general are called Jewish, meaning pagan. A similar mixture is used to anoint the heads of devotees of the *orishas*.

The ritual of the Santería varies according to the inclination of the *santero* from an imitation of Catholic ritual (complete with candles, the Lord's Prayer, Hail Mary, and appropriate ritual gestures), to the deliberate creation of a hysterical atmosphere in which the *santero* and other persons present are possessed by the spirits. A large number of possessions in one session is regarded as a good omen. When possessed, the worshipers put on the ritual clothes and adopt the character of particular *orishas*, who are at once recognized by the congregation. In this state of trance the worshipers speak with the voice of the god, who in this manner offers advice to his followers. The procedure lends itself to manipulation by the *santero*, but probably most of the trances are genuine.

Abakuá

In the 1950s the most famous of the legendary secret religions, Nañiguismo, was rediscovered by the Cuban Negro poet, Lydia Cabrera. Nañigos are members of the Abakuá secret society for men, believed by most Cubans to have been extinct since the early twentieth century but notorious in the nineteenth century for its reputed practices of child sacrifice. The Abakuá originated in the region on the border of the Republics of Nigeria and Cameroon (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 6, Social Structure). No accurate estimates of the modern strength of the Abakuá are available.

An important feature of the Abakuá rites is the oath of secrecy required of initiates. The beliefs of the cult emphasize the dangerous influences that threaten people, particularly those of African descent, for whom Cuba is full of "evil shadows." Membership in the Abakuá, however, confers protection in this world and the next: "God will accept a brother of the religion," and "To say Nañigo is to say brave man." No women belong to the Abakuá.

The society is organized into groups known as *potencias* (powers) or *naciones* (nations) of an ethnic character in which the leaders, of whom there are seven, each with a different function, are the descendants of chiefs and priests in the African homeland. The first Abakuá nation was founded in 1836; many others have developed since. Each nation is grouped into one of two branches, the Efo or the Efi which correspond to the Ekol and Ibibio African tribes. Rituals include a sacrificial communion feast and liturgical reenactments of legends. Participants in these rites must be in a state of ritual purity.

The deities are spirits of the dead whom it is necessary to placate; they are represented by masked dancers, the *irimé* (Spanish equivalent *diablitos*), who at one time appeared in public on saints' days and carnival occasions but are now only evident in the self-conscious folk revivals of the Cuban theater (see ch. 10, Artistic and Intellectual Expression). Syncretism of Catholic ritual comparable to that of the Santería has taken place but on a much smaller scale. As in the Santería, drums are given ritual significance as the voices of the spirits, but it is believed that possession is not a feature of Abakuá ritual.

In the nineteenth century, when the Abakuá was publicly known, Nañigos were noted for their aggressive spirit. Today they like to compare themselves to the Freemasons, and assert that in the nineteenth century Abakuá was to the lower class what Masonry was to the upper class.

Minor Cults

Some Afro-Cuban cults are known by name only. The names, which include Mayombería, Regla de Palo, and Regla Conga may indicate the existence of active modern cults or may refer only to extinct cults. They are also used as general terms for unfamiliar superstitions and suspected sorcery.

In addition to cults like Nañiguismo, which are rooted in ethnic traditions, various cults of a more artificial character have arisen from time to time. Spiritualism in various forms is popular, usually with a strong emphasis on hysterical experience and miraculous cures. Procedures borrowed from Santería, particularly music, dancing, and possession by spirits, are commonly combined with more pretentious spiritual and necromantic doctrines of European origin.

RELIGIOUS HOLIDAYS AND SHRINES

Periodic festivals—primarily secular holidays of religious origin—are celebrated by a majority of the people, at least in urban areas, with little difference among the classes. Christmas is the most popular holiday. According to an editorial printed in the government paper *Hoy* in 1964, there was no official constraint on the practice of setting up and decorating trees. During 1970, however, Christmas was intended to be celebrated some time in July so that the Christmas season would not conflict with the cane-cutting season.

Lent provides another season of carnival, including not only Shrove Tuesday but several weekends before and after. During 1968, a children's carnival marking the climax of the annual Children's Week (Semana Infantil) was celebrated on Good Friday; in 1969, however, the festival was scheduled to coincide with the celebration of the victory at Playa Girón (beach near the Bay of Pigs).

The most numerous festivals, both national and local, are those of patron saints. The search for protective spirits is a pervasive theme in Cuban life; it is characteristic of the secular world as well as that of organized religion. In colonial times the protection of saints was sought for the settlements named after them. In 1604 a statue of the Virgin, subsequently known as the Virgin of Charity (La Caridad) appeared miraculously to fishermen in the Bay of Nipe in Oriente Province. Enshrined in the town of El Cobre, the Virgin of Charity is the patron saint of the island. Next in importance is the Black Virgin of Regla (a suburb of Havana), guardian of sailors and of the port of Havana. Individuals and families have their own patron saints whose feasts they observe; colored pictures of saints are displayed in homes.

CHARMS AND MAGIC

Cubans are disposed to regard all unknown beliefs as sorcery or witchcraft (*brujeria* in Spanish). Brujeria is the usual upper class term used indifferently to denote African cults and all other practices dismissed as superstitious. It is also used by devotees of African cults to denote black magic—the deliberate misuse of legitimate religious techniques for malicious ends. Thus, all *santeros* are supposed to be capable of black magic, but nobody admits to practicing it. The rituals of all unfamiliar cults are believed to consist exclusively of black magic. The smallest and least-known religious and ethnic groups are credited with the most dangerous powers. They include in approximate order of deadliness, Nañigos, Congos, Jamaicans, Haitians, Canary Islanders, and Chinese.

In middle-class families stories of the fearsome methods and mysteries of these groups may be told only to frighten children. ("The Nañigos come for bad little white boys.") In lower class families, however, they may be given serious credence, partly because there is some knowledge of the actual existence of such groups. Believers in Santería are likely to attribute to sorcery abnormal and inexplicable conditions, such as insanity and any condition that fails to improve when appropriate offerings have been made to the *orishas*. Cubans who do not associate with any organized cult-group may still take fright at apparent indications of occult malice; for example, white chicken feathers unaccountably discovered in the house. Countermagic obtainable from a *santero* may be thought necessary. Whites and Negroes of the lower and middle classes may occasionally go to a *santero* for such a purpose with the vague conviction that they might be effective. If a *santero's* magic is not considered strong enough in a particular situation, recourse may be a visit to a priest of one of the more mysterious cults.

202

CHAPTER 12

SOCIAL VALUES

By early 1970 the government had tried to create a new ideal man. Instead of the guerrilla model of a decade ago, the so-called new man was to be hard working, disciplined, and cooperative. The individualistic, dramatic guerrilla, however, was more easily adapted to traditional values than was the new man.

Cubans traditionally have believed a person has an innate worth, regardless of his station in life. They respect those personal qualities that distinguish one individual from another and make him unique. Opportunity determines whether a man will be lucky enough to fulfill his personal destiny. A man does not seek opportunities, but when they present themselves they are used to demonstrate his personal worth and superiority over his competitors. A dramatic opportunity is a more appealing means to success than methodical hard work.

Most Cubans traditionally paid close attention to personal appearance and, whenever possible, acquired the material trappings of a high standard of living, although materialism for its own sake was despised.

Because ideal qualities can rarely be realized, the individual ensures that his personal dignity remains intact through the protection offered in different types of trust and contract relationships. Although a man's status is different within each situation, both contract and trust relationships guarantee that his innate worth will be respected.

Cubans believe in the dignity of the person. They respect the individuality of a person, defined in terms of personal qualities, and expect the same in return. They support individual rights as a means of guaranteeing the integrity of personal qualities.

Ideally, success is not essential to personal dignity. The ideal person is interesting and valuable because he is not quite like anyone else, not because his qualities themselves necessarily approximate ideal qualities. This individuality is partly his personal achievement; freedom means freedom to be oneself. Individuality, however, also is held to be a product of one's home environment, family traditions, associations, and parental inheritance. The dominant concern for personal dignity, together with political and social attitudes arising from it, is called *personalismo* (personalism).

In the early years of the Revolution, the government found that the guerrilla figure it held up to the public as a model person was easily adapted to traditional ideas of individuality. The guerrilla was individualistic and self-sufficient. He was more pragmatic or job-oriented than the traditional ideal, but his methods for solving problems were left strictly to his own volition.

Increasingly, however, as the government became more structured and repressive, *guerrillismo* (individualism) conflicted with new government aims at discipline, collective outlook, and the so-called new man.

The model new man sacrifices individual interests for collective ones. He works for the welfare of the whole society, not for himself; he is unprejudiced. He respects and admires party leaders and obeys party directives. He has a strong sense of social duty and is intolerant of those who do not. His children are encouraged to share and are discouraged from egotistical attitudes.

Fidel Castro believes that each person can be a useful participant in the Revolution. He has found, however, that the greatest obstacles to fostering the model behavior are traditional attitudes and values and admits it to be a difficult task to change them.

PERSONAL QUALITIES

Traditional ideals assert that everybody should be able to fulfill his spiritual potential, the accepted range of ideal personal qualities, which tend toward the heroic and imply competition with other people. To be recognized, uniqueness must in effect be achieved by a demonstration of superiority. The Cuban requires a public forum in which to demonstrate and find external support for his sense of individuality.

The Male Type

Success in competition and mastery of one's environment may be demonstrated by a wide range of ideal personal qualities, the most common and admired of which is *machismo* (maleness). Ideal feminine qualities are traditionally passive and decorative. The appeals of radical insurgents for mass support and national unity in the pursuit of new objectives have often included proposals for the emancipation of women. Such emancipation has meant in practice their admission to male roles in revolutionary cells, work brigades, or the Castro militia, rather than the exaltation of distinctively feminine qualities and roles to equal rank with masculine ones (see ch. 7, Family).

The characteristics of the male type (*macho*) were summarized by J.P. Gillin in 1960:

> The *macho* is expected to show sexual prowess, zest for action, including verbal "action," daring, and, above all, absolute self-confidence. He may express his inner convictions by resorting to physical force, as in the case of bandits and revolutionary military leaders, or he may do so verbally as a leading intellectual, lawyer, or politician.

Sexual Prowess

A husband's virility is considered to be better demonstrated by the birth of sons than of daughters. Traditionally, the ideal of sexual prowess favored extramarital triumphs in which the element of defiance of the prevailing social order added luster to the achievement.

The government has adapted the attitudes of the more conservative upper classes, which favored more or less permanent marital unions. Although the upper classes supported legal permanent unions for reasons of personal responsibility, the government supports them for reasons of order. Marital standards are more binding on women than on men.

Zest for Action

Manliness may also be displayed in military and athletic prowess. Heroes of this type include the boxer, the baseball player, the canecutter, and the guerrilla. Not everybody can match the ideal performance, but most people are enthusiastic spectators, identifying themselves with the participant in his achievements. Fidel Castro is an avid sports enthusiast, and he has provided the state with new recreational facilities throughout the country and a new Ministry of Physical Education to oversee them. Women participate in sports events more frequently than they did before 1959.

The rural sugar worker's chief activity is not the routine drudgery of cultivation but the extremely exhausting toil of cane cutting. It is man's work, not only because of the muscular exertion required, but because of the virile ideal it represents. Women can cut cane but do so only in special circumstances. The canecutter is typically depicted as a violent and heroic figure.

The transition is readily made from the canecutter to the machete-armed peasant defending his rights and finally to the guerrilla. The ideal military type is not the regimented soldier or the master strategist, but the hero of hand-to-hand combat, overcoming his enemies by physical and moral vigor. He is Antonio Maceo mounted on horseback, machete in hand (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Under Castro, the physical training appropriate for a guerrilla has been required for all who carry, or wish to carry, the responsibility for building a new society. Candidates for rural teaching are required to spend six weeks at a paramilitary camp in the Sierra

Maestra; about 10 percent leave before the end of the program. To have been in the mountains with Castro once was qualification enough for positions of responsibility.

The green fatigue uniform of the guerrilla remains the uniform of all true Castroites who, if they were not among the original fighters, wear it as members of the militia or some other revolutionary group. Men and women alike wear it to demonstrate their loyalty to the government.

Intellectual Heroism

In the lower classes the ideal type has traditionally been the muscular hero; to what extent recent educational efforts directed toward this group have affected the hero image is not known. Among the upper classes the virile element was always present but muted in favor of intellectual strengths by which the hero overcame the odds against him. Urbane refinement was itself an achievement.

The intellectual hero was not so much a man whose intelligence enabled him to understand technical complexities, for example, as one who had access to profound truths enabling him to give spectacular fulfillment to his personal destiny and to mold his social environment. Educated in the liberal arts, cosmopolitan and upper class, the intellectual hero displayed his abilities dramatically, especially in oratory.

Because of biased and limited reading material and restricted travel, the new intellectuals emerging from the Revolution have a distorted picture of Eastern and Western cultures. The number of universities has decreased; curricula are technically oriented. Urbane refinement is discouraged. A university degree is, nevertheless, highly regarded. Both students and faculty enjoy prestige. Public oratory remains the tool of the intellectual hero.

Personal Achievements and Failure: Destiny

Success in life is measured more in terms of the fulfillment of personal destiny or spiritual potential than by the achievement of a social goal. Destiny is evaluated in terms of the competitive situation and the opportunities that present themselves at any given moment for an immediate improvement in one's personal circumstances. Thus, resignation and aggressive competitiveness are juxtaposed.

The Cuban is an opportunist; when no opportunity presents itself he is not usually prepared to create one by consistent, methodical effort over a period of time. To be attractive, opportunity must be dramatic; when it occurs, the individual's evaluation of his proper destiny is suddenly enhanced, and he finds insupportable all the inadequacies and injustices to which he was formerly resigned.

Destiny is both a product of spiritual forces and a matter of luck. Both aspects are expressed in popular religious beliefs in which destiny becomes a god (see ch. 11, Religion). The pervasive gambling impulse springs from the incessant search for a lucky break that will give the necessary special competitive advantage. In the Cuban view, the Spaniards rely on hard work to succeed; this is materialism and is despised. Luck, however, is not an external circumstance so much as a demonstration of the personal spiritual qualities essential to success. Anybody may discover that it is his destiny to be lucky, to succeed by combinations of fortuitous circumstances.

It is in this spirit that the Cuban eagerly wagers on any event. The possibility of entirely escaping the material limitations of one's present status and environment has far greater appeal than a rational adjustment to those limitations, which would imply acceptance of them as consistent with one's personal destiny.

Luck is a transferable and often a specialized quality. Accordingly, the outlook for the future may be improved by attaching oneself as a client to someone who seems destined to be successful in a particular field. Such a mentor or hero may be a politician, a baseball player, a guardian spirit, or even a fighting cock.

Luck is also vulnerable to the envy of competitors, by whom success is more agreeably attributed to some dishonest trick or device than to superior personal qualities. Even those whose success is not envied are often credited with having access to some special source of power.

The government-sponsored new man philosophy espouses and implements the idea that hard work and study better serve the individual than luck, opportunity, and competition. Events are not determined by nature, luck, or destiny, but by the individual's own efforts. Short-term personal advantages are sacrificed for long-term national interests as defined by the state.

In the economic sector the government encourages emulation (*emulación*) rather than competition. In practice, emulation operates identically to competition, one individual or group tries to match the performance of another or to better past performance records. Hard work is rewarded. Honorary mentions, laudatory titles, and paid vacations are the rewards that accrue to the individuals or groups that are exemplary performers (see ch. 20, Labor).

Public Appearances

In his usual self-confident mood the Cuban is a proud man, according others the respect he expects toward himself, whatever his station, but quick to retaliate with voluble abuse if he considers his expectation disappointed. He pays close attention to his personal appearance, even with very small resources, and is almost equally interested in the appearance of others.

For those who could afford it, and even for many who could not, a conspicuously extravagant standard of living was essential to the public appearance of success before the Revolution. Expensive cars, hotel entertainments, country estates, clubs, weddings and funerals, clothes, and education were as much marks of distinction in the republican era as noble connections and coats of arms were in colonial times. High standards of living were characteristically a personal competitive accomplishment; no correspondingly high standards were applied to public life. The expensive automobile was driven over unsurfaced and unmaintained roads.

Influence

According to Cuban statements, material success is valued more for the personal independence it implies than for the physical comfort it brings. Although in fact Cubans are often highly materialistic, success or status is largely gauged by the respect received from others rather than by the attainment of personal goals. Independence is understood in the context of social competition as a relative matter; the man who is a boss of others is more independent and has higher status than he who is merely his own boss. Restrictions on independent action stimulated emigration during the Revolution.

Wit

Among other things, the distinctive spirit of an individual is demonstrated by his eloquence and wit. Anything that suggests pettiness of soul is heartily despised no matter how practical it may be. Cuban humor, lively and irrepressible, sometimes broad, often subtly barbed, is applied without inhibition to the most serious issues. Nevertheless, before making jokes, an individual carefully distinguishes between serious and relaxed social situations. For example, he may joke at a friend's expense, but not if that friend is a girl. Romance is traditionally a serious matter in which unselfconscious emotional extravagance, contrived gesture, and archaic formality are considered appropriate.

The government, which depends for its popular support largely on the maintenance of a national mood of tension and seriousness, has forbidden the publication of jokes about the regime.

Martyrdom

Death for a glorious cause is itself an acceptable achievement as a consequence of the military ideal and as a supreme demonstration of the greatness of a man's soul and his dedication to a cause. One of the slogans of the government, used by radio announcers signing off and chanted by crowds at public meetings, is "Fatherland or Death!" (Patria o muerte).

Similar slogans have always had a strong appeal to Cubans. Martyrs are highly honored; statues are raised to them, and streets are named after them. No statue or street honors a living man.

Death is regarded as an appropriate end of an opponent—be he an unfaithful lover or a traitor. If a friend or supporter dies, however, it is important to make a martyr-hero of him in order to assert that the ascendancy of the soul is more important than the physical loss. It is so important to show that the individual was morally right that where no actual heroism occurs, it is invented.

Death is a major preoccupation. The focus of concern is not so much moral accountability as the strength of the individual's soul; the fate to be feared is oblivion, which is punishment for inadequacy, rather than hellfire, which is the punishment for sin. Strong souls are remembered and respected.

Failure and Compromise

Personal qualities can rarely be realized on an ideal scale. One response to the discrepancy between ideals and reality is to seize recklessly any opportunity that offers an escape from everyday limitations—the exaltation of a fiesta, a political rally, or a love affair. Another response is to find a hero through whom one can vicariously achieve satisfying dramatic results.

Still another personal response to the discrepancy between ideals and reality is to relapse from enthusiasm and idealism to self-disparagement, gloom, and fatalistic resignation. A Cuban intellectual, Elías Entralgo, considers that the prevalence of local terms denouncing narcissists, Don Juans, and boasters indicates a habit of introspection and self-criticism. The same writer extols the outstanding physical and moral virtues of the Cubans, but elsewhere defines the national character as "light and frivolous, given to coarse expressions and disregarding social proprieties." Revolutionary-minded young women often describe the typical male as flighty (*ligero*).

Recognition of the unique dignity of one's personality must be achieved competitively and defended from the envy and self-interests of others. The ideal person, displaying an aggressive competence and dramatic mastery of his environment, is a leader, a victor in the struggle for recognition. A consequence is the acceptance of a hierarchical arrangement of society in which, at various levels, those with the personal qualifications for leadership assume the privileges and status of a *patrón* (sponsor, patron, or benefactor).

Less competent people, compromising between their ideals and the opportunities available, accept provisionally their own lower position in the hierarchy. Part of the compromise is the careful assertion that personal dignity is not infringed by inequality of status; no matter who he is, a man expects to be treated with individual respect, not as a nonentity.

The compromise is also characterized by a search for guarantees. In the social environment guarantees are afforded, not by law or accepted conventions, but by relationships of personal trust and confidence. One does not trust a man because of his station, but because one has reached a personal understanding with him.

CONTRACT AND TRUST RELATIONSHIPS

Relationships of Trust

Relationships of personal trust have two components, both of which are always present, although one may be stronger than the other. The two components are kinship (implying brotherhood, unity of interest, and the absence of competition) and contract (implying a difference in status, lack of reciprocity, and conditional acceptance). In the family, where kinship is strongest, the head of the family is nevertheless a *patrón*. In the political or economic field, a recognized *patrón*, such as Fidel Castro, is occasionally at pains to assert that the bond of unity is actually one of kinship, not of contract. Although either kind of agreement, kinship or contract, has traditionally established an association of people, which was more important than were organizations and institutions, the government is trying to channel loyalty in the direction of the Communist Party and other government-sponsored groups (see ch. 6, Social Structure).

Kinship

Relationships of trust are most easily established with relatives, whose personal qualities, because of community of interest, common heredity, and similarity of environment, most nearly resemble one's own. The family is the group within which trust and confidence prevail, magnanimity is displayed, personalities are respected, and competition and envy are kept at a minimum. The function of the family, of all associations patterned after it, and even of the patron-client relationship insofar as it also partakes of kinship, is to accomplish the protection of the family holdings against competitors. Whenever the possibility of competition arises, the lines of loyalty are sharply drawn.

Beyond the family, kinship relations are found in associations spiritually patterned after the family; thus confidence is established on personal rather than on other grounds, so that all relationships of trust are given a character of pseudokinship.

The closest pseudokinship relationship is that of the *compadrazgo*, which in its most limited sense, is the link established between a godfather and the parents of his godson. It is also the link between the godfather and other adults with whom the parents may share a *compadrazgo* relationship and so has become the ordinary colloquial term for intimate friendship.

Political parties and unions have traditionally been pseudofamilial associations. Members of each have a common material interest, either functional, as in the case of unions, or artificially created, as in the case of political parties. During the revolutionary years, other pseudofamilial associations have emerged, including the Communist Youth Union, the Pioneers Union, and the Federation of Cuban Women. The effectiveness of an association depends upon the maintenance of a common loyalty, frequently the subject of impassioned appeals tending toward fanaticism. Traditionally, competing associations, such as political parties, have presented their competitors as utterly devoid of principle and predominantly materialistic.

Contract: Patronage and Privilege

Mutual confidence is implied in the relationship between a patron and his clients even though their status is different. The benefits provided by the patron are expected but not specifically required of him; they demonstrate his generosity and magnanimity. Before the Revolution, they traditionally included the schoolhouse provided free by the local landowner, job preference or political appointment, medical facilities sponsored by the wife of the president, and the private telephone call that arranges for the release of a prisoner. Most of these benefits were provided for in the laws of the state but were not carried out.

The patronage system was explicitly and generally challenged for the first time in 1959 with the proposals of the Castro government to abolish privilege and corruption of all kinds. In practice it has meant the extension of the government patronage system to the entire society. Fidel Castro has become the supreme Grand Patron.

SECTION II. POLITICAL

CHAPTER 13

THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM

The framework of the government structure follows the general pattern of a Communist state but has been adapted to local interpretations and particularly to the personal rule of Fidel Castro. It is administered by an elaborate social and political apparatus responsive to his authority, and he remains the government's sole source and sanction of power. Although he occasionally makes token concessions to the formal government mechanism, he personally makes the final decision on all matters of national importance, although he relies at times on a small circle of trusted advisers.

In 1970 the process of conforming to a Communist pattern had not been fully accomplished, and the specific allocation of powers between the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba—PCC), and the state was not clearly defined. The party, as a government within a government, was steadily increasing the scope of its participation in, and direction of, national affairs, and there was a marked trend toward eventual complete party domination. Fidel Castro was prime minister of the Republic and first secretary of the Communist Party and would thus retain his hold on the reins of power regardless of which element eventually ran the government. Meanwhile, the conventional organization of the state preserved the facade of a standard democratic structure.

In early 1970 Cuba had had more than ten years of revolutionary government under the leadership of Prime Minister Fidel Castro. The constitution was suspended in 1959, and in its place The Fundamental Law of the Republic serves as a guiding charter to implement the socialist philosophies expounded by Castro in his basic declarations of Havana. The government professes to be "an independent and sovereign state organized as a centralized and democratic republic." It is, in reality, a totalitarian dictatorship ruled by one man. There have been no national elections since the regime took over, and the only political organization permitted to exist is the PCC.

Although the country is clearly within the Communist orbit and depends heavily on Communist-bloc economic aid, it has developed an individualistic brand of communism that has enabled it to retain a certain degree of independence, without actually becoming a Soviet Union satellite. It has been a new and unique development for the Western Hemisphere and represents a concept of government that, for the most part, is distasteful and unwelcome to its related Latin American republics.

The basic framework of the government is a relatively simple one that is complicated by the imposition of a Communist Party superstructure. The government is fundamentally a republic headed by a president, with a Council of Ministers serving in the dual capacity of cabinet and legislature. A prime minister, who is appointed by the president, is designated head of government, and the president himself serves officially as chief of state. The Communist Party structure was becoming an increasingly significant element of the governing mechanism, but in early 1970 all aspects of state-party relationships had not yet been fully developed.

CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

The country has had seven constitutions, only two of which actually went into force as charters of an independent nation. The first one, called the Constitution of the Republic in Arms, was drawn up after the declaration of independence in 1868 and was promulgated by the rebel forces in 1869. In 1878, with the resumption of active hostilities against Spain in the struggle for independence, a new Constitution of Baraguá—named for the town where it was signed--was prepared, which was designed for a provisional government that never came to power. This was succeeded in turn in 1895 by the Constitution of Jimaguayú and in 1897 by the Constitution of Yaya. The final charter, which did not reach execution, was the Provisional Constitution of Santiago de Cuba, which was formulated on October 20, 1898, shortly after the successful conclusion of the Spanish-American War.

The constitutions of 1901 and 1940, the country's two final charters, were the products of twentieth-century development and served the nation from its first days of independence until the Castro Revolution. The Republic's first constitution, that of 1901, followed the general pattern of other similar Latin American charters but adopted a number of provisions from the United States Constitution, particularly with respect to the separation of executive, legislative, and judiciary powers.

The Constitution of 1901 provided for "an independent, sovereign state capable of securing liberty and justice, and promoting the general welfare." It contained detailed provisions guaranteeing individual rights, ensuring freedom of speech, press, assembly, and religion. The functions and responsibilities of the various branches of government were strictly defined, but the president could suspend the constitution in case of serious public disturbance and would rule by means of executive orders and decrees. The Constitution of 1901 also included the Platt Amendment, which permitted the United States to intervene in Cuban affairs when deemed necessary for the security of the state (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Although extensively amended over the years, the charter remained in force for almost forty years and was finally replaced by the Constitution of 1940, which was to be the country's last formal charter.

The Constitution of 1940

The Constitution of 1940 was the result of growing dissatisfaction with the charter of 1901, which was blamed for the ills of economic depression and political turmoil that plagued the island in the years after World War I. A Constituent Assembly was convened in 1939, with all of the country's major political groupings participating, and in 1940 it produced the document that was to serve the nation until it was suspended by the Castro regime in 1959.

The general philosophy of the drafters proposed a new political and social order for the country, giving detailed attention to the government's economic and social responsibilities and to the guarantees of individual rights. Considering executive dominance to be the major political problem, the document provided for a semiparliamentary system designed to limit executive power and prevent a repetition of the abuses of the past.

The Constitution of 1940 granted the citizen the traditional individual rights and did not depart significantly in this respect from the earlier charter. The major difference between the two constitutions was in the allocation of powers and in channels of responsibility. The cabinet was made responsible to Congress rather than directly to the president, and a vote of no confidence could be lodged against an individual minister or against the entire cabinet by a majority of the membership of either House. These provisions were adopted for the obvious purpose of providing a restraint on executive power, but subsequent compromise measures substantially weakened their effectiveness.

The president was required to be at least thirty-five years of age. He was elected by universal suffrage (women were given the franchise in 1935) and could serve a second four-year term only after a lapse of eight years. A system of electoral votes was used, but without an electoral college; the candidate receiving a plurality in any province was credited with the total provincial electoral vote, which equaled the number of senators and representatives for the province.

Legislative power was vested in the Senate and Chamber of

Representatives. Nine senators from each province were to be elected by universal suffrage for four-year terms. Representatives were elected every four years, one for each 35,000 persons, half the House being renewed every two years. The powers of the two Houses were defined much as they had been defined in 1901. The right of interpellation of ministers was more clearly outlined, and the size of the quorum necessary to convene was reduced to a majority.

The judiciary was declared independent. A Chamber of Constitutional and Social Guarantees was to be established within the Supreme Court; it was to be composed of at least fifteen justices, presided over by the chief justice when considering questions of constitutionality, and of nine justices when dealing with social questions. Each member of the Supreme Court was to be appointed by the president, with the approval of the Senate, from a list of three nominees submitted by a special electoral college. Appointment, promotion, and regulation of members of the lower judiciary were vested in a special government section of the Supreme Court composed of the chief justice and six members of the Court chosen annually.

Constitutional guarantees could be suspended in cases of invasion or serious threat to public order for a period not exceeding forty-five days. This could be accomplished by congressional vote or by executive order, but in the latter case Congress was required to meet within forty-eight hours to approve or reject the action. Congress could also declare a state of emergency and delegate special powers to the cabinet, but at the termination of the emergency any legislation adopted by the cabinet had to be confirmed by congressional enactment. A special commission of twenty-four members of Congress was to be named to observe and regulate cabinet actions during any emergency.

Partial amendment of the Constitution could be effected by national referendum or by congressional vote of two-thirds majority of both Houses meeting jointly within two sessions. Complete revision, or revision of certain specified articles, required the election of a Constituent Assembly. It was made particularly difficult to amend the Constitution to extend the tenure of any government official because of the misuse of the 1901 provision by President Gerardo Machado to extend his rule (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

The long-debated question of the proper nature and role of government and the emphasis given the economic base of society were more strongly reflected in the Constitution of 1940 than in previous charters. It elaborated the individual's right to work and established safeguards against economic exploitation. It outlined in detail the government's responsibility to provide social and economic, as well as political, equality. The individual's right to equitable pay, health protection, unemployment compensation, and social security were guaranteed as fully as was his right to vote. It represented progressive and enlightened social legislation, and Castro adopted most of the Constitution's social provisions in his 1959 Fundamental Law.

The characteristic shortcoming of Cuban governments after independence was their failure to bridge the wide gulf between official practice and constitutional theory. Each charter attempted to correct abuses that had occurred under earlier governments but did not succeed in developing a stable political system. Although idealism guided the writing of the Constitution of 1940, opportunism prevailed in its implementation; it was a statement of national goals rather than a manual of procedure. For the most part the government failed to enact essential implementing legislation to enable the charter to fulfill its high promise, leaving a vacuum that Castro was able to fill with relative ease.

The Fundamental Law of 1959

One of the first acts of the Castro regime was the promulgation of a constitutional-type document designed to give sanction and lend legitimacy to the decisions of the new government. On February 8, 1959, the Fundamental Law of the Republic of Cuba was issued in the name of the Council of Ministers. In both format and content the law relied heavily on the Constitution of 1940 and in parts closely followed its text. Provisions concerning the allocation of powers, however, were completely rewritten to be consistent with the existing situation; all government authority was vested in the Council of Ministers.

The law was subsequently confirmed and bolstered by Castro's first and second declarations of Havana, in which he reemphasized the aims and ultimate goals of his Revolution. Many of these precepts were already written into the Constitution of 1940 and, since this document was a social blueprint as well as a delineation of governmental structure, large sections were incorporated into the law with virtually no change. These included portions dealing with family and culture, labor and property, suffrage rights, local government, and the national economy. In its opening paragraph the law put forward the proposition that "the Republic is dedicated to ensuring political liberty, social justice, the welfare of the individual, and the solidarity of man. The nation condemns aggressive war and aspires to live in peace with all states, maintaining bonds of cultural and commercial friendship."

Castro's first Declaration of Havana in 1960 gave evidence of the socialist nature of his philosophy, but its tenor was somewhat more restrained than that of his later pronouncements. He condemned what he called North American imperialism and decried a long series of grievances of which he accused the United States, including exploitation, discrimination, inequality, and repression. He declared his solidarity with the Soviet Union and Communist China and acknowledged their support. He then went on to proclaim a number of rights for citizens of the socialist state. These included: the right of peasants to own land; the right to work, education, and security in old age; the right of minority groups to full human dignity; and the right to nationalize the nation's wealth and resources. The statement was informally approved at a mass General Assembly of the People of Cuba, which was specially convened to lend a semblance of official legality.

The second declaration, in early 1962, was also read and approved at a mass meeting of the citizenry. This discourse was clearly Communist in tone, using freely such terms as *bourgeois* and *proletariat*. It condemned private ownership and the capitalist system in general. Although it did not change the basic principles expounded in the first declaration, it was more evidently Marxist-Leninist and significantly more militant in its presentation of the regime's revolutionary aims.

Those sections of the Constitution concerned with the Congress were omitted from the Fundamental Law, and congressional powers were transferred to the Council of Ministers. A clause in the Constitution naming five ministries as "technical departments" was rewritten to read, "all the ministries shall function as technical agencies, following the political orientation of the Government." The clause that had outlined the function of the prime minister, "to dispatch with the President of the Republic matters of general policy" became, "It shall be the function of the Prime Minister to direct the general policy of the Government."

Articles providing for the election of municipal councils and provincial governments were replaced by provisions for selecting these governments in a manner to be determined by the Council of Ministers. To facilitate personnel changes, the constitutional provisions on the nonremovability of public servants, members of the judiciary, public prosecution service, and tribunal of accounts were declared suspended in accordance with action already taken on January 13, 1959. Within the next three to four years amendments were appended to incorporate additional social legislation that became integral parts of the Fundamental Law: the Agrarian Reform Law in 1959, the Urban Reform Law in 1960, the Nationalization of Education Law in 1961, and the Second Agrarian Reform Law in 1963.

Laws and administrative decisions of the rebel army command before December 31, 1958, were declared to be still in effect throughout the country. In order to facilitate the trials by the revolutionary tribunals then in progress, provisions guaranteeing the right of habeas corpus and prohibiting the creation of special courts were declared inapplicable in those cases. New provisions sanctioned the trial of anyone who had committed crimes "in the service of the tyranny," the imposition of the death penalty for such crimes, and the confiscation of the property of those convicted. The Fundamental Law could be amended in whole or in part by a two-thirds vote of the Council of Ministers, with the approval of the president of the Republic.

In the first two years of its existence the Fundamental Law was amended on twenty-two occasions. All the changes reflected a trend toward the concentration of power in the hands of the ruling group and the stifling of any opposition or difference of opinion. The International Commission of Jurists in Geneva, Switzerland, stated: "The legal guarantees of freedom, life, and property have been eliminated. The state has become a monolithic dictatorship that relentlessly directs or ends the citizen's life as it sees fit with no restraints or regard for the rights or dignity of the individual."

STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

The Fundamental Law prescribes that the government of the Republic shall exercise its functions through the medium of legislative, executive, and judicial powers and through such other agencies as may be established by law. Legislative power is attributed to the Council of Ministers, which is designated the supreme organ of the state. The membership of the council is determined by law, and it is charged with assisting the president in the discharge of his executive duties. One of the ministers is to be named prime minister by presidential appointment and serves as the head of the government.

The Legislative Branch

The Council of Ministers operates as both an executive and a legislative body. It serves as the president's cabinet and, in its legislative capacity, fulfills the functions of the Congress that it replaced. In 1970 there were twenty ministries and sixteen autonomous agencies called Central Organizations (Organismos Centrales). In accordance with the organic structure of the ministry, each minister could have one or more vice ministers, one of whom serves as first vice minister.

The council is charged with the formulation of national laws, direction of general administration on a national, provincial, and municipal level, and resolution of any and all questions or matters pertinent to the effective implementation of the Fundamental Law. It also levies contributions and taxes on a national level and approves the national budget. Title IX, Article 119, of the Fundamental Law provides specifically that the council, through the prime minister, shall direct general government policy; and in case of absence, incapacity, or death of the President, the council desig-

218

nates the person who will succeed him, either temporarily or permanently. These responsibilities may not be delegated by the council to any other body or agency.

Additional specific powers are assigned to the council by Article 120. These include: approval of Presidential appointments of chiefs of diplomatic missions; authorization for citizens to enter the military service of a foreign country; approval of treaties negotiated by the president; regulation of national transportation, including railroads, highways, canals, and ports, as well as land, sea, and air traffic; and declaration of war or approval of peace treaties.

The sixteen central organizations are more characteristically operating agencies than ministries. Their chiefs have the rank of minister, but they are not members of the council. They have a legislative function in the regulation of their particular activities and advising on legislation affecting them. These organizations cover a wide and varied field and constitute a significant element of the national structure. They are: the National Bank of Cuba; National Institute of Agrarian Reform; Cuban Academy of Sciences; National Fisheries Institute; Cuban Institute of International Friendship; Civil Aeronautics Institute; Book Institute; Cuban Chamber of Commerce; National Institute of the Tourist Industry; Cuban Broadcasting Institute; Cuban Institute of the Cinema Art and Industry; National Forestry Institute; National Institute of Veterinary Medicine; Directorate for the National Development of Agriculture and Cattle; Center of Automotive Technical Services; and Cuban Tobacco Enterprise.

The Executive Branch

The Fundamental Law states that the president of the Republic is chief of state and represents the nation. It attributes to his office a number of powers and responsibilities in which he is to be assisted by the Council of Ministers. He approves and promulgates laws and ensures their execution and, when not already accomplished by the council, he issues such decrees and executive orders as are necessary for the proper administration of the government.

Although nominally having the customary powers and prerogatives of a traditional chief executive, the president of Cuba is in reality a figurehead whose functions are largely advisory, administrative, and ceremonial. The Fundamental Law is written in a way that could be interpreted as precluding him from participating in decisions on policy matters. Article 146 reads: "It shall be the function of the Prime Minister to direct the general policy of the government, and to dispatch administrative matters with the President accompanied by the Ministers, upon the matters of the respective departments."

The office of president as of 1970 remained nebulous, seemingly tolerated because of the tractability, competence, and personal loyalty of the incumbent, Osvaldo Dorticós. The Republic had always had a president who was usually the country's unquestioned political leader. The Constitution of 1940 provided that he be elected by universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage for a period of four years. This provision was not retained in the Fundamental Law, and in its place the authority for selection of the president was given to the Council of Ministers. The council exercised this authority in July 1959 when, upon the resignation of the first provisional president, Manuel Urrutia, it appointed Dorticós as the successor.

Conversely, Article 129 of the Fundamental Law specifies that the president "freely appoints and removes the Ministers of Government and replaces them when proper in accordance with the law." This results in a closed circle, with the president appointing the council, which in turn appoints the president. This process was conditioned somewhat by Castro's proclamation of December 1, 1961, in which he stated that he considered the best system of government to be one in which control was exercised through collective party leadership.

The trend in this direction has been minor, and power continues to rest in the hands of the prime minister. The law specifies that the prime minister would replace the president during any temporary absence of the president from the country and, as head of government, the prime minister is actually the country's chief executive. To become effective, laws must be signed by the president, the prime minister, and the particular minister concerned with the legislation. In practice, several alternative methods have developed reflecting Castro's desires and his impatience with forms. In its capacity as a cabinet, the Council of Ministers functions as an advisory body to the president, and each minister is the executive chief of his respective department. Both the individual and the collective operations of the ministers are supervised by the prime minister, who is, in effect, chairman of the council. In 1970 there were twenty government ministries: presidency; internal trade; communications; construction; economy; education; armed forces; food industry; sugar industry; interior; public health; foreign trade; justice; foreign relations; labor; transport; basic industry; light industry; mines, fuel, and metallurgy; and merchant marine and ports.

The Judicial Branch

The widest gap between theory and practice in the governmental structure is found in the judicial branch. This is particularly marked in the administration of criminal justice, where political offenses have been placed under the jurisdiction of a variety of revolutionary tribunals (see ch. 24, Public Order and Internal Security). In matters of civil law or the traditional courts' handling of ordinary crime, the Fundamental Law closely follows the guidance of the Constitution of 1940. In this respect it is almost a blueprint of the prerevolutionary system, although in operation it bears little resemblance to the prescribed format.

The Fundamental Law prescribes that justice shall be administered in the name of the people, its dispensation gratis throughout the national territory. Judges and attorneys are independent in the fulfillment of their duties and need recognize no authority but the law. The judicial power of the state is exercised by the Supreme Court and such other tribunals as may be legally established. The Supreme Court is composed of five chambers covering government, constitutional and social guarantees, demurrers, criminal matters, and civil litigation. The Court also hears appeals from lower courts, resolves jurisdictional conflicts, and rules on the constitutionality of laws, decrees, and regulations.

The hierarchy of inferior courts prescribed by the law adheres closely to the pattern of the structure before the Revolution. In the civil area justice is dispensed in conformity with established law by municipal courts, courts of first instance, and the civil chambers of courts of appeal; in the criminal field there are correctional courts, courts of arraignment, and the criminal chambers of courts of appeal. These tribunals are granted competence to try all cases within their areas of jurisdiction except for offenses committed by personnel of the armed forces on active duty, in which case jurisdiction rests with the military authorities. If a case involves both military and civilian personnel, it is tried in an ordinary court.

One radical departure from the Constitution of 1940 is the Fundamental Law's formal recognition of revolutionary courts, which are assigned jurisdiction over all offenses classified as counterrevolutionary, whether committed by civilian or military personnel. The law notes that, in addition to the acts recognized as counterrevolutionary in the Social Defense Code of 1938 (which was still in force in early 1970), other offenses have been placed in this category. It goes on to outline the justification for such action as necessary to "safeguard the fundamental institutions of the state and guarantee their operation, maintain public order to insure collective security, develop the programs of the Revolution, and defend Revolutionary interests."

The law enumerates some of the offenses that have been categorized as counterrevolutionary. In addition to acts of conspiracy or rebellion, they cover a broad area of other activities. These include offenses against the "popular economy," such as speculation or usury, against persons or property for counterrevolutionary aims, including robbery, assault or homicide, and fraud or misuse of public funds, and others. Little scope remains for the operation of ordinary courts. Except for the municipal courts, which represent a remaining link with the old system, the ordinary courts are gradually disappearing from the judicial scene.

Other than the relatively few ordinary courts still in operation in early 1970, the prevailing court structure consisted of revolutionary tribunals, people's courts, and municipal courts. These last were summary courts consisting of one judge, who was limited to trying misdemeanors. People's courts had jurisdiction over minor offenses and could impose penalties of up to six months of confinement. The revolutionary tribunals were the highest courts in the structure and tried felonies or major crimes of a counterrevolutionary nature. They could impose any recognized punishment, including the death penalty and confiscation of property (see ch. 24, Public Order and Internal Security).

The Communist Party of Cuba

The Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba—PCC) is the only political party permitted to function. It is, in fact, a functioning organism of government. Its place in the structure, the interrelationships of the various elements of the hierarchy, and the authorities and responsibilities of each segment were still in the development stage in early 1970; it appeared clear, however, that the PCC would finally end up in a dominant position, in formal, as well as in actual, control of the government.

The party manifesto declares that the PCC governs through its Central Committee by means of the public administration. This organization is at the apex of a framework that extends through all levels of government and reaches down to factory and farm. It is headed by Prime Minister Castro as first secretary of the Communist Party, who is also chairman of its two principal subordinate components, the eight-member Political Bureau and the six-member Secretariat. The Central Committee itself has a membership of ninety-four and comprises virtually the entire top leadership of the regime, including President Dorticós and minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, Raúl Castro. Over two-thirds of its members are military officers.

There are five standing subcommittees, and these have become the highest government authority in their respective fields, in effect usurping functions usually attributed to a ministry. Conflict is avoided, however, by the ministers themselves being members of the Central Committee, exercising their control in the name of the party. The standing committees are: constitutional studies; foreign affairs; armed forces and state security; economy; and education. These responsibilities were given to the subcommittees in 1965 and represent areas that had not formerly been under party control.

The party is organized in an ascending hierarchy built up on the basic party cell. There are thousands of these cells incorporated into virtually every phase of government, industry, and agriculture. They range in membership from 5 to 200 and form a directing nucleus in factories, farms, work centers, government agencies, and units of the armed forces (see ch. 25, The Armed Forces).

These cells at the grassroots level are combined to form sectional or municipal directorates called committees, and these in turn are formed into regional committees. The next higher level comprises the provincial committees, which are directly subordinate to the Central Committee. There is one of these committees for each province, and each has its Executive Bureau and its Secretariat. Members of each higher echelon directorate are elected at general assemblies by the party members of the next lower unit. Thus, the cells select the members of the sectional or municipal committees; these elect those of the regional committees, who in turn elect the members of the provincial committees.

The buildup of party membership has been slow and deliberate, and until 1969 the PCC was more a cadre than a mass organization. Membership had remained relatively static since the adoption of the present organizational form in 1965. At the beginning of 1969 membership was reported at approximately 70,000, which was proportionately the lowest rate for party cardholders of any Communist country. In May the government undertook a program of expansion and launched a concerted drive to increase the membership. The immediate goal was placed at 10,000 new members, with an ultimate aim of reaching 150,000 by the end of the year. According to information available, it was indicated that the drive was meeting with considerable success.

Paralleling the party structure, the Communist Youth Organization (Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas—UJC) is the junior organization that grooms young candidates for party membership. Patterned after the Soviet Young Communist League, it was formed in 1962 by consolidating all of the country's various youth and student groups into one central body that was guided and directed by selected party members specially trained for this work.

Admission to membership is put on a competitive basis and is held out as a prize for socialist accomplishment in studies or work. Both boys and girls up to age eighteen are eligible, and a party card in the UJC has become a standard award for excellence in any line of endeavor, whether it be work in the canefields or graduation from a military preparatory school. Membership in the youth organization serves as a steppingstone that facilitates full party membership upon reaching the required age.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The country has always had a highly centralized political administration, and emphasis on the capital city has tended to minimize local autonomy and initiative. Although the Castro regime has broadened the responsibilities of subordinate local governments, the interests favoring centralization continue to prevail, and most local government is still directed from the top. There is an elaborate framework of subordinate authorities, called administrations, each with a president elected by the Communist Party. The operation of the entire system is under the direction and supervision of a number of agencies of the central government called provincial and municipal boards for coordination, operation, and inspection.

The country is divided into six administrative provinces: Pinar del Río, La Habana (which includes the Isle of Pines), Matanzas, Las Villas, Camagüey, and Oriente. Oriente is the largest in area, and La Habana the smallest, although in structure and organization the capital city, in effect, constitutes a separate entity amounting to an additional province. A reorganization in 1965 subdivided the provinces into regions, each comprising a number of municipalities (*municipios*), which were in turn made up of a designated number of districts (*barrios*). The number of subordinate subdivisions varies widely, ranging from 12 regions and 117 municipalities in Oriente Province, to 4 regions and 28 municipalities in La Habana Province. The latter figure, however, does not include the 8 regions and 38 municipalities constituting the capital city.

Latest government-published statistics indicated that there were a total of 52 regions and 344 municipalities in the entire country, but subsequent reports from individual provinces have shown sizable increases in some areas. Oriente Province, for example, reported 12 regions rather than 11 shown in the statistical report, and 117 municipalities, increased from 88. The administrations at the various levels exercise a monitoring function in carrying out the instructions of the party. Their authority is largely limited to the supervision of local services and public works, and central committees at provincial, regional, and municipal levels appoint subcommittees that are charged with execution of the various enterprises in their areas of jurisdiction.

Elections of administration presidents and members of central committees are held twice a year at convened party meetings called *asambleas*. They are held at provincial, regional, and municipal levels, the municipality representatives being made up of delegates from the subordinate districts. After selection of a president from among those named to the central committee, subcommittees are appointed to handle the assigned area tasks. Although the number of committees and their functions vary considerably in different localities, they generally follow a standard pattern. A typically representative structure is that of the San José Region of La Habana Province. It had three major subcommittees, charged respectively with construction, communal services, and local enterprises.

The responsibilities of the construction group included all phases of the siting, erection, or razing of buildings, and the repair and maintenance of roads. The communal services subcommittee had charge of street cleaning, promotion of green areas, and upkeep of parks, social centers, and cemeteries. The local enterprises unit was divided into areas of interest, which included economic, industrial, gastronomic, and services sectors. Its wide range of responsibilities took in such varied activities as price controls, rationing, food handling, working conditions, and maintenance of utility services.

The semiannual *assamblea* of the San José Region was attended by 244 delegates, who had been selected by the various municipalities. There were 201 of these subordinate-level meetings held in work centers, granges, and farm bases, attending by over 14,000 laborers and farm workers. Of the delegates elected, 25 were women. There were 105 industrial laborers, 43 farm workers, 59 small farmers; others were in various services.

The government is placing considerable emphasis on the training of local government officials and has planned a number of schools at various levels to provide instruction in such fields as construction, economics, organization, services, and labor control. The first of these institutions, the Nico Lopez National Party School, was opened in Havana in late 1968, with a first-course enrollment of forty-one presidents of municipal administrations. Drawn from the widespread areas of the entire country, they attended a course of twenty-five days' duration.

This training is under the supervision of the National Coordinating Committee of Local Government of the Ministry of the Interior, which is in charge of all planning and execution. Additional schools at the provincial level have been scheduled, and the first of these, called the National School for Local Government Cadres, was opened in 1969 in Las Villas Province. It was anticipated that similar institutions would be opened in the other provinces in the near future.

CHAPTER 14

POLITICAL DYNAMICS AND VALUES

Cuba had been a Communist state since 1961 and still was as of 1970. The Revolution of 1959 and the country's subsequent political development focused on it a degree of world attention disproportionate to its physical size, economy, or population, but justified by the radical nature of the changes.

The government continued to be a personal regime in which all the major decisions were made by Fidel Castro. As prime minister, first secretary of the Communist Party, and commander in chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, Castro held all the reins of power, and there was little threat to his leadership. The president of the Republic was a figurehead who had no authority, and the government was administered by a Council of Ministers that was appointed by the prime minister (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). The Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba—PCC) was playing an increasing role in governing the country, but even though this gave an impression of some participation in government, the party was virtually under Castro's domination. There had been no national election since the regime came to power.

Fidel Castro set about to transform an individualistic society into one that was collectivist. In this he has met with considerable success. His alignment with the Communist states has evolved into a threat to the free world.

The government's political philosophy, economic outlook, and totalitarian methods are rooted in Castro-Marxist ideology. It has tried to play the Soviet Union and Communist China off against each other in an attempt to avoid committing itself on ideological issues. At times it has ideologically supported Communist China, but the maintenance of its Marxist structure is largely dependent on Soviet support and economic assistance. Despite its basic adherence to the Communist party line, however, the country retains a marked degree of individuality and exhibits considerable independence. It has developed a brand of communism that is not always understood or kept under control by its Soviet mentors.

The political life of the nation had always been closely tied in with the economy and, for most of the Republic's history, the economy was dominated by private foreign business interests, primarily those of the United States. This, however, was not a significant factor in arousing support from the masses, as the only people who were fully aware of the situation were those from the upper income brackets, and these usually profited personally from the arrangement. Those in the middle and lower segments of the economy might have been marginally conscious of the power of foreign capital, but this was a field outside their usual interests, and was actually of little concern. Castro used outside domination as a rallying slogan to stir up emotional response, but basically it was a problem that the masses did not fully understand or care too much about.

BACKGROUND

Generations of Cuban intellectuals have debated the nature and means of creating a desirable society, and most of them assumed that change had to be imposed by a strong central government short of a dictatorship. Twentieth-century Cuban thinkers have regarded the root of the country's social problems as economic. Many young students came to accept Marxist criticism of capitalism, which they identified with the concentration of ownership rather than with rights to individual enterprise. They held that only the centralization of power in government hands could prevail against the power of privilege and wealth.

Government in independent Cuba was always considered corrupt, and within its structure there had been constant struggles between the idealism of reformers and the opportunism of professional politicians. In the colonial period government employment was lucrative, and Spaniards sought government jobs in the colony as a means of enrichment. After independence there was a strong tendency to follow the established pattern, especially as the economy did not offer opportunities without political influence. The country was in an economic depression from the early 1920s until World War II, and political office became one of the principal paths to economic and social advancement. The government was the nation's second largest employer.

Successive governments failed to enact or implement laws ensuring such essentials of democratic government as an independent judiciary, a nonpolitical civil service, or a legislature empowered to check executive abuses. But the failure itself stemmed from the vested interests of members of all branches of government in preserving the loopholes through which they derived profit. Many individuals in government were honest; many left government service because they were powerless to challenge the system; but many who began as reformers succumbed to prevailing standards. Revolutionary groups, usually formed only when oppression had become particularly acute, tended to be puritanical in their approach to government problems, only to end by reallocating the spoils rather than reforming the system.

During many discussions and debates on the role of government, it changed little in actual operation. Occasionally, when a strongman such as Fulgencio Batista controlled the governmental and political apparatus, there was superficial tranquility and order, and the government itself became the mechanism through which political control was maintained. Most of the time, however, the government was only the partially successful arbiter of political forces; it was used in many ways by many people to buy support, to mollify opposition, to threaten, and to ensure the support of interest groups. This role took precedence over all other theoretically accepted functions, from the preservation of order to the provision of services. There was little effective action to remedy the basic social and economic ills of the country.

The imposition of a Communist regime changed the methodology but not the fundamental base of the country's political fabric. The primary concern remains rooted in economics, and the more sweeping changes in the daily life of the nation are related to economic matters. The constant striving for a larger sugar harvest, the housing laws, price controls, wage regulations, and efforts at industrialization all reflect the goal of producing an egalitarian society subscribing to Communist patterns. The most radical change has been the attempt to apply Marxist philosophy to the body politic and the methods of achieving its ends.

Between Revolutions (1933—58)

During the almost sixty years of Cuban independence before the Castro Revolution, no government was free from strong opposition. Twice, in 1933 and in 1958, the opposition was of revolutionary proportions and followed periods of dictatorship in which the incumbent regime increasingly relied on police suppression.

In each case, the leadership of the revolution emerged from a new generation of young intellectuals of middle and upper class backgrounds who found no place in the existing order as they saw it. Their programs incorporated a variety of the tenets of political liberalism, radicalism, socialism, and extreme nationalism, but their principal bond was reaction against despotism rather than agreement on future programs. In each case they acted in the name of population groups omitted from participation in the formulation of national policies. In 1933 the revolutionary effort was supported by organized urban labor, and its power was reflected in the policies of the Auténticos (Authentics) and later the Batista government. In 1958 Fidel Castro won the support of the rural peasant (*guajiro*—

see Glossary), in whose name he formulated a new program, making him the heroic symbol of the country's future. In both cases idealism lost control of the government to dictatorship.

The twenty-five year period between the two revolutions was dominated politically by the power struggle between three dominant groupings that emerged in the 1933–34 period: the conservative leaders who had opposed the dictatorship of Gerardo Machado but who were not committed to major social or economic change; the Auténticos, followers of Ramón Grau San Martín; and the followers of Batista, who was supported by the army. Politics often appeared to involve little more than personal rivalries and ambitions, but loyalties were, at times, based on real differences with regard to policies and programs. These differences, however, were frequently obscured in the struggle to gain control of the government.

The personal role of the political leader in Latin America was so important that it has been given its own name, *personalismo*. Such designations as Machadistas, Batistianos, or Fidelistas were usually more accurately descriptive of a political following than were the names of the parties led by these men. A man with such a following, if he was chief of state, as was Batista or Castro, was described as the Jefe Supremo (Supreme Chief). He was expected to be adept at political negotiation and manipulation of influential groups; he had to have a forceful physical presence and great verbal persuasiveness, personal magnetism, and a direct appeal to "the people." Dominance by the Jefe Supremo was central to the entire political system. He was not all-powerful; absolute dictatorship was rare and brief, but he was expected to be the final arbiter on all major questions and, thus, maintain a balance of power among rival political forces. He required the support of the army but could not rely on military power alone; and he had to be able to reconcile the interests of other major elements seeking to augment their role in politics and in the society. In addition to political parties, these elements included organized labor, student groups, professional associations, major business interests and, to a lesser extent, the Roman Catholic Church.

The country's political history from 1933 to 1958 may be viewed in part as the shift of mass support from one leader to another. None of the leaders of this period had the qualities considered ideal. Batista had the forcefulness but lacked the education and cultural credentials to place him above the common man. Grau San Martín was considered an impractical idealist who lacked the drive and administrative competence to continue in power, and Carlos Prío Socorrás, though well-intentioned, proved vacillating, weak, and fumbling. In all three cases public disillusionment led to loss of popular support.

The years immediately preceding Batista's second coup were, nevertheless, a period of striving for better government. Although graft continued, there was widespread reaction against corruption, and many reforms were actually enacted. There was a general feeling that progress was being made and that the democratic process was achieving a reasonable semblance of constitutional rectitude. After the coup Batista was blamed not only for imposing a dictatorship, but also for interrupting the march toward better government that many felt was making significant strides.

The first seeds of radicalism were sown during this period, as many citizens, dissatisfied with the government process, blamed democracy for the country's ills. Whereas most proponents of better government advocated reforms along democratic lines, there were some who felt that democracy represented a system that gave power to the rich and riches to the powerful. Sentiment took a variety of forms and ranged from far right to extreme left. There was general agreement among radical thinkers that the nation's problems were essentially economic, and they deplored the constant struggle among political groups for an even greater share of the country's wealth.

The two solutions most frequently advocated by those of the extreme Left and Right were those of the Communist and the corporative. The Communist favored the achievement of a classless society through destruction of the upper and middle classes, and the corporative proposed the realization of social equity by giving the government absolute authority to centrally control the economy for the benefit of all. Both of these solutions, representing the extremes of right and left, tended to justify violence in gaining and holding power, as they ignored constitutional procedures and appealed directly to the masses. The corporative movement failed to achieve any ascendancy and never became a significant force; the Communist movement, however, grew and developed steadily over the years, to achieve its goal under the sponsorship of the Castro Revolution.

The 1959 Revolution

Castro's Revolution was a military campaign rather than a political movement, and its full political implications did not become evident until after his victory. He spent over two years engaged in guerrilla warfare against Batista's forces, and the military aspects of his operations received much more attention than any plans or programs for reforming the government. His rebel army was not the only force in active opposition to Batista but, through the strength and charismatic appeal of Castro's personality, it emerged as the dominant power after the overthrow of the dictatorship.

During most of the period of guerrilla warfare, Castro's rebels were on the defensive in the mountains. Instead of a mass popular uprising that Castro apparently expected, there developed four types of organized opposition to Batista's government. First, the rebels in the mountains, who numbered fewer than 1,000 in mid-1958, alternated attacks on police posts and pursuing army patrols, with disengagement from large-scale operations in which they had no chance of success. They remained in the Sierra Maestra, gaining the support and some recruits from the local peasantry and relying on supplies channeled through underground organizations.

Second, a much larger urban resistance movement harassed the army and police in the cities (later estimates of casualties in the struggle against Batista totaled some 1,000 in the mountains and 19,000 in the cities). Throughout the island underground cells of the 26th of July movement, as Castro had named his organization, and of the closely allied Civic Resistance Movement conducted terrorist activity, spread propaganda, and brought thousands into opposition. Eventually, an allied labor organization established cells in some of the unions, and student groups joined the alliance.

A third focus of opposition was formed by the several existing political parties and factions, many of whose leaders were in exile, in open opposition to Batista. Despite early reluctance to support Castro, many prominent party leaders became active members and moving spirits in the 26th of July Movement or the Civic Resistance Movement.

A fourth element that contributed to the success of the Revolution was the joining of a number of ex-army officers who had been ousted from service by Batista or even earlier regimes, for a variety of political reasons. They brought with them a discipline and knowledge of military affairs that was sorely needed in the early makeshift rebel forces.

Castro himself had first indicated a desire for alliance with other groups as early as July 1957, but the mutual suspicions that beset the political organizations prevented agreement until the following year. At least a superficial unity was achieved in the Caracas Pact of July 20, 1958, in which most of the active opposition groups agreed on a program and on Castro's choice of Manuel Urrutia as the future president of a provisional government. Joining the 26th of July Movement were: the Civic Resistance Movement; the Auténtico (Authentic) Party Organization; the Revolutionary Cuban Party; the Revolutionary Directorate; the Federation of University Students; the Montecristi Group, made up of business and professional men and supported by the army; the Labor Unity Organization; the Democratic party; and the Ex-Army Officers Group.

After the flight of Batista, the start of the new regime was marked by great public enthusiasm for Castro, for liberation from fear, and for the future of Cuba. For a time the new order appeared to radiate an atmosphere of youth, energy, and purpose. Castro spoke constantly on television, and his words were eagerly absorbed by the nation. As first enunciated, the principles of the new order were politically moderate and socially reformist. Civil liberties were restored, exiles returned, and freedom of the press was assured. As Castro had long promised, rents were reduced and some government-owned land was distributed to landless peasants. Formerly private beaches were opened to the public in one of the many moves designed to illustrate the new equality that was to prevail in Cuban society.

Castro was not without opposition in the consolidation of his position as maximum leader. The Revolution had brought together a diverse spectrum of political opinion with widely divergent ideologies and, although they were able to cooperate effectively in bringing down the government, clash was inevitable. Castro was challenged by several groups but emerged victorious from all contests.

During his first few weeks in power, Castro sought to define his program in various ways and consistently refused to place political labels on his views or his government. For several years he had talked of a program for an ideal, utopian Cuba. He described this as a land of equal opportunity in which people were well fed, well housed, provided with education, medical care, and the means of earning an adequate living free from police repression.

It should be noted, however, that Castro felt the need for promising free elections some time after the transition period from Batista to himself ended. This promise was not seriously undercut until the second half of the 1960s and not denied until 1969/70.

Both the programs he espoused and the image he created aroused uneasiness among the groups that had given him his strongest support. Many of his adherents had intended a political, rather than a social, revolution with elections, constitutional government, and an economic and social system little different from that prevailing in the years before Batista. Others defined national needs in terms of honest public administration, a new and equitable tax structure, public works and social services, and encouragement of private investment. Castro's more radical proposals, reinforced by his techniques of public appeal, soon began to appear extremely dangerous. When his adherents sought to limit the Revolution in accord with their aims and purposes, they were attacked and eventually ousted.

The first to go were the old-line conservative leaders, who quickly became disillusioned with the trend to communism. President Urrutia was in office six months and then was replaced by Osvaldo Dorticós, a longtime Communist. Some Communists were less prone to accept Castro's leadership or what they considered his unorthodox Marxist philosophy. There followed an extended struggle with the members of the old party that finally resulted in the 1968 purging of Aníbal Escalante, the forceful and dynamic leader of the Moscow-oriented Communists, along with a number of his more militant followers. The result was that Castro gained complete control of the PCC and has remained its chief.

As with the Communists, Castro gradually overcame other opposition and consolidated his position as the nation's leader. An admitted Marxist-Leninist, in 1970 he had been in power for over ten years; he had defied opposition at home and abroad and had altered the social structure of the country along Marxist lines.

Fidel Castro

The course that Cuba follows and its political, social, and economic posture devolves to a large extent on the character and personality of Fidel Castro. Any consideration of the country's society must recognize him as a vital force. There is little in his early years to explain or give much indication of the qualities or urges that brought about the charisma that took such a firm grip on the Cuban people. The facts do not point to an inevitability of leadership.

Fidel Castro was born on August 13, 1926, the son of a well-to-do sugar planter in Oriente Province. His mother, Lina Ruz, had been a servant in the Castro household, and Angel Castro (Fidel's father) married her after the death of his first wife. Fidel attended schools run by the Christian Brothers and the Jesuits in Santiago de Cuba; he received his secondary education at the highly reputed Colegio Belén in Havana, where he had a good scholastic record and was active in athletics.

His political life began with his entrance into the university; much of this activity later became a matter of sharp dispute between his supporters and his opponents. At the university his close friends included men with a range of political leanings, from conservative to extreme radical. He earned a reputation for personal ambition, forcefulness, and volubility, but his efforts to obtain leadership in student affairs met with limited success. He had some association at different times with two terrorist groups operating at the university.

In the political turbulence of the late 1940s, there were many roads open to young radicals. In 1947 and 1948 the Auténtico government turned against the Communists, then at the height of their power. Eddy Chibas founded the new Cuban People's party (Ortodoxo) in reaction to Auténtico corruption, and Batista returned from exile to found his party of Unitary Action. Exiles and radicals were active throughout Latin America in conspiracies against dictatorship, and Castro attached himself to a number of these organizations.

He left the university for a time in 1947 to take part in an unsuccessful expedition against the Trujillo dictatorship in the Dominican Republic. In April 1948 he was one of the large number of Latin American youths who gathered in Bogotá, Colombia, for an anti-imperialist demonstration timed to coincide with the meeting of the Ninth Inter-American Conference. His role in the rioting that developed in Bogotá was a subject of particularly sharp dispute after his rise to prominence.

The same year, 1948, Castro married Mirtha Díaz Balart, the daughter of a prominent conservative family. Her brother, a university friend of Fidel's, subsequently became head of the youth section of Batista's party, and the family tried to steer the new in-law into a conservative political career. Castro, however, linked himself more and more closely to the Ortodoxos. After his graduation in 1950, he opened a law office in Havana and devoted himself to the Ortodoxo party. He became a member of the party's national assembly and was a candidate for Congress in 1952. His turn to conspiracy and violence after the Batista coup apparently caused the final break in his marriage; he was divorced in 1955 (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

There were as many conflicting impressions of Castro's character as there were of his politics. Those who knew him in his youth agreed mainly on two characteristics; his insatiable appetite for conversation, which often became a monologue, and his tendency toward self-dramatization. At the university he adopted a Bohemian appearance counter to the usual Cuban attention to niceties of dress and grooming. His height, close to six feet, gave him a commanding physical presence, later accentuated by a beard. Stories of his physical prowess were widely circulated. From the mountains also came stories of his humanitarian concern for the common man and his dispensing of summary justice.

The appeal of Castro's traits of character and personality depended largely on the views of the observer. His violent reaction to the caste consciousness of the Cuban upper class was seen by some as a symbol of his social revolution. Others dismissed him as a person who failed to wash or traced his behavior to family hostilities and psychic peculiarities. The stories of his physique and courage were countered by critical reports that he took care to protect himself from the dangers to which he casually exposed his followers. In 1970 it was reported that he travels in a three-car convoy accompanied by a minimum of twelve bodyguards.

After ten years in power, Castro still remains an enigma. Few of his followers doubt his sincerity, but failure to achieve many of his goals has opened the way to dissatisfaction and dissidence, some of which has already made its appearance. His unorthodox personal behavior puzzles even his most ardent supporters; he retains the beard and fatigues long after many feel it necessary, and it is reported that he rarely spends the night more than once in any abode. His public appearances and television addresses are less frequent. He still captivates the masses, but there is evidence that the enthusiasm he once commanded has considerably abated.

MAJOR INTEREST GROUPS

In 1970 the major interest groups that once exerted significant influence on the political scene were either inactive, dormant, ineffective, or nonexistent. Some, like the professional associations and business interests, had been done away with; others, such as the labor unions and student groups, were subordinated to the government and the Communist Party. The Catholic Church was subdued in its activities. Only the army created by Castro and led by his brother remained as an influential entity, largely because most of the men in power were nominally military men. But even the army's approach to the wielding of influence had undergone radical change, and it vied for power with the Communist Party.

In addition to the major interest groups, there were numerous less influential, but still important, organizations, such as associations of landowners, manufacturers, merchants, and the like. Negro cultural societies were grouped into a Communist-dominated national federation for social improvement, and Spanish regional societies furthered the welfare of their members who were drawn from Spanish immigrants from the same home area. Operating as social clubs and benefit associations, they pressed for favors from friends or patrons in the government.

Each of these groups had its own functions and interests, and each required some degree of government support and assistance. When they needed government action they usually relied on members who had the necessary contacts. Like the major interest groups, however, they have lost their political role which, though tenuous and indirect, had in its time considerable influence on the course of the country's history.

The Army

Until the Machado dictatorship (1924—33), the army was a weak political force. Machado increased the size of the military establishment, and from 1930 on, the army was a major factor dominating political life.

Batista's "sergeants' revolt" consisted initially of replacing several hundred officers who had served under Machado with former noncommissioned officers. As chief of staff from 1933 to 1939, he made the army his own creation and personal instrument, and all officers owed their positions to his appointment. He kept the army large; improved its organization, training, and equipment; and raised its pay. Assured of military support, Batista was able to become president, but once in office reduced overt military participation in government.

Batista's reliance on the army developed it into a power that no element could seriously threaten. Presidents Grau San Martín and Prío Socorrás each changed the personnel of the high command in order to promote their adherents, but no serious effort was made to reduce the size of the establishment nor economize on the funds budgeted for the military. Acceptance of Batista in 1952 was facilitated by a carryover of earlier loyalty and by serious military concern over the widespread violence during the Prío administration. Although dissatisfaction with the Batista regime later developed within the army, the majority remained loyal.

The army, completely restructured and rebuilt under Castro, remains one of the country's most powerful forces, but it is steadily contested by the Communist Party. Other than its rivalry with the PCC, there is no remaining avenue for participation in politics, and the army gives firm indication of being loyal to Castro. There was a period early in his regime when Castro had doubts as to its complete loyalty, and the militia was formed as a force to counterbalance any possible disaffection. Such as eventuality did not arise, and the army's preeminence was renewed. The best technicians are found in the army, and they are increasingly being utilized for positions in other ministries and government entities (see ch. 25, The Armed Forces).

Organized Labor

Organized labor had been second only to the army as a potent political force. Most of the time it was able to work in harmony with the government. On a few occasions it was forced to show its strength but, for the most part, conciliatory relations were maintained with political leaders, who tried hard to avoid conflict by accommodating to labor's demands. The leaders who had emerged in the labor movement by the early 1930s, divided among Auténtico, Socialist, and Communist loyalties, remained dominant until the Revolution. They achieved significant benefits for labor to the point where the concessions obtained from successive governments came to constitute a major obstacle to national economic development.

The position of labor in the decade before the Revolution was in part the result of Batista's political maneuvering. The ordinary union member was interested primarily in material improvements, and these could be assured only when labor leadership had a successful working relationship with the government. Labor confederation leadership generally rotated when there was a change in the government. This facilitated meeting labor demands, and the new government was freed of the possibility of labor opposition—a general strike was second only to an army revolt in the eventualities that a government had to avoid.

Organized labor became indentified most closely with the government after 1952. The Auténtico labor elements came to terms with Batista within a few days after his coup, and the Communists failed to cooperate in labor resistance efforts organized by opposition groups, permitting Batista to consolidate his position. The labor minister under Batista, however, was a Communist. The last few years of the Batista regime were a period of superficial calm in labor relations. Labor and government in a sense tolerated each other and tried to maintain a delicate balance that would avoid conflict and controversy. Organized labor contributed little to Castro's Revolution and assumed the role of interested spectator until the Revolution had demonstrated that it was well on the way to success.

By 1970 the organization of labor as it had existed before the Revolution had been entirely altered. The country's unions had been loosely consolidated into one all-encompassing federation, the Confederation of Revolutionary Cuban Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba Revolucionarios—CTC—R). Comprising fourteen separate unions that represented all of the nation's trades and industries, it was patterned after Communist labor prototypes, and membership in the party was far more important than membership in the federation or in a union. Completely dominated by the government and responsive to its dictates, the CTC—R presented a facade of unity but had ceased to be an independent or influential force in the country's social or economic structure (see ch. 20, Labor).

Students

Students have traditionally been active in political life throughout the country's history, university students in particular, but reaching down even to the secondary school level. Monuments commemorate student martyrdom as far back as 1871. Most attempts at revolt were badly organized and some proved suicidal, but the student contribution was an important element in the successful revolutions of both 1933 and 1958.

Rebellion among university students was not always political, but was frequently directed at university policies or administration. The autonomy of the university was considered an inviolable right, and incursions by the authorities were resented.

The student organization, the Federation of University Students, was a powerful and often disrupting force and was the focal point for political activity. It organized opposition to Batista, as it had done earlier against Machado, and in both cases the dictators were forced to close the University of Havana in an effort to curb dissension. Two successive student federation presidents were killed in disorders aimed at the government in late 1956 and early 1957.

Most university students were from middle and upper class backgrounds, and a large percentage found employment with the government upon graduation. This gave them a personal, as well as a purely academic, interest in the course of the country's politics. Although they were generally in agreement on matters concerned with the running of the university, they were divided on national politics, usually along party lines representing every shade of political persuasion. The university proved fertile ground for the growth of communism and, although leftist students were in a minority, they constituted a vocal and militant group that gained new adherents with each unfavorable development in the functioning of the democratic process.

Under the Castro regime the universities have lost their autonomy and are administered through the PCC mechanism. Only three of the thirteen universities that existed before the Revolution continue in operation, but overall enrollment at the university level is higher (see ch. 9, Education). The Federation of University Students still exists, but it has changed its aims and organizational structure. Most of its energies are now devoted to furthering the country's educational programs, and has been subordinated to the Communist Youth Organization. Students as a group have ceased to be a significant force for applying pressures or influencing the direction of political developments.

Professional and Business Groups

A number of professional associations called *colegios*, in which membership was required of all practitioners, brought together doctors, lawyers, teachers, journalists, architects, and other groups with similar interests. Although there was a shortage of many of these skills in the outlying countryside, nationwide there were more men in the professions than the economy required. The government was the principal employer of teachers and lawyers, and they were directly dependent on political patronage. Journalists were usually closely involved in political life, as most newspapers were published by political leaders and depended largely upon government subsidy.

The pension funds of many of the professional associations were administered by the government. Because of the importance of government in patronage and in subsidizing these groups through special taxes that accrued to their pension or benefit funds, members of the professions had both a collective and an individual interest in maintaining satisfactory relations with the government.

The leadership of these groups generally divided along political party lines and, especially among the newspapermen, shifted rapidly with a change of government.

Relations between the business community and the government were conducted similarly to those with the professional associations. The collective interests of specific groups were represented directly to the government through a structure established by government statute or decree. These associations usually limited their activities to matters directly concerned with their interests but on occasion might take a public stand on other issues. The Association of Cane Planters, for example, was the first organization to announce its support of Batista after the 1952 coup; it was followed by similar statements from the banks and from the labor confederation.

Because so few leaders of the business community went into politics, rapport with politicians was essential to business success, and business interests were among the major sources of financial support. Most businessmen tended to affiliate with the more conservative parties and conducted their negotiations with the government through personal contacts with politicians on whom they could rely. In return, businesses were often pressed to provide for needy friends of politicians. By 1970 no businessmen remained.

The Church

The Catholic Church has been mostly nonpolitical since the country's independence. Its position as part of the governmental establishment during the colonial era led to the separation of church and state after independence (see ch. 11, Religion).

The Church failed to act as a cohesive factor in uniting society. It was less powerful in Cuba than in any other Latin American country and had no mass following. In was particularly weak in rural areas, and the Spanish-born clergy generally failed to reach a rapport with the people.

The Church remained out of politics after independence, and the government did not interfere with it. In the view of many of the country's intellectuals, the Church remained a conservative force, and only the most conservative political parties mentioned Christian principles in their official platforms, until women were given the vote. After this all parties began to make increasing use of religious appeals in slogans and posters in an effort to gain the feminine vote.

During the 1940s and 1950s the Church began to take a more active interest in the country's social problems. During this period a number of Catholic Action groups became active in many cities and held meetings where they combined religious functions with discussion of political problems.

The Church's opposition to communism caused a reaction by

Castro. During the first few years of his government, he undermined what influence remained to the Church (see ch. 11, Religion).

By 1965 the government apparently considered that the Church's strength had been curtailed and eased its pressures. There was a slight revival of religious interest and a modest increase in Church activities.

By early 1970 it was evident that the Church was adapting to the Castro regime. There were indications that new contacts with the country's lower social levels were creating a greater rapport with the people. The Church has avoided antagonizing the regime and has kept its activities at a low key. Nevertheless, it appeared unlikely that the Catholic Church would attain any position or influence in the nation's politics.

POLITICAL PARTIES

Although political parties, except for the Communists, were abolished by Castro in 1959, they had actually been doomed earlier by Batista. From the time of Batista's coup in 1952, they had ceased to operate as a significant force. At times they served as rallying points, but their activities were suppressed by Batista's security apparatus. In 1970 there was only one party in the country, the PCC, and this was not a political party in the accepted sense but, rather, a component of the government.

What impact political parties had on the country is confined to the years from 1934 to 1952. Before that they represented an era that became part of history, and after this period they ceased to exert any influence on the course of the country's progress. Political parties appeared and disappeared rapidly. They typically comprised the personal following of a strong leader and tended to be more or less rigidly identified with one point of view or set of interests. Parties rose and declined with the currency of the programs they championed, and success or failure was closely bound with the personal fortunes of the party leader.

A popular leader was prerequisite to party success, but some parties did survive the death or defection of individual leaders. Most parties were organized down to the ward level, and factions within parties struggled to secure their programs. A party had to present a program responsive to the groups from which it derived its major numerical and financial support, and a successful party leader required a high degree of diplomacy and finesse in order to balance the varied interests of his coalition.

Former Major Parties

Six major national parties had a more or less continuous existence from 1933 until the Revolution. The exception to the discontinuance was the Popular Socialist Party, which was the name of the

PCC at the time. There were two other parties created after 1952, but these never became very active.

The names of the parties had little relationship to their political philosophies or programs. They were, in effect, divided into two principal camps: the conservatives, comprising the Republican, Democratic, and Liberal parties, and the left-of-center liberals composed of the Auténticos, Ortodoxos, and Popular Socialists. Over the years they made among themselves a number of alliances and coalitions, one party at times joining with another of diametrically opposed ideologies, and the Communists periodically coming in and out of favor. There was no single party with sufficient strength to overcome the opposition without the added weight of another allied group.

The conservative parties were led by men prominent since the 1930s. There was little difference in their programs, and together they derived most of their support from the wealthy. In their campaign slogans all three conservative parties stressed democratic, constitutional, and honest government, supported private enterprise with some government regulation, and opposed communism as inimical to social order. The leaders were men of political skill and administrative ability who commanded strong financial backing, but the conservatives failed to develop the support of the masses.

Once in office, the Auténticos tried to maintain their position as the dominant party, and the government pursued essentially the same policies as its predecessors. Labor was favored, business was placated, the press subsidized, and professional groups encouraged with jobs and pensions. Both the Grau San Martín and Prío Socorrás governments enacted some needed legislation, particularly the setting up of institutions called for by the Constitution of 1940, but they were still judged harshly for their failure to effect promised reforms in the political system. Many of the measures in the 1940 Constitution were never fully implemented. Toward the end of Prío's term, animosity between him and Grau developed, and their enmity disillusioned party members and divided their loyalties. The resultant split contributed to easing the path for Batista's second coup (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

The Ortodoxo party was formed in 1946 by Eddy Chibas, a member of the Auténtico party since its beginning. The Ortodoxo program differed little from that of the Auténticos, claiming, in essence, to be orthodox Auténticos and adopting a broom as their electoral symbol. Chibas, a well-known anti-Communist, had wide personal popularity, stemming largely from a weekly radio broadcast. Disappointed with the performance of the Grau government, he organized his own faction as a reform group. Many classed Chibas as a professional agitator, but his efforts to arouse political conscience gained him rapid popular support and attracted a number of competent political leaders. In the 1948 campaign, with no coalition, he polled some 16 percent of the popular vote.

The Auténtico party was the leading government party from 1944 to 1952. Nationalist in outlook, it emphasized the need to regulate foreign businesses and enterprises. Its mildly leftist platform consistently stressed prolabor policies, social security, agrarian reform, government control of the economy in the interests of public welfare, a more equitable distribution of wealth, and the expansion of public education and health facilities.

The party's dependence on outside support contributed to factionalism. During their two terms in office (1944—52), the Auténticos governed in coalition with the conservative Republican party, which had little regard for the Auténtico platform. On assuming office, Grau did not have majority support in the legislature, and he accepted help from the Communists but at the price of overlooking their dominance in the labor movement. This antagonized labor leaders in his own party who had counted on the government to restore their control. Only after winning congressional majorities at the next election did Grau turn against the Communists and restore unity within his own party.

The distinctions among the conservatives were largely historical. The Liberals had been the party of Machado and never completely recovered from the taint of this association. The Democratic party had evolved from the pre-1933 Conservative party and, together with the Liberal party, had been part of the Batista coalition in the 1940 elections. Much weakened after two terms out of office, they supported the Auténtico candidate in 1952 and again entered the Batista coalition in 1954, although factions split off in opposition.

The Republican party was the most conservative of the three. It came into existence as a splinter group of the Democratic party during the 1944 campaign when some members accused Batista of perpetuating himself in office. They allied themselves with the Auténticos in the 1948 election, and their leader, Alonso Pujol, served as vice president under Prío Socorrás (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). This success was not followed up, however, and the party started to disintegrate after 1950.

The Auténticos and the Ortodoxos started fundamentally as protest parties seeking to reform the country's political system and inject a modicum of social consciousness into government. The Party of the Cuban Revolution (Auténtico) was organized in 1934 under the leadership of Ramón Grau San Martín, a prominent physician and professor at the University of Havana. In its first electoral contest in 1939, the Auténtico party, as it was called, won a strong position in the Constitutent Assembly, and its general program was reflected strongly in the social and economic provisions of the Constitution of 1940.

In 1951 Chibas committed suicide at the close of his weekly broadcast, an act attributed to his frustration over political developments, combined with his inability to obtain some promised proof substantiating a public accusation. His martyrdom, as it was viewed by many, drew substantial support to the party, and the Ortodoxo candidate for the presidency in 1952, Fernández Casas, had been conceded a good chance of winning.

Both Auténticos and Ortodoxos were thrown into confusion by the Batista coup, and many leaders went into exile to escape persecution. By 1954, when political parties were permitted a degree of activity in preparation for the elections held by Batista to legalize his position, they were split into a number of factions and had lost a majority of their members to other affiliations. Their respective candidates for president, Grau San Martín and Fernández Casas, withdrew from the contest before the election, and to all intents and purposes the Auténtico and Ortodoxo parties ceased to exist.

The Communist Party

A Communist party was first formed in Cuba in 1925 and has been an important force in Cuban politics since the early 1930s, when Communists became powerful in the labor movement and participated in the overthrow of Machado. The party survived a number of shifts and reversals of policy reflecting changing Soviet attitudes, but after 1934 it presented a fairly consistent program supporting honesty in government, extension of social services, and the economic welfare of urban and rural workers.

Communist fortunes varied in accordance with their relations with the government in power. The party remained a small illegal organization from 1926 to 1938. It became a legal entity in 1938 after an agreement with Batista. In the early 1940s the Batista government contained the first Communist cabinet minister in the hemisphere and, from 1939 to 1952, the Communist Party regularly elected representatives to Congress. Beginning in 1947, its position was substantially weakened by government opposition, and in 1953 it was again declared illegal. It remained banned until 1958, although well-known Communists continued to hold prominent positions in the Batista government and Cuban labor.

The advent of the Castro regime resulted in a new acceptance of the party and brought forward a number of Communists who had been prominent in the movement for years. At first Castro did not clearly show his leftist leanings, but by 1961 his admission of Marxist-Leninist ideology left no doubt about his adherence to the Communist cause. A sharp and bitter power struggle ensued between the old-line Communists and the new Castro adherents, who were more recent subscribers to Marxist ideology. Castro and his

243

group emerged victorious from this contest, and his brand of communism became the accepted philosophy. The party underwent a series of reorganizations and changes of name and finally, in 1965, adopted its designation of Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba—PCC). It promptly consolidated its position at the top of the power structure and began the process of becoming not only an integral, but also a predominant, element of the government (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 13, The Governmental System).

The avowed mission of the Communist Party, as outlined in its manifesto, is:

> to direct the country's mass organizations and to advance the Revolution in all its economic, political, and cultural phases, each of which forms a part of the daily and continuing activity of the party. It guides, serves as an example, and listens attentively to the masses, while at the same time directing, teaching, and orienting their actions. It is the loftiest conscience and supreme organization of the working class, and imparts meaning and direction to the dictates of the proletariat in furthering the programs of the Revolution.

By early 1970 the country's governmental structure had been so adapted that the superimposed framework of the PCC could, in effect, fulfill its avowed mission of directing national affairs. The powers accorded the PCC Central Committee along with the creation of a number of standing subcommittees, with supreme authority in various fields, had in practice usurped most of the basic authority of the regular government (see ch. 13, The Governmental System).

Some aspects of the parallel operation of the government and the party had not been enunciated or formally legislated. Although the powers of the government were clearly delineated in the Fundamental Law, the growth and assumption of powers by the party had been effected entirely by decree. Under ordinary circumstances this could open the way to possible conflict, but a clash was avoided by the nature of the power structure. As long as Castro remained prime minister as well as first secretary of the PCC, and the members of the Council of Ministers were also members of the PCC Central Committee, a conflict of interests would usually not arise, nor would rivalry develop between the two power bases.

The party is steadily supplanting the government in formal direction of the state, although the dictates of the party are still technically promulgated in the name of the government. The PCC formula for governing is straightforward and direct: party cells are incorporated into every phase of national life, and control is maintained through a disciplined hierarchy. An elaborate security apparatus maintains close surveillance over the population, and dissidence is dealt with swiftly and harshly. Authority filters upward through the various levels of the party structure, with each echelon passing on the decisions of the next lower level. After reaching the Central Committee, final authority devolves on Fidel Castro, who is the ultimate source of power and personally makes all major decisions. Other than changes dictated by subsequent unfavorable developments, there is no appeal to his decisions.

Until 1969 the number of party members had been kept to a minimum and constituted a political elite that did not exceed 70,000. A membership drive begun in 1969 aimed at doubling this total. This could present a facade of increased participation in national affairs, but even this larger number would still represent a small percentage of the population.

POLITICAL VALUES

The heroic image of Castro and his small band of rebels in the Sierra Maestra was successful in providing the focus and symbols for the revolutionary movement and the basis for wide acceptance of a new set of values. Although thousands of Cubans took an active part in the movements against Batista before his final flight, Castro had been the first, the most publicized, and the most individualistic. By 1958 he had emerged from the familiar pattern of a young hero to assume the symbolic role of messianic leader, vacant since the death of José Martí.

Castro's radical views found support in the country's revolutionary history. The dozens of heroes, most of them martyrs of 1865, 1898, and 1933, were symbols of the Cuban search for absolutes. Political leaders commonly identified themselves with this tradition of uncompromising total commitment, and the familiarity of Cuban intellectuals with Spanish, French, and Latin American political history enabled them to find a historical precedent and justification for the type of struggle they considered essential. This attitude justified the use of violence to gain and hold power. Power generally accrued not only to the individual who mustered the greatest force but to the one with the most personal appeal to the masses.

Castro has used his charisma to maximum advantage, not only to attain his position of preeminence but also to sway the people. The effectiveness with which he has been able to bring about what appears to be a fundamental and deep-rooted change in many of the accepted values of the population has been somewhat of a surprise to the outside world. Cubans had always had a strong and ingrained set of values that did not differ too radically from those of other Latin American republics. The long years of struggle for independence had made it perhaps more personal and intense than in many other countries. The common use of the affectionate term *Cubita Bella*, the love of the flag, and the emotional impact of the national anthem all reflected an intense and personal patriotism and genuine love of the country.

The national anthem itself, "La Bayamesa," is a stirring martial air generally on the pattern of the French "Marseillaise." It antedates the nation and even the flag and was written to exhort Cuban resistance against Spain during the rebel invasion of Narciso López in 1849. It survived the ensuing years of struggle and was officially adopted as the national hymn with the formation of the republic. Its creator, Pedro Figueredo, was executed by the Spanish authorities for insurgency. The anthem has given voice to the strong nationalism that has characterized the country's history, and the lines "to live in chains is to live in shame—do not fear a glorious death, for to die for one's country is to live" have inspired countless Cuban patriots ever since.

What change of political values has taken place among the people has been the result of Castro's unrelenting personal efforts to reeducate the population. He has taken every opportunity to urge, exhort, cajole, demand conformity to the new order. In this he was helped by imprisonment or emigration of the more conservative elements that would normally be resistant to change, but indications are that there was little resistance to the new standards. Not all has been change, however. In addition to the creation of new values, Castro has astutely retained many of the old, adopting them without reservation or adapting them, when necessary, to the new order. Thus, the flag, the coat of arms, and the national anthem remain the identical symbols that have been familiar to Cubans since the nineteenth century.

From the point of view of his Revolution, Castro's major achievement has been the imposition of a Communist system on a country that had had a strong democratic tradition. Cuba's democracy had not been without its faults, but the country had been conditioned by democratic forms and a degree of unity and cohesion resulting from the homogeneity of its people and a pronounced national consciousness. This was evidenced by the universal acceptance of democratic procedures, the respect for free speech, widespread campaigning, and the carefully guarded franchise.

Other generally accepted values included adherence to free-world standards and, for the most part, a distaste for communism, which had represented only a miniscule, if militant, minority of the society. These views, however, applied to the middle and upper strata of the society who were politically conscious; a large segment of the population, particularly in the lower economic brackets, was uninformed and held few political views except the desire to improve its lot.

Castro's program of reeducation was aimed primarily at the masses of workers and farmers who had benefited the least from the relatively prosperous economy. He found a fertile field and, in many cases, a political vacuum for the introduction of Marxist thinking. Using to full advantage the Communist tactics of subtle pressures and unending repetition, he succeeded in changing much of the nation's viewpoint and brought about the abandonment of old standards, with at least a superficial acceptance of Communist norms. However, Cubans' loyalty appears to be to Castro, not to the Communist party. His charisma is a strong underpin of Cuban communism.

Although prompt free elections had been promised at the start of the regime, they were repeatedly postponed, then ignored, and finally openly rejected as inconsistent with the operation of a "people's democracy." Submission to the will of the state became the watchword, and the individual was sublimated to the nation and later to the party. Castro's speeches emphasized the social nature of the new order and clearly acknowledged its adherence to Marxist-Leninist principles. New symbols were introduced to replace old values, and such terms as *imperialism*, *people*, *worker*, *proletariat*, and *party* became a conspicuous part of the language.

Castro has done his best to undermine and eradicate what had been the prevalent friendliness of Cubans toward the United States. Losing no opportunity to excoriate his northern neighbor, he has tried to make the United States the scapegoat for all of Cuba's past and present ills. For a time he attempted to build up a substitute amity with the Soviets who came to the country in large numbers as technicians and advisers. This effort was not successful, as the two nationalities did not find themselves mutually agreeable. Cubans found the Soviets dour and unresponsive, whereas these in turn considered the Cubans flighty and undisciplined. Little close contact or cordiality developed, and reports from Cuba indicate that relations are marked by a mutual aloof toleration. Castro has not, apparently, succeeded in building up any widespread animosity toward the United States, and indications are that Americans individually are still well thought of, particularly among those old enough to remember another era.

The country's political values cannot be entirely divorced from its social and economic values, and political events and outlook are to a large extent determined or influenced by the citizens' attitudes toward society. Many social and economic values were radically altered by the Revolution, and those that remained from the previous era were changed in focus and direction. The Castro Revolution has been described by its adherents as a true social revolution designed to change the structure of Cuban society and realize the full potential of the Cuban people. (see ch. 12, Social Values).

Most of the distinguishing marks of the old upper class were abolished. An attempt was made to make agricultural labor respectable and commendable, and even cabinet ministers took part in it. Salaries were reduced along with rents, profits were nationalized, and dividends confiscated. The possession of enough wealth for even a modest display of domestic luxury was frowned on. Fatigue uniforms and beards replaced the urbanity of preceding generations. Even enemies acknowledged its fiscal probity, although there was evidence that some persons still used official positions to their own advantage, and the appearance and growth of a new privileged class is being observed.

Most of the social and economic changes had repercussions in the political area, and the nation reflects the application of the new Revolutionary principles. After ten years of Revolutionary government, however, many were beginning to question the new values. The dream of an overnight solution to all the country's problems was not realized. Though a small number have improved their situation somewhat, the large majority are no better off than before, and their illusions may have been shattered. Living in an atmosphere of austerity and hard work, the mystique of the new order is fading. Castro's hold on the popular imagination has enabled him to keep the people patient, but signs of passive resistance have been noted and labor absenteeism is on the rise.

CHAPTER 15

FOREIGN RELATIONS

In early 1970 the foreign policy of the government was officially described by the Information Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Relations as conforming with that "of all socialist nations," in favoring "peaceful coexistence with all nations," both socialist and capitalist, but calling for "firm solidarity" with all peoples who fight against what the Cuban government calls "imperialist agression, colonialism, and neo-colonialism."

From its inception, however, the government has displayed a calculated disregard for the usual conventions and institutions of international diplomacy, although Castro from time to time has availed himself of them when they suited his purpose. On the premise that the Revolution had been an inevitable response of the people to an intolerable situation, the government asserted that it had created a new type of popular diplomacy. Describing itself as the agent of the popular will, the regime considered itself morally justified in all its courses and chose to define international problems in terms of the social and political situation existing in the countries with which it had dealings.

Governments favorable to Cuba were automatically described as representatives of the popular will, motivated by just and rational impulses, but governments it opposed were labeled tyrannical agents of imperialist economic monopolies. In the latter cases Castro assumed the right to address himself directly to its people, disregarding the legally constituted government and the normal restrictions of diplomatic usage.

After ten years of revolutionary government, Cuba was firmly commited to the Communist nations. It has tried to maintain a neutral position in the conflict between the Soviet Union and Communist China, but its dependence on technical and economic aid has brought it closer to the Soviet Union, which provides the major share of the country's needed assistance. The country has maintained a degree of independence that has on occasion been of some concern to its Soviet mentors.

Adherence to the Communist cause is reflected in relations with the rest of the world; Cuba maintains formal and friendly diplomatic relations with the world's Communist nations and is practically cut off from contact with the nations of the free world.

Adoption of communism has almost isolated Cuba from Latin America, and formal relations are maintained only with Mexico. Cuba's efforts to export its Revolution have alienated most of the nations of the Western Hemisphere, although by 1970 this program had been severely hampered because of its signal lack of success. Mexico's recognition was not the result of any sympathy with Cuba's Communist position but, rather, of its stated desire to avoid interfering in another country's internal affairs.

Cuba's relations with the United States in early 1970 remained antagonistic and aloof. The United States continued to disapprove of the Castro government. Castro remained as adamant as ever, placing conditions on a resumption of normal relations that he knew would be unacceptable to the United States.

BACKGROUND

Upon coming to power, Castro's initial policy statements expressed the intention of his government to honor all of Cuba's treaty obligations and to remain on good terms with all nations. His government was accordingly recognized by the United States and by all of Latin America within eight days of its accession. The grounds for future difficulties already existed, however. In particular, Castro and his supporters claimed that the United States had prolonged the Revolution by supporting Batista with arms and equipment. Great play was made in the press with pictures of bomb fragments marked with the symbol of the United States-Cuba mutual defense aid program.

More generally, Castro's followers saw themselves as part of a continual revolution. This revolution had begun in the nineteenth century but had been allegedly arrested by North American influence. In the twentieth century Marxist dogma appeared to provide an apparently rational exposé of the imperialist process and encouraged Latin American left-wing revolutionaries to set their own dissatisfactions in the context of dialectical materialism.

In the early weeks of the revolutionary government, there was no single official Cuban policy in foreign affairs. The attitude that gradually developed took into consideration both the facts of the country's economic and political interests and a series of ill-defined, emotionally charged assumptions with respect to future actions of the United States and the course of Latin American history as a whole. By the end of 1960 these assumptions, fostered by direct Communist influence, had been fully integrated with their current Marxist doctrines concerning the worldwide progress of the anti-imperialist revolution. Foreign policy was further hardened by the regime's need for financial aid, and the climax of the trend came in May 1961, when Castro labeled his government as socialist.

Cuba never held a strong bargaining position in international affairs. Its domination of world sugar production was offset by the general worldwide surplus of sugar and the inherent weakness of its dependence on this single crop. The strategic military and commercial significance of the island's location on the routes from Europe to Central America and the Pacific and from North to South America was diminished first by the restrictive trading policies of the Spanish Empire and later by the development of modern means of transportation.

The country is small and has no overseas territories or foreign investments. It has always been in the position of a client among the world's nations. After the establishment of the Republic in 1902, the proximity of the United States and the value of the American domestic sugar market made the United States its principal patron. This dependence was intensified by a series of trading and fiscal agreements establishing and strengthening economic ties that lasted until 1960; by the explicit assertion of American political authority under the Platt Amendment; and by the reliance placed on United States influence by every Cuban government since 1902 (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

The foreign policy of the Republic has accordingly been more a matter of organizing foreign influence for use in internal politics than in pursuing any distinctive line abroad. The exception has been in the area of international economic agreements, particularly those affecting sugar. Since coming to power, the Castro government has established widespread and complex economic and political ties with the Soviet Union, Communist China, and a number of other Communist countries, and its desire to assert its independence is reflected in its apparent unconcern for the disapproval of its sister Latin American states. It still remains a client among nations, however, dependent on others for sugar outlets and for consumer goods, but the past dependence of its relationships with the United States and its neighboring republics has been shifted to the nations of the Communist world.

POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

The Fundamental Law delegates to the president the power to appoint ambassadors, chiefs of diplomatic missions, and the minister of foreign relations. He is also empowered to negotiate treaties and is the nominal supreme commander of the armed forces. All of the president's functions, however, are subject to review and approval by the Council of Ministers, which is the sole agency authorized by law to declare war or a state of emergency. In practice, the president has little authority in foreign affairs. The Fundamental Law provides that the prime minister direct the general policy of the government and, in actuality, direction of foreign affairs, like the other governmental functions, is in the hands of Prime Minister Castro (see ch. 13, The Governmental System).

By 1970 all of the country's prerevolutionary diplomats had departed from government service. Before the Revolution most of the country's diplomats had been held in generally high esteem, and its ministers and ambassadors were usually leading figures who combined their political activities with outside scholarly pursuits. They were respected on the world scene, and a number of them played important roles in international organizations, both as representatives of their own country and as international officials. As the Castro government moved toward its totalitarian orientation, many veteran diplomats began quitting the diplomatic service or leaving the country. Most were well-educated upper-class professional men and women who became disillusioned with the trend to communism of a regime they had at first welcomed.

The new brand of Cuban diplomats consists mostly of young, usually untrained revolutionaries who are expected to compensate for their lack of experience by the ardor of their revolutionary enthusiasm. They are selected by the president or the prime minister, primarily for their conformance and zeal rather than for any suitability or capability, and few receive any training to prepare them for their duties. The result is an amateurish approach to diplomacy that disregards the usual conventions. Minister of Foreign Relations Raúl Roa has accented his government's unconcern for traditional procedures by labeling conventional diplomatic courtesy in international affairs as a hypocritical device to conceal the realities of politics.

Diplomatic representation is maintained in all Communist countries, a number of uncommited states, and some Western nations. Cuba has no diplomatic relations with the United States nor with most countries of Latin America. Because representation is confined largely to countries that are of like persuasion or at least tolerant of Cuba's communism, its unorthodox diplomacy is generally overlooked and accepted. On occasion, however, Cuban diplomats have been accused of abuse of the prerogatives of their position for purposes of propaganda and subversion and have received protests and warnings from their host country.

There have been numerous defections from the foreign service over the years, some as recent as late 1969. Residence abroad in a new environment has prompted and offered opportunities for sanctuary, and even some ambassadors have severed their ties with their homeland. Many were the result of dissatisfaction and disillusionment with conditions at home, but others grew out of discontent with the service itself.

One diplomatic defector who abandoned his post in Geneva, Switzerland in September 1969, reported widespread discontent over requirements for diplomats to collaborate with the intelligence service. Embassy personnel are expected to cooperate fully in performing any task placed on them by the intelligence representatives, which may include covert collection of information, underground subversive activities, or recruiting of agents. This use of foreign service representatives is expressly acknowledged by the Ministry of the Interior, which, in its Directorate of Intelligence, has a Legal Department for directing the intelligence activities of personnel officially posted to foreign countries (see ch. 24, Public Order and Internal Security).

CUBA AND THE WORLD

Although Cuba does not ignore the world-at-large, its interests with other states are concentrated primarily in two major areas: Latin America, of which it forms a part by geographic location, and the Communist world, of which it is a part by choice. These two areas are of most concern with respect to Cuba's foreign relations, the one to further its welfare and development within the Communist bloc, and the other to derive as much advantage as it can from an unfavorable situation. Needing economic assistance and foreign trade, it has made some efforts to improve its relations with some of the less unfriendly states, and in this regard it has had a few minor successes. The regime's militant attitude and acknowledged view of itself as the spearhead of Revolution, however, often tend to antagonize or alienate governments that might otherwise be somewhat more tolerant.

Castro's pronouncements, in consonance with his people-to-people theme, tend to simplify all world problems into clear issues between good and evil. All who express disapproval of Cuban policies are said to be in the wrong, united by selfish mercenary interests. This is particularly true of the United States, which is generally the target for his most vituperative denouncements. His government has gone out of its way to express sympathy for, or associate with, any cause that might be considered embarrassing or distasteful to the United States. In late 1968 Cuba went on record as approving the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia; earlier it had supported Patrice Lumumba in the Congo (Kinshasa), the Algerian revolt against France, and the admission of Communist China to the United Nations.

In the Western Hemisphere diplomatic relations were maintained only with Canada, Jamaica, and Mexico in early 1970. The establishing of relations with Jamaica had been an action on the part of that country's newly independent government and had resulted in a delay to Jamaica's admission to the Organization of American States (OAS) by opposition from a number of Latin American countries. Cuba's lack of contact with its neighbors reflected the isolation brought about by its Communist alignment and militant and aggressive policies. The Monroe Doctrine, long a keystone of hemisphere relations, had been successfully challenged for the first time, and Castro had intruded into the New World an alien philosophy that for the most part had been an anathema to the nations of the hemisphere.

In early 1970 Cuba had normal diplomatic representation with nearly all the free nations of Europe, including the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy, and Belgium. In the Far East relations were maintained at embassy level with Japan. Denmark and Liberia had exchanged consular representatives with Cuba. Of the world's unaligned countries, there were diplomatic ties with ten states of Europe, Africa, and Asia. These included India, the United Arab Republic (Egypt), Algeria, Indonesia, Ghana, Morocco, and the Vatican. Israel had raised its legation to an embassy in 1969, and Sweden had announced plans to take similar action.

Most of Cuba's diplomatic ties were with the Communist countries. In addition to the Soviet Union and Communist China, there were embassies in virtually all the satellites and allied states, totaling thirteen as of early 1970. These included North Vietnam, Mongolia, North Korea, in addition to the European Satellites, such as Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, and East Germany. Sizable staffs were exchanged with most of the allied states; the embassies of the Soviet Union and Communist China in Havana were particularly heavily manned. Cuba also maintained diplomatic relations, accompanied by much propaganda, with the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) in South Vietnam.

The government continued to maintain some worldwide commitments and retained membership in a number of non-Communist international organizations. It was still active in the United Nations and frequently took the floor to denounce actions or attitudes that it considered counter to its interests or to espouse causes that furthered the leftist line. Backed by other Communist members, Cuba was elected in June 1969 to the Administrative Council of the United Nations Development Programme, despite the opposition of the Latin American group, which had proposed Argentina for the vacancy.

Cuba was still a member of most of the specialized agencies of the United Nations and participated in the activities of such organizations as the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the Food and Agriculture Organi-

254

zation (FAO). The country asserted that it had no military pacts or alliances, although there were indications of at least informal defense agreements with the Soviet Union and possibly other allied Communist states. It acknowledged, however, that it had entered into a large number of cultural, technical, and trade agreements and, in the latest government report published in 1966, claimed to have negotiated over 300 treaties, accords, conventions, and modus vivendi, as compared to a total of 190 such instruments during the years of the Republic from 1902 to 1958.

Among some of the more recent pacts signed were: minor commercial and credit agreements with Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela in 1967; a scientific, cultural, and technical agreement with Algeria in 1968; a trade agreement with Communist China in 1968; and a new technical assistance agreement with the Soviet Union in 1969, covering irrigation, land drainage, and the peaceful use of atomic energy.

CUBAN AND LATIN AMERICA

Latin America has been the principal target of Castro's program of exporting the Revolution and, other than the United States, it is with Latin America that Cuba has its most strained relations. Castro's espousal of guerrilla warfare and violent revolt is viewed as a threat by the other republics and has made it virtually impossible for him to reach a détente with his neighbors.

The program has not been successful. Cuba's support of incipient revolts in Colombia, Panama, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela failed completely; a publicized peasant insurrection in northeast Brazil failed to materialize, and Ernesto (Ché) Guevara's Bolivian adventure cost him his life. Cuba has been known to have sent agents to help insurgents in other Latin American countries and trained guerrillas from a number of countries, but there have been no successes or even tangible results to show for these efforts.

The export program has isolated the country from its Latin neighbors and has even put Castro at odds with his Soviet protectors, who favor a nonviolent approach to Latin America, working through the traditional Communist parties.

Cuba's hemispheric isolation is economic, cultural, and geographic as well as diplomatic. There are few contacts with other hemisphere nations and virtually no cultural exchanges. Only Mexico, in deference to its own revolutionary history, maintains an air link, with two flights a week between Havana and Mexico City providing virtually the only contact with the Western Hemisphere. Trade is nonexistent, and the economic quarantine imposed by the United States has forced Cuba to seek other friends and trading partners.

Foremost in this new association is the Soviet Union, whose support has become essential in preventing the economy from collapsing. This dependence has become fully as pronounced as was the island's earlier dependence on the United States.

None of this, however, has lessened Castro's enthusiasm for world revolution, and in his speeches and pronouncements he continues to advocate the violent overthrow of nonsocialist governments. Despite his lack of success, Guevara has been fashioned into a symbol of militant insurgency and has been sanctified from a legendary hero of the Revolution into a martyr.

Pre-Castro Cuba had had a long history of friendly and cooperative relations with Latin American states. These nations began holding international conferences to discuss mutual problems as early as 1889, when the International Union of American Republics was founded. Cuba joined this organization promptly after gaining its independence and became an active participant in hemisphere affairs.

In 1948 the machinery of inter-American cooperation was entirely reconstructed at the Ninth International Conference of American States in Bogotá, Colombia, with the adoption of the charter of the Organization of American States (OAS). This provided for an OAS council as the organization's governing board, with representatives at the ambassadorial level accredited from each member nation and the Pan American Union serving as permanent secretariat. Most actions require a two-thirds majority vote, and no member state has veto power. Article 15 of the charter specifically denies the right of intervention by any state or group of states in the internal or external affairs of any other state. It prohibits not only the use of armed forces but also any other form of interference or threat against a country's economic and cultural elements as well as the political.

The OAS charter requires that all disputes that may arise between American states shall be submitted for peaceful arbitration before being referred to the United Nations Security Council. There were a number of violations of this and other principles of the charter in the years following its adoption. One was an abortive invasion of the Dominican Republic in which Castro participated, with the initial tacit approval of the Cuban government by Ramón Grau San Martín.

One of the principles adopted by the OAS was the support of "the essential freedoms and rights of the individual." To several of the governments concerned, this was a reiteration of the principle of nonintervention directed at the time against international communism. This issue became increasingly important to the United States during the 1960s. At OAS conferences in 1951 and 1954, resolutions were passed opposing the intervention of the Communist movement, but most of the member states regarded this danger as an internal matter to be dealt with individually and not a justification for collective action.

As the Marxist trend of the Castro Revolution became increasingly evident around 1960, the regime began to be viewed with alarm by most governments of the Western Hemisphere. In May 1960 Cuba resumed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and in September established a formal link with Communist China. On January 1, 1961, Peru broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba, and on January 3 similar action was taken by the United States. Castro's aggressive support of dissident groups in neighboring countries prompted additional diplomatic breaks, and by February 1962 all Latin American nations except Mexico had severed their formal ties with the revolutionary government. The month before, at the foreign ministers' conference at Punta del Este, Uruguay, Cuba had been excluded from participation in the OAS.

Castro's efforts to export his Revolution have been of concern to Latin America, especially the smaller and less stable nations, but the larger countries, such as Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, considered Castro's activities an irritation rather than an acute threat, particularly in view of Cuba's remoteness. Cuban-trained guerrillas and revolutionaries did cause, or contribute to, some minor disturbances in several countries; however, despite the sizable investment in funds, propaganda, subversion, and violence beyond the island's borders, no Latin American country followed Cuba's example. By 1970 popular opinion in most of Latin America had emerged as predominantly anti-Castro, and his followers and advocates in each country had in most cases become discredited.

Castro still considers his government the forerunner of hemisphere-wide revolution and, in a speech as late as July 1969, still pledged that he would back any "true Latin American uprising." The harsh reality of his failures, however, appears to have induced him to reassess the situation, and many of his more recent pronouncements have been significantly tempered. Cuba, according to press reports, would like to increase its trade with the West in order to ease its economic dependence on the Soviet Union, and the recent commercial agreements with several South American countries indicate some progress along these lines. In early 1970, however, these had not yet resulted in any concrete exchanges.

Relations with the rest of Latin America are not likely to improve significantly so long as the regime maintains its aggressive attitude. If Castro restrains his militancy and foregoes outside interference, however, there could be a change. Indicative of this possibility was the statement by the new government of Bolivia in September 1969 that it would be receptive to resuming diplomatic relations if Cuba would give assurances that it would avoid interference in Bolivian internal affairs.

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

United States-Cuban relations have remained in a state of immutable hostility since 1962. In early 1970 there were almost no signs of a possible resumption of the diplomatic ties that were broken off on January 3, 1961. The United States continued its pressures to enforce a quarantine of the island. This was not a blockade, but, rather, an economic boycott aimed at trade and travel restrictions. Although there were loopholes in the embargo and Cuba was conducting a sizable trade with the Communist world and a number of Western nations, it was blamed, nevertheless, by Castro as the cause of all of Cuba's economic problems.

Relations with the United States began to deteriorate in 1959 after the first Agrarian Reform Law was passed (see ch. 18, Agriculture). Agricultural property of United States citizens had been confiscated. A year later oil refineries owned by United States companies were seized, and most of the remaining properties of United States citizens and businesses were nationalized by the early 1960s.

One unusual aspect of United States-Cuban relations is the existence of the American base at Guantánamo, which has become symbolic of the strained confrontation between the two countries. This naval installation at one of the best harbors in the country was ceded by treaty to the United States in 1903 and has continued in use ever since. The United States has shown no readiness to consider relinquishing the base, and Castro has taken no aggressive action to secure its return other than some irritating harassment such as cutting off the water supply. This was successfully countered by the installation of desalinization equipment.

Castro has used Guantánamo as a recurrent propaganda theme. He asserts that this enclave constitutes a form of siege. The United States recognizes that the base has little military significance in today's world.

CUBA AND THE COMMUNIST NATIONS

Cuba is allied to the Communist world, with particularly close ties to the Soviet Union. Although signatory with several Communist nations to a variety of economic and cultural programs, there are no formal treaties of alliance as such. Doctrinally, Castro and his Revolution are committed to a local brand of Marxist-Leninist philosophy that espouses violent world revolution. In this it more closely approaches Chinese Communist doctrine that it does that of the Soviet Union.

By the second year of the revolutionary regime, diplomatic, cultural, and commercial relations had been established with all Communist countries. There was no close relationship, however, until after Castro's declaration in May 1961 of the socialist nature of his regime. Aid and technicians then began arriving in quantity from a number of Communist countries, and Russians, Chinese, and other Communist-bloc nationals became a common sight on the streets of Havana. Visits were exchanged between cultural and trade groups, and in the initial stages there was an atmosphere of unity, good will, and cooperation. Communist support in the early stages of the new regime did much to avert Cuba's economic collapse.

Cuba's relations with the Communist world since the beginning of the revolutionary regime have been far from placid, and there have been periods of controversy and disagreement that have at times threatened to create a serious breach in the association. This has involved the major partners, the Soviet Union and Communist China, as well as some of the lesser Communist states. Three major developments since 1960 have brought about significant changes in Cuba's attitude toward its new partners and are indicative of the independent line that has characterized the country's brand of communism. The first was the Cuban-Soviet disagreement sparked by the missile crisis of October 1962; the second, the altercation with China that started in January 1966; and the third, the more recent Cuban coolness toward its principal mentors and its attempts to develop Havana as a new center of communism independent of both Moscow and Peking.

The crisis of the missile confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1962 had a far-reaching and lasting effect on Cuba's outlook and evaluation of its Communist relationships. The Soviet capitulation demonstrated to the Cuban leaders that the Soviet Union was not willing to risk a global war in their behalf and revealed the need for an independent posture with less reliance on outside support. The development of Cuba's independent Marxist line resulted largely from this loss of faith in the reliability of the major Communist powers.

The start of Cuba's disaffection with Communist China crystallized in 1966, but by that time relations between the two countries had already been deteriorating for almost three years. Cuba had become increasingly disappointed with Communist China's attitude toward Vietnam and by its flagrant propaganda efforts to sway Cubans to its side in its conflict with the Soviet Union, which was already well advanced. The situation was further aggravated by China's decision to reduce its rice shipments below the quantities that Castro alleged had been agreed upon.

Just before the forthcoming Tricontinental Conference in Havana in January 1966, the Cuban leader denounced the Communist Chinese actions and accused Peking of blackmail, interference in Cuban affairs, and joining in the blockade against Cuba. He also decried Communist China's "preposterous personality cult" and asserted he was ready to limit the number of embassy personnel or even sever diplomatic relations.

The Tricontinental Conference was successfully dominated by Cuba and has been interpreted as a repudiation of the Soviet Union line of approach to revolutionary groups. The conference underscored Castro's approach: the stress on action before ideology, on bravery before discipline, and on priority aid to revolutionaries in other countries.

Following up his action at the Tricontinental Conference Castro organized the Latin American Solidarity Organization in 1967 as a regional organization to carry out in Latin America the resolutions of the Tricontinental Conference. At the first conference of this organization in Havana, Soviet Union Communist orthodoxy was criticized and Cuba was recognized as the leader of the Latin American revolutionary movement.

Although Sino-Cuban relations have improved somewhat since their low ebb of 1966, they have not reattained the hearty cordiality of the early years. As with the Soviet Union, they have undergone a series of wide fluctuations that have ranged from close friendliness to strident hostility. Notwithstanding its ties to the major Communist powers, Cuba continues to pursue its relatively independent course.

Although tempered somewhat in its militancy, it has not renounced its self-assumed leadership of the revolutionary struggle in Latin America. This was demonstrated in 1968 when, as a result of a number of acrimonious debates on basic doctrinal differences, Cuba attempted to rally the more militant factions of the Communist world to endorse the global strategy of violent revolution. These efforts did not get very far, but Cuban-Soviet relations reached their nadir. Castro did not attend the fiftieth anniversary of the Soviet October Revolution and snubbed the consultative meeting of Communist parties held that year in Budapest.

In spite of these differences and disputes, however, the Communist powers recognize the value of Cuba as a Marxist showplace in the Western Hemisphere, and Cuba, in turn, needs their aid and support. They are consequently mutually willing to tolerate a certain amount of friction or insubordination in the hopes of preserving a degree of unity within the Communist movement. In 1970 Cuba was on reasonably amicable terms with both the Soviet Union and Communist China but was leaning more toward Soviet thinking. Signs of a new restraint on the part of the Cuban leader gave indication of a possible eventual endorsement of the Soviet position that export of the Revolution should be done by example rather than arms. The Soviet Union was stepping up its aid and showing other marks of increasing favor.

CHAPTER 16

PUBLIC INFORMATION

The government dominated the public information effort in early 1970 as it had for nearly a decade. Aware early of the importance of the country's well-developed information media, the government had all aspects of it under control by 1962. It was thereafter used relentlessly, though not exclusively, to promote official policies and to involve the people in them. Older people who were adults at the time the revolutionary government came to power recognized that much of what the government put out was what Cubans call *panfleto*, or propaganda; there were some indications that young people took it more at face value.

No single government agency was responsible for overseeing the information output and, as a consequence, the media enjoyed reputations for varying degrees of nonconformity. In the late 1960s the film industry enjoyed the greatest latitude and radio and television the least. Nevertheless, all media were subject to limits that prevented them from seriously criticizing the government.

Radio and television played the largest role in public information although not necessarily the most significant. Requiring a lesser degree of literacy for understanding, they served as the media of appeal to the mass of the people, blanketing the entire country and in constant contact with remote areas. As a consequence, they catered to popular tastes and lower educational levels and were, for the most part, merely entertaining and propagandistic. Radio Havana Cuba broadcasts beamed at North and South America, Europe, and Africa served as the main propagator of the revolutionary faith abroad, although publication and film exchanges also contributed to this effort.

Only two newspapers were published in Havana in early 1970, *Granma* (Grandmother) and *Juventud Rebelde* (Rebel Youth), both official dailies of Communist party organizations; this represented a decline both in number and diversity from the early 1960s. Most news was supplied by the official government news agency, Latin Press Agency (Agencia Prensa Latina—APL), which had bureaus and subscribers in both foreign countries and provincial towns. The newspapers carried few editorials, and criticism was restricted to complaints about bureaucratic inefficiency. Locally distributed provincial dailies were also published, but they were relatively unimportant.

Periodical publications fared better than the newspapers, perhaps because of their diverse and often apolitical themes; but more than that, political subjects could be covered more thoughtfully than in the newspapers. Numerous periodicals were available in 1970, ranging from general interest to women's magazines and specialized trade publications, many of which were founded before the Revolution. Some were distributed throughout Latin America, where they enjoyed considerable popularity, among them *Bohemia* (Bohemian) and *Casa de las Américas* (House of the Americas). Publications from Communist nations were available on the newsstands, but current Western European and United States periodicals could be read only in the José Martí National Library, which subscribed to them.

A number of former domestic newspapers were incorporated in the National Publishing House that, with the increased facilities, instigated a significant expansion of book publishing. In the later 1960s book imports no longer played the crucial role they did before the Revolution. Despite a shortage of paper, a wide range of books were being published; most were textbooks, but United States, European, and unorthodox Communist authors, among others, also received attention. Cuba did not recognize the Universal Copyright Convention and was therefore not hindered by foreign copyright ownership.

Film making and dissemination have played a unique role. The first cultural decree of the Castro government established the Cuban Institute of Cinema Art and Industry (Instituto Cubano del Arte e Industria Cinematográfico—ICAIC). ICAIC film makers have documented nearly all of the major happenings, including the 1961 literacy campaign, Hurricane Flora in 1963, and the speeches made by Premier Castro. Mobile cinemas carried these films to remote areas and thus served to inform isolated peoples and involve them in the revolutionary process. Feature films were also being produced. Nevertheless, this aspect of the industry was not well developed in 1970, and most feature films were imported—primarily from Communist countries but from Western Europe and other areas as well.

PRESS AND PUBLISHING

Background

In the period from 1935 to 1958, the government maintained firm control over the nation's newspapers. It exercised its control more by bribery than by decree. Outright press censorship was imposed only in times of crisis, such as the period immediately before the overthrow of the second Batista regime in 1959.

The *botella* (bottle) system, the name applied to government sinecures and other forms of official bribery, provided a highly effective

263

means of curtailing criticism of the government. The majority of Cuban newspapers were dependent on the *botella* for their existence and were unwilling to risk losing their source of support. Of the fifty-eight newspapers in circulation in 1956, for example, not more than six or seven were able to meet costs from subscription fees and advertising revenue.

The Ministry of Education provided a four-year course of study at about six secondary-level schools of journalism. Advanced work was offered at the University of Havana. All practicing newsmen were required to belong to the Newspaperman's Association, which exercised disciplinary powers over the profession.

In 1956 the country ranked fourth among the nations of the Western Hemisphere in the ratio of newspaper circulation to total population. The ratio of newspaper circulation to the number of inhabitants was particularly high in Havana. In January 1959 about fifty daily newspapers were being published, of which fourteen came out of Havana.

With the success of the Revolution in 1959, the character of the press began to change, coming increasingly under government ownership, a process that was virtually complete by 1961. Many of the publications were continued under the earlier names, but many more ceased to exist altogether.

In January 1959 the government expropriated five newspapers that had been organs of Batista's regime, *Alerta* (Alert), *Mañana* (Tomorrow), *Tiempo en Cuba* (Time in Cuba), *Ataja* (Attack), and *Pueblo* (Town). The expropriations were done under the authority of the Law for the Recovery of Stolen Property on the grounds that their editors and publishers had been entirely subsidized by the Batista government. These were renamed *Revolución* (Revolution), *Noticias de Hoy* (News of Today), *La Calle* (The Street), *Combate* (Combat), and *Diario Libre* (Free Daily).

The government then set out to reduce the number of newspapers in the country. To retain the workers' support for this move, the government backed those candidates for union leadership who supported government policies. After a government victory in the Havana Province Journalist Guild elections in November 1959, the guild passed a resolution allowing postscript commentary called *coletillas* (little tails) to be appended to any article considered unfriendly to the government. An editorial, for example, might carry a postscript that said that "the contents of this article do not conform to the truth, nor to the most elemental journalistic ethics."

The government exercised more direct control by withholding advertising from certain newspapers and by encouraging independent advertisers to do likewise. In addition, Castro vigorously denounced on television the editors and news commentators who opposed his policies. *Revolución*, the official newspaper of the 26th of July Movement, began to get favored treatment in terms of news handouts and financial support (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Nevertheless, several newspapers published attacks on government policies, an action at odds with the government's conception of the role of the press in the Revolution. In 1966, in an interview with the United States journalist Lee Lockwood, subsequently published in Lockwood's book, *Castro's Cuba, Cuba's Fidel* (1967), Castro said:

> An enemy of socialism cannot write in our newspapers—but we don't deny it, and we don't go around proclaiming a hypothetical freedom of the press where it actually doesn't exist. . . . Furthermore, I admit that our press is deficient in this respect. . . . Criticism is a very useful and positive instrument, and I think that all of us must learn to make use of it. . . . Not that I would tell you we delude ourselves that under the present circumstances journalism can have any other function more important than that of contributing to the political and revolutionary goals of our country. We have . . . an objective to fulfill, and that objective essentially controls the activity of the journalists.

The year 1960 saw the demise of the independent press. Responsibility for press guidance remained diffuse, being maintained by numerous government organizations. Many newspapers, including *Información* and the English-language *Havana Post*, were forced to cease publishing for financial reasons; neither advertising revenues nor government subsidies were any longer available. *Diario Nacional* (National Daily) was purchased by the government. *El Mundo* (The World), owned by an Italian family that had supported Batista, was expropriated as foreign property.

Three newspapers, *Avance* (Advance), *Diario de la Marina* (Marine Daily) and *Prensa Libre* (Free Press), were taken over by their unions after continuously publishing material highly critical of the government. At the time of its closing, *Diario de la Marina* was the oldest newspaper in continuous circulation in Latin America. Founded in 1832, it was highly conservative and supported Spain against the nineteenth century revolutionists. As a modern newspaper it was conservative, Catholic, and friendly to the United States. It was noted for the breadth of its national and international coverage, as well as for factual reliability and technical excellence. *Prensa Libre* was a mass circulation daily with a conservative slant, appealing to the working lower classes; it was one of the few newspapers that had received no financial aid from the government.

A number of the defunct newspapers were incorporated into *Imprenta Nacional* (National Publishing House), established in March 1960, and their physical plants were turned to book publishing that, unlike the newspaper industry, was scheduled for a tremendous expansion. Many printers and other technical employees were absorbed into the *Imprenta Nacional*. Unemployed reporters, however, found it impossible to secure jobs unless they were in accord with official policies.

Government-Controlled Daily Press, 1961–70

The character of the press continued to change after government control had been established. Changes mirrored to some extent the political position of groups vying for government influence; for instance, when the 26th of July Movement started to lose influence so did its periodicals and official organs. When the movement's importance was revived, its heroes and political policies received extensive coverage in the press (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Newspapers continued to be merged or to disappear after 1960. The government was intent on expanding book publishing, which had been neglected before the Revolution, and it needed the physical plants of the newspapers to accomplish this. In addition, a shortage of newsprint developed that continued through 1969. The People's Republic of China (Communist China) came to be the main supplier, although some newsprint has been produced domestically from *bagasse* (cane residue—see Glossary). As early as 1960 the Ministry of Commerce ordered all newspapers to limit their daily editions to sixteen pages and Sunday editions to twenty-four.

By February 1961 only six newspapers were being published in Havana; five, *Revolución*, *El Mundo*, *La Calle*, *El Combate*, and *Prensa Libre*, were semiofficial newspapers. The sixth, *Noticias de Hoy*, which had been founded in 1938, closed by Batista in 1953, and reinaugurated in 1959, was the official organ of the Popular Socialist Party and later of the United Party of the Socialist Revolution. In November 1961, *La Calle*, *El Combate*, and *Prensa Libre* were merged, becoming *Diario de la Tarde* (Afternoon Daily), thus reducing the number of Havana dailies to four.

In 1965 *Revolución* and *Noticias de Hoy* were merged to become *Granma*, the official organ of the Communist Party of Cuba, which had been established as such in that year (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). This new publication was named after the boat that Castro and his followers used to reach Cuba in December of 1956. *Juventud Rebelde* replaced *Diario de la Tarde* in 1965 and became the organ of the Communist Youth Organization (Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas—UJC) (see ch. 6, Social Structure). *El Mundo* continued to be published until 1969.

In the mid-1960s *El Mundo* was considered a relatively autonomous newspaper, its editor claimed that, with a circulation of 158,000 in 1967, it earned enough to support itself. It covered world news more objectively than did *Granma*. Until 1967 it also featured a section of classified advertisements where information on second-hand merchandise and domestic help could be found. In

1968 *El Mundo* began to be used as part of the University of Havana's journalism course. Third-year students were made responsible for the newspaper's publication. For the most part these journalists-in-training would eventually go to work on the provincial newspapers. In 1969 *El Mundo* was merged with *Granma*, which planned to assume its instructive function.

Thus, in early 1970 only two daily newspapers were published in Havana (see table 4). There were some differences between the newspapers, but they were more of function than of opinion or approach to the Revolution.

Granma, a morning newspaper with a circulation of about 327,000 in 1967, was flamboyant in appearance, adorned with red and green stripes, and frequently featuring banner headlines. It did not usually run editorials but emphasized news that supported official goals. It usually had no more than eight to twelve pages a day except when it printed Castro's speeches; then it used as many pages as were necessary. Long political articles were a prominent feature of the newspaper's content, as were industrial production figures, pictures of exemplary workers, and articles concerning technical achievements. Public notices informed readers of available government services and encouraged them to participate in education or work programs or to adhere to other things such as good hygienic practices. The newspaper was sold for 5 Cuban centavos (equivalent to US$0.05) or even given away. Weekly editions of *Granma* were published in French, English, and Spanish and distributed abroad.

Juventud Rebelde, the organ of the UJC and Havana's sole evening newspaper, was similar in format and content to that of *Granma*. It did, however, place more emphasis on serving as a voice for people's complaints and on exposing bureaucratic inefficiencies. In 1969 it began circulating a Sunday morning newspaper, the only nationally circulated Sunday newspaper in the country. Daily circulation was an estimated 68,000 in 1967; a figure for the Sunday edition was not available, but it was undoubtedly considerably higher. The newspaper also published a weekly humor supplement called *DDT*.

In addition to the two nationally circulated Havana newspapers, each province had at least one daily, not published on Mondays. The circulation of these newspapers in 1967 ranged from 5,000 for *Ahora* (Now), published in Holguín, Oriente Province, to 23,000 for *Sierra Maestra*, published in Santiago de Cuba, also in Oriente Province. Provincial newspapers covered most local news. *Vanguardia*, published in Santa Clara, Las Villas Province, has served as a kind of pilot project for the upgrading of the provincial dailies. In 1969 the Union of Cuban Journalists (Unión de Periodistas Cubanos—UPEC) was sponsoring a program to train worker and

Table 4. *Daily Newspapers in Cuba, 1969*

Publication	Location	Circulation (1967)	Remarks
Granma	Havana	327,000	Morning, not published Sundays; organ of the Communist Party of Cuba; founded in 1965.
Juventud Rebelde	. . . do . . .	68,000	Evening; organ the Communist Youth Organization; founded in 1965.
El Mundo	. . . do . . .	158,000 (daily) 250,000 (Sundays)	Ceased publication in 1969; morning; founded in 1901.
Kwong Wah Pao	. . . do . . .	n.a.	Was being published in 1966 by the Chinese community; reflected views of Chinese Communist regime; status in 1969 not known.
Adelante	Camagüey	14,000	Morning; founded in 1959.
Ahora	Holguin	5,000	
Girón	Matanzas	8,000	Founded in 1962.
Vanguardia	Santa Clara	12,000	Founded in 1962.
Sierra Maestra	Santiago de Cuba	23,000	Founded in 1959.
Guerrillero	Pinar del Rio	n.a.	Founded in 1969; replaced *El Socialista* (founded in 1962), which had a circulation of about 6,000 in 1967.

n.a.—not available.

Source: Adapted from *The Europa Year Book, 1969*, II, London, 1969; *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1966*, Stanford, 1967; and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "Availability and Reliability of Statistics in Socialist Cuba," *Latin American Research Review*, IV, No. 1, Spring 1969, pp. 53-91.

citizen correspondents and other nonprofessionals so that news could be gathered precisely where and when events were taking place throughout the province. Moreover, the UPEC has encouraged contributions on such subjects as history, science, and art, as well as news stories. *Vanguardia* also published a weekly humor supplement called *Melaito*. Other provincial dailies also had humor supplements; *Cocuyo* of *Adelante* and *Van-Van* of *Girón*.

For foreign news the newspapers relied principally on the Cuban wire service, Agencia Prensa Latina (APL), established in 1959. In addition, the newspapers occasionally used material, sometimes extensively rewritten, from such agencies as the Associated Press (AP), United Press International (UPI), both of the United States, Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (Telegrafnoye Agentstvo Sovietskova Soyuza—TASS), Press Agency of France (Agence France Presse). APL claimed that it received no subsidies from the government. Its services cost 500 Cuban pesos a month (1 Cuban peso equals US$1—see Glossary) to provincial newspapers and 600 to 800 Cuban pesos to the Havana newspapers. It requested no fixed price from foreign subscribers and offered its services for small fees for political reasons. APL had little foreign currency and had to make special arrangements for the service to be viable. For example, the Soviet government paid the expenses of APL in Moscow; in return APL paid the salary of the TASS correspondent in Havana.

In 1966 APL had about twenty correspondents stationed throughout the world, with four offices in Latin America; operations elsewhere in Latin America had been severely curtailed after the Organization of American States' meeting in 1962 (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). The material that the APL put on the wire was propagandistic, and its foreign subscribers were, as a result, primarily socialist or Communist organs. In late 1968 another news agency began operating; observers felt that its role would be to serve the government but in less polemic language so that its appeal would be wider than that of APL. By early 1970, however, little had been heard from this new agency, and it was not known if it still existed.

In 1969 a number of foreign news agencies had correspondents in Havana, including AP, UPI, TASS, the Press Agency of France, the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, the Czechoslovak News Agency, New China News Agency (Communist China), the Novosti Press Agency (Soviet Union), and the Mexican News Agency. The Foreign Office officially complained about dispatches that displeased the government. United States correspondents stationed in Cuba were isolated from news sources and had to depend primarily on the official press and on Castro's speeches for their reports; there was little evidence, however, that other correspondents had this kind of trouble.

In September 1969 the government expelled the AP correspondent, objecting to a particular story he had written and to his general approach. Later, the government closed the offices of both AP and UPI and froze their bank accounts. The United States Department of State requested revocation of APL's license to operate in the United States until AP and UPI operations were restored in Cuba. The outcome of this incident had not been resolved by mid-1970.

The Periodical Press

Periodicals suffered the same fate as newspapers after 1959. By 1961 magazines that had been independent had either disappeared or been taken over by the government. The government also began publishing its new periodicals designed specifically to serve its purposes. Among these were *Verde Olivo* (Olive Green), the organ of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, and *INRA*, a glossy, general interest magazine published by the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria—INRA), which was later replaced by *Cuba*. The third important periodical of the early 1960s was *Bohemia*. Originally founded in 1908, it had established a reputation for being critical of all Cuban administrations. Among Spanish-language publications, its circulation before 1959 was one of the largest in the world.

In the late 1960s numerous periodicals were available covering a wide range of interests (see table 5). The number of periodicals published had not been reduced as drastically as the number of newspapers had been. Nevertheless, many periodicals ceased publication, including those that had previously had considerable success; even though the reason usually given was a shortage of paper, political circumstances were responsible for the demise of at least a few. New periodicals usually appeared to replace the former ones.

Among the periodicals that closed were a number covering economic subjects, some of which were the official organs of various groups. Those included were: *Comercio Exterior* (Foreign Commerce), published until 1966 by the Ministry of Foreign Trade; *Vanguardia Obrera*, closed in 1966, and *Trabajo* (Work), closed in 1968—both published by the Confederation of Cuban Workers—*Agro*, published until 1966 by the agricultural trade unions; and *Teoría y Práctica* (Theory and Practice), which was edited by the schools for revolutionary instruction until 1967. *Cuba Socialista* (Socialist Cuba), a very popular periodical according to a study done in 1964, ceased publication in 1967. It was asserted that the people had not had sufficient political education and that debate on the subjects covered in the monthly should be postponed. *Cuba Socialista* carried news of the Communist Party and published analyses of political, economic, and social conditions (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). It was replaced in 1967 by *Pensamiento Crítico*

Table 5. *Selected Periodical Publications in Cuba, 1969*

Publication	Sponsor	Circulation (1967)	Remarks
Weekly			
Bohemia	....	....	Founded 1908; illustrated.
Palante	....	116,000	Founded 1961; satirical.
Panorama Económico Latinoamericano	Prensa Latina	15,100	Founded 1960; Spanish, English, French editions.
Verde Olivo	Revolutionary Armed Forces	....	Illustrated.
Fortnightly			
Boletín Sumario	Chamber of Commerce	....	....
Gaceta de Cuba	UNEAC[1]	....	Literary.
Monthly			
ANAP[2]	....	....	For small farmers.
El Caimán Barbudo	....	....	Cultural.
Cine Cubano	ICAIC[3]	....	Founded 1961; film review.
Cuadernos de la Casa de las Américas	....	....	Founded 1967; politics.
Cuba	....	141,000	Founded 1962; picture magazine published in Spanish and Russian.
Ingeniería Civil	....	....	Founded 1949.
Mar y Pesca	National Institute of Fishing	....	....
Mujeres	Cuban Federation of Women	....	Women's magazine.

OCLAE[4]	Continental Organization of Latin American Students	....	....
Pensamiento Critico	Department of Philosophy, University of Havana	....	Founded 1967; political, economic, social analysis.
Romances	....	....	Founded 1935; women's magazine.
URSS[5]	Embassy of the Soviet Union	....	Founded 1961.
Boletín de Higiene y Epidemiologia	Ministry of Public Health	....	
Casa de las Américas	Casa de las Américas	10,000	Founded 1960.
Con la Guardia en Alto	Committee for the Defense of the Revolution	120,000	Founded 1961.
Cuba, Comercio Exterior	Chamber of Commerce	....	Published in several languages.
Tricontinental	Afro-Asian Latin American People's Solidarity Organization	....	Founded 1967.

Table 5. *Selected Periodical Publications in Cuba*—Continued

Publication	Sponsor	Circulation (1967)	Remarks
Universidad de la Habana	....	....	
Universidad de Oriente	....	....	
Quarterly			
Politica Internacional	Ministry of Foreign Relations	....	Founded 1962.
Revista de la Biblioteca Nacional "José Marti"	....	....	Founded 1909.
Unión	UNEAC[1]	....	
Other			
Cuba Azúcar	Ministry of Sugar Industry	....	Annual; published in Spanish, English, French.
Ediciones el Orientador Revolucionario	....	....	Irregular issue; founded 1966; official speeches and documents.
Revista de Agricultura	Academy of Sciences	....	Three times a year; founded 1967; technical.
Signos	National Council of Culture	....	Founded 1969; cultural.

El Placer de Leer	....	....	Magazine for beginning readers.
Islas	Central University	....	Twice yearly.
Militante Comunista	Revolutionary Orientation Commission	....	....
Nueva Revista Cubana	National Council of Culture	....	Literary.

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[1] Union de Escritores y Artistas Cubanos (Union of Cuban Artists).

[2] Asociacion Nacional de Agricultores Privades (National Association of Private Farmers).

[3] Instituto Cubano del Arte e Industria Cinematografico (Cuban Institute of Cinema Art and Industry).

[4] Organizacion Continental Latinamericana de Estudiantes (Continental Organization of Latin American Students).

[5] Union de Republicas Sovieticas Socialistas (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

(Critical Thinking), which was edited by the Department of Philosophy of the University of Havana.

General interest magazines were among the most popular in 1969. *Bohemia*, *Cuba*, and *Verde Olivo* contained a variety of news and politically oriented feature articles in addition to human interest material. *Verde Olivo*, in addition, carried information on military happenings. In 1968 the magazine was involved in the controversy over the House of the Americas (Casa de las Américas) literary prizes (see ch. 10, Artistic and Intellectual Expression). *Cuba* was published in the Russian language, as well as Spanish, and issues were presumably sent to the Soviet Union in addition to being sold to the resident Russian community. The monthly publication *URSS*, covering aspects of Soviet life, was first put out by the Embassy of the Soviet Union in 1961 and by 1969 had achieved considerable popularity. Other Soviet publications were available, but they were not as well received.

Mujeres (Women) and *Romances* (Romance) were both women's magazines. *Mujeres* was published by the Federation of Cuban Women and carried articles on women's place in the Revolution under such sections as "Women in Agriculture," as well as stories about fashion, cooking, and other traditional feminine pursuits (see ch. 6, Social Structure). In addition to being sold, *Mujeres* was distributed free by the federation. *Palante*, a satirical weekly founded in 1961, also enjoyed considerable success.

Casa de las Américas (House of the Americas), a bimonthly magazine published by an organization of the same name and edited by the poet Roberto Fernández Retamar, was considered one of the best publications in Latin America. Receiving contributions from Cuban and other Latin American writers alike, it featured articles on literature and the social sciences.

Numerous other periodicals, less widely circulated, were also published. Many were publications put out for smaller, specialized readerships. *Cuba, Comercio Exterior* (Cuba, Foreign Commerce), *Revista de Agricultura* (Agriculture Review), *Ingeniería Civil* (Civil Engineering), and *Boletín de Higiene y Epidemiología* (Bulletin of Hygiene and Epidemiology) were among them. Cultural publications included: *Signos* (Signs), founded in 1969 and edited by the National Council on Culture; *Cine Cubano* (Cuban Cinema), a film review; and *Gaceta de Cuba* (Gazette of Cuba), a literary magazine published by the National Union of Artists and Writers of Cuba (Union Nacional de Escritores y Artistas Cubanos—UNEAC), devoted largely to translations from foreign languages. The University of Havana published *Universidad de la Habana*, which contained valuable historical articles. Political organs of international groups were also published in Cuba; among them *Tricontinental*, put out by the Afro-Asian, Latin American People's Solidarity Organization, and *OCLAE* of the Continental Organization of Latin American Students (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Western magazines were not for sale as of 1968, but United States publications could be read in the National Library, which subscribed to them. Chinese and Soviet Union periodicals of a nonpolitical type could be found on the newsstands.

Book Publishing

Domestic book publishing with the exception of elementary and secondary school textbooks was insignificant before 1959. Most books sold in Cuba were imported, primarily from the United States. After 1959 many printing establishments, in addition to the physical plants of three important newspapers, came under the control of the National Publishing House. With these expanded facilities book publishing grew rapidly. In 1967 the Book Institute (Instituto del Libro) was established, which combined a number of nationalized smaller printers with the National Publishing House. Some independent publishers were still in existence in 1969 including Casa de las Américas and Editora Júvenil (Juvenile Publisher), founded in 1962, whose director was the writer Alejo Carpentier, (see ch. 10, Artistic and Intellectual Expression). Imported books, including Spanish translations of Soviet novels, were no longer of great interest; such books were not well publicized, and inexpensive domestically produced books were readily available. Cubans preferred Latin American writers.

The Book Institute was by far the largest publisher. In 1967 it published about 600 titles, most of them textbooks, totaling 8 million copies. This reportedly rose to 15 million copies in 1969; 18 million were planned for 1970. Books to be published were selected both by the institute itself and the UNEAC, which selected the Cuban authors to be published.

In the mid-1960s textbooks and teaching manuals accounted for about 70 percent of all books published; many prerevolutionary texts were being rewritten, sometimes to make them more current but in other cases to bring them in line with the official view toward the particular subjects. Some of the technical books used at the universities were translations of United States and Soviet texts. Textbooks were available free at any bookstore to all students.

The economic blockade has served to deter Cuba from purchasing newer texts and other educational materials from the United States and Latin America (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Partly in response to this situation, Castro renounced Cuban adherence to the Universal Copyright Convention, and the publishing houses proceeded to publish without regard to copyright. A number of United States texts found in the universities and other books, held under copyright by United States authors and publishers, are being freely published in Cuba.

Although most of the books published by the Book Institute were textbooks and other school-related materials, other fields of interest were not being ignored. An effort was made to publish as many titles as possible in relatively small editions. The interested public can borrow them from the libraries. Books considered of little general interest were printed in very small, higher priced editions of about 2,000 copies. Important general interest works, such as those in a series for workers and farmers being published in 1969, were reportedly printed in 50,000-to 60,000-copy issues and sold for very low prices. Even 10,000 copy printings of Franz Kafka and James Joyce have sold out.

In addition to numerous classic Communist works, the institute has published works of unorthodox Marxists. It has been reluctant, however, to publish purely propagandistic works including the quotations of Mao Tse Tung. There has been little theoretical writing by Cubans and few works published that have been seriously critical of the Revolution. Authors allegedly believe it politically unsafe to write such books.

United States writers who have been published include Ernest Hemingway, William Faulkner, Norman Mailer, Saul Bellow, F. Scott Fitzgerald, and Jack Kerouac. Plans were made in 1968 to publish the works of General Maxwell Taylor and Erich Fromm. The institute has given some attention to publishing Cuban works in English for export. These include anthologies of postrevolutionary Cuban poetry and short stories, selections from Ernesto (Che) Guevara and Fidel Castro, and scholarly works on such subjects as the revolutionary, José Martí, and science in Cuba. Exchange programs existed between libraries and university presses in the United States and Cuba, which provided part of the demand for these books.

The publishing houses have made few attempts to cater to popular tastes; few mysteries and science fiction tales were being published unless they were considered classics. Instead, television has been made the medium of appeal to this particular audience.

The Casa de las Américas, a combination library, museum, and publishing house, annually sponsored a literary contest for all of Latin America with prizes given in five categories (see ch. 10, Artistic and Intellectual Expression). It published the works of the winners and runners-up with a guaranteed edition of 15,000 copies for the winner. It also published the works of young and established authors who submitted acceptable work and sponsored "coffee-hours" during the evenings when an author would be available to those interested in speaking to him. In 1968 the Casa de las Américas was also involved in publishing a series of Latin American classics and another series covering the Latin American countries.

Much attention has been given to the publication of children's books. The National Council on Culture sponsored children's short story contests to develop writers' interest in producing for children. In 1966 Editora Juvenil planned to publish about fifty different titles. Among those already published was a book by José Martí called *The Golden Age* written while he was in exile in New York in 1889. A number of children's books have been written about life during the wars for independence and the Revolution.

Libraries

In early 1970 the two most important libraries were the José Martí National Library, with about 750,000 volumes in 1968, and the Casa de las Américas Library (about 40,000 volumes), both located in Havana. For convenience the two libraries shared a joint catalog. In addition to branch libraries of the national library located throughout the capital city, there were 57 other libraries in the rest of the island, 3 bookmobiles, and 330 school libraries (by 1966).

The special services that the national library offered included a children's room with 14,000 volumes and a lending library of framed art reproductions. The library subscribed to current United States publications, including the *New York Times*, *Time*, and *Life*.

Most of the new books acquired by the libraries since the Revolution have been published in Cuba. These were augmented by purchases, exchanges with foreign institutions, and confiscation of the private collections of people leaving for the United States.

FILMS

The film industry was not well developed before the Revolution. It consisted of five film companies that produced only newsreels, a number of importing companies that procured films from abroad, and theater owners. There were many theaters, and movies were well attended; in 1958 the average attendance was nine films per capita.

The Cuban Institute of Cinema Art and Industry (Instituto Cubano del Arte e Industria Ciematográfica—ICAIC) was established in 1959; in fact its creation constituted the first law passed by the government dealing with cultural matters. ICAIC soon became responsible for almost the entire range of film production, distribution, importation, and exhibition. Its main purpose was to document the Revolution and contribute to art. That ICAIC has succeeded in its first purpose is indicated by subjects covered in the documentaries, including the invasion at Playa Girón, Hurricane Flora, the 1961 literacy campaign, and speeches by Castro and Guevara. The young writers and directors connected with ICAIC have made cinema the most exciting and controversial of all media; newsreels and documentaries were taken seriously as sources of information, reportedly more so than television.

Although the number of theaters, appeared not to have increased substantially since 1959, one ICAIC official estimated that in 1969 every Cuban could see two different films a week. There were about 500 theaters in 1969 in addition to about 100 mobile cinemas, which could play in fields, schoolhouses, and community centers. Film attendance was a very popular form of entertainment because there were so few other diversions. Since there were an ample number of theaters, lines were not usually long, and the cost of 50 Cuban centavos (equivalent to US$0.50) was reasonable. Since all theaters were required to project ICAIC's newsreels, filmgoers constituted a captive audience for news presentations, which were often imaginative and skillfully done but usually frankly propagandistic.

The documentaries produced, however, have gained respect and renown. Like the newsreels, they often present collages of fact, fantasy, and blunt propaganda. One of the busiest ICAIC film makers was Santiago Alvarez who, between 1959 and 1969, had made nearly 450 newsreels and 20 documentaries. The documentary, *Hanoi: Tuesday December 13*, combined sensitive pictures of Asian life and narration of a poem about Indochina by José Martí with crude anti-United States propaganda.

Octavio Cortazar (who was age thirty-one in 1969) produced a number of films that describe the uniqueness of the early years of the Revolution. One was called *About a Person Whom Some Call St. Lazarus and Some St. Babalou.* It is about an annual pilgrimage that takes place in Oriente Province. The suffering pilgrims are descendants of slaves who crawl for one day to the Lazarus-Babalou shrine (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). Priests, psychiatrists, students, and the pilgrims are among those interviewed about the meaning of such a pilgrimage during a socialist revolution. The symbolic message comes at the end of the film when schoolchildren are shown exercising on a beach. Another of Cortazar's documentaries is called *For the First Time*. It shows the reactions of villagers, who have never before seen a film, to Charles Chaplin's *Modern Times*.

Cyclone showed the destruction that Hurricane Flora wreaked on the island. *Birth of a Forest*, produced by ICAIC in conjunction with the National Institute of Agrarian Reform, won first prize at the World Forestry Festival in 1966.

The Cuban Broadcasting Institute (Instituto Cubano de Radiodifusión—ICR), one of the few groups outside ICAIC that produced films, began in 1966 to film television programs, many of which were broadcast live, in order that television program exchanges could be arranged with other countries; arrangements for providing Spanish subtitles or dubbing dialogue for foreign films and programs were also made. In addition, the Animated Film Studios of the ICR produced cartoons primarily for television. For the most part these films are educational or informative even while they are entertaining. In 1969 cartoons produced included ones on the raising of citrus fruit, public announcements concerning gastroenteritis, and films designed for classes that were to be taught via television covering such subjects as modern mathematics, zoology, and geography. Children's cartoons were also produced by the ICR, usually with a revolutionary moral. ICAIC also had a department for the production of animated cartoons as well as one for short films dealing with agriculture, hygiene, and civic education designed for rural areas.

ICAIC also produced full-length feature films. Among the best were: *Memories of Underdevelopment*, which was about a bourgeois intellectual who has accepted but is confused by revolutionary values; and *Lucia*, about three women in different historical periods, 1895, 1932, and 1961 (see ch. 10, Artistic and Intellectual Expression). Others were *Death of a Bureaucrat* and *The American War*.

ICAIC was responsible for choosing the films to be imported. In the late 1960s about 40 percent came from Communist countries, primarily the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the People's Republic of China (Communist China); 30 percent came from Western Europe (primarily England, Spain, and France); and the remainder came from Japan, Mexico, and elsewhere. In addition, United States films that predated 1961 were constantly being reshown.

Controversy concerning the showing of foreign films has arisen on occasion. In 1964 the newspaper *Hoy* criticized the showing of films from non-Communist countries as being a corrupting influence; *Revolución* opposed this view. The issue flared but then died down, and the films continued to be shown. The Czech film *Love is Reaped in Summer* was allowed to run for three weeks but, since it showed girls in miniskirts at a time when the government was campaigning against them, it was withdrawn. A French film *Lola* was prevented from being shown because one of the characters was a United States sailor. *People of Moscow*, which had won a prize at the Leipzig festival, was withdrawn from the theaters when the Soviet Embassy objected to its being shown.

RADIO AND TELEVISION

In the decade from 1959 to 1969 there was considerable expansion in the facilities of radio and television. In 1959 there were still areas of the country that could not receive radio signals; radio and television facilities were heavily concentrated in Havana.

The government gained control of radio and television by 1961, using methods similar to those applied to the newspapers, including even the use of *coletillas* (little tails), or postscript commentaries. It realized early their importance in involving the entire country in building socialism, especially those people in remote areas whom the press and cinema, because of transportation problems, could not reach regularly. By 1969 the entire country could receive both radio and television signals, although television reception was poor in some areas, (particularly in Oriente Province), and sets were not well distributed. Radio and television, consequently, played a larger role than did the other media. Castro used them when he broadcast his lengthy speeches, often three or four hours long, in their entirety.

On the other hand, because together they constituted the medium of appeal to the mass of the people, radio and television programming tended to be both propagandistic and entertaining rather than educational and cultural.

Radio

In 1969 there were 121 AM (amplitude modulation) radio stations and 27 FM (frequency modulation) stations (see table 6). All were owned by the government and operated by the ICR, with the exception of one AM station (one kilowatt power) located at Guantánamo Bay and run by the United States Armed Forces Radio and Television Service. There were an estimated 1.3 million radio receivers in the country in 1968, or about one for every six people; they were not subject to license fees. Many were installed in public places such as parks, schools, and places of employment.

There were a number of national and provincial network systems. Four of the most important national networks were: Reloj Nacional (National Time), with fourteen stations; Radio Rebelde (Rebel Radio), with eleven stations; Radio Progreso (Progress Radio), with eight stations; and Radio Musical Nacional (National Music Radio), with six stations. In 1967 Radio Musical Nacional broadcast eighteen hours of classical music a day.

Radio Rebelde, which was the most powerful in the country, and Radio Progreso were directed to appeal to wider audiences but particularly to the peasant sector of the population. There was heavy emphasis on children's programs, melodrama, sports events, news, and popular music. In addition, radio versions of plays and novels and selected university lectures were occasionally broadcast. A radio sex education program was begun in 1967.

Most of the networks had their key stations in Havana and be-

Table 6. *Cuban AM Radio Stations, 1969*[1]

Station Name[2]	Location	Symbol[3]	Call Letters	Power (in kilowatts)	Wavelength (in meters)	Frequency (in kilocycles per second)
Radio Rebelde	Colón	R	CMGN	30	416.70	720
Do	Guantánamo	... do ...	CMDN	10	344.80	870
Do	Havana	......	CMW	150	508.50	590
Radio Liberación	... do ...	......	CMQ	50	468.80	640
Radio Progreso	... do ...	......	CMBC	50	434.80	690
Reloj Nacional	... do ...	R	CMCD	10	394.70	760
Radio Cadena Habana ...	... do ...	......	CMCH	10	379.70	790
Radio Cordón de la Habana	... do ...	......	CMCA	10	361.40	830
CMBL	... do ...	......	CMBL	15	348.80	860
Radio Musical Nacional ..	... do ...	......	CMBF	10	329.70	910
Do	... do ...	R	CMBM	10	322.60	930
Radio Rebelde	Holguín	... do ...	CMKV	150	500.00	600
Radio Liberación	... do ...	... do ...	CMKJ	10	411.00	730
Radio Rebelde	Pinar del Rio	... do ...	CMAN	30	545.50	550
Radio Progreso	... do ...	... do ...	CMAF	10	447.80	670
Radio Liberación	... do ...	... do ...	CMAQ	10	405.40	740
Radio Progreso	San Pedro de Cacocum	... do ...	......	50	447.80	670
Radio Rebelde	Santa Clara	... do ...	CMHI	10	526.30	570
Radio Liberación	... do ...	... do ...	CMHQ	50	476.20	630
Radio Progreso	... do ...	... do ...	CMHG	10	454.50	660

[1] Including stations of 10 kilowatts power and over; excluding the thirty-one shortwave stations of Radio Havana Cuba, all of which were located in Havana; all could operate on between 10 and 100 kilowatts power; the only differences between these stations were in the wavelengths and frequencies.

[2] All stations in Cuba were owned by the Cuban Broadcasting Institute with the exception of one at Guantanamo Bay owned by the United States navy.

[3] Relay station is indicated by R.

tween six and fourteen relay stations located in important provincial towns; an exception to this was CMKC, Cadena Provincial de Oriente (Provincial Network of Oriente), which had its key station in Santiago de Cuba and seven relay stations in other towns in the province. In addition to the networks, there were numerous so-called independent stations both in Havana and in the provinces, most of them ranging between 250 and 2,000 watts in power.

Television

In mid-1968 there were twenty television stations, nineteen of them owned and operated by the ICR (see table 7). All were relay stations except for two key stations located in Havana and a third owned and operated by the United States navy and located at Guantánamo Bay. Both key stations were part of the Televisión Nacional (National Television) network. In late 1968 a third station, Tele-Rebelde, was established in Havana, apparently independent of Televisión Nacional, but little information was available regarding it. Cubans were not limited to listening to domestic stations, as programs emanating from Miami could be received on Cuban television. Although Baracoa in Oriente Province was the last major area to be covered by domestic television (in 1966), it is probable that residents of the area were able to view programs from Miami before 1966 because of Baracoa's location on the north coast of the island (see ch. 2, Physical Environment).

There were an estimated 575,000 television receivers in 1968, or about one for every thirteen inhabitants; more than 8,000 were located in public places in addition to the 10,000 that were being used in schools. Vanguard workers were given first priority to buy available television sets (see ch. 6, Social Structure).

Experimentation with television in the schools was being carried out in 1969. More than seventy classes a week in a number of subjects were scheduled to be televised over channel 6 in Havana, reportedly to reach about 180,000 secondary school students. Classes on soils, fertilizer, and livestock breeding given at the People's Technological Institute were televised and were part of the curriculum at a number of schools, as well as being available to the general public. In addition, people who were put in charge of recently nationalized industries were reportedly going to receive training via a televised course.

One program called *Teatro ICR* (ICR Theater) was inaugurated in 1964; it broadcast such plays as Tennessee Williams's *Sweet Bird of Youth* and *A Streetcar Named Desire*. In 1969 a program was initiated called *Tuesday Panel*, a discussion series to be devoted to scientific, political, and cultural subjects. Performances of the National Symphony and visiting foreign artistic groups, such as the

Table 7. *Television Stations in Cuba, 1968*

Station Name[1]	Location	Channel[2]	Symbol	Power Video-Audio (in watts)[3]	Frequency Video-Audio (in kilocycles per second)
Instituto Cubano de Radiodifusión (Television Naciónal)	Havana	A4	. . . . . .	125000 62500	67250 71750
Do	. . . do . . .	A6	. . . . . .	125000 62500	83250 87750
Do	Baracoa	A7	R	30000 5000	175250 179750
Do	Camagüey	A4	. . . do . . .	56000 28000	67250 71750
Do	. . . do . . .	A6	. . . do . . .	56200 28000	83250 87750
Do	Ciego de Avila	A2	. . . do . . .	16000 8000	55250 59750
Do	. . . do . . .	A7	. . . do . . .	18500 9250	175250 179750
XMTR (at Loma de Cueva Arriba)	Guantánamo	A13	. . . do . . .	24000 4000	211250 215750
Owned by the United States Navy	Guantánamo Bay	A8	. . . . . .	200	181250 185750
Instituto Cubano de Radiodifusión	Holguín	A3	R	27500 13250	61250 65750
Do	. . . do . . .	A8	. . . do . . .	10000 5000	181250 185750
Do	Matanzas	A9	. . . do . . .	29300 14700	187250 191750

Table 7. Television Stations in Cuba, 1968— Continued

Station Name[1]	Location	Channel[2]	Symbol	Power Video-Audio (in watts)[3]	Frequency Video-Audio (in kilocycles per second)
Do	. . . do . . .	A11	. . . do . . .	42000	199250 7000
Do	. . . do . . .	A13	. . . do . . .	30000	211250 15000
Do	Pinar del Rio	A12	. . . do . . .	61000	205250 30500
Do	San Cristobal	A7	. . . do . . .	58000	175250 29000
Do	Santa Clara	A5	. . . do . . .	25400	77250 12700
Do	. . . do . . .	A8	. . . do . . .	24000 4000	181250 185750
Do	Santiago de Cuba	A2	. . . do . . .	14000	55250 7000
Do	. . . do . . .	A5	. . . do . . .	16000	77250 8000

[1] All stations except channel A13 at Guantánamo Bay are owned by the government agency.

[2] All stations except A4 and A6 have relay stations.

[3] Denotes the effective radiated power due to the station's antenna system (with the exception of the channel located at Guantánamo Bay).

Bolshoi Ballet, were carried on television. In addition, important sports events were broadcast.

Many programs were broadcast live, although the tendency was away from this. Entertainment programs featuring music and comedy took up a significant amount of broadcast time, as did melodramas and heavily propagandistic newscasts denouncing imperialists and counterrevolutionaries.

PROPAGANDA TO AND FROM CUBA

In the early 1960s foreign propagandists were vigorous and diverse. Information emanating from countries in both North and South America was aimed at changing or reviling the new government. The objective of Sino-Soviet propaganda was to draw the country closer to the Communist bloc. Various means used to accomplish these ends included: economic, technical, and military assistance; cultural and educational agreements; and the exchange of visits by political delegations, trade union officials, journalists, and students. In the late 1960s, however, there were indications that the amount of foreign propaganda directed toward Cuba, particularly from the Americas, had fallen off as its effectiveness remained unproven and the regime became firmly established.

Propaganda directed abroad, particularly over Radio Havana Cuba, continued to accelerate during the 1960s; programs were directed to more places, and more hours were dedicated to foreign programming. APL also served as a voice of Cuba abroad as did various cultural missions.

Radio Havana Cuba

In early 1960 the government announced its intention to establish an international radio service. A proposed transmission schedule was filed with authorities in Geneva, Switzerland, in the summer of 1960. Programs were to be broadcast in the language most commonly used in the area to which the program was beamed, and operations began in 1961.

In 1969 Radio Havana Cuba controlled thirty-one shortwave stations beaming programs to North, Central, and South America, Europe, and North Africa in eight languages: Spanish, English, French, Creole (to Haiti), Portuguese (to Brazil), Guaraní (to Paraguay), Quechua (to Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador), and Arabic. Some of the more powerful medium-wave stations also directed programs abroad, but Radio Havana's broadcasts were the most important.

Most of Radio Havana Cuba's broadcast time was spent beaming programs to Latin America; of approximately 200 hours directed abroad weekly in 1969, about 150 hours were broadcast to Latin

America, mostly in Spanish. After the Latin American People's Solidarity Organization was formed in Havana in 1966, many of the programs emphasized the need for revolution throughout Latin America and in the United States (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 15, Foreign Relations).

Broadcasts were tailored for the particular audiences receiving them. Relatively simple broadcasts were beamed to Haiti; guerrilla warfare manuals were read over the air, for example, in a mock education effort. More sophisticated programs were beamed to Venezuela and Chile. The Cuban government considered President Eduardo Frei of Chile and his Christian Democratic government the most significant threat to Castroism in the hemisphere because of their emphasis on significant change by orderly processes; the Cuban propaganda effort made vigorous attempts, therefore, to discredit them.

There were indications in 1969 that Radio Havana Cuba was toning down its propaganda broadcasts; some observers felt this exhibited Soviet influence over Cuban policy, as the Soviet Union preferred to emphasize peaceful changes in Latin America. Two special propaganda programs for Chile and Venezuela were discontinued, and the Peruvian military government, which had assumed power in 1968, was treated more respectfully. Propaganda was Radio Havana Cuba's reason for being, but cultural programs and popular Cuban music were also broadcast.

Propaganda from Abroad

In the early 1960s many Western Hemisphere radio stations regularly broadcast to Cuba. Programs emanated from the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Miami, New York, and unknown places in the Caribbean. Cuban exile groups in the United States were active in mobilizing support for the significant opposition that existed both in and outside Cuba. Their campaign was carried out by radio and in periodicals, pamphlets, and newsletters. Publications like *Bohemia Libre* (Free Bohemian), edited by the exiled editor of *Bohemia* were established.

The United States Information Agency carried out a program in Cuba until mid-1960, but worsening relations between the two countries forced its demise. Its program had involved a variety of activities that included the distribution of news items, radio scripts, operation of mobile film units, and maintenance of cultural institutes and reading rooms. Voice of America broadcasts to Latin America were increased after 1959 and continued to be heard in the late 1960s. In 1969 a United States-owned radio station and a television station were located at the naval base at Guantánamo Bay. Programs were in English and were directed at base personnel, although Cubans in the immediate area could receive their broadcasts.

Aside from broadcast propaganda and information, however, there were few ways of reaching the Cuban people that were not explicitly approved by the government. Cultural exchange programs were in effect between Cuba and a number of countries, including Communist China, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, North Korea, and the Soviet Union, but they were primarily informational. The Cuban press refrained from printing polemic arguments in favor of one socialist country or another, and the Chinese and Soviet periodicals available on the newsstands were strictly nonpolitical. Chinese and Soviet newspaper articles were occasionally reprinted but only when they served official purposes.

SECTION III. ECONOMIC

CHAPTER 17

CHARACTER AND STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY

In early 1970, despite vast economic changes, two principal characteristics of the economy remained the same as before the Revolution: the nation still relied heavily on agriculture and was highly dependent on foreign trade. These circumstances reflected the facts that the nation's resource structure was more suited to agriculture than to industry and that the major crops had generally been grown for export. A successful shift to nonexport crops would require gradual and substantial retraining and retooling within major economic sectors. Otherwise it could result in tremendous losses such as occurred between 1961 and 1963, when an ill-fated effort was made to deemphasize sugar production.

Sugar has long dominated both agriculture and the economy. In 1969 its production occupied roughly two-thirds of the total cropland, well over a quarter of the work force, large portions of the land and sea transport systems, and industrial plants valued as high as the equivalent of US$1 billion. Before 1969 sugar accounted for roughly 80 percent of total export value.

Economists regard this dependence on one primary export product as undesirable, especially since the international sugar market is weak and tightly hemmed in by quota and tariff restrictions. Small production shifts can quickly glut the market, producing substantial price fluctuations. Because of this situation, Cuba cannot profitably dispose of all of its sugar on the free market and must find countries willing to make exceptions to their regulations protecting domestic sugar producers. Before 1960 the United States did this by giving Cuba a major share of United States sugar imports under the quota system; between 1960 and 1970 the Soviet Union and other Communist countries provided similarly favorable treatment (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations).

This dependence on foreign markets is matched by a corresponding need for imports. The island has little natural fuel and devotes so much land to export crops that it cannot feed its own people. Besides meeting key food and fuel requirements, foreign countries also supply many consumer goods, machines, and raw materials.

In early 1970 this reliance on foreign trade was posing a particular problem. Partly because of long-time trade imbalances, the Soviet Union was showing some reluctance to expand exports to Cuba and appeared to be carefully rationing its shipments of crude petroleum. As a result, the Cuban government found itself committed to a large-scale sugar production campaign without the necessary fuel to maintain both the campaign and economic programs in other fields.

ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT

Transition to State Control

By early 1970 the government controlled nearly every facet of economic life. Most of the transformation from a relatively free economy came in the first postrevolutionary years, but campaigns to further tighten state control were still in progress in 1970.

The first important vehicle for change was the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria—INRA) established by the Agrarian Reform Law of 1959. At first primarily concerned with handling agricultural expropriations, INRA soon branched out into other fields. When massive industrial expropriations occurred in mid-1960, the seized properties were turned over to INRA's Department of Industrialization; a Commercial Department was set up within the organization at about the same time to handle commercial establishments taken over by the state. INRA also established "people's stores" in the countryside, operated rural schools and hospitals, built new housing and roads, and imported large quantities of products from abroad.

In 1961 INRA's power was reduced through the establishment of separate ministries of industry, foreign trade, and internal trade. The rearrangement concentrated great authority in the Ministry of Industry, but this was reduced by subsequent reorganizations. In 1964 the separate Ministry of the Sugar Industry was set up, and in 1965 the Cuban Tobacco Enterprise was established. In 1967 the Ministry of Industry was split into three units: the Ministry of Basic Industry, the Ministry of Light Industry, and the Ministry of Mining and Metallurgy.

In early 1970 these five organizations controlled all industry except for a minor group of enterprises supervised by the Book Institute (Instituto del Libro) (see ch. 16, Public Information). Domestic trade activities were conducted by the ministries of transport and domestic trade, and INRA continued to play a major role in agriculture. All foreign trade was in the hands of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and all banking operations were controlled by the state-run National Bank of Cuba (Banco Nacional de Cuba). Agriculture was the only sector where private ownership played a significant role. Crop prices were set by the government, however, and a large part of private agricultural output was obligated to the state in advance. Moreover, flows of technical assistance, equipment, fertilizer, and seed to independent farmers were regulated by the National Association of Private Farmers (Asociación Nacional de Agricultores Privados—ANAP), which functioned largely under government auspices (see ch. 18, Agriculture).

Consolidated Enterprises and State Farms

As of early 1970 productive activities within the public sector were lumped into consolidated enterprises or groups of farms. The consolidated enterprises brought under centralized management various local enterprises of a single type, such as drugstores, buslines, oil refineries, and sugar mills. The number of units in each varied from a few to more than a hundred. Each consolidated enterprise was headed by a director, who was assisted by a council, and was subdivided into departments.

Although this staff generally supervises its group of productive units directly, intermediate administrative organs have been set up in some cases where the units involved are numerous, very large, or widely scattered. In turn, most enterprises are directly responsible to a government ministry, but there are some exceptions. The Cuban Export Enterprise, for example, was given its own juridical personality so that the state could not be bound by its international contracts (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations). In fact, however, the Cuban Export Enterprise was geared to work very closely with the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

The apparatus for administering the government's farms paralleled the consolidated enterprise structure. Individual farms, most of them quite large, were combined into single administrative units called *agrupaciones*. Each of these was run by a director and an advisory council. In contrast to the consolidated enterprise, however, the *agrupación* was generally concerned with more than one type of agriculture, and its farms were often adjacent to one another rather than dispersed. In 1967 the largest *agrupación* contained roughly 800,000 acres and commanded a work force of about 21,000 persons.

Planning

General planning was instituted in 1962 in an effort to impose more discipline on the economy. Since then the agency officially in charge of planning has been the Central Planning Board (Junta Central de Planificación—JUCEPLAN). During the 1960s the most important part of this organization was a plenum consisting of the prime minister and all cabinet members directly concerned with economic affairs. JUCEPLAN also possessed an executive council in charge of day-to-day matters and a number of subordinate departments concerned with formulating and coordinating economic plans. Most planning followed a format wherein JUCEPLAN produced a general plan, which was then coordinated with proposals and projected needs submitted by the various ministries. The revised version was then used as the basis for calculating the budget, allotting resources, and negotiating commercial agreements with foreign countries.

Up to early 1970 most such plans proved overoptimistic. The first general plan, spanning the years 1962—65, was drastically revised in 1963 in an attempt to bring it more in line with reality, but the revised goals were still substantially above 1964—65 production levels. The second long-term plan, covering the period 1966—70, appears to have suffered from the same problem, since most projected gains for the 1966—69 period did not materialize.

Economic Policy

The dominant feature of economic policy in the 1960s was its emphasis on rapid change. In 1960, as the government came to operate substantial sectors of the economy and relations with the United States worsened, ways were sought to solve some of the economy's major problems and, simultaneously, end trade dependence on the United States. The result was a short-lived policy of import substitution and wholesale reorganization based on a series of major trade and credit agreements with the Communist world. The goal was to make the country self-sufficient in a few years, both in food crops and industrial production. These ambitious plans required that the transition be made very rapidly, so that imports could be cut down before the accompanying de-emphasis of traditional exports upset the balance of trade and exhausted the nation's stock of foreign exchange.

For the most part this policy was a failure. Only a few of the planned industrial plants were installed before monetary reserves ran out. Costs were not effectively calculated, and in some cases prices of raw materials plus transportation exceeded the cost of importing the finished products. On the farms, adjustment to new organizational methods and new crops was slow, little additional food was grown, and de-emphasis of sugar eventually caused yields of that all-important commodity to plummet.

With these paths toward progress blocked, the government reversed its field in 1963 and publicly proclaimed a new policy re-emphasizing sugar and traditional exports. The new export-oriented policy, like the former one, was accompanied by predictions of large increases in production. This optimism was shared by the later five-year plan of 1966—70, which forecast gradually rising sugar yields reaching 10 million tons in 1970, more than double the annual average of the 1962–65 period.

As of early 1970 yields had not kept up with the goals, and there were some signs that official policy might soon change again. An important five-year sugar agreement with the Soviet Union was due to expire at the end of the year. Perhaps in anticipation, attention to investment in other crops increased noticeably around the close of the 1960s. It was not yet clear what major policies would emerge in the 1970s, but difficulties in sugar production had already turned emphasis of more balanced agricultural production into an appealing alternative.

ECONOMIC GROWTH

Growth Indicators and Living Standards

The ordinary standards used to measure progress in Western economies are only marginally applicable to post revolutionary Cuba. Through early 1970 prices were set by the government rather than by a free market system, making the economic value of products hard to gauge. Furthermore, the real value of the Cuban peso could not be measured in terms of other currencies because it was not used as an international medium of exchange. In the small number of cases where the island's foreign trade required payment in cash rather than goods, some other country's currency was generally used. This procedure allowed the peso's official value to remain at the prerevolutionary level of one Cuban peso for US$1, despite substantial depreciation of the peso's true worth. This depreciation cannot be measured precisely, but one unofficial estimate has indicated the peso's domestic purchasing power was between US$0.33 and US$0.14 in 1968.

Recent data on the gross national product (GNP) have not been made available, but the government has published information about the "gross material product" from time to time. This term covers most items included in the gross national product, the major omissions being international transactions and services deemed nonproductive, such as defense and public administration. Official estimates of the gross material product for the 1961–66 period have been as follows: 1961, 2.7 billion Cuban pesos; 1962, 2.8 billion Cuban pesos; 1963, 3.2 billion Cuban pesos; 1964, 3.9 billion Cuban pesos; 1965, 3.8 billion Cuban pesos; and 1966, 3.7 billion Cuban pesos.

Because of the peso's decreased purchasing power, these figures appear to indicate that the economy was moving backward. This conclusion is in agreement with an International Monetary Fund estimate placing per capita gross national product the equivalent of US$320 in fiscal year 1966. By comparison, per capita gross national product consistently exceeded the equivalent of US$350 per annum in the 1950s, reaching as high as the equivalent of US$420 per annum toward the close of the decade. No post-1966 figures are available, but in early 1970 there was little evidence of significant overall forward progress. The economy might possibly have been holding its own in absolute terms, but it had not demonstrated an ability to keep up with a population growth of about 2 percent per year.

Many of the radical changes of the 1960s, however, could not be adequately measured in terms of monetary indicators. For example, by early 1970 the Castro government had come to provide a vast array of free public services. These included such things as education, medical and dental care, admission to sports events, funeral and burial services, and local telephone calls. In addition, many vital goods were assigned very low prices well within the reach of nearly all consumers (see ch. 8, Living Conditions).

Private income structure was also transformed. Not only were large private fortunes eliminated, but much of the basis for creating such fortunes was removed. One of the ways of doing this was equalization of wage scales. Wages still varied significantly for different jobs, but the variations were slight compared to those prevailing in prerevolutionary days (see ch. 20, Labor).

At the same time, however, many goods and services available before the Revolution could not be obtained at any price; others deemed luxury goods, such as irons and refrigerators, were extremely costly. Even relatively low-priced goods were often rationed, and both rationed and unrationed items were in short supply. Such shortages generated long queues, which quickly became a prominent feature of daily life.

Sector Growth Patterns

No precise data are available on growth within major economic sectors, such as agriculture, industry, construction, trade, transport, or communications. Even the growth or decline in foreign trade value is impossible to gauge because of the complexities of barter agreements, which form the basis for most postrevolutionary Cuban trade (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations). In general terms, however, it appears that the agricultural sector grew less than 5 percent during the 1960s. Industry, much of which is closely tied to agriculture, made little progress. The domestic trade sector was so drastically changed when placed under state control that no accurate growth estimate is possible. Serious retailing problems showed up in the 1960s, but this was caused at least as much by production failures as by shortcomings of domestic trade activities. Communications facilities may have improved, but the transport sector appeared to be encountering growing difficulties in early 1970. Construction of residences and urban facilities appeared to decline in the 1960s, but an intensive effort was being made in the latter part of the decade to construct productive units such as factories and powerplants at a fairly rapid rate.

With respect to specific activities, fishing and merchant shipping constituted the most spectacular examples of rapid growth in the 1960s. The total annual fish catch grew about 400 percent in the first postrevolutionary decade, and deadweight tonnage of the island's merchant ships and cargoes underwent a similar rise (see ch. 18, Agriculture; ch. 19, Industry). These developments could indicate important future growth in these areas; however, shipping and fishing were minor activities before the Revolution, and by early 1970 their rapid growth had not had much influence on the economy.

In terms of immediate gains the nickel industry was more important, even though it had grown less. Nickel extraction did not even double between 1958 and 1970, but world prices skyrocketed toward the end of the decade, and continued worldwide shortages promised to keep them fairly high in the 1970s. Preliminary estimates indicate nickel exports accounted for up to 30 percent of total export earnings in 1969 (see ch. 19, Industry; ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations).

As of early 1970 major projects connected with cattle raising had improved the prospects for expanding meat and dairy production. The most ambitious was a long-term breeding program designed to improve substantially the quality of domestic herds. Cuban officials have claimed it would yield concrete results around the end of the year, when substantial numbers of new cattle were scheduled to start giving milk.

Sugar received top priority in the late 1960s, but the industry could barely maintain old production levels. Compared with the 1960–64 period, sugar output for the 1965–69 period increased less than 5 percent. An intensive campaign to boost production in 1970 resulted in the largest sugar harvest in Cuban history, but only at the expense of other economic sectors.

Strengths and Weaknesses

By early 1970 a number of the more important forces behind the nation's new development patterns could be identified. On the one hand, the economy was suffering from maladministration, personnel problems, labor shortages, equipment breakdowns, and dependence on foreign commerce. On the other hand, the land's basic fertility, together with foreign assistance, had promoted recovery and was helping to maintain the country's new style of economic life.

The Revolution's leaders had almost no administrative or economic experience. Furthermore, virtually all experienced administrators and technicians left the country soon after the Revolution. Those who replaced them often were unable to cope with unfamiliar administrative procedures or complex mechanical equipment. Such problems were felt most severely in the first years after the Revolution, but recovery was slow, and shortages of well-qualified administrative and technical personnel still affected the economy in early 1970.

Labor shortages, especially in agriculture, appeared a couple of years after the Revolution and grew in severity throughout the ensuing decade. To supplement the ordinary working force, the government has resorted increasingly to "volunteer" labor by workers, government officials, students, women, and members of the armed forces (see ch. 20, Labor). Part of the cause of these shortages is movement to the cities in the face of official reemphasis of agricultural pursuits, which has created a need to get urban labor to the country at peak harvest times. Shortages of mechanical equipment have placed a higher premium on devices requiring more labor, like the oxcarts that are reportedly assuming a larger role in hauling sugarcane. Large-scale movement of workers to new jobs requiring time and patience to learn is also partly responsible, and low incentives and morale frequently cited by exile groups are certainly important factors. These labor shortages became very severe by early 1970 and showed no signs of easing in the immediate future.

Old United States-made machinery provides another major source of aggravation, primarily because there are few spare parts available for its upkeep. This matter was most serious when United States trade first stopped, at which time it helped to generate an aura of economic crisis. Since then its impact has diminished, but United States-manufactured equipment has continued to deteriorate faster than it can be replaced, again largely for lack of adequate replacement parts. As late as 1969 aged sugar mill equipment was being blamed for widespread production shortfalls. A large number of old United States-made trucks were reportedly still functioning but were in need of almost constant repair.

Perhaps the greatest counterpoise to these troubles has been the nation's phenomenal agricultural resources. Without much effective machinery, organization, or labor, the land could still produce enough to sustain its population, through either production for export or farming for domestic consumption. In all, roughly 60 percent of the total land surface is potentially arable, and much of it is very rich.

Considerable direct and indirect financial assistance by the Soviet Union has been necessary, however, to maintain the required level of imports. By early 1970 direct credits to Cuba, not including military assistance, totaled the equivalent of more than US$2.5 billion. These credits played an important part in sustaining the economy in the face of major shortfalls in domestic production.

Despite the potential of Cuban agriculture and the high level of Communist assistance during the 1960s, the Cuban economy was experiencing major difficulties by mid-1970. The Cuban prime minister, Fidel Castro, pointed out in a major speech on July 26, 1970, that serious declines and bottlenecks had occurred in most economic sectors in the wake of efforts to mobilize the nation's manpower and transportation for the 1969/70 sugar harvest. Castro also pointed to incompetent administration, poor coordination, lack of a skilled work force, and a high level of worker absenteeism as the causes of Cuba's economic problems.

As 1970 drew to a close, the Cuban government was involved in major efforts to increase worker productivity, end absenteeism, and restore order to sectors harmed by the diversion of resources to the 1969/70 sugar harvest. New laws on absenteeism and merits and demerits for workers were being formulated, changes in high-level personnel were occurring, and the population was being exhorted to work harder. The government, nevertheless, was deliberately avoiding a return to reliance on a market-price system of allocating scarce resources.

CHAPTER 18

AGRICULTURE

Agriculture is the mainspring of the economy, providing employment for a major part of the labor force and providing the basis for sugar milling, the largest single industry. Agricultural production in 1969, with sugar milling included, accounted for between 30 percent and 50 percent of the gross domestic product and about 90 percent of the value of exports.

In terms of influence on foreign trade, employment, and the overall level of economic activity, sugar cultivation was of paramount agricultural importance. Sugarcane was the largest crop, sugar milling had long been the country's largest industry, and the hauling of sugarcane and its byproducts was a prime concern of the nation's truck and rail transport facilities. Cattle raising, though definitely subordinate to sugarcane-growing, was second in importance in terms of production value. These two activities, both of which depended heavily on the availability of vast expanses of fertile land, occupied about three-quarters of the agriculturally productive territory.

The remainder of the agricultural land was devoted to a large variety of other crops and livestock. Tobacco was second to sugar in terms of export value, but brought in only a small fraction of the foreign exchange obtained by sugar. Coffee, grains (mostly corn and rice), and a large variety of tubers were among the more important of the many other crops grown.

The primary orientation toward cash crops for export—sugar and to a lesser extent tobacco—has left agriculture unable to fulfill domestic food requirements, making the country a net importer of basic foodstuffs. Vigorous official efforts to diversify the economy after 1959 did not succeed in altering this situation. In fact, the revolutionary government's intense initial campaign to make the country agriculturally self-sufficient and to deemphasize sugar production was one of the prime causes of a serious economic downturn in 1963, which then led to renewed emphasis on sugar.

A partial explanation for failure of this diversification effort lay in the rapid and virtually complete reorganization of agriculture that had begun in 1959. By 1969 this action, felt most strongly during the 1959—63 period, had resulted in the transfer of between 65 percent and 85 percent of all agricultural land to state farms.

The rest of the agricultural land, consisting of private holdings 67 hectares in size or smaller (1 hectare equals 2.471 acres), operated under the direction of state-controlled agencies. This speedy transformation brought with it serious organizational and administrative problems that were aggravated by severe shortages of managers, economists, and adequately trained technical personnel. A chronic shortage of agricultural labor also developed in 1961, and the government subsequently found it necessary to mobilize increasingly larger numbers of urban dwellers each year to help harvest the sugar crop and to perform other agricultural tasks.

Agricultural production was also adversely affected by the suspension of economic relations with the United States, which caused serious import shortages and machine-parts replacement problems that continue to create production bottlenecks (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations). Other contributing factors were natural disasters such as hurricanes and droughts which were reported to have been unusually frequent and severe in the years immediately following the Revolution. Agricultural production has shown signs of rejuvenation since the serious slump during the years 1962–63. Despite a marked rise in output, however, agricultural production in 1969 continued to remain below pre-1959 levels. As of mid-1969 Cuba was embarked on the key phase of a government plan to produce 10 million metric tons of milled sugar during the 1969/70 harvest year. Economists outside the country were generally skeptical of this goal, and believed that an estimate of between 6 and 8 million metric tons was more reasonable.

LAND USE AND TENURE PATTERNS

Over 60 percent of Cuba's 28.3 million acres is potentially arable, making land, as opposed to labor and capital, the most plentiful agricultural resource. As of 1965 approximately one-quarter of the total land surface (roughly 6.94 million acres) was in crops, with another quarter (roughly 7.04 million acres) being given over to pasture. Much of this pastureland, as well as significant portions of other types of land, is available for future expansion of crop production.

Available figures, which may not be wholly reliable, indicate a significant increase in cropland, mostly at the expense of pastureland, over the past twenty-five years (see table 8). It is estimated that the harvested areas increased by about 20 percent, or about 1 million acres, between 1945 and 1959. Cropland subsequently declined during the first years of the Castro regime, but the downward trend was later reversed; by 1965 there had been a substantial expansion of cropland, even in comparison with the years just preceding the Revolution. As was true from 1945 to 1955, many of

Table 8. Production of Major Crops in Cuba, 1951—69

Year	Milled Sugar[1]	Sugarcane[1]	Tobacco[2]	Coffee[2]	Rice[2]
1951	5.6	....	42.5	39.8	118.2
1952	7.0	....	36.0	32.7	127.4
1953	5.0	....	33.9	28.7	192.0
1954	4.7	....	43.7	35.7	181.0
1955	4.4	....	50.9	38.6	215.0
1956	4.6	....	48.2	46.5	250.0
1957	5.5	44.7	41.7	36.7	256.8
1958	5.6	45.7	50.6	43.7	225.9
1959	6.0	48.0	35.60	29.5	.....
1960	5.9	47.5	(45-52)	(42.0)	.....
1961	6.8	54.3	(47-58)	(37.0)	.....
1962	4.8	36.7	(45-53)	(58.0)	.....
1963	3.8	....	(48)	(28.5)	.....
1964	4.6	....	(59)	(36.0)	(160.0)
1965	6.1	....	(43)	(27.6)	(55-180)
1966	4.9	....	(35-51)	(27.0)	.....
1967	6.2	....	.....	(27.0)	(96)
1968	5.2	....	.....	....	.....
1969	4.7-4.8[3]	....	.....	....	.....

Note — Parentheses indicate figures of questionable validity.
[1] Million metric tons.
[2] 1,000 metric tons.
[3] Estimates.

the new croplands apparently came from areas previously given over to pasture. Some pastureland may also have been abandoned in the immediate postrevolutionary years, presumably before a reemphasis of cattle production after 1962.

Of the remaining 50 percent of the land, between 10 percent and 15 percent was covered with forests. The other 35 percent, considered agriculturally unproductive, included both wasteland and land put to nonagricultural use. The category thus comprised land occupied by urban areas, rural buildings, roads, and railways, in addition to mountains, swamps, and limited desert areas. Also within this 35 percent were thousands of potentially cultivable acres covered with marabú, a leguminous shrub that grows into dense thickets and is difficult to eradicate.

Crop Distribution

Sugarcane

Sugarcane is grown on about two-thirds of the cropland and dominates agricultural production in the four eastern provinces. The nineteenth-century nucleus of sugar production was in Las Villas, La Habana, and Pinar del Río provinces, where the best soils and most favorable rainfall conditions are found (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). With the influx of large amounts of foreign capital after independence, the slightly less favorable but more extensive lands to the east began to be planted in sugarcane, and these territories soon produced most of the crop. This eastward trend continued, until by 1965 the proportional contributions of each province to the year's total production were roughly as follows: Oriente, 32 percent; Camagüey, 24 percent; Las Villas, 23 percent; Matanzas, 11 percent; La Habana, 7 percent; and Pinar del Río, 3 percent (see fig. 2).

In general the sugar farms in the east are larger and the cultivation and milling facilities are more modern than those in the western provinces. Poorer average soils and rainfall conditions, however, tend to reduce yields per acre and to increase the danger of serious damage by drought.

Tobacco

Tobacco is produced on small farms located primarily in Pinar del Río and Las Villas provinces. In striking contrast to sugarcane, before the Revolution tobacco was limited to less than 0.5 percent of the total land area.

The best tobacco in Cuba is raised in the area known as Vuelta Abajo in Pinar del Río Province (see fig. 3). Semi-Vuelta, a much smaller tobacco area, runs along Vuelta Abajo's southeastern border. Another very small area known as Partido is found in the border region of Pinar del Río and La Habana provinces. Farther east, in Las Villas Province, there is a large tobacco-growing region called Remedios that produces almost as much tobacco as Vuelta Abajo; however, the average quality of Remedios leaf cannot compare with that from Pinar del Río. Several small regions in Oriente Province also produce limited amounts of tobacco, but this leaf is of low quality and is used only for domestic consumption.

Coffee

Like tobacco, coffee has traditionally been grown on numerous small farms occupying only a tiny fraction of the island's arable land. Cuba's National Economic Council estimated that coffee was grown on about 314,000 acres in 1967. There have been vigorous efforts to expand coffee lands since 1967, and many millions of trees were planted in the "Havana green belt," but as of 1969 no reliable figures were available covering the results of this expansion.

Rice

Rice, which is produced primarily in the low-lying coastal areas,


GULF OF MEXICO
PINAR DEL RIO
LA HABANA
MATANZAS
CAY SAL
LAS VILLAS
CAMAGUEY
ORIENTE
ANDROS ISLAND
GREAT EXUMA
LONG ISLAND
CROOKED ISLAND
ACKLINS ISLAND
GREAT INAGUA
BAHAMA ISLANDS (U.K.)
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
ISLE OF PINES
Gulf of Batabanó
JARDINES DE LA REINA
Gulf of Guacanayabo
CARIBBEAN
SEA
LESSER CAYMANS (U.K.)
U.S. NAVAL BASE
207
401
657
1,368
1,478
1,971
84
82
80
78
76
74
22
20
SUGARCANE AREA, 1962
Figures below circles represent 1965 cane sugar production in thousands of metric tons. Total: 6,082,000 metric tons.
Province boundary
0 20 40 60 80 Miles

Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, *A Survey of Agriculture in Cuba* (ERS-Foreign 268), Washington, 1969.

Figure 2. Cuban Sugarcane Area and Production of Sugar by Provinces.


84
82
80
78
76
74
22
20
GULF OF MEXICO
VUELTA ABAJO
PARTIDO
SEMI-VUELTA
REMEDIOS
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
ORIENTE
CARIBBEAN
SEA
Tobacco Regions
Coffee
Major Rice Areas
Note: Excluding sugar.
0 20 40 60 80 Miles

Figure 3. Location of Major Cuban Commercial Crop Production Areas

accounted for about 380,000 acres of cropland in 1957. Oriente Province normally turns out over 30 percent of the crop; Camagüey Province's Production is usually second in size, with the remainder being distributed between the four other provinces. Rice production has declined since the Revolution, but there have been recent efforts to correct this.

Other Croplands

The remaining cultivated land is taken up by a variety of crops, the more significant of which are corn, beans, sweet potatoes, yams, malanga, cassava, cocoa, pineapples, bananas, plantains, citrus fruit, and assorted vegetables. Many of these were grown as subsistence crops and are widely distributed throughout the country.

A large portion of the corn and bean crops, which serve as mainstays of the average diet along with rice and sweet potatoes, are grown near Holguín in Oriente Province. Because of its corn crop, the area has become popularly known as the granary of Cuba. Oriente Province, especially the northeastern area, is also a major supplier of native tubers and other *viandas*, which include plantains and pumpkins. The best areas for growing bananas are also found in Oriente Province; pineapple cultivation, on the other hand, has tended to concentrate itself in La Habana and Camagüey provinces; both bananas and pineapples, however, are cultivated in many other places throughout the island. Citrus fruit cultivation is widely scattered too, but the Isle of Pines, which is administratively part of La Habana Province, is the major center of grapefruit production. Major government concentration on the island's citrus production since 1967 is helping to maintain this area's dominance.

Pastureland

The vast majority of the country's abundant pasturelands are devoted to cattle raising; the largest concentration of grazing lands is found in Camagüey and Oriente provinces, but a large number of cattle are also raised in other areas. Before 1959 considerable quantities of land were used alternately for sugar growing and pasture, but it is hard to say to what degree this practice has continued since the Revolution.

Forests

Forests cover between 10 percent and 15 percent of the total land area. The largest forest regions, including the only virgin stands of timber, are found in the mountains of southeastern Oriente Province. Fair-sized forests are located in the highlands of Pinar del Río Province and the small Sierra del Escambray of southern Las Villas.

Large swampy areas occupied by mangrove trees are found on the Zapata Peninsula in southwestern Las Villas Province and in eastern Camagüey, as well as in other coastal areas.

Landholding Patterns

Before 1959 most agricultural land was in large private estates dedicated primarily to sugar cultivation, cattle raising, or a combination of the two. As of 1945, 36.1 percent of the farmland or 8.05 million acres was in holdings of 2,400 acres or more; at the other end of the spectrum, 69.6 percent of the farms, between 1.0 acres and 61.5 acres in size, occupied 11.2 percent of the farmland, or about 2.52 million acres.

In view of the shift to state control, it appears significant that farmowners made up only about 30 percent of farm operators in the immediate prerevolutionary period. The remainder of the farms, covering almost all the cultivable area, were run by people with no direct ownership interest: managers, 6 percent; renters, 29 percent; subrenters, 4 percent; sharecroppers, 21 percent; squatters, 9 percent; and other types of operators, 1 percent. Most of the largest farming areas were controlled by sugar enterprises, some of which were foreign-owned (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations). Such was the land concentration in the sugar sector that as of 1959 the twenty-eight largest holders controlled approximately 5 million acres or about 17.9 percent of the country's total land area.

At the time of the Revolution about 10 percent of the sugarcane lands was farmed directly by the sugar mills that owned them. The remaining 90 percent was farmed by *colonos*, smaller operators who generally rented their land from the mill and who depended upon the mill to grind their cane once it had been harvested. Though their holdings were small in comparison with the large milling enterprises, many *colonos* ran sizable operations, hiring their own labor and concerning themselves with essentially managerial functions.

Most cattle lands were also concentrated in a few hands, but the overall tenure pattern was distinct from that of sugar-growing land. There were three basic types of cattle farms before 1959: breeding farms, mostly small with limited facilities, where calves were born and raised until they were about a year old; intermediate ranches, generally larger, which bought yearlings from the breeders and sold them when they were between 2½ and 3 years old; and finally, ranches with high-quality pasture, usually of large size, where the cattle were fattened for market and sold when they were between 3 and 4 years old. According to a 1952 estimate by the Ministry of Agriculture, 38,035 farms—mostly breeding farms—possessed less than nine head of cattle apiece, whereas 1,335 farms each had 1,000 head or more. With respect to ranch size, as of 1959 the forty largest cattle firms controlled some 2.3 million acres of land, or about 9.8 percent of the island's total land area.

In comparison with the large sugarcane and cattle farms, individual tobacco, rice, coffee, and other types of farms were usually quite small. Tobacco and coffee estates rarely exceeded 1,000 acres; the average coffee farm contained about 20 acres and the average tobacco farm contained about 7.5 acres. Most coffee farms were operated by renters or sharecroppers; these forms of tenure were found on tobacco farms also, but family owner-operators tended to predominate in tobacco areas.

After 1959 there were various shifts in land-tenure patterns, characterized chiefly by the transfer of more than 70 percent of agricultural land to state control. Most of the largest units, however, were simply changed into state farms and were not broken up into smaller units.

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

Factors of Production

The agricultural sector's most plentiful factor of production is land; the two most important agricultural pursuits, sugar cultivation and cattle raising, rely very heavily upon land resources and are carried out in such a way as to maximize the use of land as contrasted to that of labor and capital. Most other crops tend to follow this pattern, though not to the same degree. The only major exception is tobacco cultivation, which uses relatively little land or capital and depends on large inputs of highly skilled labor.

The second most heavily applied resource has traditionally been labor, most of which is relatively unskilled. This fairly extensive application of labor, along with the country's small population in relation to cultivable land, has meant that a large proportion of the labor force has always been engaged in agricultural pursuits. Therefore, a sharp decline in the productivity of agricultural labor after the Revolution led to severe labor shortages during the sugar harvest season; the shortages began to be noticed about 1961 and continued through 1969 (see ch. 20, Labor). There was no indication of any change in this situation as of mid-1969, and at that time it appeared almost certain that labor shortages attributable to low productivity would continue to be the major factor limiting agricultural production in the 1970s.

In comparison with land and labor, capital has been the least-used resource in Cuban agriculture. Large capital investments were made in agriculture between independence and the 1959 Revolution, but a large share of these went into bringing new crop- or pastureland to a low level of productivity requiring extensive hand labor, so that the land and labor inputs retained their relative dominance. Before 1959 only limited areas were fertilized or irrigated in any way, and modern farm machinery was little used except in rice-growing and in some aspects of sugar cultivation. There has been greater emphasis on capital investment aimed at labor substitution and land improvement since the Revolution, but as of mid-1969 this had not caused any radical change in the usual Cuban cultivation methods.

Crops

Sugar Production

Sugar became the island's major agricultural product in the latter part of the eighteenth century and has maintained this position ever since. After independence in 1902 the existence of improved production methods, the realization of domestic tranquility, and the availability of extensive foreign capital caused production to quadruple in less than three decades. By the 1920s sugar had become so important economically that subsequent saturation of the world sugar market, combined with the effects of the world depression, spelled decline and stagnation for the entire economy. The predepression production level was not reached again until the 1950s, by which time international trade regulations and domestic restrictions designed to prevent overproduction had drastically reduced the opportunities for further expansion (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations).

Sugarcane has traditionally been grown in a manner designed to take advantage of the cheap and abundant supply of cultivable land. As a result, there has been little mechanization, fertilization, or irrigation. Moreover, most of the time sugarcane root structures remaining in the ground after the annual harvest have been relied on to produce the next year's crop, resulting in gradually diminishing yields. Fresh plantings, which are made by placing pieces of sugarcane stalk in furrows, are generally carried out only about once every seven years.

These methods produce very low yields per acre. In 1958 and 1959, for example, the average yield per acre was about 40 metric tons of sugarcane, as compared with more than 160 metric tons in countries where intensive cultivation was the rule. In addition, before the Revolution overall sugarcane production was reduced to meet the requirements of the International Sugar Agreement, and a considerable portion of the crop was left unharvested in the fields. During the years 1953 through 1958 this portion averaged at least 28 percent of the total sugarcane area. Despite this, conditions for sugar-growing are so favorable that the country was the world's leading cane sugar producer for most of the years between independence and the 1959 Revolution, turning out an average of 13 percent of the world crop in the 1950-59 period.

After 1959 restrictions on production were eliminated and sugar production increased significantly, rising from 5.8 million metric tons of milled sugar in 1958 to 6.8 million metric tons in 1961. This was partly because the cultivation of sugarcane as a perennial crop prevented mounting organizational problems from becoming apparent immediately. Drought and accumulated neglect of the cane fields, however, caused production to fall sharply in 1962 and 1963. Official re-emphasis of sugar production at this point permitted gradual recovery after 1963, despite destruction of significant parts of the crop by hurricanes in 1964 and 1966. Sugar production during the years 1965 through 1969 averaged about as much as it did in the period 1955 through 1959.

No annual increases occurred in the 1967-69 period, however, and production figures have shown little relation to the progressively higher production goals set by the government in 1965 for the years 1966 through 1970. Because of the major effort being made to approach the official goal of 10 million metric tons in 1970, however, some significant increase in the sugar harvest for that year can be expected.

Tobacco Production

Tobacco is native to Cuba and ranks with coffee, rice, and corn in terms of production value. The unusually high quality of most leaf grown in the country, however, requires more sophisticated cultivation techniques and higher labor skills than any other crop. The delicacy of this cultivation process and the almost irreplaceable skills of the labor force help explain why the government has chosen not to run the risk of disrupting the tobacco farms through direct state intervention. As late as 1966 only 10 percent of the crop was being grown on state farms, with the remainder being grown by some 40,000 small farmers in the private sector.

Despite the suitability of the environment, tobacco production has expanded very slowly, and its 1969 volume was no more than double that of the immediate postindependence years (see table 9).

Table 9. Cuban Land Use for Selected Years, 1945, 1955, and 1965
(in percent)

Type of Use	1945	1955	1965
Cropland	17.2	20.2	24.6
Pasture	34.0	31.1	24.9
Other	48.8	48.7	50.5

Note—Total land area 28,298,000 acres (11,452,000 hectares).

Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Foreign Regional Analysis Division, *A Survey of Agriculture in Cuba*, Washington, 1969.

Like sugar, tobacco production was hard-hit by the 1929 depression and did not regain its pre-1929 level until after World War II. Tobacco statistics since the 1959 Revolution are very unreliable, but the Cuban government reported a sharp drop in production in the 1963–64 period. Since that time the picture has been unclear; some reports have placed 1966 production volume at the prerevolutionary level of 50,000 metric tons, whereas others claim the amount produced was about 35,000 metric tons. Aside from production quantity, however, it is clear that there has been a substantial drop in the average quality of Cuban tobacco since the Revolution. A prime cause of this has been the loss of the large United States market for high-quality tobacco and the increased concentration on production of lower quality tobacco for domestic use (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations).

Coffee Production

Coffee, introduced in the latter part of the eighteenth century, rivaled sugar in importance during much of the colonial period. It suffered relative neglect after independence, however, and its subsequent expansion was very limited. In general, coffee production since the turn of the century has been characterized by simple cultivation methods, low yields, and high production costs.

After 1961 production declined sharply: the 1967 crop was estimated at only 27,000 metric tons, in comparison with an average of 43,000 metric tons per year in the 1955–59 period. There have been some indications of an upturn in production since 1967, presumably in response to vigorous government expansion efforts, although sufficient data was not available in 1969 to make an accurate assessment of this apparent trend.

Rice Production

Rice-growing developed on a significant scale after World War II largely as a result of domestic tariff protection and restrictions on sugar production (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations). Between 1955 and 1959 internal production of milled rice averaged 150,000 metric tons per year or about half the amount needed to satisfy the high level of domestic demand. A sharp drop was evident in the mid-1960s, followed by some improvement by 1967. As with coffee production, large-scale projects designed to expand rice-growing areas were underway in mid-1969.

Other Crop Production

Most other crops followed the general trend of decreasing production after 1961, with production subsequently leveling off and in most cases eventually rising again. It should be noted, however, that a significant share of many of these products was consumed on the farms producing them and may therefore not have been included in available statistical compilations.

The production of basic food crops other than rice declined in virtually all cases during the 1961—64 period. Corn output, for example, dropped from an estimated 212,000 metric tons in 1960 to about 117,000 metric tons in 1965, and bean production in the 1961—67 period was consistently below the large crop—35,000 metric tons—harvested in 1960. With respect to sweet potatoes and some other *viandas*, however, declines have reportedly been made up, and in some cases production during the years 1965—69 may have exceeded the amounts turned out in the 1955—59 period.

Since 1959 the government has emphasized production of citrus fruits, with the result that purchases from government procurement centers increased from 98,000 metric tons in 1962 to 160,000 metric tons in 1966. Major projects to expand citrus acreage, including one begun in 1967 that involved between 40,000 and 50,000 "volunteers" on the Isle of Pines, will probably result in continued production increases.

Pineapples accounted for about two-thirds of fruit exports in 1958, but exports apparently became lower after the Revolution, and there is no indication that the crop has received great emphasis since that time.

Plant diseases seriously reduced banana production before 1959. Though banana cultivation was still practiced in early 1970, significant quantities of the crop were no longer exported. No precise production figures are available for the variety of other fruits raised, which includes mangos, papayas, and avocados; however, rough data indicate that less than 110,000 metric tons of such fruit was produced in 1962; this total does not include plantains, which are classified as *viandas*.

Output of *henequen*, which yields a fiber used to make rope and course cloth, reached a peak in 1952; in that year 16,400 metric tons of *henequen* were produced and 10,200 metric tons of fiber-equivalent were exported. There have been no records of any henequen being exported after 1960, though unofficial estimates of average annual production have been as high as 10,000 metric tons for the 1961—66 period.

A small crop of peanuts is produced, primarily as a source of vegetable oil, though the country depends on imports for most of this commodity. Cocoa production, another minor agricultural activity, has probably not yielded more than 3,000 metric tons per year during the 1960—69 period. A small amount of cotton is raised, and the government apparently hopes to devote some 140,000 acres to it by 1970 in an effort to become self-sufficient in cotton fiber. In addition, it has been reported that 220,000 metric tons of vegetables—including tomatoes, onions, green peppers, cucumbers, cabbages, eggplants, and carrots—were purchased through government procurement centers in 1965.

Livestock Production

Cattle

Cattle raising is second only to sugar as a source of farm income and far surpasses all other livestock activities in importance. For most of the twentieth century the total number of Cuban cattle averaged over 4 million head, though there were sizable fluctuations. Beginning in 1952, the size of the herds grew rapidly, reaching a high of approximately 5.8 million head by 1959.

As with sugar cultivation, cattle raising has traditionally depended upon the country's vast expanses of readily exploitable land. Problems posed by the dry season are greater for cattle than for sugarcane, however, since the savanna grasses turn brown during the dry months and it is difficult for cattle to maintain themselves. Despite this, before 1959 the vast majority of large ranches failed to provide supplementary feed, depending entirely on the land to maintain their stock. Some grazing land was planted with special varieties of grass such as *pangola*, but most of it was simply unimproved natural pasture. The result was a system of cattle raising that involved extreme seasonal hardships and required between three and four years to bring an animal to marketable size and weight.

Because of the difficult environmental conditions, the predominant cattle types represent crosses between the so-called native breed (*criollo*) and the pest- and disease-resistant Brahman or zebu type. Despite their selection for hardiness, however, Cuban cattle suffer severe losses from various diseases and parasitic infections; of these, brucellosis, tuberculosis, cysticercosis, and anthrax are particularly widespread. In addition, it was claimed in 1960 that hoof and mouth disease was present on the island; as of 1969 this claim had neither been publicly substantiated nor disproven.

Far more destructive than any of these continuing health problems was the indiscriminate slaughter of cattle and livestock stemming from economic uncertainty and disorganization after 1959. It is hard to estimate how many head were lost, but it appears that the 1958 total of 5.8 million head had been reduced between 25 and 50 percent by 1962. The result was that beef and veal production declined from an average of 183,000 metric tons during the period 1955–59 to an average 145,000 metric tons during the 1962–63 period. To counter this trend, the government promulgated a law in 1962 providing severe penalties for any slaughter of cattle without official authorization. This was followed in 1964 by the requirement that all cattle be registered with a newly created Livestock Registry Office set up for this purpose.

Besides such regulatory actions, the government has made a major effort to improve conditions on the cattle farms. Much of this has been directed toward improvement of domestic breeds through the setting up of artificial insemination centers; the new emphasis is on crossbreeding domestic types and Holstein cattle, though Santa Gertrudis, Brown Swiss, Charolais, Hereford and other types are also being utilized.

Simultaneously, the government has been trying to alleviate the health problems posed by disease and parasitic infection. A number of diagnostic laboratories were set up, and in 1967 a National Institute of Veterinary Medicine was established. As of mid-1969 programs for training technicians in veterinary medicine appeared to be making significant progress. The government is also attempting to ease the problems posed by the dry season through annual plantings of grasses in limited areas and the establishment of some cattle-feeding stations.

As a result of all these programs, there was apparently a significant increase in the size of Cuba's herds between 1962 and 1969. Presumably because of this, beef and veal production rose from the low annual average of 145,000 metric tons during the period 1962–63 to between 160,000 and 170,000 metric tons in the period 1964–67. In view of a continuing intense government interest in this area, continued moderate increases through the 1970s seem very likely.

Other Livestock

Hog raising, though significant, is hampered by adverse climatic conditions and primitive farming methods. Many animals, mostly native types, are simply left to forage for themselves. The result is that they gain weight slowly, produce little lard, and suffer from high rates of disease and parasitic infection.

Indiscriminate slaughter after the Revolution reduced the hog population and caused a sharp drop in pork production from 1961 through 1963, though there was some recuperation during the 1964–69 period. Production fell from an annual average of approximately 39,000 metric tons of pork during the years 1955–59 to about 25,000 metric tons in 1963. It then rose to about 27,000 metric tons in 1964 and average around 30,000 metric tons per year from 1965 through 1967.

Small flocks of chickens were raised on most farms before the Revolution. Although this style of aviculture is presumably still very common, the Revolutionary government has tended to stress large-scale commercially oriented production. During the 1961–65 period recorded production of poultry meat apparently averaged between 45,000 metric tons and 48,000 metric tons; according to official Cuban statistics, there were approximately 4.3 million laying-hens in the country in 1965.

Some sheep are also raised, primarily for mutton. A few goats provide meat and milk to small farms and to some families living on the outskirts of cities. Horses, mules, and donkeys are also raised and provide an important means of transport, especially in the eastern provinces.

Forestry

Past destructive exploitation has made Cuba's forest resources incapable of meeting local demands for timber, and forest products have ceased to be a significant source of exports. Total production yielded only about 60 million board feet of sawn timber in 1965.

In 1954 the Cabot Foundation reported that broadleaf forests still covered about 11 percent of the island, but that most of the exploitable timber trees had been removed. The trees left standing by this "high-grading" process are exploited chiefly as a source of fuel. Extensive stands of mangroves and other low forest included in the 11 percent figure also provide limited quantities of fuel, principally in the form of charcoal.

Pine forests, which covered roughly 4 percent of the island in 1954, still provide small amounts of timber. But virtually all the unexploited stands are on the upper slopes of the Sierra Maestra and are therefore hard to reach.

Before 1959 there were limited official attempts to control continuing forest depletion through reforestation campaigns and establishment of forest preserves. These efforts are apparently continuing, and there are indications that the government has made substantial plantings of various types of forest trees. There is no evidence, however, that any great progress has been made toward rejuvenation to the nation's forest resources.

Fisheries

The fishing industry has expanded greatly since the Revolution as a result of government concentration on this sector. The total catch has averaged well above the 22,000 metric tons recorded for 1958, and claims that 82,000 metric tons were brought in during 1968 appear reasonable.

Despite the presence of many types of edible fish in Cuban waters, little effort was made to develop a modern fishing industry before 1959. Following the Revolution, all commercial fishing ventures were nationalized, organized into cooperatives, and placed under the control of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria—INRA). Since then the government has vested large amounts of capital and technical skills in the expansion and modernization of the industry.

This program has involved purchase of a large number of foreign-made fishing vessels, including some ninety shrimp trawlers that were acquired during the years 1968–69 and construction of a limited number of fishing vessels in domestic yards. Port facilities have also undergone marked improvement, and a new fishing port has been constructed near Havana. This latter project, featuring such items as a television monitoring system and fork-lifts for moving fish, involved extensive Russian technical assistance.

As a result of this campaign, by the mid-1960s Cuban fishing fleets were operating off the coasts of Greenland and Argentina as well as in the Gulf of Mexico. As of mid-1969 there had been no perceptible decline in the government's level of investment in fishing, and further significant increases in production appeared very likely.

POSTREVOLUTIONARY AGRICULTURAL REORGANIZATION AND POLICY

Evolution of State Control, 1959–69

Following the Revolution a large portion of the nation's arable land was placed under state control and a system for central regulation of the agricultural sector began to evolve. The first major agricultural changes were brought about by the Agrarian Reform Law of 1959. This law set 30 *caballerías* (see Glossary), or about 996 acres as the maximum land area most persons or corporate bodies could own. Unusually productive farms, however, were permitted up to 3,320 acres. The Agrarian Reform Law also created the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria–INRA) to handle all matters relating to agricultural production, land reform, credit, and trade. This organization quickly absorbed the functions of the Ministry of Agriculture, in addition to existing commodity stabilization and agricultural credit and banking facilities.

Before the 1959 Revolution private banks had extended credit to agricultural enterprises but had always favored sugar interests to the detriment of other sectors. Attempting to strike a balance the government established the autonomous Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank in 1950. This bank accounted for about 29 percent of the credit advanced for crop and livestock operations in 1958, the year before it was absorbed by INRA. After 1958 INRA was responsible for granting all short- and medium-term credit to both state and private farms.

Under the provisions of the 1959 Agrarian Reform Law, over 8.5 million acres of land were placed under state control between June

1959 and August 1961. Additional lands were expropriated and distributed to more than 100,000 former sharecroppers, squatters, and tenant farmers; however, most of the large estates were kept intact, partly because of the feeling that they would not be operated efficiently if split up, and were run as units by the government.

Another major Agrarian Reform Law, promulgated in the fall of 1963, provided for expropriation of virtually all private holdings over 166 acres in size. This law was followed by rapid expropriation of over 5 million acres, almost all of which were retained by the state. Precise figures were not available, but it appeared by mid-1969 that between 65 percent and 85 percent of all farmland was held by the state, including virtually all the sugarcane fields and most of the better pastureland.

In the first years of the revolutionary government, two general types of farms were set up in the state sector under the management of INRA. These were state-managed "cooperatives," many of them concerned primarily with sugarcane cultivation, and state farms—otherwise known as people's farms—consisting mostly of expropriated cattle and rice lands. Almost all the "cooperatives" had been transformed into state farms by the end of 1962, leaving the huge state farming units, most of them over 17,000 acres in size, as the dominant type of agricultural enterprise.

As of 1967 the state farms were run by a director, in whom most of the managerial authority was concentrated, and by a six-man council limited to an advisory role. Each director reported to a similar director and six-man board at the regional level, and they in turn were subordinate to INRA organs in Havana.

The government has continued to experiment with other types of agricultural units, including various sorts of cooperative or joint ventures, and has also altered some of its basic patterns of administration from time to time (see ch. 17, Character and Structure of the Economy). As of mid-1969, however, there had been no indication of any significant decline in the overwhelming dominance of the centralized "state farm" pattern of organization.

In the private sector, a series of steps were taken after the Revolution that made private producers heavily dependent upon the state. The first of these, announced in August of 1959, consisted of transferring the functions of all autonomous organizations concerned with agriculture and marketing to INRA. The next step was the establishment in 1961 of the National Association of Small Farmers, the name of which was subsequently changed to The National Association of Private Farmers (Associación Nacional de Agricultores Privados—ANAP). This organization, which was designed to help implement official policy guidelines, rapidly came to control the policies of a variety of service and credit "cooperatives" and later absorbed virtually all local small-producers' organizations. ANAP has also played a major part in regulating flows of technical assistance, equipment, fertilizer, and seed to independent farmers and in setting production goals for the private sector. In addition, since 1963 INRA has had a virtual monopoly over marketing and distribution of all agricultural produce, a fixed percentage (usually over two-thirds of this produce) must be sold to local procurement centers at prices established by INRA.

The overall effect of this has been to make the state the only major entity legally entitled to do business with private farms. In accord with the government aim of bringing private farm activity into line with official policy, these measures have sharply curtailed opportunities for independent action within the private sector.

Labor and Capital Investment

Labor Patterns

The predominant farm labor pattern before the Revolution was one of seasonal unemployment generated by the sugar crop. There was apparently a slight rise in the number of full-time agricultural workers after 1959, but this numerical change was not radical, and increasingly serious labor shortages developed after 1961 despite the numerical increase. This resulted in increased use of relatively inexperienced "voluntary" labor, especially during the sugar harvest. City dwellers were recruited to work in the sugarcane fields at night and on weekends after completing full-time work at their regular jobs. Voluntary labor was also organized into battalions and brigades, and sent into the fields as units. There was a considerable increase in the number of such units between 1961 and 1969, and they tended to remain in the fields for longer and longer periods of time. In May 1968 it was announced that in future years all adult Cubans would be mobilized for one month of either agricultural labor or civil defense training. As of 1969 voluntary labor forces consisted not only of city workers, but of growing numbers of students, women, prisoners, and military conscripts. The total number of voluntary laborers employed at peak periods was difficult to determine, but a minimum of several hundred thousand people were involved at such times.

The existence of this situation was one measure of the decline in the efficiency of agricultural labor after 1958. Another indicator of this was the gradual lengthening of the sugar harvest season despite the fact that sugar output generally did not exceed prerevolutionary levels.

Before 1961 the harvest began in January and lasted between three and five months. Since that time it has gradually been extended, reaching an average length of about eight months during the

1967–69 period. By itself, the longer season had the tendency to reduce sugar yields somewhat, since sugarcane harvested out of season has a lower sugar content and is more likely to be leached by heavy rains than cane harvested earlier. Prime Minister Castro has claimed that the 1970 harvest season will last twelve months, mid-July 1969 through mid-July 1970, though it is doubtful that much harvesting will be attempted during the height of the rainy season.

The most logical causes of the long harvest season and the labor shortage include extremely low productivity on the part of the inexperienced volunteers and military laborers and reduced incentives and low morale within the permanent farm labor force. Other major factors have been the shrinking of the pool of experienced agricultural laborers resulting from movement to urban areas and emigration, and serious administrative shortcomings within the government and its new agricultural institutions.

Capital Investment

Capital investment in agriculture before 1959 was strongly oriented toward bringing new land under cultivation in order to exploit it with traditional methods. Tractor-drawn plows and harrows were used extensively in preparing sugarcane fields for planting; there was some mechanical weeding of these fields, and most rice production was also highly mechanized. In other agricultural sectors, however, mechanized equipment was virtually unknown. Likewise, fertilizers were not utilized extensively before the Revolution, and the areas under irrigation comprised less than 3 percent of the total cultivated area.

Statements by Revolutionary government officials in 1959 indicated plans for increasing the amount of equipment and fertilizer imported, for increasing local fertilizer production, and for bringing large areas of land under irrigation through construction of dams and related works. Severe problems prevented most of these plans from making much headway during the 1959–63 period; however, the idea of heightening the level of technology applied to agriculture has proved an enduring one and has continued to receive priority attention from top leaders. The government has also recognized the need for increasing the number and quality of trained agricultural technicians and administrators, but as of 1969 it was difficult to evaluate the degree of progress made by educational efforts in this area (see ch. 9, Education).

After 1963 official emphasis on agriculture provided the impetus for continued high levels of capital investment in agricultural equipment irrigation, and fertilizers. In the first years after the Revolution, difficulties in replacing worn-out United States equipment more than cancelled out the effect of extensive imports from Communist countries. It is reasonable to assume, however, that this problem has lessened with the passage of time.

In 1963 there were reportedly 18,000 tractors in the country compared with 14,200 in operation in 1956. About 5,700 tractors are believed to have been imported in 1967; imports, including some from Western Europe, were continuing as of 1969. With respect to other types of equipment, extensive experiments with cane-cutting machines have proven practical. About 44 percent of the sugarcane milled in 1966 was loaded mechanically, and the use of mechanical loaders has probably been increased significantly since that time. Probably the most difficult problems facing agricultural mechanization in 1969 were shortages of appropriate equipment, fuel, skilled workers, mechanics, and maintenance shops (see ch. 19, Industry).

Efforts have also been made to increase the use of fertilizers. In comparison with roughly 220,000 metric tons of fertilizers used in 1958, about 300,000 metric tons were apparently consumed during the 1967/68 production year. As of 1967 about 90 percent of Cuban fertilizer was still being imported. Some emphasis has also been placed on herbicides and pesticides; though there was a sharp decline in pest control after 1959, the use of pesticides appeared to be on the increase in 1969. According to Cuban government reports, approximately 8,350 metric tons of pesticides and herbicides were used in 1967, as compared with about 3,200 metric tons in 1956.

Prerevolutionary expansion of irrigation facilities has continued. An estimated 150,000 acres, mostly riceland, were under some form of irrigation in 1946, but according to Cuba's National Economic Council 865,000 acres were receiving some form of irrigation by 1958. In July of 1965 the government reported that the facilities on 363,000 acres were not being utilized. Irrigation apparently was being supplied to some 363,000 acres of sugarcane, 170,000 acres of pasture, 150,000 acres of vegetables, as well as to lesser areas devoted to rice, fruit, and tobacco. In 1969 work on a large number of water control projects directly related to agriculture was in progress, and there was no sign of any decline in the government's willingness to invest extensive resources in expanding irrigation facilities.

Agricultural Policy After 1959

The government's basic agricultural policy during the years 1959—63 was aimed at diversification, expansion, and attainment of self-sufficiency. Although the government was at first preoccupied with problems posed by new land aquisition and the need to maintain prerevolutionary levels of production, it was decided very early that sugar production should be deemphasized. Theoretically, this was to allow for greater emphasis on import-substitution crops and to permit more resources to be committed to the industrial sector. Few, if any, new sugar plantings were made after 1958, and during August of 1960, INRA officials reported that more than 240,000 acres of sugarcane land had been destroyed. This policy of deemphasizing sugar was intensified by suspension of the United States sugar quota at the end of 1960. Responding to this measure, the government directed that all available sugarcane be harvested in 1961, that no new plantings be made, and that large amounts of sugarcane land be prepared for the cultivation of other crops.

As in other economic sectors, agricultural policy-making and administration in the 1959—63 period were characterized by a serious lack of effective coordination. As noted in E. Boorstein's *The Economic Transformation of Cuba*, INRA leaders, like most others at the time, "were without experience in the administration of large organizations . . . . Leaders at all levels operated as though the best way—almost the only way—of making sure something got done was to do it themselves. . . On paper there was an organization heirarchy: there were provincial INRA Delegates, Zonal Delegates, and the administrators of the cooperatives; . . . [but]everyone by-passed different parts of the organization when it seemed quicker and more convenient to do so."

Regional INRA chiefs for example, were permitted to withdraw large sums from the government's financial reserves without accounting for how the funds were used. Much of this spending was not very effective, since there was a severe shortage of experienced agricultural managers in the new government. As a result, this diversification, expansion, and modernization campaign was carried out without much consideration being given to the cost of individual projects or their economic worth.

The ultimate consequences of this were not recognized at once, partly because experienced persons were almost entirely absent at top policy-making levels. What really allowed this "free-wheeling" system to last as long as it did, however, was the continued high rate of agricultural production through 1961.

Promulgation of the 1959 Agrarian Reform Law caused most large cattle ranchers to stop buying cattle to fatten for market, but this caused no immediate drop in production. On the contrary, the threat of expropriation, combined with economic disorganization, prompted an unprecedented rate of slaughter, thus technically raising beef production to record heights. The seriousness of this problem was apparently not generally recognized until 1961, and it was not until March 1962 that the government began taking forceful measures to stem indiscriminate slaughter. In the case of sugar, misleading initial appearances provided even more room for official optimism. Since sugar is a perennial crop, the high production figures for the period 1959–61 tended to mask the cumulative effects of failure to plant new sugarcane or to properly weed existing fields. This in turn led to a belief that prerevolutionary production levels could be maintained even if extensive areas of sugarcane land were diverted into other types of agriculture. That such was not the case was demonstrated by the slump in production that began in 1962. The rapid fall in sugar output was not compensated for by any general increase in other agricultural outputs, nor was it offset by developments elsewhere in the economy (see ch. 19, Industry).

Shortages of foreign exchange, which first appeared in 1960, prompted some curtailment of the high rate of uncontrolled agricultural spending in 1961. Also, shortages of foods and other basic consumables in 1961 sparked preliminary efforts to control the economy through formal centralized planning in 1962. The agency in charge of this activity, the Central Planning Board (Junta Central de Planificación–JUCEPLAN) had been created in March 1960, but it was given little effective power until the latter part of 1961 when the experimental 1962 plan was formulated (see ch. 17, Character and Structure of the Economy). Apparently because of the continuing high levels of agricultural production, the 1962 plan did not stress any particular need for caution with respect to agricultural diversification. Although very high goals were set for most crops, the 1962 goal for sugar production was approximately 5.4 million metric tons or about 1.4 million metric tons less than had actually been produced the previous year.

The subsequent failure of sugar production to reach even this lower level, the resultant huge 1962 trade deficit, and the unwillingness of Cuba's foreign creditors to tolerate such a situation indefinitely, caused a reversal of the government's basic economic priorities by the end of 1962. From 1963 until mid-1969, Cuban economic policy has given first priority to agriculture and, within that sector, to sugar and cattle. This major policy reversal was publicly announced in August of 1963, at which time it was indicated that sugar and cattle would remain the country's economic mainstays through 1970.

In accord with the new policy, the national five-year plan for the 1966–70 period called for gradually increased sugar production culminating in an output of 10 million metric tons in 1970. The precise goals were as follows: 1966, 6.5 million metric tons; 1967, 7.5 million metric tons; 1968, 8.0 million metric tons; 1969, 9.0 million metric tons; and 1970, 10.0 million metric tons.

Sugar production did not approach the projected goal in any of the first four years; however, as of mid-1969 the "10 million" goal had accumulated considerable political and diplomatic importance, providing additional impetus for heightened production in that year. As of mid-1969 the government appeared to be taking great pains to increase 1970 sugar output, and no slacking of the official emphasis on sugar was expected until after the 1970 harvest. Without shifting its prime emphasis away from sugar and cattle, however, during the years 1967—69 the government significantly increased attention given to nonexport crops. This development pointed up the possibility that greater official emphasis would be placed on production of nonexport crops after 1970.

CHAPTER 19

INDUSTRY

For a nation of Cuba's level of economic development the industrial sector is relatively unimportant and is highly dependent on agricultural raw materials. Projections based on prerevolutionary data suggest that about one-sixth of the labor force was engaged in industry on the eve of 1970.

The nation's industries can be conveniently grouped under four categories: agriculture-related industry, other manufacturing industry, extractive industry, and power generation. Of these the agriculture-related category is the most significant; in addition to its large size it has generally been the most active and has comprised the major portion of the industrial sector producing for the export market. Sugar milling and refining alone regularly account for between 10 and 25 percent of the national income, and the sugar industry's plants and equipment represent over a third of the value of the country's entire industrial plant.

Apart from agriculture-related industries, the manufacturing sector has been relatively undynamic and oriented toward the domestic market. The major pursuits within this category have been metallurgy, petroleum refining, construction, and chemical and textile production.

The third and fourth categories, power generation and mineral extraction, are of limited scope and significance. The power industry, most of which depends on fuel oil to produce electricity in thermoelectric plants, has an important impact on other types of economic activity. This impact, however, is reduced by the fact that many industrial plants have their own generating equipment. The only really important products of the extractive sector are nickel and petroleum. Nickel, the nation's chief mineral product, was Cuba's second most important export in 1969. Though no rival to sugar, the leading export, sharply rising world demand seems certain to make nickel an increasingly important foreign exchange earner in the 1970s. The island's small-scale petroleum production is important primarily because of an acute shortage of other domestic fuels and because of the growing tendency of available fuel imports to lag behind domestic needs.

During the 1960s the industrial growth pattern was very uneven. Large-scale mismanagement and reorganizational problems, together with losses of skilled personnel, prevented sustained growth in most manufacturing enterprises during the years 1959 through 1963. Production was also pulled down strongly in the officially deemphasized agriculture-related industries by the precipitous fall in crop levels in 1962/63 (see ch. 18, Agriculture).

Significant recovery began to be noted in 1964, after the government reversed its policy of trying to establish new import-substitution industries. Though most state attention was on the agriculture-related industries during the 1963—69 period, the output of many other industries also increased considerably in these years. This was partly because some of the worst problems of the postrevolutionary period, such as shortages of experienced administrators, had their greatest impact in the first few years of the Castro government. Budgetary allotments for industry as a whole did decline sharply in comparison to agricultural allotments, but the bulk of the cuts were directed at the new import-substitution projects, rather than at the well-established and generally more productive parts of the industrial sector.

As of early 1970, however, the prospects for any sharp short-term increase in industrial production were not good according to many economists observing the situation. The more prominent reasons for this include the economy's failure to effectively deal with its chronic balance-of-payments problems, difficulties in working with old United States-made equipment and in finding equipment and obtaining parts (most notably spare parts for the sugar industry), a decline in labor efficiency, and reluctance of the Soviet Union to step up its shipments of crude petroleum (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations). There was, in addition, the danger that the 1970 campaign to produce 10 million metric tons of sugar would take needed personnel and scarce resources away from industries not directly concerned with sugar production.

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

Prerevolutionary Patterns

Two of the most prominent factors shaping industrial patterns before 1959 were the proximity of the United States and the nature of the sugar industry. As of 1956 United States investors had a controlling interest in roughly 40 percent of the sugar industry, and Cuba ranked third in Latin America in terms of total United States investment. Within the industrial sector United States and other foreign investment was concentrated in fair-sized enterprises, with the result that the larger firms in a particular industry were frequently foreign owned and managed and generally had a corporate structure, whereas the remaining firms, many of them very small indeed, were Cuban owned. Thus, foreign investment helped produce a pattern of size contrast whereby 40 of the 1,840 firms registered in 1954 employed over 250 persons each, and over 800 firms employed 5 persons or fewer.

The major industrial growth area of the 1950s was in manufactures unrelated to agriculture. United States corporate investment in this sector doubled between 1950 and 1959, and a sizable number of large plants producing such varied items as detergents, gasoline, and rubber tires were installed. The result was a sharp general increase in production.

The role of the United States caused United States-made machinery and spare parts to predominate. The system of measurements used in industry corresponded to that used in the United States rather than to the metric system; most pieces of equipment were produced according to United States designs and specifications; and many industries, especially the larger ones, had factories designed to work with raw materials imported from the United States that sometimes differed significantly from equivalent raw materials produced elsewhere.

The size and nature of the sugar industry also had an important influence on the character of the industrial sector. Because of the importance of sugar, after the world depression Cuba reduced its tariffs in exchange for a sugar quota in the United States market. This agreement worked against economic diversification and the development of manufactures for the internal market and stood in marked contrast to the high-tariff policies of most Latin American countries at the time. Similarly, private bank credit was available in fairly large quantities to the sugar sector before 1959, but the amounts available to other industrial sectors were often inadequate to meet credit needs. The tremendous size and importance of the sugar sector before the Revolution also made it a focal point for government actions that sometimes hindered development of other domestic industries, especially those producing for the internal market.

In addition, the sugar economy tended to impose a wasteful cycle on manufacture for the domestic market. High levels of employment during the sugar harvest and milling season provided consumers with funds for purchasing manufactured goods. When the harvest was in and the mills stopped working, the domestic market for manufactured items shrank. The result was that until the Revolution a large portion of private industry geared production to the sugar cycle, thus lessening the efficiency of installed industrial capacity and aggravating the effects of the cycle.

From these and other causes, domestic industry outside the sugar sector appeared quite poorly developed in comparison to the rest of the economy at the time of the Revolution. Though production picked up noticeably in the 1950s, the overall level of industrial growth was still slow.

The state's role was primarily indirect before the Revolution; private ownership was the rule, and there was no industry in which the government had direct operational control. Even in the field of industrial development the government role was very small until the 1950s when the Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank and several other quasi-official institutions were set up. Collectively, these agencies were responsible for a large increase in government spending between 1955 and the Revolution. The emphasis of these government programs, however, was on creating jobs rather than on economic development, and a large share of the funds were directed toward unproductive public works projects.

Industrial Expropriation, 1959—64

Following the 1959 Revolution the new government's first steps toward nationalization of the industrial sector were hesitant and ill-defined. A smattering of enterprises were taken over in the course of the first year and a Department of Industrialization was set up within the powerful all-purpose National Institute of Agrarian Reform (Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria—INRA) to administer the nationalization program. More significant were other official actions—The 1959 Agrarian Reform Law, issuance of decrees that drastically reduced power rates, mortgage rates, and rents, and growing problems with the United States—all of which helped eliminate whatever potential business confidence there had been in the Castro government.

The nationalization pace picked up in early 1960, following signature of a major trade and credit agreement with the Soviet Union and other Communist nations in February and reached a climax in midsummer, when a decree was issued authorizing expropriation of all United States-owned properties. Shortly thereafter, the country's three foreign-owned oil refineries were intervened for refusing to refine Russian crude oil; thirty-six American-owned sugar mills, as well as the major American-owned telephone and electric power companies, were taken over at the same time. By October 1960 the remaining sugar mills had been expropriated along with the tobacco factories and most other large industrial enterprises.

From then on expropriation spread in widening circles; estimates vary, but at the end of 1961 the state-owned sector clearly accounted for at least 75 percent of industrial production in terms of value, and by 1964 all private industrial output of any real significance had ended. There were still a considerable number of very small private enterprises operating in 1964, but their total output was negligible; most of them were apparently eliminated or incorporated into state enterprises between 1964 and 1969.

The rapidity with which the bulk of the expropriations were carried out left little time for gradual adjustment to new conditions, and in many cases industries were reduced to near-chaos. Most technicians and managers fled the country during 1959 and 1960, causing a serious shortage of personnel capable of running the new state enterprises. The new government's lack of top leaders with administrative, economic, or technical experience aggravated the effects of this exodus. The United States embargo on exports to Cuba in October 1960 cut off an important source of raw materials and parts for the nation's factories, many of which could not be immediately supplied by the Soviet Union. These developments provided the basis for problems still plaguing the industrial sector in 1969 and for keeping overall industrial output at or below the levels achieved in the years immediately preceding the Revolution.

Organization of State Industry

The government was totally unprepared to administer the large number of newly nationalized industries. At first all the expropriated firms were assigned to the Industrialization Department of INRA, but a general administrative reorganization in early 1961 altered this arrangement by creating a Ministry of Industry separate from INRA and headed by Ernesto (Che) Guevara. This ministry was given jurisdiction over most of the expropriated industrial firms, which were shortly thereafter grouped into so-called consolidated enterprises.

Each of these consolidated state enterprises was responsible for one or more plants and was concerned with a particular type of production. As of 1966 there were about fifty consolidated enterprises in all: two for mining, one for electricity, one for gas, and the remainder in the manufacturing sector. Under this system production units within the jurisdiction of a given enterprise can be widely separated geographically, and the number of such units included in different enterprises varies greatly.

The supervisory structure of each enterprise consists of a director, an administrative council, several specialized departments, and an administrative staff. Control is highly centralized: the administrative council and specialized departments play only an advisory role; each factory unit in the enterprise is immediately responsible to the director of the enterprise.

By mid-1969 there had been changes at the upper levels of this organizational framework, but the enterprise concept had not been affected. A separate Sugar Industry Ministry was established in 1964, and in 1966 the tobacco industry was removed from the Ministry of Industry's jurisdiction and placed under the newly created Cuban Tobacco Enterprise. Then in 1967 the Ministry of Industry was split into three separate entities. These were the Ministry of Light Industry, the Ministry of Basic Industry, and the

Ministry of Mining and Metallurgy. With the sole exception of a few enterprises under the government-controlled Book Institute, these five organizations controlled all of the nation's industrial firms.

Since large-scale nationalization began, there has been a significant attempt to consolidate the island's vast array of tiny manufacturing establishments into larger units, both for reasons of theoretical economic savings and because of difficulties in establishing effective centralized control over very small units. Such consolidations have generally had very little effect in terms of output and in most cases appear to have actually caused substantial short-run increased costs.

The Castro government has also tried to deemphasize Havana as the dominant industrial center and to develop secondary urban centers. For this reason most major industrial projects have been located away from the capital. The most marked examples of this policy have been coordinated development efforts in such cities as Neuvitas, where a major power plant, several factories, deep-water port facilities, and large amounts of housing for workers were being constructed toward the close of the decade.

Industrial Policy, 1959—69

In the early 1960s these nationalization, consolidation, and decentralization campaigns were combined with a policy of rapid industrialization that is generally viewed as one of the most quixotic economic quests of the twentieth century. The basic idea was that the economy could be made independent of sugar-generated foreign exchange and imported industrial products by concentrating all available resources on import substitution. As a result, the import-substitution policy adopted placed such emphasis on industrialization that considerable short-term industrial growth was required merely to maintain the economy at its 1959 level and to avoid major balance-of-payments difficulties.

Theoretically, the economic basis for this effort was provided by a series of agreements made with various Communist states during 1960. In all, the Soviet Union, Communist China, and Czechoslovakia granted Cuba credits totaling the equivalent of over US$200 million with which to purchase various types of factories; and separate contracts were made for large-scale import of factories from East Germany, Poland, and Bulgaria.

As in agriculture, mounting industrial problems were moderated at first by sizable reserves of spare parts and finished products, a significant portion of which were brought in during mid-1960 when the United States embargo was anticipated (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations).

On the other hand, industrial output never rose significantly as agricultural output did in the first years after the Revolution. Part of the reason, according to the *Economic Transformation of Cuba* by Boorstein, was that those new plants that were installed were often inappropriate, inefficient, and even counterproductive. One of the more extreme examples was a plant for making jute sacks; after its installation it was discovered that the cost of buying and transporting raw jute to Cuba was greater than the value of the finished sacks. It would have been cheaper to continue importing the finished sacks. Most of the new industrial experiments were somewhat more successful, but in most cases little consideration was given to the cost of raw materials or to the manner in which the new installations would mesh with the economy.

More significantly, the countries that had signed agreements to provide factories slowed down deliveries, presumably because of growing doubts about the practicality of the industrialization plans. By January 1963 less than eleven of the proposed new factories had been completed; most of these were quite small, and their overall effect on levels of production and employment was negligible.

By the end of 1961 the nation's stock of spare parts and finished industrial products was seriously depleted, and it was becoming necessary to run some plants at reduced capacity and to dismantle others for spare parts in order to keep the remainder operating. One of the sectors hardest hit was the sugar industry, partly the result of the low priority assigned sugar and other exports in the early years of the regime. In March 1962 the government announced that six mills in Camagüey were unable to operate and that twenty mills were operating so inefficiently that they might not be used in the next harvest if needed spare parts were not obtained.

In addition, raw materials from new sources were causing trouble. The petroleum refining industry, for example, had trouble adapting its equipment to the high sulfur content of Soviet crude oil.

The shortage of industrial managers and technicians also reduced output and limited the possibilities for expansion. So extreme was this shortage that the nation's complex detergent plant was run for a time by a former physician who happened to know some chemistry. In some instances trained foreign personnel were brought in to help run industries, but where they were not present there was generally little trained administrative or technical talent available.

As a consequence of all the problems, industrial production did not rise in the 1959–63 period, and in most sectors output declined significantly. This resulted in a continuing unbalanced drain on the goods and services provided by the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. At least as far as Cuba's backers were concerned this was an untenable state of affairs, and a major policy reversal eventually resulted. The situation reached a head in late 1962, and it was finally announced, in August 1963, that emphasis would henceforth be placed on agricultural export products rather than on industrialization and import substitution.

Following the government's renewed emphasis on agriculture and exports, the sugar industry and other agriculture-related activities slowly began to recover. There were also noteworthy upsurges in the oil and nickel industries, where high levels of government spending and foreign assistance were maintained. As was to be expected, those industries that received least attention and showed least improvement were those not related in any way to production for export.

There were, however, some notable exceptions. Power-generating capacity increased significantly between 1965 and 1969, and high levels of construction were evident in planned port facilities, factories, and power plants. The government appeared to be assigning a fairly high priority to basic industries related indirectly to export activities and other types of industrial production. By contrast, there was no evidence of any emphasis on consumption-oriented industries, and the level of output of these activities remained extremely low. Definite data is not available, but rationing levels indicate most consumer-oriented industries probably did not keep pace with population growth between 1962 and the end of the decade.

EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES

Mining has never been of major importance to the economy, and the value produced by it has generally remained well below 1 percent of total national income. The reason for this is a serious shortage of readily exploitable metal and fuel resources. Coal is absent, and the very limited petroleum resources available up to 1970 have never supplied more than a small fraction of domestic demand. Extraordinarily large reserves of nickel and iron ores exist, but their extraction and isolation has presented serious technical problems.

The economic uncertainty and reorganizations of the postrevolutionary period adversely affected the extractive industries, but most indicators point toward substantial recovery during the years 1963 through 1969. In particular, the output of nickel, by far the most important product in terms of value, was apparently well above prerevolutionary levels at the end of this period, and petroleum production was being maintained well above levels of the 1959–62 period. These two products have been placed high on the government's list of priorities; other types of mineral production seem to have made progress, but were not known to be receiving any unusually large share of official attention or investment.

Metallic Minerals

Nickel and Cobalt

Cuba's nickel reserves are among the largest in the world, being estimated before the Revolution at over 4 million metric tons of pure metal (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). They are difficult to exploit, however, because the nickel ore is associated with other metals—notably iron, chrome, and cobalt—and its extraction is therefore an involved and expensive operation.

Nickel was not exploited until 1943, when the United States government-financed plant at Levisa Bay, run by the Nicaro Nickel Company, commenced operations. Production reached a peak of approximately 20,000 metric tons of nickel in oxide in 1957 but, since intervention by the Cuban government in 1959, the total output of nickel in oxide has run considerably below the plant's theoretical capacity, averaging approximately 15,000 metric tons a year (see table 10).

Overall nickel production was expanded considerably between 1962 and 1969 by the opening of a new extraction plant at Moa Bay in northern Oriente Province. Commercial production of nickel (in sulfide) began in 1962 and output gradually increased to approximately 11,500 metric tons in 1967. The plant's initially planned capacity of 22,500 metric tons per year has never been approached, but total nickel production reached 33,400 metric tons in 1968.

Table 10. Cuban Metallic Mineral Production, 1953—67[1]

Year	Nickel Oxide	Nickel Sulfide	Cobalt Sulfide	Chromite, Refractory Grade	Manganese	Copper (in concentrate)
1953	12	n.a.	n.a.	70	353	16
1954	13	n.a.	n.a.	65	265	18
1955	14	n.a.	n.a.	74	314	21
1956	14	n.a.	n.a.	53	221[2]	16
1957	20	n.a.	n.a.	115	249[2]	16
1958	18	n.a.	n.a.	75	60[2]	13
1959	18	n.a.	n.a.	40[3]	45[2]	9
1960	11	n.a.	n.a.	30[3]	16	12[2]
1961	15	n.a.	n.a.	25	42	5
1962	15	1.9	164	35	75	5
1963	15	5.1	470	57	41	6
1964	15	7.7	700	33	n.a.	6
1965	18	9.0	800	30	n.a.	6
1966	16	10.0	915	30	n.a.	6
1967	15	11.0	1,045	43	n.a.	n.a.

n.a.—not available.

[1] In thousand metric tons except cobalt and manganese, which are in metric tons.

[2] Exports.

[3] United States imports from Cuba.

Skyrocketing world nickel prices caused heavy emphasis on production in 1969.

Neither the ammonia-leach process used at Levisa Bay nor the acid-leach process employed at Moa Bay provides any way for exploiting the vast quantities of iron and considerable amounts of chrome found in the laterite ore from which the nickel is extracted; these ores contain roughly 40 to 50 percent iron by weight. The Moa Bay process, however, does permit extraction of recoverable cobalt in sulfide, and since 1962 it has provided the basis for a small amount of cobalt production. This output has generally averaged a little less than 10 percent of Moa Bay nickel production, apparently reaching approximately 1,000 metric tons of recoverable cobalt in sulfide in 1967.

Iron

The nation's iron reserves are truly immense, but the problems of extraction and purification are even greater than in the case of nickel. Total iron reserves have been estimated at 3.5 billion tons, or over 5 percent of total world reserves. The major drawback is that the vast majority of these reserves are badly contaminated with nickel, cobalt, alumina, and chrome; no way has been devised to remove these contaminants at less than prohibitive cost.

As a result, Cuban iron production has generally depended on relatively small deposits of less contaminated ore. Output from this type of mining has decreased steadily since 1920, and Cuban government reports indicate iron-ore production during the 1959—69 period was negligible, never exceeding 2,500 metric tons per year.

Chromite

The country has abundant supplies of chromite, a major ore of chromium containing iron and oxygen, and became the world's second-largest chromite producer during World War II. Subsequently, competition with lower cost producers in other areas caused production to drop precipitously, though large amounts of chromite are still mined. The ore deposits, varying in size from small knots to bodies with over 200,000 tons of ore, are found all along the north coast; however, virtually all of the ore extracted in the mid-1960s appears to have come from the rich deposits in the Moa-Baracoa area of Oriente Province.

Manganese

Spurred on by high United States demand during the Korean conflict, the country in the 1950s became the Western Hemisphere's second largest producer of manganese, turning out a peak of 258,000 metric tons of ore in 1955. As in the case of chromite, however, manganese production plummeted after the war. Problems in manganese mining stem from the low-grade nature of the ore, its location in small pockets, high transportation costs, and a shortage of concentration facilities. During the mid-1960s the largest mine, the Charco Redondo—which is located south of Bayamo—was reported operating at about one-fifth of its peak level of the 1950s, and this appeared fairly typical of manganese extraction activity throughout the country.

Copper and Other Metals

Copper is the nation's second metal in terms of production value. Extraction of the metal dates back over 400 years, and during the nineteenth century Cuba ranked third among the world's copper-producing countries; however, major known deposits had given out well before World War II. Since that time the Matahambre Mines in Pinar del Río Province have been the major source of the metal. The Matahambre Mines possess a modern concentrating plant that is capable of processing over 1,200 metric tons of copper ore per day. Overall, copper production seems to have slipped somewhat since nationalization of the Matahambre Mines in 1960, apparently averaging about 6,000 metric tons of metal in concentrate annually.

An interesting feature of the copper industry is the fact that significant amounts of the metal are obtained from pyrite deposits in Pinar del Río Province. These deposits, mined primarily for their copper content, are also a source of sulfur and of small amounts of lead, zinc, gold, and silver.

It has been reported that 100 metric tons of zinc, 4 metric tons of silver and about 1,000 ounces of gold were produced in 1960, the last year in which comprehensive statistics for these metals are available. Tungsten and antimony are known to exist, but as of 1969 none of the deposits appeared to provide a basis for production on any significant scale.

Nonmetallic Minerals

In terms of number of persons employed and value of output, production of nonmetallic minerals—particularly limestones and clays—may well exceed that of all the metallic minerals combined. Reliable statistics are difficult to obtain, however, because output is primarily directed toward local consumption rather than foreign markets. Limestones (including marble), clays, gypsum, and sulfur constitute the more important nonmetallic minerals; exploitable deposits of barite and magnesite also exist, along with a small amount of silica sand; significant amounts of salt are produced by evaporation of sea water (see table 11).

Table 11. Cuban Nonmetallic Mineral Production, 1960–66
(metric tons)

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Lime							
Limestone[1]	2,200	2,000	2,000	2,100	.....	.....	.....
Burned lime	.....	.....	.....	5,400	4,700	.....	.....
Hydrated lime	.....	.....	.....	4,672	10,194	.....	.....
Marble							
Block	.....	.....	.....	6,513	9,522	.....	.....
Rough slabs[2]	.....	.....	.....	23,790	40,107	.....	.....
Finished slabs[2]	.....	.....	.....	15,758	17,763	.....	.....
Sulfur (in pyrite)	8,000	9,000	11,700	15,200	13,500	13,500	13,500
Kaolin	500	1,000	3,000	5,800	.....	.....	.....
Gypsum	26,000	19,000	19,000	26,700	25,300	.....	.....
Salt[1]	59	60	70	90	87	106	100
Silica sand[3]	.....	.....	.....	277,000	296,000	.....	.....

[1] In thousand metric tons.
[2] In square yards.
[3] In cubic yards.

Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, *Minerals Yearbook, 1964*, Washington, 1966; *Minerals Yearbook, 1965*, 1968, p. 116; and *Minerals Yearbook, 1967*, 1969, p. 874.

Limestones

Cuban limestones cover a wide range of types, from the lower grades to high-grade marble. Large quantities are used in construction of roads and buildings and as raw material for producing burned lime in kilns. Burned lime is employed extensively in clarification of sugar juices; many sugar mills have their own limestone quarries and limekilns. Burned lime is also used in making mortar and plaster, treating water, and tanning leather; in the manufacture of paper, textiles, and soap; in neutralizing acid soils; and as a fertilizer.

Significant quantities of good quality marble are found on the Isle of Pines and, to a lesser extent, in Oriente Province. A cutting and polishing plant located and operating at Sigua before the Revolution continued operating in the 1960s. The latest available figures, covering 1963 and 1964, indicate that substantial quantities of marble were produced in those years.

Clays

The nation has virtually inexhaustible supplies of clays, including most standard varieties, with the sole exception of high-grade refractory types of bauxite. Clays needed for manufacture of brick, tile, sewer pipe, flue linings, pottery, whiteware, and other ceramics are abundant. In the early 1960s over 150 brick and tile plants were in operation on the island; most of them were small and employed primitive techniques, but some of the larger plants possessed modern equipment. Overall, the combination of clay and limestone resources has made Cuba virtually self-sufficient in basic building materials.

Gypsum

This material, a sulfate of calcium used mainly in the building trades and in cement manufacture, is mined in Matanzas, Camagüey, and Oriente provinces. Deposits in these and other areas appear sufficient to provide for any foreseeable needs of domestic industry.

Other Nonmetallic Minerals

Sulfur, derived from pyrite mining, was being produced on a significant scale in the 1960s presumably for the sulfuric acid and other chemical industries.

Silica sand, basic to the construction and glass industries, is somewhat scarce, but a major deposit exists on the south coast of Pinar del Río Province. Coral sand, containing calcium carbonate, is abundant along the coasts.

Rock salt outcrops exist but have not been found in the right amount or location to make significant commercial exploitation possible; all domestic salt production is carried out by solar evaporation of sea water. Salt output rose significantly after the Revolution, reaching a reported 106,000 metric tons in 1965. As of 1967 the Cuban government was planning further expansion of existing facilities.

Fuels

The nation lacks commercial deposits of coal and does not have sufficient supplies of petroleum to provide for domestic needs. Despite extensive exploration and development efforts, production did not exceed 5 percent of domestic requirements in any year before 1970.

Oil deposits in and around Jatibonico in extreme western Camagüey Province provided most of the island's domestically extracted petroleum in 1969. Small but significant supplemental supplies of petroleum were also provided by deposits at Santa María del Mar and a few lesser fields. Although domestic petroleum extraction reportedly exceeded 110,000 metric tons in 1967, this was less than 3 percent of the 5 million metric tons of petroleum products consumed in the country that year (see table 12). Considerable worldwide publicity accompanied the discovery of a serpentine-plug oilfield at Guanabo in early 1968, but its geological character indicates it was probably a relatively minor find.

As early as 1961 the Cuban government was placing strong emphasis on exploratory investigation and drilling, an effort involving substantial amounts of Soviet technical assistance and equipment. Though the postrevolutionary search for oil has not proved highly productive, Soviet assistance continued at a high level through the 1960s. At the same time, the priority placed on increas-

*Table 12. Petroleum Production in Cuba, Selected Years, 1951–67**

Year	Production	Year	Production
1951	81	1958	n.a.
1952	30	1963	205
1953	19	1964	248
1954	51	1965	382
1955	369	1966	460
1956	381	1967	756
1957	n.a.		

n.a.—not available.

*In thousands of 42-gallon barrels; 6.65 barrels are equivalent to 1 metric ton.

ing domestic petroleum output has been heightened by lack of sufficient oil imports from the Soviet Union to meet rising domestic needs. As of early 1970 there had been no noticeable slackening of official Cuban efforts to expand domestic production, and no such slackening was anticipated in the immediate future. Overall prospects for substantially increased production, however, remained dim.

Small amounts of natural gas have been found in connection with some oil deposits, but no major effort to exploit this type of oil-linked deposit has been reported. High-pressure gas wells found near Majagua were being exploited in 1967, but there is no evidence that they can contribute significantly to solving the country's fuel problems.

The same can be said of asphalt deposits found in varying quality and quantity throughout the island. In 1969 Radio Havana reported that asphaltite was being used for fuel by a powerplant in Cienfuegos, and studies have been made to see if asphalt could be substituted for petroleum in paper and textile mills; however, it is very unlikely that such substitutions can significantly reduce the country's demand for petroleum.

MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES

Agriculture-Related Industry

Sugar Milling and Refining

Sugar production, the backbone of the economy, accounts for at least 20 percent of the gross national product (GNP). About half of this income is derived from industrial processing, primarily sugar milling and refining. In all, sugar-related activities produce roughly one-quarter of industrial income.

The bulk of the sugar industry is concentrated in the mills, which pass the cane through presses to produce cane juice and crushed cane stalks or *bagasse* (see Glossary). A portion of the *bagasse* is burned to provide steam and electric power for the plant, and the cane juice is clarified by adding burned lime, applying heat, and removing the resulting precipitates. After this, boiling away most of the clear juice under vacuum precipitates sugar crystals, and these are separated from the juice by centrifuging. Blackstrap molasses, the material remaining after these processes have been completed, is used by other factories in producing cattlefeed, alcohol, and a variety of chemicals.

This modern sugar milling process requires large-scale capital investment and places a great premium on achieving economies of scale through construction of very large industrial plants. On the other hand, the transportation of the heavy and bulky sugarcane is costly. Through the mid-nineteenth century the emphasis was on building small mills near the canefields, and a total of about 2,000 such mills existed in Cuba at that time. With the gradual lowering of transport costs and the increasing efficiency of large-scale production after independence, the size of the individual mills grew while their numbers shrank. The bulk of the smaller mills were in the three western provinces where most sugar was grown before independence, and the larger and more efficient units were located in Camagüey and Oriente provinces, the areas into which the sugar industry expanded during the twentieth century (see ch. 18, Agriculture). No new sugar mills have been constructed since 1929, because of government policies designed to maintain the status quo before the Revolution and because of parts, maintenance, and management problems since then.

In 1959 there were 161 operating mills in the country, but by 1968 this had been reduced to 152. The total designed capacity of these 152 mills was about 7.5 million metric tons of crude sugar, but their capacity was reduced somewhat in the early 1960s during the years of lowest sugar production. After the government began emphasizing sugar in 1963 there was some recuperation, and the production of 6.2 million metric tons of sugar in 1967 clearly demonstrated a capacity of at least that amount (see ch. 18, Agriculture).

As of mid-1969 there was no evidence that a capacity of 10 million metric tons per year had been approached in support of the government's 1970 sugar campaign; however, strong emphasis was placed on repairing and expanding existing mills during the 1967—69 period, and a rough estimate of between 7 million and 8 million metric tons of mill capacity for 1970 appears reasonable.

Turning to by-products, the mills produce a quantity of *bagasse* about equal in weight to their crude sugar output. Most mills are equipped to burn the material in their power plants, a practice that has made *bagasse* an energy producer second only to petroleum in importance. The mills produce more of the material than they need for fuel, and this has led sugar-producing countries to develop other uses for it. Before the Revolution some ten factories of varying sizes were using *bagasse* to turn out pulp, fiberboard, cardboard, and paper. Of the estimated 2,600 workers in these *bagasse*-related industries, 1,500 were employed by one paper-producing plant. Since the Revolution the government has been searching for new ways of using *bagasse*, and at least one rayon plant has been converted to using it as a raw material.

Blackstrap molasses, a major end-product of sugar milling, is also produced in substantial quantities. From 1959 through 1968, production averaged between 1.1 million gallons and 1.2 million gallons per year, making the nation the third-largest producer of this commodity in the world. Several small plants using molasses as a primary raw material for assorted products, including animal feed, alcohol, yeast, and dry ice, have been in existence since prerevolutionary times. In addition, the government has conducted extensive experiments to find new uses for molasses and has constructed some new molasses-using plants.

Another mill product is clarified sugar juice, which is taken out of the production line before the evaporation stage and is used to make a variety of alcohols, sugar syrups, and other items. The extent to which this practice was continuing as of 1969 was not clear, but output of alcoholic beverages has declined significantly since the Revolution.

The country also possesses a number of sugar refineries, most of them attached to mills, which turn the crude or "gray" sugar from the mills into a "white" sugar that is more able to endure long periods of storage than the crude product. There has reportedly been some expansion in the refining capacity of the island's twenty-one operating refineries, which were capable of producing over 600,000 metric tons of refined sugar per year in the early 1960s.

Tobacco

Tobacco is native to the country, and the industry as it evolved after the Spanish conquest was quite heavily oriented toward the export market (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations). Overall industrial output, in the form of cut tobacco, cigars, and cigarettes, was for many years second only to sugar in terms of value and the number of industrial workers employed. The value of the tobacco and livestock industries' factories and equipment—by contrast with that of the sugar industry—is not very great, but the amount of industrial labor performed in processing these goods is nonetheless considerable. Tobacco products, for example, are worth more than twice as much when they come from the factories than the tobacco was when it went in.

After independence the industry began to slowly move away from exports, a result of fewer available foreign markets and increased production costs. In contrast to the effects of skilled labor in tobacco cultivation, which were of great importance in the opening of foreign markets to Cuban tobacco, industrial labor practices seem to have closed off markets for finished products by raising the cost of production to prohibitive levels (see ch. 18, Agriculture). High costs were a particularly important factor in the cigar-manufacturing industry, which before the Revolution was well known for its strong unions and heavy dependence on skilled hand labor.

At the time of the Revolution three large mechanized cigarette factories, employing a total of over 1,500 workers, were operating on the island; however, most of the 1,000 tobacco-processing establishments were minute. In general, mechanization was kept to a minimum, with cigar production the least mechanized, and cigarette production the most mechanized of the three types of manufacture.

Since the Revolution mechanization has increased substantially. There has apparently been greater stress on the use of machinery in cigar manufacture, as well as a new emphasis on cigarette manufacture and production of lower quality goods for domestic consumption. By 1966, in sharp contrast to declines in crude tobacco output, cigarette production had risen to approximately 15 billion cigarettes; there has been no indication of any increase in cigar or cut tobacco manufacture since the Revolution.

During 1966 the government placed all stages in the cultivation, manufacture, distribution, and export of tobacco under a newly created organization, CUBATABACO. Sufficient data for judging the effects of this action were not yet available by 1969.

Meat and Dairy Products

The nation has a variety of meat-processing and dairy industries based on large-scale livestock production (see ch. 18, Agriculture). Slaughterhouses for beef and pork are found throughout Cuba, with the largest establishments being located in La Habana and Camagüey provinces. Before the Revolution most meat was sold fresh, without refrigeration, and there is no indication of any major change in this practice as of 1969. Processed meat is produced by a number of small and medium-sized establishments, though most of it is not of high quality and is produced under less than optimum sanitary conditions. Hides are often recovered for sale to tanneries, but use of other inedible by-products is limited to a few of the larger and more efficient plants.

Overall beef, veal, and pork production was almost enough to meet domestic demand before the Revolution; however, the depletion of livestock herds after the Revolution caused commercial meat output to fall during the period 1961—63. Since then there has been some recovery, with the best figures available indicating production somewhere in the neighborhood of 190 million metric tons in 1967. There has apparently been more commercial poultry meat production than there was before the Revolution, but accurate statistics on this minor industry are not available.

Almost all of the nation's approximately 2,000 dairies merely turned out milk as a sideline to the raising of cattle for beef before the Revolution, and dairy production in general received little emphasis. Commercial dairy production fell steadily through the first half of the 1960s, but since then major long-term projects designed to improve the island's cattle breeds have increased dairy production. In 1969 the government reported significant improvement in commercial whole milk production, which was apparently around 560,000 metric tons in 1967, as well as an increase in egg production; however, as of mid-1969 it was still too early to point definitely to any general upward trend.

In addition to its milk production plants, the dairy industry contains at least seven condensed- and powdered-milk plants, twenty-five pasteurizing plants, seventeen butter factories, twenty-six cheese plants, and fifty-nine ice cream plants.

Food Processing

Data on production of finished foodstuffs for domestic consumption have not been available since the Revolution, especially since the imposition of rationing in 1962 (see ch. 8, Living Conditions).

Canning

The domestic canning industry at the time of the Revolution was made up of about 160 firms, many of them very small. Approximately 45 percent of their output consisted of condensed milk and canned meat, with canned fruit, vegetables, and seafood accounting for most of the remainder.

In general, the industry has suffered from a lack of credit facilities, shortages of qualified managers and technical personnel, an absence of official inspections and grading standards, the need to import tin plate, and the low quality of agricultural goods made available for canning.

Shortly after the Revolution the Castro government placed a high priority on expansion of canning facilities. Significant plant capacity was apparently constructed for production of metal containers, but the effort was seriously hurt by difficulties connected with the importation of tin plate. There has been no evidence of any major change in the nation's canning capacity since the government began stressing agricultural production for export in 1963, although expansion of the fishing industry may well have provided the basis for increased output of canned fish products.

Flour Milling

Domestic grain milling appears to account for about half the wheat flour consumed domestically. Two wheat flour mills existed in 1965, and Cuban government sources said that their combined output was about equal to the wheat flour imported in that year. The production figures cited, 137,000 metric tons of wheat flour and 47,000 metric tons of bran and bran meal, against 138,000 metric tons of wheat flour imported, seem high considering that

1955 imports plus local production of wheat flour came to only 135,000 metric tons. On the other hand, bread was one of the last major food products to be rationed in the 1960s, an indication that supplies of wheat expanded considerably after the Revolution (see ch. 8, Living Conditions). In the early 1960s there were several corn mills in Cuba, as well as sufficient rice mills to handle all imported and domestic rice-milling requirements.

Beverages

Beverage-making facilities, including some fifty distilleries, ninety wineries, five breweries, and thirty soft drink and mineral water plants, drifted into the state sector of the economy after the Revolution. Soft drinks were being produced throughout the 1960s, though the government had experienced some difficulty in quality maintenance. Beer output fell after the Revolution, but the government reports production was around 50 million gallons in 1966, in comparison with an average of about 30 million gallons in the 1950s. Since the Revolution, not much information has been available on production of hard liquor, notably rum and cane brandy; however, the fact that little hard liquor was consumed domestically before 1959, together with the postrevolutionary need to divert sugar juices to sugar production, makes it very likely that output has indeed dropped. This conclusion is supported by a precipitous drop in the value of alcoholic beverage exports.

Other Food Products

The Cuban government has attempted to increase vegetable oil production, as a substitute for large quantities of vegetable oil and lard imported before the Revolution. According to latest available official statistics, over 32,000 metric tons of refined vegetable oil were produced in 1962 and 1963. A large number of other processed-food items are produced, including yeast, roasted coffee, baking powder, vinegar, gelatin, puddings, hydrogenated fats, starch made from cassava, and pasta.

Construction Materials

The most important segment of the construction industry is that of supplying construction materials. After the Revolution the unavailability of cement from the United States, the bulkiness of the material, and the presence of all necessary raw materials on the island provided impetus for adding to the two cement plants then operating. On the eve of 1970 four plants were functioning, with a fifth scheduled to go into operation late in the year; total output had increased significantly over the prerevolutionary figure of about

650,000 metric tons per year and was estimated at around 1 1/2 million metric tons per year.

Clay construction materials produced locally include building brick, tiles, refractory brick, and clay pipe. The most important of these items is building brick, which accounts for about three-fourths of the total value of clay product output. Refractory materials were produced by one factory before the Revolution, which generally managed to satisfy between 20 and 30 percent of local demand. Domestic output continued in the years immediately following the Revolution, though substantial imports through 1966 indicated little expansion.

Sporadic attempts were made both before and after the Revolution to produce glass and glass products locally. A large plant designed to produce pressed and blown glass was apparently being built in 1966, but as of 1969 no production figures were available.

The building industry taken as a whole has played a major role in the economy since the 1940s, employing in excess of 60,000 workers. A 50-percent reduction in house rent ordered by the Revolutionary government in early 1959 caused private housing construction to drop precipitously, and the government countered at once by embarking on a lavish array of state construction projects heavily oriented toward private dwellings and other unproductive units.

This orientation changed, however, after shortages of materials and foreign exchange appeared in 1962 (see ch. 8, Living Conditions). From then until the close of the decade, construction emphasis was on capital goods, such as factories, agricultural facilities, dams, and powerplants. With respect to housing, the government has shown notable interest in prefabrication; three prefabricated-housing factories were reportedly operating in 1966, and plans existed for building more.

Other Manufactures

Petroleum Refining

At the time of the Revolution the nation had three oil refineries capable of processing between 4.0 and 4.5 million metric tons of crude petroleum per year, more than enough to satisfy a domestic demand that was then around 3.1 million metric tons per year. The Castro government has been able to maintain these refineries at a high capacity. Imports of Soviet crude oil reached 3.6 million metric tons in 1961 and since then have varied between 3.4 million and 3.9 million metric tons per year. Apparently no insuperable difficulties have been encountered in refining these amounts of crude oil, though Russian assistance seems to have played a major role in maintaining refining capacity.

Metallurgy and Machinery

There were several large iron and steel foundries at the time of the Revolution, in addition to a few smaller ones; they were primarily concerned with production of heavy equipment such as mill rollers, vacuum pans, evaporators, boilers, and other items for the sugar industry. Significant amounts of cast-iron pipe were also being produced, and several small foundries were working with bronze, copper, and aluminum. There were also two large steel-fabricating plants turning out steel structures varying in size from rivets to railway-car parts; other smaller plants produced a large array of minor items, such as bobbypins, nails, and cooking utensils. In terms of value produced, the industry was dominated by the heavy equipment demand of the sugar mills.

Since the Revolution, the government appears to have concentrated on expansion of steel and iron production for capital equipment and spare parts. The only steelworks in the country capable of utilizing scrap metal, the José Martí Steelworks near Havana, was being expanded in 1966 under a technical assistance and cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union. Other plants were expanded or modernized in the 1960s, and a new steel foundry began operating in Santa Clara late in 1966. Initial plans called for this foundry to eventually turn out 5,000 metric tons of steel per year for fabrication of machine parts; there are indications that the plant produced about 1,500 metric tons of steel in 1967.

Chemicals

Several sulfuric acid plants were operating in the 1960s, and official reports claim production for 1962, 1963, and 1964 as 135,000 metric tons, 149,000 metric tons, and 195,000 metric tons, respectively. Other plants produced a variety of inorganic chemicals, such as caustic soda, chlorine, hydrochloric acid, sodium sulfate, silicate of soda, and carbon bisulfide. In 1965, 1,600 metric tons of caustic soda were reportedly produced.

Between fifteen and twenty fertilizer plants operated on the island before the Revolution, but most of these were mixing plants using imported raw materials. Limited amounts of nitrate and phosphate fertilizers are produced but have generally not exceeded 10 percent of total domestic fertilizer consumption. In 1969, however, Cuba was constructing a nitrogenous fertilizer plant near Cienfuegos with British assistance, to cost the equivalent of US$100 million, and another large plant was being built with Soviet help. The former plant is designed to turn out ammonia, ammonium nitrate, nitric acid, and urea, and is scheduled to begin large-scale production in early 1971.

Toilet soap, laundry soap, and detergents were turned out in sufficient quantity to satisfy domestic demand in the 1950s, but total output fell significantly in the first years of the Revolution. The drop was from about 83,000 metric tons in 1958 to less than 60,000 metric tons by 1963, with laundry soaps and detergents sustaining most of the losses.

Textiles and Apparel

The textile industry did not get started until 1931 but then grew rapidly and, by the middle 1950s, there were about thirty large textile factories producing sufficient cotton, wool, and rayon products to meet most local demands. This industry, however, was one of those most adversely affected by the Revolution, and in 1969 production was still well below pre-1959 levels.

Both the cotton and rayon mills were heavily dependent on machinery and raw material imported from the United States, and this helped cause output to fall drastically after 1959. Rayon mills, which depended on imported pulp, seem to have been particularly hard hit, with production dropping more than 50 percent after the Revolution.

Use of locally available raw materials was stressed after the first rather indiscriminate drive for industrialization in the early 1960s. At least one rayon plant has been modified to use *bagasse* pulp as its primary raw material, and there has reportedly been some recuperation in the rayon industry since the early 1960s. Production of rope and sacks from locally grown fiber plants, henequen and kenaf, was also emphasized throughout most of the decade; two plants were engaged in this activity in 1965, and the government had plans at that time for constructing two additional ones. There was still a noticeable shortage of textiles at the close of the 1960s as indicated by continued rationing of fabric for personal use in 1969.

The garment industry was consolidated in the 1960s, but production remained well below prerevolutionary levels. This industry was well developed in the 1950s, employing some 30,000 workers and supplying virtually all the needs of the domestic market. Like the United States garment industry, it was for the most part subdivided into tiny enterprises performing specialized functions, a feature that undoubtedly created difficulties when garment-making was nationalized.

Intense consolidation of garment manufacture appears to have been carried out after the Revolution. In 1965 the government reported that the number of plants making woven products (including clothing, blankets, hammocks, and others) was thirty-four in

1963, and that this had since been cut to fifteen. Administrative personnel in this section of the industry had been reduced some 50 percent. Overall, the woven-product and knit-product enterprises employed about 24,000 workers in 1965, or about 80 percent of the garment industry labor force of the 1950s. Major shortages of garments for unofficial use were indicated by the ration quota of one dress or two suits per person per year in 1969.

The leather industry, almost entirely dedicated to shoe manufacture, declined after the Revolution and has shown no signs of regaining its former vigor. Shoe production fell over 50 percent between 1957 and 1962, from a maximum output of about 15.3 million pairs per year. Though there has probably been some recovery since then, shoes were still rationed in 1969, and any shoes of reasonable quality were difficult to obtain at less than prohibitive cost.

Rubber, Paper, and Miscellaneous Products

Several papermills were operating in the 1950s, supplying the island with paper and paperboard. Most of the paper produced locally was for bags, wrappings, or other primarily industrial purposes. Specialty items such as writing paper, envelopes, and colored wrapping paper were turned out only intermittently.

The government claimed sharp increases in paper production through 1965, and it is likely that some increases indeed occurred, especially with respect to production of paper products from *bagasse*. As of 1966, however, writing paper still appeared to be in very short supply.

A rubber industry was established in the 1930s and by 1959 was supplying about one-third of the island's tire and tube needs as well as most rubber for domestically manufactured shoe parts. At that time the industry consisted of over twenty plants employing in excess of 1,500 workers. Virtually all raw materials except rayon for tire cord was imported. Statistics for the 1960s indicate that basic rubber items were still being turned out; however, most goods were apparently inferior in quality to those produced before the Revolution.

Domestic manufactures not mentioned thus far include plastics, pencils, matches, candles, and assorted wood products. With respect to plastics, official reports indicate that seven plants were operating in 1965, one of which was said to employ over 700 workers. Some difficulty in maintaining quality in match production has been reported by other sources, and pencils were in short supply as of 1966; however, production of most of these miscellaneous items was still underway at the close of the decade.

POWER

The nation has no adequate source of natural power. Coal is absent, the island's hydroelectric potential is negligible, and developed petroleum resources are clearly insufficient. As a consequence, most of the country's electric power is derived from imported fuel oil and *bagasse*.

Total installed generating capacity grew and increased roughly five times between 1935 and the Revolution, reaching a total of 932,000 kilowatts in 1959. Of these, 387,000 installed kilowatts were in the hands of private industrial establishments, mostly sugar mills; over nine-tenths of the remainder were in plants belonging to the American-owned Cuban Electric Company (Companía Cubana de Electricidad), and the rest was owned by small, scattered public services. The large capacity owned by the sugar mills contributed relatively little to actual output because it was almost completely inactive in the so-called dead season when the mills were not grinding cane (see table 13). Most of these mill-owned powerplants used pressurized steam generated by the burning of *bagasse* as their prime energy source.

Soon after the Revolution the Castro government cut the rates that the Cuban Electric Company could charge and followed this by nationalizing the enterprise. Similar action was taken with respect to the smaller private electric companies and a gas company that had been supplying gas to small sections of Havana. By 1962 a total of seventeen power stations outside the sugar sector were operating

Table 13. Power Generation in Cuba, 1955—67

Year	Installed Capacity (in thousand kilowatts)	Production (in thousand kilowatts)
1955	635	1,842
1956	645	2,063
1957	755	2,357
1958	n.a.	2,588
1959	932	2,806
1960	944	2,981
1961	956	3,030
1962	966	2,993
1963	976	3,057
1964	976	3,250
1965	976	3,700
1966	1,100	4,000
1967	1,100	4,250

n.a.—not available.

Source: Adapted from Jose M. Illan, *Cuba: Facts and Figures of an Economy in Ruins*, Miami, 1964.

as part of two grids run by the Consolidated Electric Enterprise: the so-called Eastern Grid operated in the south of Oriente Province; the Western Grid served the other provinces. Total power output in 1962 was: 1.793 million kilowatt-hours from the Western Grid; 204 million kilowatt-hours from the Eastern Grid; 45.6 million kilowatt-hours from isolated stations mostly in Northern Oriente; and 955 million kilowatt-hours from the sugar sector.

Total generating capacity remained virtually static through 1963, grew slowly through 1965, and expanded rapidly in 1966 and 1967 to a total of 1.1 million kilowatt hours. The basis for this expansion was provided by two major plants that began operating during the latter years, one about forty miles west of Havana and the other near Santiago de Cuba. The eventual planned capacity of the Santiago de Cuba plant was 100,000 kilowatts and that of the Havana plant was 200,000 kilowatts; extensive Soviet assistance and machinery were used in construction of these facilities. Another major thermoelectric plant, this one at Nuevitas, began to function in 1969; the plant was built with assistance of Czechoslovakia and has an eventual planned capacity of 120,000 kilowatts. On the eve of 1970 government plans called for five other new thermoelectric plants of varying capacities to be operational by 1971.

Very few hydroelectric projects have been attempted in Cuba because the terrain is not suitable. Two hydroelectric plants with a total capacity of 28,400 kilowatts were installed on the Habanilla River near Santa Clara in the 1950s. These stations were apparently inactive for some years but began working again in 1963. As of 1966 they were the only two significant hydroelectric plants in the country.

The predominance of oil-burning thermoelectric plants aggravates an already serious problem of increasing Cuba's dependence on petroleum shipments from abroad. Power generation appeared to be consuming well over 30 percent of the oil available to Cuba in the 1960s and consumed considerably more fuel than any other single activity unless all forms of transportation were considered as a single category. In view of the expansion of power stations toward the close of the decade, it seemed that the major threat to the country's power resources was related more to fuel problems than to any shortage of generating equipment.

CHAPTER 20

LABOR

By early 1970 the government had come to consider that the maximum use of the national labor force could make a major contribution to the solution of the country's economic problems. No other sector of the national culture has undergone such sweeping changes as those that have affected the status and utilization of labor. The government has increasingly devoted its energies to establishing labor as a dominant feature of national life, enhancing its dignity, and stressing the duty of every citizen to contribute his share in order to ensure the success of its goals.

The government has met with some success, and no citizen can be unaware of the pervasive prominence of the labor theme. The approach to labor has been patterned along Communist lines, and every individual is expected to respond to the country's needs. The government can point to some concrete accomplishments, and government programs have benefited the worker, particularly at the lower end of the economic scale. The goal of full employment has been achieved, and the half million seasonal workers who in the past found only three or four months' employment during the sugar harvest, now have steady jobs with guaranteed annual wages.

Whatever gains have accrued to the worker, however, have been at the cost of his freedom and individuality. Labor organizations are controlled by the Confederation of Revolutionary Cuban Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba Revolucionarios—CTC—R), sometimes called the Central of Cuban Workers, a Communist-run federation of the country's labor unions. More concerned with promoting the progress of the party than the welfare of its members, it is a bureaucratic control mechanism rather than a representative labor organization. The worker has no voice in planning, standards of output, working conditions, wage scales, or labor discipline.

One of the first acts of the new government in 1959 was to take over control of the country's labor unions. In the early flush of revolutionary enthusiasm it was able to place partisans of the 26th of July Movement in positions of leadership, and thus impose its will on the unions. Through nationalization of industry and agrarian reform, the government soon became the nation's principal employer and working through the CTC-R and the Ministry of Labor,

348

was in a position to dictate the direction and policies of the labor movement.

From the start, government policy in the area of labor relations was designed to promote four principal goals: reduction of unemployment; increase in production; nationalization of private enterprises; and indoctrination of workers in its aims. The government promptly began to neutralize the political importance of the unions and to reeducate the workers. A number of labor disputes that developed early in the new regime were summarily dealt with, always along government-dictated lines; the emphasis was on increased productivity rather than increased wages and on voluntary unpaid overtime rather than shorter hours.

Over the years the trend to increasingly stringent government controls continued. By early 1970 production norms were being set by government decree, as were working conditions and wage scales. Individual unions continued to exist but were subordinate to the CTC-R, which made all major policy decisions, subject to the approval of the Ministry of Labor. Disputes had to be submitted to a ministry-appointed coordinator, and issues of any significance usually were forwarded to Havana for resolution. The labor movement evolved into an organ of revolutionary indoctrination, the labor organizations becoming government instruments for exhorting workers to greater productivity and for discouraging demands for increased compensation. Many unions appeared to have no function other than propaganda, urging the worker to build up the country's socialist society through austere adherence to the Marxist line.

The government has made significant progress toward achieving one of its principal aims, the creation of an egalitarian socialist society. Despite government manipulation of the labor movement to its own ends, the worker has benefited in some areas. Although he must work as much as, if not more than previously, he has relative job security, and his pay is adequate, although wage scales have not increased in absolute terms. There is a marked degree of economic equality, and the gap between upper and lower extremes of compensation has been narrowed to the point where no man need feel economically inferior. A cabinet minister's salary of 500 Cuban pesos a month (1 Cuban peso equals US$1—see Glossary) is about five times the 85 Cuban pesos to 125 Cuban pesos a month earned by an unskilled laborer in the countryside.

The income gap in purchasing potential at different socioeconomic levels has been closed even more dramatically. Many households have two or three wage earners and, with a variety of services such as education, housing, or medical care virtually free, the average worker often finds himself with a surplus of funds. Food is rationed in limited quantities, and many consumer goods items are scarce or nonexistent. A worker can often spend his money on unaccustomed luxuries, such as an expensive restaurant meal or a vacation at a luxurious resort hotel. Fidel Castro has called his regime a government of the labor and peasant classes, and many workers have come to believe it.

ORGANIZED LABOR AS A POLITICAL FACTOR

Organized labor has rarely been independent of government pressures or control. Since the time the first unions were formed in 1889, most labor organizations accommodated to the governments in power, wheras these, in turn, came to terms with labor. It was usually possible to arrive at mutually beneficial arrangements, the government granting favors to the unions in exchange for industrial peace and cooperation with the political powers. Complete control, however, was usually conditioned by two factors. First, the unions were usually not unified or cohesive and were themselves a battleground for contending political groups, with a handful of labor leaders having enough strength to be in a position to bargain for claims on their support. Second, many close personal relationships existed between union leaders and officials of the government, which often enabled labor leaders to press for concessions based on shared interests.

The authoritarian nature of the Castro regime has enabled it to impose a more effective control over labor than had any other government in the past. This was accomplished not only by political maneuvering and pressures on independent labor leaders but also in part by the capitulation of labor itself. Responding to Castro's charisma, the rank and file of workers were willing to entrust their welfare to him. As a result, the unions virtually lost their identities and strength and became impotent.

The country's first labor organizations, formed in 1889 under Spanish rule, were unions of tobacco workers and longshoremen in Havana. They were headed by Spanish anarcho-syndicalists, who distrusted political activity and favored direct action with employers. Their ideas continued to influence the labor movement for many years after their leadership was undermined by President Gerardo Machado in the 1920s. Thereafter, control passed increasingly into the hands of Communists. Unlike the early leaders, these men brought the labor movement into close association with political events.

The country's unions grew rapidly in size and scope and by the 1930s included virtually the entire labor force. They ranged from advanced industrial unions to small craft guilds; until 1933, however, they were disunited and marked by internal dissension. The 1933 general strike, which contributed to the overthrow of Machado, was the first instance of unified action on the part of labor, and the success of the strike's organized thrust led to the formation of the Nation Labor Confederation of Cuba (Confederación Nacional Obrera de Cuba—CNOC).

Although the leadership was primarily Communist, the CNOC united a group of forces of widely divergent political persuasion, from far right to extreme left. For the most part the older craft and artisan organizations stood on the conservative right. These included some of the unions of railroad, tobacco, and construction workers, as well as retail clerks. On the left were most of the mass membership unions, among which were the sugar, textile, and transportation workers. Between the two polar groups was a variety of unions of different shades of political coloring that cut across particular occupations and constantly shifted their allegiances.

The general strike of 1933 was the first in a number of labor disruptions that took place throughout the succeeding two years. This period of unrest spurred the government to test its ability to control the unions, and the government emerged victorious from the confrontation. The more radical aspects of organized labor were checked; union leaders were arrested; and the CNOC was dissolved. Between 1935 and 1938 the labor movement was without the direction of a national federation.

The unrest of the times induced government and labor to seek compromise solutions to their differences, instead of the pressures or force that usually proved inimical to both sides. In late 1937 Fulgencio Batista reached an agreement with Communist labor leaders whereby they were given a free hand in the reorganization of the labor movement in exchange for their political support. It was decided to found a new national federation, and, in January 1939, the Confederation of Cuban Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba—CTC) was established. The new organization included unions led by independent and Party of the Cuban Revolution (Auténtico) leaders, but control at the top once again rested in Communist hands.

The CTC continued to be active over the years, surviving a number of vicissitudes and changes in political climate. Communist leadership came and went, depending on the attitudes of the governments in power. After a period of uneasy truce, the Auténtico party wrested leadership away from the Communists in 1947. The leftist elements broke off from the parent group and formed their own CTC but, faced by strong government opposition, their strength declined rapidly. The Communist CTC continued a covert and ineffectual existence until 1951 when, for strategic reasons, it was ordered by its upper echelons to affiliate with the official government CTC.

The official CTC was still the country's major labor federation when Castro came to power, although it had experienced a turbulent period of ferment and unrest during the years preceding the Revolution of 1959. Castro found the CTC useful, and it has continued in operation during the ten years of his regime. In early 1970 it was, however, a far different organization from its original concept. The old-line Communist leaders had been replaced by handpicked young revolutionaries loyal to Castro, and the designation of "revolutionary" had been added to its title; the structure was reorganized so that all unions were subordinate to the federation; and instead of functioning as a traditional labor organization, the CTC had become merely the centralized instrument of Communist Party control.

LABOR FORCE

Cuban labor has always been primarily a wage-earning force. Even in agriculture the vast majority of workers were wage earners who were employees with no ties to the soil or to any specific locality.

The basic pattern of the labor force has not changed drastically since 1959. Castro's early efforts to industrialize the country's economy were abandoned soon after the early indication of failure, and his plans were not sufficiently advanced to have effected any significant changes in the composition or character of the working population (see ch. 19, Industry). There have, of course, been some changes. Greater emphasis has been placed on working women, and some increases in feminine employment have resulted. There has been a degree of decentralization, and agricultural labor is somewhat more diffused throughout rural areas. The sizable military establishment, through its civic action programs, has become a contributing labor factor, and many workers not usually associated with manual labor have joined the agricultural labor force, at least for a time, in response to government pressures attendant on harvesting the sugar crop (see ch. 25, The Armed Forces).

Cuba's last officially announced census, taken in 1953, showed the total labor force to be approximately 2.1 million. In 1960 the Ministry of Labor released the results of an informal labor census, which indicated a total numbering 2.3 million. In early 1970 the force was estimated at between 1.9 million and 2.4 million, with more informed opinion leaning to the larger figure. Estimates were based largely on casual observations by periodic visitors—the government was no longer publishing any data or statistics on labor practices or conditions, and there was little official information reaching the outside world.

Agricultural Labor

Before the Revolution, government statistics indicated an agricultural labor force of some 807,000, representing 38.5 percent of the entire working population. Approximately 218,000 of these were classified as farmers, and 489,000, or 60.6 percent, were paid agricultural workers, almost all of them in sugar production. The balance were in other agricultural pursuits, including forestry and animal husbandry.

The only statistics on the subject released by the Castro government have been the results of the 1963 Development Plan prepared by the Ministry of Labor. These figures showed the agricultural force as 915,000, or 42 percent of the total, with approximately 450,000 wage workers. The drop in wage earners, principally in the sugar industry, was attributed to agricultural diversification, and the figures did not include labor available from volunteers from other sectors or the contributions of the military. Indications were that in early 1970 the figures and ratios had not changed very significantly.

The nearly 40 percent of agricultural workers who did not work for wages before the Castro regime were mostly self-employed cultivators producing for a market. The group included small-scale cane growers associated with the sugar mills, producers of dairy products and truck garden crops, and sharecroppers in tobacco. A small percentage were subsistence farmers living in remote areas isolated from the market by inadequate transportation. A great majority of the self-employed had small farms and hired a relatively insignificant percentage of the agricultural wage labor. It was reported that 64 percent of all farm wageworkers were employed by 8 percent of the farms, all of them over 249 acres in size; 1.4 percent of the farms, all over 1,200 acres, employed close to 33 percent.

The agrarian reform program of the new regime limited the amount of land that could be held by any one individual. Excess holdings were placed under cooperative and state management or in a few instances distributed in small parcels to the workers. The total number of wageworkers who received land titles has never been announced, but it was reported that there were over 1,500 state farms operating under the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria—INRA). It is estimated that roughly one-third of the agricultural labor force was affected by these changes and now works in cooperatives or on state farms rather than for private employers.

Although the environment and conditions surrounding agricultural labor have changed significantly under Castro, the work itself has not changed its basic character. The government has become virtually the country's sole-employer, and even if a man farms his own land, he is, in effect, working indirectly for the state, as the government controls the marketing of his produce. For the average worker this presents both advantages and disadvantages. Required to conform to a Communist system, he has lost his independence and freedom of action; he cannot leave his job to seek a better one; his promotions and transfers are controlled by the state, as are his production quotas, wages, and working conditions; and the state can discharge him and prevent him from getting other employment, or it can forcibly impose work on him as a duty or as a sanction. In compensation, he has a degree of job security, and the seasonal aspects of agricultural labor, particularly in the sugar industry, have been eliminated, ensuring him a guaranteed annual wage. He is protected by social security, is compensated during periods of illness or incapacity, and is assured housing, medical care, and ultimate retirement.

The sugar industry is the backbone of the nation's economy, and its importance is continually injected into the country's labor consciousness. It employs the largest number of workers, and contributing to its success has been made a patriotic duty. Castro set a goal of a 10 million-ton harvest for 1970, a figure almost twice the country's average annual production. This goal was not met although tremendous effort was devoted to the attempt. The harvest totaled 8.5 million tons.

In an effort to attain his goal, Castro constantly besieged the population with exhortations to work longer and harder. Volunteers were sought throughout all economic sectors to donate their spare time, and even government ministers, including Castro himself, made their contribution to cane cutting. Drives to recruit more women met with some success, and many joined the male workers in the fields. Military units were put on agricultural tasks and were joined by youth organizations and prisoners from jails and work farms. In order to concentrate on the sugar crop objective, the 1969 Christmas holidays were completely ignored, and work schedules in all industries were maintained as usual in order not to interfere with production.

Urban Labor

All of the country's nonagricultural labor is officially classified as urban labor, even though much of it is performed in outlying rather than urban locales. Best available figures indicate that the force numbers some 1,269,000 workers, which represents 58.0 percent of the total labor force. For statistical purposes it is broken down into six major categories, reported as: industry and manufacturing; services and administration; trade; construction; transportation; and mining.

The largest group reported in the Ministry of Labor's 1963 Development Plan was industry and manufacturing, with a total of 462,000 workers. This represented 36.4 percent of the urban workers and 21 percent of the total labor force. Before the Revolution, this category had amounted to 16.6 percent of the economically active population. Services and administration was the second largest group, with 339,000, or 27.4 percent of urban workers and 15.5 percent of total workers. Before Castro it had constituted 20.1 percent of the entire labor force.

There were 188,000 workers reported in trade. This was 14.5 percent of urban workers and 8.6 percent of the total labor force. The number of people in trade was declining steadily as government took over more and more establishments and the small businessman disappeared. Before 1959 an average of 12 percent of the work force had been engaged in trade and had at times reached close to 25 percent.

Construction accounted for 150,000 workers and transportation for 120,000. This was 11.7 and 9.4 percent, respectively, of the urban force and 6.9 and 5.5 percent of the total. The final category shown was mining, with 10,000 employees reported, representing 0.8 percent of urban workers and 0.5 percent of the total labor force. Statistics were further broken down into broad categories of laborers and supervisory personnel. Laborers were reported to constitute 84.5 percent of the force; administrators and technicians, 10.7 percent; and supervisors and officials, 4.8 percent.

There are no firm official figures on female employment, but there have been a number of estimates released by demographers and other observers. Before the Revolution, 83 percent of the total labor force was reported to be men, and 17 percent women, with 52 percent of all employed women living in Havana. Estimates in early 1970 showed female workers ranging from 20 to 23 percent. Because of the emphasis on women doing agricultural work, the percentage of female workers in Havana was estimated to have decreased to between 43 and 47 percent of the female labor force. As most women were still employed in a variety of services, from government to domestic, the high ratio of urban female employees was expected to continue.

As early as 1965 the government claimed that unemployment, both total and partial, had been completely eliminated. Government releases stressed that anyone who wanted to work was guaranteed full employment on a year-round basis and, in fact, noted that there were seasonal labor shortages in a number of areas. For those who sought to avoid work, the government had a number of ways of applying pressure, from withholding ration cards or assignment to labor battalions, to actual arrest and imprisonment. These procedures were not foolproof, but they were effective in a majority of cases, and few able-bodied men within the prescribed age limits were able to avoid making their contribution to the nation's overall labor force requirement.

LABOR ORGANIZATION

Before 1959 an estimated 800,000 to 1.5 million workers of the total labor force of 2 million belonged to labor organizations. Although the higher membership estimate was probably considerably inflated, the labor movement was strong and since 1933 had exercised significant influence on political and economic life. After 1959 the number of labor organizations and the size of the membership increased as the government moved rapidly to draw all workers into the tasks of the Revolution and mobilized mass labor support for the government. By 1961 the national labor federation claimed a membership of 2 million workers of an estimated labor force of 2.4 million. It was becoming apparent, however, that the political functions of the labor unions—to support the government and indoctrinate workers—were overshadowing their role as representatives of their members' economic interests.

Castro retained the CTC, renamed it the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers of Cuba (Confederacion de Trabajadores de Cuba Revolucionarios—CTC-R) and promptly set about to reorganize it along Communist lines, setting up a hierarchy of executive committees and bureaus that dictated the policies and direction of the labor movement. They were made up of Communist Party members and followed the Soviet pattern of labor organization.

The confederation was made up of all the country's national unions, which at the time of organization numbered twenty-five. These included the unions of all national economic enterprises, such as sugar, tobacco, transportation, agriculture, and construction, and extended to such fields as education, the arts, and medicine.

The new direction of labor policy was clearly evident in the new CTC—R charter adopted in 1963. The confederation's stated mission is to: organize and maintain union affiliation for all workers, manual and intellectual; protect workers' rights; increase production and productivity; defend revolutionary power; strengthen the worker-farmer alliance; practice international solidarity; combat discrimination; educate the working class; and encourage all activities to build up the country's socialist society. This was elaborated on at the CTC—R national congress in 1966, adding that the worker movement must concern itself with stimulating the masses and awakening their initiative; and it must develop conscious labor discipline, eradicate bureaucracy, and apply strict work standards and wage schedules.

The organization and functioning of the CTC—R are direct and authoritarian. It has authority over all unions, and is subordinate only to the Ministry of Labor. The Communist Party structure is superimposed on the federation and forms an integral part of the framework; the party is represented at all levels, including the Ministry of Labor. Supervision of each union's activities is in the hands of the local executive committee, which is selected at the municipal, regional, and provincial level. Party cells form the basic foundation of the directing structure and constitute the ruling executive bureau at the higher supervisory levels. The national union leadership is selected by the members of the union's executive committee at the provincial level.

The individual unions themselves have no independent authority and serve, in effect, merely as the instruments for passing on the instructions of the CTC—R. Before 1959 labor legislation had permitted the organization of unions either on a craft or industrial basis. The Castro regime eliminated organization by crafts and required a vertical grouping along industrial sector lines. This sharply reduced the number of unions and facilitated centralized control. It meant that all employees of an industry, collective farm, or other enterprise had to belong to the same union, regardless of their occupation. Thus, an electrician working in a chemical plant had to join the chemical union, and a chemist working in a sugar mill had to affiliate with the sugar workers' union.

The new structure of the CTC—R had been prescribed in the Law of Union Organization that was promulgated in August 1961, but almost two years passed before it was fully implemented. Citing Lenin's argument that organization on a craft basis encouraged divisions among the working class and created privileges and conflicting interests, the law followed the principle of organizational unity. It set up a virtual union monopoly, with only one organization in each enterprise or basic unit of work and one central union in each labor or administrative sector.

The law provides for a complex interrelationship of the various union echelons at different levels, but it does not prescribe how these are to operate. The union sections in the enterprises of a given industry affiliate with the regional and provincial bodies in that industry and with the appropriate national union. At the same time, a dual chain of command maintains representation in the CTC—R through its corresponding local, regional, or provincial body, regardless of the industry involved. Coordination is effected usually through the respective executive committees, which act somewhat in the capacity of boards of directors.

Although the new law ostensibly guaranteed free unionism, including the right of workers to join or not to join, a number of its provisions ensured governmental control and, in effect, deprived the individual of any freedom of action. The system of exclusive unionism precluded any choice in affiliation, as there was no alternative to joining the officially recognized union. Government pressures were provided to coerce workers into joining the union by withholding benefits and advantages or even by implying threats to the job security of nonjoiners. The right of assembly and freedom of expression were circumscribed by requiring that these rights be exercised "without detriment to production, the administration in general, or the interest of the public service." Finally, the right to vote or run for union office were barred to anyone with a record of having committed any so-called counterrevolutionary offense.

An additional control feature that was started in 1968 and has since spread throughout all labor organizations was the formation of labor councils to operate at the provincial level under the supervision of the Executive Committee of the CTC—R. These councils are surveillance groups designed to investigate the reliability and social conformance of the workers. Their announced function is to check individual production, ensure that all goals are met, urge acceptance of "voluntary" extra assignments, and encourage the declining of overtime pay.

The councils also serve in the capacity of basic summary labor courts and are authorized to apply labor justice. This is limited to adjudicating minor disputes and disciplining minor failures or breaches by workers. Labor violations beyond their jurisdiction are handled by the Labor Justice Administration, which operates the country's labor tribunals. These consist of labor courts, labor review courts, and labor courts of appeal.

The country's women have been loosely organized since 1960, when the Federation of Cuban Women (Federación de Mujeres Cubanas—FMC) was formed. This is an association of female workers under the supervision of the Ministry of Labor, but it operates more as a welfare organization than as a labor union. With the emphasis on increased sugar production and the drive to recruit more women into the labor force, however, the FMC has increasingly become an instrument of government propaganda. Since early 1969 it had been conducting a strenuous campaign to enlist more working women and had set a goal of 100,000 additional workers by the end of the year.

Although little official information has been released on the subject, there were indications that the FMC campaign was meeting with some success. In September 1969 a broadcast by the Minister of Labor announced that the drive had succeeded in recruiting over 90,000 new female workers. Earlier estimates had placed the number of working women in the country at approximately 380,000, out of a total eligible female population of 2 million; 46,000 were in agriculture and 334,000 in various government enterprises, including education and social services. Successful fulfillment of the FMC drive would bring the working female population to some 480,000, or 20 percent of the overall labor force.

Typical of the distribution and utilization of female labor was the situation in Matanzas, which was the only province to publicize the results of the FMC drive. In December 1969 it reported its female work force as 18,405 in services (a sizable percentage in domestic work), 3,670 in industry, 3,345 in agriculture, and 600 in sugar mills. Matanzas was probably an average province with respect to totals and ratios; La Habana and Oriente provinces would undoubtedly have considerably larger figures.

WORKING CONDITIONS

A worker's rights, welfare, and the conditions surrounding his labor are meticulously defined and protected by a broad spectrum of progressive and enlightened legislation. The harsh realities of the country's economy, however, have made this legislation more theoretical than real.

Soon after coming to power, the revolutionary government enacted a series of laws affecting labor and regulating its conditions and practices. Most of these laws were favorable to labor and appeared to offer a new status of dignity and fulfillment to the working man and woman. Among some of the principles incorporated into law were the freedom to organize, a maximum eight-hour day, equal pay for equal work, safe and sanitary working areas, and guaranteed annual vacations at full pay. In early 1970 these laws, along with many others, were still in force, but their observance was dependent on the needs of the state. If their application did not interfere with the goals and interests of the government, they were observed, but if their use caused any conflict, they were ignored.

Some of the legislation has been effective and has resulted in definite benefits to a sizable segment of the working population. Job security for agricultural workers has been achieved, and seasonal unemployment has been eliminated. Discrimination has been done away with, except for persons unsuited to certain types of work because of sex, age, health, or political beliefs. Free basic and advanced vocational training are provided, and social security and retirement benefits accrue to all workers.

Other laws have met with less successful application. In most cases noncompliance has been dictated by the frenetic drive to increase production, particularly in sugar, but the net result has worked to the disadvantage of the worker. The eight-hour day is almost universally ignored, and ten- and eleven-hour days are commonplace. In addition, workers are urged to volunteer for an extra hour, usually without additional pay. The law calls for a month's vacation for each eleven months worked, but the granting of vacations is extremely erratic, as there usually is some "national emergency" to prevent a worker's absence. Holidays are similarly ignored in many cases, and pressures are applied to encourage forgoing free time.

Wages

The usual criteria for comparative evaluation of working conditions, such as wage scales, housing, and benefits, are generally inapplicable. Under prerevolutionary standards, Cuba ranked high in the wage level of its labor force. Statistics published by the International Monetary Fund for 1957 through 1959 showed Cuba ranking fourth among Latin American countries, with an annual per capita income equivalent to US$374. It was considerably higher than most Asian countries and compared favorably with some European states.

During this same period Cuba ranked fifth among all the nations of the world in the percentage of its total national income paid to the workers. With 66.6 percent going to wages, it was surpassed only by the United States, Great Britain, Canada, and Panama and was well ahead of many more developed countries. Pay was not the only criterion, however, and conditions in many other areas left much to be desired.

There was scant information on wage scales in early 1970, as no official data were released by the government on the subject. Occasional press releases and broadcasts, or general statements by observers, are often contradictory and of questionable validity. Available information indicates that pay ranges from approximately 100 Cuban pesos a month to a maximum of 500 Cuban pesos. This covers a span from unskilled day laborer to government ministers. One of the few decrees made public was Resolution No. 291, of December 31, 1968, which established a wage of 4 Cuban pesos a day for sugar workers who met the government-established production standards.

Pay is subject to a variety of deductions that, during the ten years of the Castro regime, have averaged some 15 percent of a worker's wages. This compares with approximately 4.75 percent before the Revolution. The purpose and applicability of these deductions have been changed periodically, but the total percentage withheld has remained generally constant.

Income tax accounts for the largest deduction, running from 10 to 12 percent for all workers. Employees contribute an additional 1 percent for union fees and 3 percent for so-called voluntary deductions. These have included such projects as the construction of monuments, the purchase of arms, help to earthquake victims in Chile, and the campaign against illiteracy. To compensate somewhat for substantial increases in the income levy, some types of deductions that had been in effect since before 1959 were eliminated.

In the mid-1960s the results of an economic project at the University of Miami by a Cuban exile group estimated that Cuba's real per capita income had declined to 185 Cuban pesos a year. Other estimates ranged as high as 300 Cuban pesos. The 185 Cuban pesos is probably low, but the Cuban worker is probably not as badly off as it appears.

Judgments based on standards or criteria in other Latin American countries are relatively meaningless, as a Cuban's life is geared to a controlled economy that offers certain benefits and advantages to compensate for losses in other areas. He has a high degree of security, and he receives considerable assistance from the state in providing for his basic needs. Many services are furnished gratis, housing costs are free or minimal and food, although rationed and in short supply, is officially controlled at prices that fit his income. In actual purchasing power the worker, as distinct from the former middle or upper class executive, is probably no worse off than he was before the Revolution. Despite the gains in some areas, his life is, nevertheless, austere and sterile, with more work and little diversion.

Housing

In the early stages of the new regime there was considerable publicity released relative to workers' housing. There was a concerted drive to construct new units, and unspecified numbers of peasants were moved from their dirt-floor shacks into new, modern quarters with unaccustomed conveniences. Despite occasional photographs of peasants receiving titles to their new homes, there was an almost complete paucity of factual information. The number of workers who may have benefited from the program is not known, but recent reports from observers and the lack of official publicity on the matter would appear to indicate that the project was not meeting with great success. Reports of sizable reductions in construction industry activity would also appear to support this view.

Whether or not a worker owns his own home, however, the government has eased the matter of lodging. Agrarian and urban reform laws forbid multiple house-ownership, and all privately owned real estate, except for an actual dwelling, is seized by the state, which has become virtually the country's only landlord. Rents are strictly controlled and are kept at a low level that rarely exceeds 10 percent of a worker's income. All rent payments are credited to the tenant toward eventual purchase, and the average occupant can get title to his house in twenty years. There are still shortages of dwelling units, the results of dislocations, area concentrations, and increases in population. Some construction is going ahead, but the rate of completion is not high enough to provide for all requirements. Most workers, however, particularly agricultural workers in the countryside, are better housed than they were before the Revolution (see ch. 8, Living Conditions).

There is widespread use of temporary housing, necessitated by the development of new agricultural areas, often at locations far removed from settled communities. These are usually tent camps. They may be used for local workers awaiting permanent quarters or for urban volunteers committed to a specific agricultural task. The camps, which accommodate both men and women, are generally adequate and provide basic crude comforts. They generally have mess and recreation tents and are equipped with day nurseries for children of working mothers. Some of the outlying camps, such as those in Camagüey and Oriente provinces, house up to 2,000 workers. One installation on the Isle of Pines had a contingent of 600 women from the Havana area who were planting coffee seedlings.

Voluntary Labor

Voluntary labor includes periodic work by people not usually employed full time, such as students or militia personnel; work in the sugarcane fields by office and administrative employees; and overtime donated to the state without additional compensation. Although called voluntary by the regime, it is usually termed forced labor by anti-Castro groups.

In the early enthusiasm of the new regime, large numbers of persons responded spontaneously to the appeals of the government for contributions of labor to further the goals of the Revolution. Thousands of workers freely offered their services to the state, donating extra hours or working on weekends and holidays, and the government profited from these contributions in increasing production at no extra cost. As time went on, however, and the novelty and zeal wore off, voluntary offers fell off rapidly, and the government was obliged to exert pressure to ensure the continuation of this supply of labor.

By early 1970 the system of voluntary labor was solidly entrenched as a permanent facet and had been designated as such by both government and labor leaders. The pressures applied by the authorities range from subtle exhortations or branding as an enemy of the socialist state to threats of loss of permanent employment. Recruiting of voluntary labor is accomplished through the CTC-R and its component labor unions by the management of state enterprises, the FMC, the schools, and the Communist Youth Organization (Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas—UJC).

The latest reports available from Cuba on the size of the voluntary work force, for 1967, showed a total of 70,000, a sizable increase from the 15,000 reported in 1962. This force is used on a wide variety of tasks in the agricultural, industrial, and service fields. It includes planting and cutting sugarcane, harvesting fruits and vegetables, picking coffee and cotton, and planting trees. It is also used in constructing buildings and roads and repairing hurricane damage.

There are four different approaches to the utilization of voluntary labor: as overtime hours added to the regular workday; on holidays and weekends, particularly Sundays; during paid vacations; and for a specific continuous period while on leave of absence from a regular job. This last, called long-term voluntary employment, may run from one to six months, during which the worker receives his regular wages. It is most commonly used by urban workers who volunteer to engage in agriculture, usually in the canefields.

The FMC has recruited thousands of females, particularly housewives, into the volunteer force. In 1967 their number was estimated at between 5,000 and 10,000 and in 1970 was believed to be higher. In addition to administrative and service jobs, women have worked as laborers in the fields of sugarcane, cotton, coffee, and rice. As a majority of women usually work in agricultural areas close to their homes, the government is saved the expense of lodging and board, which it must provide for workers who are dispersed to localities away from their residences.

Students began volunteering in numbers for unpaid labor in 1962, and in 1964 the system was made compulsory. A decree of the Ministry of Education required all elementary and secondary school students between the ages of six and fifteen to work on state farms or in factories on weekends and during school vacations. While engaged in agricultural work, students generally were housed at their worksite for periods of one to six weeks. Toward the end of 1965 the system was extended further with the inclusion of university students, who were ordered to participate in voluntary labor for periods of three to six weeks a year.

There are signs of growing opposition to voluntary labor, and the government is finding it necessary to apply stricter pressures. After nearly ten years in force, however, the system is firmly entrenched, and its discontinuance would require a major upheaval. Whether through conviction or coercion, most workers still respond to Castro's exhortations. The matter of unpaid overtime, in particular, appears to have become a fetish almost approaching mass hysteria. Spurred by Communist Party activists, large groups have pledged their support of the Revolution and renounced overtime pay. Typical was a mass meeting of workers held in Havana in August 1968, where over 139,000 men and women announced their waiver of overtime pay. Under the surface, however, observers report widespread resentment and dissatisfaction.

For the government, voluntary labor has proved a beneficial and economical solution to much of its labor requirement. Although recognizing its economic contribution, many government leaders have stressed its ideological value in bringing together urban and rural workers and as "a vehicle to promote unity and understanding between administrative and manual workers." Ernesto (Che) Guevara, in 1964, stated that voluntary labor should not be looked at for its economic importance but, rather, as the element that most actively develops the worker's conscience, preparing the way to a new classless society. In any event, everyone in the government agrees on its advantages, and all indications are that the government clearly intends to continue it.

GOVERNMENT AND LABOR

Government control of labor was systematically pursued from the inception of the Castro regime. The removal of old-line union leadership and its replacement by young revolutionaries made possible the changes in the structure and organization of the country's labor unions that were to lead to equally radical alterations in their functions. The concept of unions as independent instruments with some control over industry for the benefit of the worker was promptly discarded, and labor organizations were integrated into a central planning structure for the defense of the Revolution and the development of national economic growth.

The proposed functions of the newly reorganized unions were set forth in the Law of Union Organization, which was promulgated in August 1961. The law directed unions to "assist in the fulfillment of the production and development plans of the nation, to promote efficiency, expansion, and utility in social and public services." Union personnel were directed to work in close cooperation with agricultural, industrial, and financial management, but at the same time they were to help protect workers from administrative abuses.

Like the unions, the status of the Ministry of Labor was significantly modified through the allocation of steadily increasing powers. Starting in 1960 the ministry was given a dominant role in the intervention process and the settling of worker-employer relations. It acquired additional authority after the nationalization of industry and was made an integral part of the national planning mechanism, with supervision of job distribution and labor mobility. In August 1962 the government directed all workers to acquire identity cards, and the ministry's Division in Charge of Labor Control was entrusted with the issue, distribution, and control of these documents.

The government did not limit its attention to organized labor, but set about to eliminate all activity and employment that did not stem from the government itself. The regime relentlessly undermined the farmer who worked his own land, the independent and professional worker, the small merchant and industrialist, and the landlord. By early 1970 all of these categories had virtually disappeared from the economic scene and had become dependent on the state.

State control is exercised for the most part by means of organic laws of the Ministry of Labor. The first such law, enacted in 1960, illustrated the trend of government labor legislation; several labor control offices were established and placed in charge of a variety of specific labor functions. One was given the function of controlling employment throughout the country. This involved the maintenance of registers of employed and unemployed, showing the distribution and movement of workers, work applications, types of jobs available, wages paid, and terms and conditions of employment.

Information for the occupational register was gathered through the informal labor census of 1960. These data became the basis of a national roster that was used to control all labor movements. All workers, whether or not employed, were required to register, and the roster was used to distribute employment opportunities. Additional organic laws over the years ensured ever tighter government control, to the point where the Ministry of Labor could announce through the press that it could "guarantee full compliance with the directives established by the Revolutionary Government as far as labor is concerned."

There were early attempts to create the illusion of worker participation in the decisions affecting his labor. Technical advisory councils were set up to involve the workers more intimately in production. The councils were given the task of developing emulation plans, improving working conditions, and ensuring consent and active participation of workers in establishing goals and procedures. Grievance commissions were also created to handle local disputes that could be resolved without referral to a coordinator or labor court.

Both of these devices were short lived and by 1964 had fallen into disuse, with new legislation assigning their functions to the Ministry of Labor, along with the formulation of work standards and wage rates. By 1968 work norms, standards of output, hours, wages, working conditions, and granting of employment were all in government hands; there were few decisions left within the purview of the workers themselves.

One device used extensively by the government to increase output and productivity is the principle of socialist emulation. This is basically the fostering of competition between individuals or groups for the purpose of increasing production, and it relies on incentives granted for success or punishment for failure. The project was started in 1963 and has been continued, with varying degrees of success, since that time.

The regulations for the organization of socialist emulation were published in the *Official Gazette* in February 1963. They define emulation as "a method designed to build Socialism based on the maximum activity on the part of the working masses." The regulations stress that the project is aimed at increasing the productivity of the majority of workers and not of isolated individuals. Incentives are designed to reward the individual for exceptional performance in exceeding work minimums. The rewards held out are social rather than monetary and consist of recognition, public commendation, or designation as labor heroes.

Emulation has probably been of some value to the government in promoting revolutionary ideology and socialist disciplines, but its success in increasing production has been erratic. Although it has fulfilled its purpose in a few isolated areas, for the most part it has failed to get an enthusiastic response from the Cuban worker. During 1969 numerous reports indicated widespread worker apathy and indifference, marked by a lack of response to any type of government exhortation. This has been of serious concern to the authorities, who have repeatedly denounced labor's indolence, absenteeism, and low productivity.

A final aspect of government-labor relations is the ubiquitous presence of the Communist Party. Although the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba—PCC) and its predecessors nearly always exerted a strong influence on the labor movement, since the Revolution its grip on the entire mechanism of government has been strengthened to the point where it is now the dominant power of the government. Through its cells at the worksite level it controls the local unions and, through membership in executive committees and bureaus, directs the CTC—R, which determines the course of Cuban labor. In early 1970 it was still an indirect control, but as in other phases of government operation, the party was steadily assuming a more prominent and clearly defined role in the direction of national affairs, with labor an important element of the whole (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values).

CHAPTER 21

DOMESTIC TRADE

In early 1970 the government supplied all major services and directly controlled all legal marketing and distribution. Official policy stressed provision of roughly equal shares of essential goods to all citizens while deemphasizing those commodities considered nonessential. Consequently, most luxury goods were very high priced or unobtainable; likewise, many nonvital services—especially those catering to wealth before the Revolution—had completely disappeared. Those that remained, such as restaurant and hotel services, were generally of low quality and very expensive.

Except in the area of nonessential goods and services, prices played a sharply diminished role in domestic trade. The government assured that most necessities carried very low price tags, placing them within reach of nearly everyone, and that such services as medical care and education were provided free or at very low cost. Since the supply of such goods and services was limited, other factors arose to determine their distribution. In cases where demand consistently exceeded supply, needed goods and services simply became unobtainable. Beginning in 1962 such supply shortages were partially checked by stringent rationing. Since then rationing has continued to be a prominent feature of Cuban commerce.

Domestic trade has also suffered from chronic transport problems, partly owing to the lack of maintenance of railroad track, rolling stock, trucks, and buses. This has been caused by the continuing shortage of qualified technicians and spare parts, especially parts for old equipment made in the United States.

As of early 1970 prospects for radical change in the domestic trade sector appeared minimal. Improvement of port facilities and continued growth of the merchant marine seemed likely; however, the government was experiencing difficulties in maintaining land transport systems at current levels of operation, and there were plans to purchase up to 4,000 trucks and buses from Japan. The consistent low priority given consumer marketing and services made it somewhat less likely that there would be significant improvements in that area in the 1970s.

COMMERCE AND SERVICES

Transition to State Control

Large numbers of small independent retail stores were operating throughout most of the 1960s, but most wholesale enterprises, commercial services, and department stores had been taken over by the government.

After the Revolution, for about one and one-half years, relatively few businesses were taken over by the government. With few exceptions, state actions were limited to setting prices for some goods, creating a National Tourist Commission to oversee the tourist trade, and establishing the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria—INRA), which soon assumed major trade responsibilities in the rural areas. Substantial numbers of expropriations did not begin until late 1960, following finalization of major trade and credit agreements with the Soviet Union (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations).

The first major series of appropriations came in September and October of 1960, a few weeks after seizure of farms, industries, and public utilities owned by United States citizens. Local branches of United States banks were nationalized in September, and expropriation of other banks and practically all sizable commercial enterprises followed. Wholesalers, various types of retail stores, and many service establishments, such as hotels, motion picture theaters, beauty parlors, insurance companies, and radio and television stations, were swept up in this action.

To manage its growing inventory of commercial firms the government created a special Commercial Department of INRA in October 1960. Some services were placed elsewhere—for example, the insurance companies were assigned to the Social Security Bank, and the radio and television stations were placed under the Cuban Broadcasting Institute—but most expropriated commercial services went into the Commercial Department.

In February 1961 the department was converted into the Ministry of Domestic Trade, and the Ministry of Trade, which had existed since before the Revolution, was abolished. The new ministry was given broad powers to regulate both state and private commerce, and by 1962 it was directly operating some 8,000 retail enterprises organized into seventeen consolidated enterprises. The largest of these enterprises were clothing (3,028 outlets), food stores (1,130 outlets), and hardware stores (1,109 outlets). Most of these outlets were in urban areas and were particularly numerous in Havana. In the countryside people's stores, set up by INRA, took on a major role; by 1964 some 1,600 of these were in operation.

From 1960 on commerce was characterized by increasingly close state regulation and slow elimination of the private sector. Almost all wholesalers and important private services had disappeared by 1963. In addition, since late 1960 the government has set virtually all retail prices, including all prices at which the remaining private operators can legally buy and sell. These price controls were used to regulate consumption patterns and to limit the potential field of action of private entrepreneurs. Sharper limitations were imposed by rationing, which was introduced in 1962 and which has gradually become tighter. Such controls soon produced a thriving black market, against which the government waged a vigorous publicity and police campaign.

Despite adverse conditions private retailers continued to play a significant role in trade through the mid-1960s. Estimates vary, but it has been claimed that about 30 percent of the agricultural products marketed in rural areas in 1965 were sold by private merchants. Similar informal estimates indicate that up to 30 percent of Havana's retail outlets were privately operated in 1966. These percentages plunged downward in early 1968 when the government suddenly expropriated the remaining private concerns as well as such small retail services as nightclubs and photography studios. In Havana alone some 4,300 private businesses passed into government hands in 1968, and throughout the country legitimate private commerce ceased to be economically significant. The government had shown no signs of relaxing its complete domination of commerce by 1970 and at that time appeared irreversibly committed to a policy of continued state control.

Organization of Commerce

In early 1970 the Ministry of Domestic Trade still controlled most commercial activity. It was directly responsible for most wholesale marketing as well as nearly all urban retailing of goods and services. Subject to the supervision of the Central Planning Board (Junta Central de Planificación—JUCEPLAN), it also bore responsibility for setting most prices in the trade sector.

Aside from top leadership decisions and general planning guidelines, there were few restrictions on the ministry's actions within this field. It did suffer a significant setback in 1967 when it was reorganized as a result of an antibureaucracy campaign. Its working force was cut to eighty-seven people, and all its vice ministries were abolished. This undoubtedly reduced the volume of work it could do, but as of early 1970 there was still no evidence that the ministry's tight control of most domestic trade had been seriously threatened.

Within the Ministry of Domestic Trade's jurisdiction, trading entities are grouped into commercial consolidated enterprises resembling the consolidated enterprises of the industrial sector (see ch.

19, Industry). Initially, as was true of the industrial enterprises, they were lumped together according to function with little regard for geographic location. Eventually, however, greater stress came to be placed on regional peculiarities, which led to creation of local administrative organs and mixed regional retail enterprises in the mid-1960s.

Around the periphery of the Ministry of Domestic Trade's area of responsibility other large state economic organizations play roles in domestic commerce. Except for the sugar, tobacco, coffee, and cacao crops, INRA controls all acquisition of farm produce through a system of procurement centers and runs the rural people's stores that account for a large portion of retail sales in farming areas. INRA also dominates the National Association of Private Farmers (Asociación de Agricultores Privados—ANAP), which plays a major role in supplying seed, fertilizer, and technical assistance to independent farmers (see ch. 18, Agriculture). INRA, the Ministry of the Sugar Industry (Ministerio de la Industria Azucarera—MINAZ), and the Cuban Export Enterprise together handle cultivation, milling, and export of sugar.

The Ministry of Domestic Trade is not involved in transferring sugarcane to the mills and is only marginally involved with marketing the finished product, since almost all of the crop is exported. The Cuban Tobacco Enterprise (Empresa Cubana de Tabaco—CUBATABACO) controls all business involving tobacco; in the commercial field this means providing supplies for private growers, distributing leaf to processing plants, distributing finished tobacco products to retail outlets, and proposing retail prices for these products. Commerce in coffee and cacao is also controlled by the Cuban Coffee Enterprise up to the stage of distribution of the processed beans.

In contrast to the agricultural sector, in early 1970 the Ministry of Domestic Trade had full responsibility for internal distribution and marketing of most industrial products. There were few incursions into domestic trade on the part of import and export firms run by the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The most notable exception was the Ministry of Foreign Trade's Hardware Import Enterprise (Empresa Importadora de Ferretería—FERRIMPORT), which assumed responsibility in 1966 for distribution and sale of hardware products as well as their importation. The transport sector, though intimately linked to domestic commerce, was controlled by the Ministry of Transportation.

Overall supervision of domestic commercial transactions is in the hands of JUCEPLAN, which establishes general guidelines for transactions among state enterprises and within the private sector. But specific transactions involving two state enterprises, whether or not they belong to the same ministry, are generally the result of negotiations between the two enterprises themselves. Money accounting of such transactions has apparently been replaced by barter agreements; that is, a producing enterprise gives its goods to a state marketing agency and receives equipment, raw material, and cash for salaries from other state organizations.

Prices, however, are still important in retail marketing, private agriculture, and foreign trade. Most retail prices are set by the Ministry of Domestic Trade, whereas INRA and the Ministry of Foreign Trade are responsible for establishing prices in the other sectors. Price levels, especially in the case of important products, are set according to JUCEPLAN guidelines and are subject to approval by that organization.

Consumer Marketing

Prices and Rationing

From 1962 through early 1970 the most striking feature of consumer marketing was the rationing system. Of the items rationed, foodstuffs were probably the most tightly restricted. Near the end of the decade a Havana resident's weekly food ration was about six ounces of meat, four ounces of fish, two pounds of potatoes, twelve ounces of pasta, twelve ounces of rice, six ounces of beans, four ounces of chickpeas, one plantain, one bar of chocolate, and two ounces of coffee. One bottle of milk per day was alloted children under three years of age; adults were permitted to buy six cans of condensed milk per month. Bread rationing, introduced in Havana in 1969, limited consumption to seven ounces per person per week. Less important food items were also rationed, and in general the allotments were in line with those already mentioned. The major exception was sugar, which was not tightly rationed.

These ration quotas changed with time and varied within the country. For most foods the government clearly intended rationing, rather than prices, to determine the consumption pattern. In accord with this policy, prices were kept very low, and ration quotas were strictly enforced.

Ways of compensating for slim ration quotas included purchasing goods on the black market and eating at restaurants, where the items served were not checked off the patron's ration card. Both sorts of action were expensive: a meal at an average restaurant generally costs well over four Cuban pesos (1 Cuban peso equals US$1—see Glossary); black-market prices were at least four or five times greater than those established by the state. Furthermore, it was apparently becoming increasingly difficult to carry on black-market activity by late 1969. In urban areas the market usually depended on private farmers near the city selling produce to independent shopkeepers. For this reason establishment of state-run "green belts" around major cities and elimination of most private shopkeepers reportedly diminished the importance of the black market after 1968.

Aside from food, the most important rationed items were clothing, textiles, shoes, and gasoline. As of 1967 every person was limited to one pair of shoes per year, three pairs of socks, and three sets of underwear; women could purchase a dress, and men were allowed two pairs of pants, three shirts, and one complete suit. These allotments were supplemented by home-produced clothing made from whole cloth, which was also rationed. Strict gasoline rationing began in 1968. Quotas varied from about four gallons per month for a motorcycle to 25 gallons per month for a 250–300 horsepower automobile.

Less vital goods were also rationed, but with many such items price considerations were more important than ration restrictions. For example, in the mid-1960s a table radio cost about 200 Cuban pesos; other electrical appliances and most durable consumer goods were similarly priced.

Services

In general, services followed the same general pattern visible in the marketing of goods. Those deemed essential became either free or very inexpensive. In early 1970 medical and dental services were free, and higher education had been made free through a system of scholarships. Urban transportation was very cheap and was free for school children; kindergarten was free, as were all school lunches. Rents and water bills had been eliminated, and funeral and burial services were free. Also, several services not generally considered essential were provided without cost; admission to government-sponsored sports events was free, and there was no charge for local telephone calls from public telephones (see ch. 8, Living Conditions).

On the other hand, the quality of many incidental services deteriorated sharply in the 1960s. Retail store services designed to attract customers had virtually disappeared from consumer markets. There was almost no advertising of any kind; urban store windows were unlit; and most stores were only open for a few hours in the late afternoon and early evening. To visitors, the most visible deterioration occurred in the services connected with the almost nonexistent tourist trade, such as hotels, restaurants, and nightclubs. Many other minor services also went into decline, however, and a fair number disappeared as their functions were done away with in an effort to divert resources into more productive channels.

Distribution

Distribution shortcomings constituted one of the economy's most serious weaknesses in early 1970. The problem was not so much rationing as the fact that even tightly rationed goods were frequently unobtainable due to production shortcomings and distribution obstructions. A good illustration of such an obstruction is provided by a government study of bread distribution in Havana in 1966. According to this study, published in the March 3, 1966, issue of *Granma* (the official government organ), bread was so badly distributed in some parts of the city that most consumers went directly to the bakeries to buy their bread. This produced long lines of people at the bakeries, which were relatively few in number and located away from most consumers, even though sufficient bread was apparently being produced to satisfy demand.

On a countrywide scale, difficulties like this aggravated the situation created by shortages of goods and produced long queues for a large number of badly needed items. It was not unusual for such lines to involve overnight waits, and government measures adopted in the late 1960s to set limits on the time allowed in line had proved unenforceable. About 1969 the situation became so serious that the government announced a campaign against what it claimed was a nationally organized ring of line-standers making a business of selling places in line to waiting patrons.

This deterioration in the distribution system was probably more marked in the cities than in rural areas, partly because the rural distribution had been less developed. In general, the prerevolutionary distribution system had concentrated very heavily on urban areas, notably Havana, leaving rural areas badly neglected. In the early 1960s the Castro government tried to compensate for this by deemphasizing urban affairs while making major investments to improve rural distribution systems through such measures as the construction of large numbers of people's stores. Migration of rural people to urban areas from 1960 to 1969 eased the rural situation, but further increased the pressure on urban distributors.

Other problems affected both urban and rural areas. The transition to state control tended to produce overcentralized administration, especially in the first postrevolutionary years, and elimination of individual profit reduced the incentives of wholesalers and shop personnel previously accustomed to working for profits. Centrally made estimates of popular demand for a product were often inaccurate, leading to oversupply of the item in question. Because wholesalers, merchants, or consumers were not in a position to reject shoddy merchandise, quality control became very difficult. The government appointed teams of inspectors to help maintain quality in the mid-1960s, but there was no indication that this problem had been solved by the end of the decade.

Furthermore, the distribution system bore much of the brunt of difficulties in other sectors of the economy. When problems emerged in agriculture, industry, and transportation, the official concern was to keep the economy functioning at a reasonable level, which meant diverting resources away from both distribution and production of goods for private consumers. To a large degree scarcities of consumer goods were logical consequences of the government's concentration on capital goods and production for export throughout most of the 1960s.

TRANSPORTATION

Since domestic commerce depends heavily on the transport sector for adequate distribution, postrevolutionary commercial developments were very closely tied to events affecting transport. These fell into two major classes: events related to revolutionary reorganizations and the transition to a state-run economy, and those resulting from the shift to new foreign sources of equipment, spare parts, and fuel. By the mid-1960s all privately owned transport had been expropriated and assigned to the Ministry of Transport. Airlines and shipping firms were engulfed by these takeovers along with the nation's bus, truck, and railway lines. Cuba's international trade had shifted away from the United States, and most new equipment was coming from Communist countries. Spare parts, needed to bridge the gap from old United States-made equipment to new trains, trucks, and buses from Europe and the Soviet Union were generally unavailable. Such transportation-adjustment problems affected all economic sectors, but they played a particularly important role in the deterioration of domestic trade.

Railroads

The nation's extensive railroad system deteriorated rapidly in the first years after the Revolution, and this decline had still not been made up by early 1970. For example, according to the Cuban government, only some 7.4 million metric tons of freight were carried by rail in 1964, in comparison with an annual average of about 25 million tons in the 1950s. The number of functioning locomotives had reportedly been reduced to 165, in comparison with a prerevolutionary total in excess of 500.

Total track amounts to over 11,000 miles, the majority of it standard gauge (56½ inches), and the remainder is an assortment of narrow gauges (24 to 36 inches). Roughly 80 percent of the track is located in the three eastern provinces. Only four-fifths of the country's track is deemed operable by the government.

Major maintenance problems were considerably aggravated by events following nationalization. Trade difficulties with the United States and a shortage of foreign exchange made replacement parts hard to obtain, and the government showed little inclination to assign high priority to railroad maintenance. The consequent deterioration of rail lines and rolling stock was quickly felt because the major lines had been making little or no profit since the 1930s and hence had done little more than keep the equipment marginally operable. There were some reports of track repair and importation of new rolling stock, especially locomotives, in the latter 1960s but no indication that the government was contemplating any major expansion campaign.

The primary function of the rail system is the transportation of sugarcane and sugar products, which account for 75 to 85 percent of total rail-freight tonnage. Most of the rest of the rail freight consists of other agricultural products. In contrast to freight, the rail system's passenger transport function has increased significantly since 1960, mainly because large numbers of freight cars have been used to carry passengers.

Highway Transport

Roads

In 1969 the government was attempting to improve and expand the country's extensive road network. It appeared, however, that many highways underwent significant deterioration during the preceding decade.

The most important roadway and the chief connecting link between major cities is the Central Highway, which runs from Pinar del Rio to Santiago de Cuba. In general, this road follows the island's central axis, except for one portion that skirts northward to reach Havana and another section that follows a Z-shaped pattern in Oriente Province. Although in spots other roads parallel the Central Highway, especially in the western part of the country, it is still the most convenient, and frequently the only, route for most long-distance traffic.

Until 1968 there were few efforts to increase the roughly 9,000 miles of roadway that existed at the time of the Revolution. The only well-publicized exception was construction of a series of minor roads in Oriente Province, the area most in need of additional roads. The most important of these projects, a 97-mile highway running from Guantánamo to Baracoa, was completed in 1966.

As of the end of 1968 total road length appears to have been somewhat less than 9,500 miles, but during 1968 and 1969 the government began drawing public attention to major road construction projects. These included a planned 503-mile "superhighway" from Havana to Santiago de Cuba, which was apparently under construction in mid-1969, as well as expansion and improvement of roads used extensively for transporting sugarcane. Over 1,200 miles of sugarcane roads had reportedly been "constructed" by mid-1969, but it is likely that much of this activity consisted of road maintenance and improvement rather than construction of wholly new arteries. Most of these agricultural roads fall into the category of unpaved highway, which accounts for a least 60 percent of the nation's road mileage. Minor roads such as these have traditionally constituted the most neglected part of the nation's road systems, especially in the rural east; the evident effort to improve them, if continued, could have a significant impact on communication with rural areas.

Vehicles

The major highway transport problem has been maintaining an adequate stock of vehicles. Private cars, the use of which has been discouraged by the government, no longer account for a significant percentage of passenger transportation. Fuel shortages and a lack of spare parts for United States-made equipment have also had a major impact on truck and bus transport. In accordance with fuel rationing measures imposed in 1968, twenty-five gallons of gasoline per month are allotted to large private automobiles and eight gallons per month to small ones.

Truck freight is believed to constitute more than 20 percent of the total freight tonnage transported by land. As of 1969 the Cuban government reportedly possessed some 60,000 cargo trucks, about one-third of which were imported before the Revolution. The unavailability of new parts has made most of these older vehicles only marginally operable. The importance of this parts problem is expected to decrease gradually as more and more of the old trucks are removed from circulation.

Considerably more buses were operating in 1969 than the roughly 4,500 in service ten years earlier. In all, over 4,500 new buses were imported between 1960 and 1969, including over 650 British-made Leyland buses, but a significant number of United States models imported before the Revolution were still in service at the close of the decade. There was no indication that this augmented bus service has come close to compensating for the virtual total elimination of the more than 90,000 private automobiles and 20,000 taxicabs previously in service.

Air Traffic

Air service has expanded steadily since 1962 to take up the slack left by withdrawal of airlines by most non-Communist countries and the shortage of passenger vehicles. The official Cuban Aviation Enterprise, which is in charge of all civil air transport, carried about 500,000 passengers in 1968, twice the annual average carried by the principal national airline before the Revolution. Domestic operations accounted for almost all of this traffic.

Regular domestic flights by the national aviation enterprise serve sixteen airports, the most important of which are near Havana (José

Martí Airport), Camagüey, Cienguegos, Holguín, Santa Clara, and Santiago de Cuba. Other centers served include Baracoa, Bayamo, Cayo Mambi, Guantánamo, Manzanillo, Moa, Nicaro, Nueva Gerona (on the Isle of Pines), and Varadero. The national enterprise also operates flights between Havana and Mexico City. In addition, there are direct flights by airlines of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia connecting Moscow and Prague with Havana.

When air transport was nationalized, the government took over an assortment of United States- and British-made aircraft operated by domestic lines. Among those used for civil aviation in the 1960s were some ten C—47s, at least three C—46s, and four British Brittanias. The United States-made aircraft were kept running for a time with stopgap repairs, but most were gradually phased out; the Brittanias, however, were still operating in 1969. In addition, Soviet-made airplanes had been brought in to fill the gaps and to permit expansion of air transport services. The types involved include the IL-14, IL-18, AN-12, and An-24; a number of AN-2s have also been brought in and are being used in crop-dusting activities.

Passenger transport dominates civil aircraft activities to such an extent that freight transport seems insignificant by comparison. In 1966, for example, about 3,000 metric-ton miles were reportedly flown; passenger-miles flown that year apparently totaled about 180 million.

Ports and Shipping

As of early 1970 the shipping trade was still adjusting to a drastic reorientation of freight patterns. Two principal changes were involved: construction of port facilities capable of handling large deep-draft vessels and expansion of the national merchant marine.

When the United States was the country's major trading partner, most exports were carried on small freighters or oceangoing ferries that could take on cargo at minor ports. Most of these ports were not deep enough to accommodate large freighters and were unable to store sufficient goods to serve them effectively. Trade with Communist nations, however, required larger vessels efficient over long distances, and these created an urgent need for enlarged port facilities. As a result, many of the smaller harbors were deemphasized in favor of a few of the larger ones, whose piers were extended, and major loading and storage facilities were built.

With sugar constituting the bulk of the nation's exports, it was natural that much of the new construction should be specifically designed to handle this product. Toward the end of the 1960s new terminals for loading and storing sugar for export were completed near Matanzas, Guayabal, and Cienfuegos (one of the largest sugar-handling facilities in the world).

About two-thirds of all imports entered through the Port of

Havana before the Revolution, so that the shift to imports from Communist states did not place as great a burden on harbors away from the capital as did the shift of exports. The Port of Havana did experience difficulties in handling the Soviet cargoes at the beginning, however, and efforts were made in the mid-1960s to redirect some of this traffic to less congested places. Most of these import-related problems still had not been reduced to manageable proportions by early 1970.

Some 10 million metric tons of goods per year were being transported to and from the island by ship toward the end of the 1960s. This was about the same amount that was carried in the years preceding the Revolution, although the distances involved were much greater. This international traffic carried about 98 percent of the total freight tonnage, with coastal shipping accounting for the rest. Even though the nation's merchant marine expanded rapidly during the 1960s, the tonnage shipped by Cuban vessels in 1969 was still less than 12 percent of the total. As of the middle of that year the merchant fleet consisted of forty-nine vessels with a total deadweight of over 370,000 metric tons. Oceangoing freighters acquired after 1959 accounted for over 80 percent of this tonnage.

Coastal shipping has been a minor activity because of the island's well-developed road and rail systems. In places not served by these systems, notably parts of Oriente Province and the Isle of Pines, coastal shipping is more important. For example, the Oriente Province transport fleet, consisting of about twenty small schooners using a combination of steam and sail, was responsible for about one-third of all coastal shipping in 1967. The Isle of Pines, which is difficult to reach because of extremely shallow water between it and the mainland, is served by tugboats and a ferry service.

COMMUNICATIONS AND POWER

Electricity

The Castro government has expressed strong interest in uniting the nation's power networks and has shown signs of trying to carry this out. By early 1970 powerlines linking a number of isolated powerplants in Pinar del Rio and Oriente provinces to larger grids had been completed, and work was underway on a 220-kilovolt line between Santiago de Cuba and Nuevitas. Long-range plans reportedly call for this line to be extended in such a way as to eventually unite the Western Grid serving parts of Camagüey and all provinces to the west, with the Eastern Grid serving Oriente Province. According to a government report, 753 miles of 110-kilovolt line and 740 miles of 33-kilovolt line were functioning in early 1969.

The campaign to consolidate power networks is designed to improve the efficiency of power distribution in the face of serious power shortages, especially in the Western grid. The city of Havana and other areas within the Western Grid were subjected to frequent power blackouts toward the end of the 1960s. At that time the government was sponsoring publicity campaigns to reduce power consumption, and it had become evident that power demand was in danger of outrunning available supplies despite completion of several major thermoelectric generating plants (see ch. 19, Industry).

Part of the reason for these shortages is that the increase in installed generating capacity during the decade failed to keep pace with population growth and the consequent increases in consumer demand. This was aggravated in the capital by migrations from the countryside and by the fact that most of the government's expansion and maintenance efforts were directed toward rural areas (see ch. 4, Population). Also, the actual generating capacity of the system was often far below its installed capacity because of routine maintenance stoppages and the frequent breakdown of aged equipment. Regardless of generating capacity, however, the growing scarcity of fuel needed for power generation made it very unlikely that these chronic power shortages would be eliminated in the foreseeable future.

Communications

As many as 2,000 pay telephones were installed in Havana after the Revolution; the number of automatic exchanges was apparently increased in some areas, and limited attempts were made toward the end of the 1960s to expand telephone service to isolated rural areas. These projects appear to have been limited in scope, however, and there is no evidence that they have done much more than keep up with maintenance problems and population growth. In early 1970 the total number of operating telephones on the island appeared to be around 200,000. International long-distance exchanges were maintained to the United States, Mexico, Puerto Rico, the Soviet Union, and a number of other countries.

The national telegraph system has some 400 offices throughout the country, but service in the past has tended to be inefficient. Some modernization has been accomplished through installation of teletypewriters imported from East Germany (German Democratic Republic), and in 1969 a program was underway to expand service to rural areas of Oriente Province.

CHAPTER 22

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS

In early 1970, as in the past, foreign trade was of critical importance to the economy. The key element was sugar, which was produced in large quantities, with only a small portion of the crop being absorbed by the domestic market. The economy's traditional pattern is one in which sugar exports are used to obtain a large variety of imports not produced domestically.

Because of this dependence on imports, any attempt to drastically reduce the role of foreign trade would be very costly to the economy. The nation's capacity for any radical change in foreign trade had been reduced in early 1970 by extensive international debts and domestic economic weakness, but there were indications that a policy of self-sufficiency for some currently imported products was likely to receive growing attention in the years ahead.

The Soviet Union has been the nation's leading trading partner and creditor. The total debt to the Soviet Union exceeded the equivalent of US$2 billion in 1970; this figure did not include military aid, indirect subsidies, or the economic cost of buying large quantities of sugar, a product in which the Soviet Union is self-sufficient. About half the island's total trade in that year was with the Soviet Union; other Communist trading partners took up about one-quarter, the balance going to non-Communist nations.

Sugar still dominated exports in early 1970, but by then a growing role for nickel exports had emerged. Tobacco and a few other agricultural and mineral products played relatively minor parts. Imports were much harder to describe because of their diversity, but they included large amounts of foodstuffs, capital equipment, and fuel, as well as a variety of durable consumer goods and raw materials. Barter agreements formed the basis for most foreign economic relations with Communist bloc countries.

BACKGROUND: ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

For the first half of the twentieth century the island's dependence on foreign trade meant dependence on trade with the United States. This was because the United States' share of the market generally amounted to over two-thirds of Cuba's total foreign trade. The nation had other trading partners, mostly in Europe and the Western Hemisphere, but their roles appeared minor by comparison. The most important of them were, in descending order: the United Kingdom, Venezuela, Canada, several other European countries, and Japan.

The primacy of the United States in foreign trade was reinforced by formal trade agreements, investment patterns, and established business procedures. From 1903 to 1948 a series of official bilateral agreements gave Cuban sugar a 20-percent preferential tariff reduction upon entering the United States, and United States exports to the island received similar tariff reductions. The situation became more complicated after negotiation of the multilateral General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), but a separate supplementary agreement with the United States preserved the preferential tariff relationship between the two countries. Another feature binding the two nations together was the sugar quota system set up in the 1930s to prevent deterioration of sugar prices in the United States market. Under this system Cuba's sugar producers were allotted as their quota a substantial portion—about 28 percent—of total United States consumption, and were thereby assured prices considerably above those prevailing outside the United States.

The influence of foreign investment was another binding force. The book value of United States investment, a calculation based on the initial costs of installing plants and equipment, amounted to about US$1 billion in 1958. Nearly one-third of this was concentrated in public utilities, but United States-owned firms also produced over 30 percent of the island's raw sugar and heavily influenced major parts of its mining and manufacturing industries. Their total annual sales usually exceeded one-quarter of the gross national product (GNP).

Because of these trade and investment patterns, consumers became accustomed to a seemingly limitless supply of products from their northern neighbor. Most cars, trucks, buses, trains, and even aircraft were United States models, for which supplies of spare parts and knowledgeable technicians were readily available. Most pieces of machinery on the island were made according to United States designs and engineering specifications for the same reason, which often made it especially easy to process United States-produced raw materials in cases where imported raw materials were required. The accepted standards of measure were either old Spanish standards or those used in the United States, rather than the metric system employed by most European and Latin American nations.

The attractive force of these economic ties was so powerful that even the infrastructure of the nation's foreign trade was strongly affected. Most exports were shipped from a multitude of tiny ports on small freighters or oceangoing ferries. These small ships also provided quick import service to rural areas. The disadvantages of the system were that most of the ports were unable to serve large vessels and that the small vessels used were not efficient over long distances. Neither of these circumstances made much difference so long as only short trips to the United States were involved, but they became quite important when the main axis of trade was shifted to the Communist world (see ch. 21, Domestic Trade).

At first the advent of the Castro government did not have a great impact on economic relations with the United States. The total value of foreign trade declined slightly in 1959, but there was no disproportionate effect on the United States' share. Large amounts of direct United States investment, totaling about US$63 million, flowed into the country during the first year after the Revolution, but toward the end of that period, the situation began to change. Initially, the government appointed "interventors" to oversee the operations of several large United States-owned companies; then some agricultural land owned by United States citizens was seized in the course of implementing the 1959 Agrarian Reform Law; mining and petroleum laws were issued that severely handicapped foreign mining operations; and new tax laws were passed that discouraged foreign ownership and investment. The result was that most foreign companies began cutting back their operations or shutting them down altogether. By early 1960 the Castro government was openly seeking major economic agreements with the Communist world, and virtually all United States and other private foreign investment had ceased.

Foreign trade, including trade with the United States, continued on a fairly substantial scale through mid-1960. The downturn came after the island's three oil refineries, two of them United States-owned, refused on technical grounds to refine crude petroleum from the Soviet Union. The government then seized the refineries; the United States cut Cuba's 1960 sugar quota in retaliation; most United States-owned property was quickly expropriated; and in November 1960 the United States placed a partial embargo on exports to Cuba. This embargo permitted purchases of foodstuffs and medicines, but such purchases were negligible, and from that time on trade with the United States ceased to be of major importance. A nearly complete embargo was imposed in 1962; in mid-1963 Cuban assets in the United States were frozen, and a prohibition was placed on dollar transactions with the island.

The extent and long duration of economic relations with the United States caused these actions to have tremendous economic impact. Although their effects were most strongly felt during the early 1960s, consequences of the blow were still evident in early 1970. The problem of finding new markets and suppliers was significant but was eventually overcome. A harder task was training replacements for United States supervisors and technical personnel leaving the island; but the main problems were obtaining replacement parts for old United States-made equipment, finding raw materials that fit into United States-made machinery, and adapting non-United States machinery to an economic structure for which it had simply not been designed (see ch. 19, Industry). So long as old equipment plays an essential role in production, as it was still doing in early 1970, this situation will continue to have an adverse effect on the economy.

TRADE

Data on trade activities is not precise because the government does not publish official statistics, but there is sufficient rough data indicating the general structure of foreign trade arrangements (see table 14).

Well before 1970 trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe completely replaced the former massive trade with the United States. Simultaneously, state organs rather than private entities came to control all trade. Influenced by a variety of economic ailments and political considerations, exports fell far behind imports, in marked contrast to the relatively minor trade deficits of the 1950s. The composition of imports had changed, shifting away from luxury consumption times and toward greater emphasis on capital goods. About the only really familiar feature in early 1970 was the island's mix of major exports: sugar, tobacco, and metals. There had been some alteration in the importance accorded one or another of these items since prerevolutionary days, but that was of minor significance compared to the other transformations that had occurred.

Direction of Trade

The way was cleared for large-scale trade with the Soviet Union by the signing of a bilateral trade and payments agreement in February 1960. This agreement initially committed the Soviet Union to purchase 3 million metric tons of sugar annually from Cuba for 1962—64 and to extend a credit equivalent to US$100 million repayable over twelve years. The agreement was later amended in 1964. Trade and payments agreements with other Communist states quickly followed, and by the end of 1960 most of the nation's trade had been committed to the Communist world. From then until 1970 this trade predominated; data reported by the United States Department of State indicate that the share of foreign trade directed toward the West amounted to only about 25 percent by the end of the decade.

The Soviet Union dominates the nation's trade. The Soviet Union accounts for well over half of the value of trade with the Com-

Table 14. Cuban Trade for Selected Years, 1958, 1964–68[1]

Year	1958[2]		1964[3]		1965[3]		1966[3]		1967[3]		1968[3]	
	Amount	Per-cent	Amount	Per-cent	Amount	Per-cent	Amount	Per-cent	Amount	Per-cent	Amount	Per-cent
Exports												
Principal Market												
United States	490	67	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other non-Communist countries	225	30	293	41	140	20	148	23	145	20	144	24
Soviet Union	14	2	275	39	375	55	285	45	375	53	280	46
Other Communist countries	5	1	141	20	171	25	207	32	195	27	186	30
Imports												
Principal Market												
United States	543	70	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	n.a.	n.a.
Other non-Communist countries	234	30	327	32	220	25	218	24	232	23	n.a.	n.a.
Soviet Union	(–)[4]	(–)[4]	411	41	420	49	479	54	550	56	n.a.	n.a.
Other Communist countries	(–)[4]	(–)[4]	277	27	225	26	203	22	208	21	n.a.	n.a.

n.a.—not available.

[1] All data after 1960 are highly unreliable. They were estimated by using data of reporting countries, and estimating sources were not always comparable.

[2] In million Cuban pesos. In 1958, 1 Cuban peso equaled US$1.

[3] 1964—68 data are in million US dollars.

[4] Minus means insignificant, if any.

Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Foreign Regional Analysis Division, *A Survey of Agriculture in Cuba*, Washington, 1969.

munist world, and since 1965 the value has frequently exceeded that of all other countries combined. Since the sugar agreement went into effect, the Soviet Union has absorbed about half the island's total sugar exports, which have accounted for about nine-tenths of the value of all the nation's exports to that country.

Even so, these sugar shipments have been considerably smaller than was planned in 1964, and trade with the Soviet Union has continued to run a large deficit. At the beginning of 1970 most experts believed this unbalanced trade was likely to continue at least through 1970, despite the campaign to produce 10 million metric tons of sugar in that year.

Trade with Eastern Europe became important while the Soviet Union was assuming its predominant role and has served as a significant supplement to economic relations with that country. Its value has varied considerably, but it appeared to account for between 15 and 20 percent of the island's total trade toward the end of the 1960s. The countries with major shares in this activity have been Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and East Germany. Poland, Hungary, and Romania have participated consistently, but their roles have been relatively minor. Cuba has built up significant trade deficits with several of these countries, but the total debt accumulated is a far smaller percentage of total trade than in the Soviet case.

Communist China is the island's second most important trading partner, although less important than Eastern Europe as a whole. Most of the trade consists of rice exchanged for sugar. Traffic between the two countries peaked in 1965 and then fell, after the emergence of diplomatic problems. In 1969 China accounted for somewhat less than 10 percent of the nation's total foreign trade.

Interchanges with Western countries other than the United States have apparently declined somewhat since the Revolution, although a high level of trade has been maintained. In general, the countries participating most actively have been those that had significant trade with Cuba before the Revolution, although there have been important variations. From 1963 through 1968 the non-Communist nations most deeply engaged were Spain, Canada, England, Japan, and France, in that order; however, France assumed a much greater role toward the end of these years than at the beginning and by 1968 led all other Western nations in terms of value exchanged. In 1969 Japan was the leading non-Communist trading partner. The overall value of trade with the West in that year hovered around 23 percent of total trade. Exchanges with Latin American nations, which had never played a major role in the country's foreign trade, declined after the Revolution. Total trade with Latin America during the years 1966—68 has been estimated at about US$15 million, mostly consisting of imports from Mexico.

In contrast to exchanges with the Soviet Union, a fairly even trade balance has characterized traffic with the West. Imports have slightly outrun exports since the Revolution, but this adverse balance was less than 10 percent of total trade value in early 1970. The fact that the overall imbalance grew markedly between 1964 and 1970 was an indication of Western confidence that the accumulated debts would be repaid and also of the economy's inability to compensate for planned imports in the face of mediocre sugar harvests. Over half of the total deficit was being financed by France in 1970.

Exports

In prerevolutionary days a reduction in exports would generally precipitate an almost instantaneous reduction of imports and would cause reduced economic activity throughout the country. With both imports and exports tied to annual agreements in the 1960s, the economy's dependence on high export levels was greatly reduced. On the other hand, the Soviet Union had made it clear by early 1970 that it did not intend to let the island's imports outrun its exports any more than was absolutely necessary. This meant that imports and the activity of the economy as a whole still depended on exports, even though short-term rises and falls in the export level did not have nearly as strong an effect as they did before the Revolution.

Sugar

Sugar has been the nation's prime export since the beginning of the twentieth century. In every year of the 1960s sugar shipments were worth over four times as much as all other exports combined, even in the disastrous crop year of 1963. Only about 10 percent of the crop has been consumed domestically, and holdover stocks have been kept down, so that about 90 percent of any given year's production has usually been sold abroad. Most economists agree that the country will continue to be a major sugar producer and will retain its position as the world's leading sugar exporter.

The chief drawback of sugar production is the weakness of the international sugar market. During the 1960s the island depended very heavily on the Soviet Union's willingness to purchase a large portion of the crop at prices well above those available on the world market, despite the fact that the Soviet Union is itself a net sugar exporter. Soviet purchases averaged about 40 percent of the total sugar tonnage exported in that period but did not approach the amounts called for in the Soviet-Cuban agreement of 1964, because Cuban sugar production did not keep up with official plans (see ch. 18, Agriculture).

The agreement was to expire at the end of 1970. New negotiations were due to occur that year, possibly resulting in reduced quota levels for future years. A good 1970 output would have strengthened Cuba's bargaining position, which is one reason emphasis has been placed on maximizing sugar production in that year.

Between 1969 and 1970 the prices paid for Cuban sugar throughout the Communist world averaged somewhat less than the US$.06 per pound paid by the Soviet Union. The Eastern European market, which has been receiving over 15 percent of the nation's sugar export tonnage, was paying an average of about US$.055 per pound in 1968; China, which took slightly less than 10 percent of the export tonnage, paid about US$.05 per pound that year. Because barter arrangements form the basis for all trade with Communist nations, it is hard to determine how accurately these barter prices reflect the actual value received for sugar exports. The average price for sugar on the world market was between US$.02 and US$.035 per pound in 1968 and 1969.

The prevailing low sugar prices on the world market constitute a severe obstacle, since the nation depends on this market as its main source of foreign exchange for purchases from non-Communist areas. Largely for that reason, over 30 percent of the island's sugar exports were sold on this market during the 1960s. Japan, Morocco, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab Republic were the principal non-Communist markets for sugar in that period. Special agreements with some non-Communist nations have at times fixed the price for sugar far in advance, thereby annulling world market fluctuations; but these agreements have not covered most of the island's trade with the West, and the sugar prices agreed upon have generally been in line with the world market price prevailing when the accord was made.

Other disadvantages of the world market are its small size and inherent instability. Trade restrictions by major consumers, designed to protect their domestic sugar industries, have confined the "free" world market to about 15 percent or less of total world sugar production. Unrestricted trading in the mid-1960s saturated this fragile market, causing prices to fall precipitously and then remain below US$.03 per pound. A new International Sugar Agreement, modeled along the lines of an earlier agreement in force from 1954 through 1961, went into effect in 1969. Under this measure quotas were assigned sugar-producing countries, and some of the downward pressure on prices was eased. The goal of the agreement is to stabilize prices at between US$.0325 and US$.0525 per pound.

Relatively small amounts of sugar byproducts (principally molasses) are also exported. Although significant in terms of world production of such commodities, these byproducts generally accounted for less than 3 percent of the export value derived from sugar in the 1960s.

Tobacco and Other Agricultural Exports

Tobacco is the other agricultural export of major importance and was the nation's second export product until surpassed by nickel in the early 1960s. With the loss of the United States market after the Revolution, exports of tobacco declined sharply and never recovered. Much of the tobacco that was previously exported had been diverted to the domestic market by 1970. That portion of the crop which continued to be exported, primarily in the form of unmanufactured tobacco and cigars, accounted for between 4 and 5 percent of total value in the first years after the Revolution. Since 1966 tobacco production has dropped off, and it is likely that its export earnings have also declined.

As of early 1970 the country had been trying for several years to export coffee, but it was not yet possible to estimate how successful this effort had been. Although there have apparently been small exports since 1964, production levels near the end of the 1960s did not greatly exceed domestic requirements. As a result, the nation's quota under the new International Coffee Agreement introduced in 1968 was cut from 11,500 metric tons to 3,000 metric tons. In view of plans for expanding production at that time, the Castro government refused to sign this agreement and withdrew from the International Coffee Organization.

Pineapples and citrus fruits apparently constituted the only remaining agricultural exports of any significance at the end of the decade. Export of bananas and plantains had been all but eliminated by plant diseases, and although a few livestock products were occasionally sold abroad, most of them were not produced in sufficient quantity to even meet domestic needs. Major livestock exports were not likely to occur as long as that situation remained unchanged. Some seafood, consisting mostly of shrimp and lobsters, has been exported, but this trade had not reached major proportions by early 1970.

Nickel and Other Minerals

Prospects for continued high export earnings from nickel production were good in early 1970. This metal was of growing importance to the nation's foreign trade all through the 1960s, because of increased production capacity and gradually rising prices on the world market; but earnings from nickel and other mineral exports were still dwarfed by sugar and amounted to less than 10 percent of total export earnings for most of the decade (see ch. 19, Industry).

A major change occurred in 1969, when extreme shortages and speculation caused world nickel prices to rise over 500 percent in nine months. This boom showed no signs of reversal during the first months of 1970, and at that time it seemed certain to yield substantial windfall benefits to major nickel exporters. Final 1969 figures were not yet available but, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit's quarterly review, Cuba's income from nickel exports in that year was certain to quadruple, "possibly reaching the equivalent of US$250–300 million." By comparison, total export earnings in 1968 were about US$610 million.

The nickel industry's installed production capacity is limited to about 40,000 metric tons per year, and the industry does not possess the equipment necessary to refine its final nickel sulfide and nickel oxide products, a substantial portion of which are shipped to the Soviet Union for further refining. Even so, possession of one of the largest known deposits in the world is a tremendous asset in view of the growing scarcity of this commodity and is likely to continue yielding substantial gains for the nation's exports in future years.

Other minerals exported consist mainly of copper, manganese, and chromium. Copper used to be an important export in the early days of the Republic, but this is no longer true. Although all metallic ores mined are exported, the sum total of these minerals—aside from nickel—generally accounted for less than 1 percent of total export earnings in the 1960s.

Imports

The ratio of imports to the GNP is one of the highest in the world. Because of heavy concentration on specialized export products, notably sugar, the nation is unable to feed and clothe its people, fulfill capital equipment needs, or even provide the raw materials for consumer-oriented domestic industry. The result is an absolute dependence on high volumes of imports, the most critical of which are fuel, foodstuffs, and capital goods.

Fuels and Industrial Raw Materials

In early 1970 fuel shortages were rapidly becoming one of the most critical factors in the economy. The problem revolved almost entirely around crude petroleum imported from the Soviet Union, from which an overwhelming share of the island's fuel was derived (see ch. 19, Industry).

Imports of crude petroleum and smaller quantities of refined petroleum products from the Soviet Union totaled about 5 million metric tons per year in the latter part of the 1960s. Although these supplies appeared to have been sufficient in 1966, rising industrial demand and population growth rendered them inadequate in later years. By 1968 Russia's unwillingness to increase shipments more than about 2 percent annually had resulted in stringent rationing and was beginning to produce serious economic consequences.

387

Transport and power generation were the activities most notably affected. By early 1970 power blackouts had become a frequent occurrence, and shortages of fuel for vehicles transporting sugarcane were frequently mentioned as one of the major problems of the 1970 sugar campaign.

The problem was critical because the Soviet Union was the island's only major source of supply. Because of the country's lack of native fuels, the shortage seemed certain to remain critical until new petroleum trading partners are found or until the Soviet Union agrees to increase its supplies.

There were also extensive imports of industrial raw materials other than crude petroleum. The most significant of these in terms of value were materials used in the chemical industry, particularly in the manufacture of fertilizers, and metal products such as steel sheets and tinplate. The Soviet Union and Eastern European countries have been the major suppliers of these materials.

Capital Equipment

By 1970 capital imports probably accounted for over one-third of total import value. Such goods have constituted a large share of imports throughout the nation's history, but toward the end of the 1960s, their prominence was increased by the sugar campaign and concurrent efforts to improve transportation, fishing, and other industries. In all years after 1960 the need for capital equipment was heightened by the problems associated with old United States-made machinery for which spare parts could no longer be obtained.

Throughout the 1960s the major components of capital imports consisted of motor vehicles and spare parts, heavy equipment for the sugar mills, other industrial machinery, some complete industrial plants, and tractors and other agricultural machinery. Substantial number of ships were also imported, and these played a key role in expansion of the national merchant marine an fishing fleet (see ch. 18, Agriculture; ch. 21, Domestic Trade). About half of all capital imports were being obtained from the Soviet Union at the close of the decade, but such goods also formed a very large share of the items imported from non-Communist trading partners such as France, Spain, and England.

Foodstuffs

Agricultural products, chiefly foodstuffs, appeared to constitute about 20 percent of total import value in the 1960s. Major imports included wheat, flour, meat, fish, rice, corn, peas, beans, vegetable oils, lard, processed milk, and potatoes.

The Soviet Union is the country's major foodstuff supplier and provides mostly wheat and wheat flour, vegetable oil, meat, and dairy products. Significant amounts of rice come from Communist China. Eastern Europe also participates significantly in this food trade, as do many Western nations; Canada is probably the nation's leading non-Communist supplier of agricultural products.

Incoming agricultural goods have always been important, as the island has never been self-sufficient in basic foodstuffs. Since the Revolution food imports have been subject to conflicting pressures: official policy has not favored extensive food importation, but shortages of locally produced foodstuffs have made high import levels necessary. The very limited data available indicates that foodstuffs constituted a greater percentage of total import value in the 1960s than in the preceding decade.

Textiles and Wood Products

Other significant imports include those associated with textiles, paper, and carpentry. Besides bringing in raw cotton to support its small textile industry, the government has imported large supplementary shipments of cloth, yarn, and thread for the garment industry and individual consumers. In addition, the domestic shortage of lumber has necessitated sizable imports of boards and woodpulp (see ch. 18, Agriculture). Smaller tonnages of paper, mostly newsprint, are also shipped in from abroad, along with a large number of sacks that are used principally in the sugar industry.

ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT

All through the 1960s foreign economic relations were directly controlled by the government. The chief organization in charge for most of that period was the Ministry of Foreign Trade, which was authorized to make all commercial agreements and supervise all foreign exchange operations. Established in 1961 along with the ministries of industry and domestic trade, it did not completely dominate foreign economic relations until 1966, when it took over the commercial duties of the former National Foreign Trade Bank.

In early 1970 there were a large group of organizations performing specialized foreign trade functions. Nearly all of them, including the Cuban Traffic and Freight Enterprise and most import and export agencies, had been established by the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Major alterations in the tasks assigned individual agencies were made in 1966, but between then and 1970 their roles remained essentially unchanged. As of the latter year, all significant exports except sugar and tobacco were handled by the Cuban Export Enterprise. The Cuban Sugar Enterprise and the Cuban Tobacco Enterprise were in charge of sugar and tobacco exports.

A larger number of agencies were involved in importing. These included Alimpex (foodstuffs), Consuminport (general consumer articles), Cubatex (textiles, fibers, hides, and byproducts), Quimimport (chemicals), Maprinter (raw materials and intermediate products), Cubametales (metals and minerals), Medicuba (medical products), and Cubartimpex (art and cultural materials). Before 1966 all of these agencies were also engaged in export work but, with the sole exception of Cubartimpex, their export functions were taken over in that year by Cuban Export Enterprise.

In early 1970 these agencies worked within a framework in which all customs duties and fees had been abolished. Broad decisions as to the type and quantity of goods to be traded were made within the Ministry of Foreign Trade and coordinated with other government organs. Price regulation was achieved through an internal payments system designed to bring any variations in the price of an export into line with the official domestic price.

All legitimate foreign exchange transactions were tightly controlled. For this reason the Cuban peso (see Glossary), although technically on a par with the dollar, was not quoted on exchanges and had no commercial value outside the country. It was illegal to transfer capital abroad, and restrictions were maintained on the use of foreign exchange by Cuban citizens traveling outside the country. Likewise, there were tight restrictions on the amount of clothing, jewelry, and other valuables that visitors could take out of the country; incoming travelers had to exchange all their foreign currency for Cuban pesos when they entered the country (see ch. 23, Fiscal and Monetary Systems).

Besides placing control of international commerce firmly in state hands, some of these restrictions were designed to augment the amount of scarce foreign exchange available for purchasing goods from non-Communist nations. So great was the demand for this foreign exchange that by 1967 foreign embassy staff members in Havana were being required to use foreign exchange to purchase goods from the official Diplomatic Supply Service. Likewise, in 1968 a drive was conducted to collect and melt down old silver coins, so that their silver content could be used to obtain negotiable currencies.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND CREDIT

Some imports are purchased with hard currency on the world market, but the vast majority are obtained through bilateral barter agreements. These are the sole basis for trade with the Communist world and govern a large share of the trade with non-Communist countries as well. Most of them are either short-term agreements governing trade for one year or specialized arrangements dealing with imports or exports of a few specific products.

The basis for foreign trade evolves out of long-range plans originated by the Central Planning Board (Junta Central de Planificación—JUCEPLAN). These plans are then coordinated with projections by the foreign trade ministry, and the resultant product is used as the groundwork for all bilateral accords including both barter agreements and hard-currency purchases.

Major Trade Agreements

In early 1970 the nation's most important economic agreement was a pact governing sugar trade with the Soviet Union over the 1965—70 period. The sugar shipments called for in this agreement were: 1965, 2.1 million metric tons; 1966, 3 million metric tons; 1967, 4 million metric tons; 1968, 5 million metric tons; 1969, 5 million metric tons; and 1970, 5 million metric tons. By providing a sure market for sugar, the agreement cleared the way for a major economic policy reversal stressing production of agricultural exports instead of industrialization (see ch. 18, Agriculture). It also laid the groundwork for the omnibus short-term trade agreements with the Soviet Union that were made each year during this period. The sugar pact was scheduled to expire at the end of 1970, and negotiations were generally expected to be conducted during that year with the aim of evolving a new agreement by 1971.

Like the Soviet Union, Eastern European nations use all-encompassing annual barter agreements as the basis for their trade with the Castro government. More specialized agreements have been arrived at with individual countries from time to time. Some of the latter have been sizable by themselves, but few have been large enough to have any very great impact on foreign trade. The most significant of these toward the end of the decade was a 1968 agreement by Romania to provide roughly US$30 million worth of oil-well drilling equipment. Multilateral agreements involving Cuba and Eastern Europe have also existed.

In the case of Communist China, a quarrel over a major barter agreement appears to have had a significant impact on both economic and diplomatic relations between the two countries. In early 1966 Premier Castro publicly blamed Communist China for anticipated rice shortages. He said Cuba had understood that a barter agreement made in 1964 was to cover several years but that Communist China had interpreted it as applying to one year only and, therefore, had no compunctions about reducing the level of trade. Despite a sharp Chinese response to these statements, trade continued on a reduced scale, and in 1967 another protocol was signed covering trade for that year.

Multilateral economic agreements with Western nations were sharply reduced in the 1960s. A request for membership in the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) was rebuffed in 1962. The country withdrew from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, commonly known as the World

Bank) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the mid-1960s and left the International Coffee Organization in 1968, after reduction of its quota under the new International Coffee Agreement. Apart from the barter agreements, the only important international economic accord to which the nation still belonged in early 1970 was the International Sugar Agreement.

When this accord was negotiated in 1968, the basic quota assigned to Cuba was set at 2.15 million metric tons of sugar. In addition, the Soviet Union and several other Communist countries buying sugar from the island were not to reexport more than 1.25 million metric tons of Cuban sugar in 1970 or 1971 without reducing this quota. The arrangement appears to provide the Castro government with considerable leeway, since the nation did not sell more than 1.8 million metric tons of sugar on the world market in any year during the 1960s, and total Soviet exports have generally not exceeded 1.2 million metric tons per annum. Should the government approach its goal of producing 10 million metric tons in 1970 the problem of how to dispose of it would become extremely difficult, and there has been some speculation that the nation would abandon the terms set by the International Sugar Agreement in that event.

Bilateral barter agreements with Western nations covered a large share of the island's total non-Communist trade in the 1960s. Most of these measures were primarily concerned with a few particular products, such as British buses or Spanish fishing vessels, although omnibus trade and payments agreements were made with some nations such as the United Arab Republic (Egypt). The terms of many of the smaller agreements covered periods of a year or less; but it was not unusual to have deliveries and payments spread out over several years, especially where large exchanges were planned.

Credit and Foreign Assistance

Private foreign investment no longer exists, and direct grants of foreign aid other than military aid are almost unknown. The accepted manner for providing foreign assistance is through long-term credits, most of which have come from the Soviet Union. In 1970 these credits were financing a gigantic trade deficit estimated at well over US$2.5 billion.

The first Soviet credit, in the amount of US$100 million, was granted in early 1960 and provided the basis for a rapid industrialization campaign and the breaking off of economic relations with the United States. A second US$100-million credit was extended in 1961 to help develop the nickel and cobalt industries, and yet another in the same amount was announced in 1962 to assist the industrialization campaign (see ch. 19, Industry). The collapse of the industrialization drive did not affect the need for credit, and a large loan in the range of US$100—150 million was made in 1963

394

to finance the nation's growing trade deficit. From then until the close of the decade, annual Soviet-Cuban trade agreements generally included clauses extending sizable credits to the island. In all, the total long-term debt to the Soviet Union was probably slightly over US$2 billion in early 1970. The interest rate on this debt was apparently between 2 and 2½ percent, and amortization payments were scheduled to peak around 1975 if no new debts were incurred. Besides these overt loans, the Soviet Union provided vast amounts of indirect assistance by subsidizing sugar production at a rate of about US$.06 per pound. Even if actual value received from the Soviets did not correspond with this price, it would have been impossible for Cuba to consume much of its immense crop in these years or to sell much of it without hurting world market prices.

Credit arrangements with Eastern Europe and Communist China have not been very different from those with the Soviet Union. For example, Eastern European nations extended credits totaling US$97 million in the 1960—61 period, and Communist China offered a credit of US$60 million in 1960. These credits continued to build up all through the 1960s, but the accumulated debt with Communist China and Eastern Europe has remained much smaller than that incurred with the Soviet Union. Both Communist China and Eastern European nations invariably set sugar prices considerably above prevailing world prices on the world market when dealing with Cuba in the latter part of the decade. However, these were barter prices and the true value of the goods received in exchange cannot be measured.

Western governments have also extended loans to Cuba. Most of these have been designed to permit payment for a specific purchase and have called for repayment of the loaned funds within five years or less. A British loan in 1967 for US$45 million covering construction of an English fertilizer plant was a fairly typical example. Their function has generally been limited to financing Cuba's trade deficit with individual Western nations, thus permitting purchases from them in the face of chronic shortages of foreign exchange.

Technical Assistance

The Soviet Union was the major supplier of technical assistance in the decade after the Revolution. Most of this assistance consisted of sending technicians and instructors to Cuba to work on specific projects. Substantial numbers of Cubans were also sent to the Soviet Union to receive instruction in engineering, agricultural mechanization, and other technical occupations.

Outside the military field, technical advisers appear to have concentrated on activities related to foreign trade and those requiring fairly high technologies, such as oil exploration and nickel processing; but significant amounts of technical assistance have also been distributed throughout many other areas of the economy. Relatively small numbers of technical personnel have also come from Eastern Europe, Communist China, and the West. Most non-Communist personnel, such as eighteen British technicians helping to construct the previously mentioned US$45 million fertilizer plant, were involved with a specific project using equipment purchased from their home country.

CHAPTER 23

FISCAL AND MONETARY SYSTEMS

As of early 1970 the budget was the key element in guiding the economy and was of much greater size than those of prerevolutionary governments. It played this role mainly because of the way it allocated funds for the state enterprises. Most of the enterprises do not retain income but turn it in to the National Bank of Cuba (Banco Nacional de Cuba) as it is earned. Their operating costs are covered by quarterly allocations under a preplanned budget that has little flexibility and thus acts as a financial control on the operations of the enterprises and, indirectly, on the growth of the economy.

About seventy of the enterprises, particularly those with the greatest earning capabilities, are not subject to the financial control imposed by the budget and are permitted to cover costs from current income. The scope of operations of these enterprises is, therefore, wider, and only at the end of the calendar year do they turn in their net profits.

The budget has been increasing rapidly since 1959 and, by 1967, was about 3 billion Cuban pesos (1 Cuban peso equals US$1—see Glossary), or over eight times as large as the last prerevolutionary budget. Later budget figures are not available. It is estimated that budgetary deficits have also been increasing because of increased social services, new investment in state enterprises, deficits of some enterprises, increased defense costs, and an expanded bureaucracy. In addition, there is a large foreign debt. The main source of government revenue is the income from state enterprises; thus, it is important to the government that they utilize their budgetary allocations efficiently and earn a profit. The National Bank of Cuba also earns considerable income. The income tax is the largest source of tax revenue. About eight other taxes and several nontax receipts, including Soviet Union financial aid, constitute the balance of the revenue.

The National Bank of Cuba is the only bank in the country. It combines the functions of a central bank, an investment bank, a foreign trade bank, and a savings bank. It acts as the state treasury, regulates monetary circulation, issues currency, administers foreign exchange, grants loans and credits to small farmers, administers the investment program for the state enterprises, organizes annual savings campaigns, and acts as a clearinghouse for transactions between state enterprises. The bank has over 10,000 employees, more than 250 branches throughout the country, and several foreign correspondent banks in other countries.

The Cuban peso is the monetary unit and has not been devalued since its adoption in 1914. Although the official rate is one Cuban peso to one United States dollar, several other rates are utilized in foreign trade. In addition, there is a black-market rate, both in and out of the country, which has fluctuated between seven and twenty-five Cuban pesos to one United States dollar.

GOVERNMENT FINANCE

In June 1960, after the Revolution, all budgets, including those of the national, provincial, and municipal governments and autonomous organizations, were centralized. The Central Planning Board (Junta Central de Planificación—JUCEPLAN) was authorized to prepare the consolidated budget, but in 1961 this responsibility was given to the Ministry of the Treasury. In 1966 the ministry was abolished, and JUCEPLAN assumed preparation of the budget. Since 1963 the preparation, approval, execution, and supervision of the budget have been regulated by the provisions of the Organic Budgetary Law of December 31, 1962, as amended.

All state enterprises and public agencies, including the ministries, the autonomous entities, and the local administrations, submit annual estimates of their financial plans to the Central Planning Board. The public agencies must also submit their personnel rosters, and the state enterprises must include a detailed account of their past production and costs. A preliminary budget is then drawn up that must conform to the goals of the economic development plan (see ch. 17, Character and Structure of the Economy). It is then submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval or modification.

The budget has two parts, revenues and expenditures. Revenues are listed by type of tax or receipt. This is then further broken down by source of the tax or receipt and, further, by the purpose of the tax. Expenditures are divided into major activities, then by objectives of each major activity, and then finally by the government unit that carries out the activity. Budgets run on a calendar year basis. The budgets are seldom released publicly, although it is known that they are frequently altered in order to appropriate funds for an unbudgeted purpose.

Centralized budgetary financing is followed by all but about seventy state enterprises. Usually, there is a rigid separation between income and expenditures. All income is turned over to the National Bank as it is earned, and all expenditures must be made from either the current operation account or capital investment account under the centralized budget. Budgeted expenditures may not be exceeded, and funds for the accounts are allocated on a quarterly basis. Those enterprises not under budgetary financing operate with a greater degree of independent action. They may use revenue from income to cover expenditures and may turn over only part of their profits to the state at the end of the year, retaining the balance. Enterprises permitted to operate under this method are those considered to be the best income producers. They may also grant financial inducements to workers to increase productivity.

Revenues

The main source of government revenue is the net income of the state-owned enterprises. About 50 percent of annual revenue is derived from the profits of these enterprises. Another 15 percent is income earned by the National Bank. Taxes, which brought in over 90 percent of government revenue annually before the Revolution, contribute about 15 percent. Miscellaneous nontax receipts make up the balance of the revenue. Part of the balance comprises financial aid from the Soviet Union.

Despite the secondary importance of taxation as a source of government income, taxes actually bring in more revenue in absolute figures than they did before the Revolution. The old tax system was an accumulation of uncoordinated separate laws, some of which dated back to the Spanish colonial era. There were over 200 taxes and levies in force. Numerous studies over the years had recommended a basic tax reform, but only some modifications had been carried out. Some taxes actually produced less revenue than the cost of levying them, and there was acknowledged tax evasion. The tax burden was not very high by recognized standards, always less then 18 percent of gross national product (GNP). Indirect taxes, largely customs duties, brought in five times as much revenue as direct taxes, which were mostly income taxes.

A tax reform law was enacted in July 1959 that revised and amended tax procedures. Over 100 old taxes were replaced by a fewer number of newer taxes. Penalties for tax evasion were made more severe, and an administrative tax committee, equivalent to a tax court, was created to hear appeals. The 1959 tax reform did not last long. It was replaced in January 1962 by a completely new tax law, under which ten national taxes were created and all local municipal taxes were eliminated. Under this tax law, which was still in effect in early 1970, the contribution of the net income of the state enterprises to the government's revenue is called a tax proceed.

Of the other nine taxes, the income tax is the most important. Income tax payers are divided into three groups: employees, the military, and members of cooperatives; artisans and self-employed;

private enterprises, cooperatives, and private farmers. The tax rates are progressive, ranging from 11.9 percent to 70 percent, depending on the category of taxpayer and level of income. The lowest rate applies to salaries of less than 250 Cuban pesos per month, and the highest rate is levied on income exceeding 2500 Cuban pesos per month. Interest on savings accounts is not taxed. For most wage earners a withholding system is utilized. Others have to file on a quarterly basis.

Some sales and excise taxes exist on consumer goods. A real estate, business transfer, and inheritance tax is another important tax. The rates for this tax have been increased over prerevolutionary rates, but taxpayers have been given easier payment methods. There are a land transportation tax, which is paid twice yearly by all vehicle owners, and a document tax on most documents, which is payable by the purchase of a revenue stamp. Every wage earner pays a 10-percent tax for social security, and each business pays a 10-percent payroll tax for the same purpose.

Expenditures

The budget had grown by at least 800 percent in the decade 1957—67, to the point where it was equal to about half of the GNP. In some years it has been the largest budget of any Latin American country. The approved budgetary expenditures in the first year of the Castro government, 1959, was about 390 million Cuban pesos. This figure rose through the ensuing years as follows: 1961, 1.4 billion Cuban pesos; 1962, 1.8 billion Cuban pesos; 1963, 2.2 billion Cuban pesos; 1964, 2.4 billion Cuban pesos; 1965, 2.5 billion Cuban pesos; 1966, 2.7 billion Cuban pesos; and about 3 billion Cuban pesos in 1967. Figures were not available for 1968 or 1969.

A large percentage of the budget, representing an increase in absolute terms over pre-1959 budgets, is devoted to public investment. The increase accounts for much of the growth of the annual budgets. The percent of the budget devoted to public investment rose from about 12 percent in fiscal year 1957/58 to almost 40 percent in the 1960s. Budgetary expenditures are listed by eight sections. Section I, always the largest, is called Development of the National Economy and is entirely the public investment. This includes government investments in industry, agriculture, commerce, communications, transport, and basic services. Each of more than forty ministries and agencies receives its share for investment, and the funds must be used for that purpose.

The second largest section of the budget has been Section III, Social Services, Culture, and Science, which accounts for about 30 percent. This includes all funds spent on education, social security, public health, science, social assistance (welfare), sports and recreation, and cultural activities. The amount spent on education, social security, and public health has been increasing considerably each year. Pension payments under social security have particularly increased, because almost every worker, including all persons who would not have qualified previously for social security, receives a basic pension.

The government also reimburses the owners of nationalized property, although the indemnification frequently is not based on true value. Persons whose land is nationalized are reimbursed at the rate of 15 Cuban pesos for each thirty-four acres. Owners of stores and small buildings receive 600 Cuban pesos monthly for ten years regardless of the original value. An estimate was made in 1964 that over 100,000 persons were receiving payments at that time from the government for loss of their property.

Section V, National Defense and Public Order, is the third largest component constituting between eight and nine percent of the budget. Before the Revolution this was the second largest component of the budget, averaging around 18 to 19 percent. Section V is followed by Section IV, Public Administration, which is the cost of running the government; Section VI, Financing the Public Debt; Section II, Housing; and Section VII, Reserve, which is a fund for unforeseen miscellaneous purposes.

PUBLIC DEBT

The revolutionary government acquired a large public debt from the previous government and has also accumulated large deficits of its own. This has presented the regime with serious financial problems, which have apparently been overcome by encouraging the public to subscribe "voluntarily" to new bond issues, by obtaining credit from the National Bank and from Communist countries, by increasing the money supply, and by confiscating the assets of persons leaving the country.

A deficit spending policy was followed in the last years of the Batista government, and the public debt expanded from 218 million Cuban pesos to an estimated 1,280 million Cuban pesos by the end of 1958. Only a very small percentage of this amount was foreign debt. Most of the debt was in Cuban hands, particularly the private commercial banks and the National Bank. The pension funds and insurance companies also held some of the debt.

The level of total public debt at the beginning of 1970 was not known because figures on domestic debt have not been released, but foreign debt apparently had become its largest component. Foreign debt in early 1970 was unofficially estimated at over 5.5 billion Cuban pesos. The debt to the Soviet Union was estimated at 2.1 billion Cuban pesos at the end of 1969, with an interest rate of

2 to 2½ percent. The debt to the other Communist countries totaled 3.4 billion Cuban pesos. Most of these debts are being repaid with sugar. Credit has also been received from other European countries since the mid-1960s. Current account payments on these debts apparently have been met. Some older foreign debts inherited from the previous government were defaulted, but part of them have been renegotiated. For example, a debt to Switzerland of 4.2 million Cuban pesos was settled in 1967 by an eight-year repayment plan that included sugar. In addition to the recognized foreign debt, almost 8,500 United States government and private claims against Cuba for expropriated property totaled over 3.3 billion Cuban pesos in early 1970.

Many of the domestic public debt bonds issued before the Revolution were being redeemed on schedule, and interest was paid during the early years of the Revolution. Holders, however, had to declare, register, and deposit them in the National Bank. Persons who failed to do so could not redeem their bonds. In 1964 a 150-million-Cuban-peso, long-term bond issue was authorized in an attempt to consolidate several older issues. Holders of older bonds exchanged them for the new issue at the same rate of interest. In addition to the consolidation bonds, the government consistently issues bonds, called "peoples shares," in denominations ranging from 5 to 100 Cuban pesos, redeemable in five years. Longer term bonds are issued for special purposes, such as housing, industrialization, and irrigation projects.

BANKING

There is only one bank in the country, the National Bank of Cuba. All private banks, both foreign and domestic, have been nationalized. The functions of the various state credit institutions have been taken over by either the National Bank or another government entity.

The first domestic bank was founded in 1833; the first foreign bank, the Royal Bank of Canada, opened in 1899 and soon became the principal bank in the country. Until 1945 foreign institutions dominated the banking system, holding over 80 percent of all deposits. After 1945, however, Cuban banks gradually recovered the position they held before the disastrous crash of the 1920–21 period, and by 1955 they held over 60 percent of all deposits. The recovery was greatly assisted by the spectacular postwar prosperity, by the formation of the National Bank, and by the recognition of the Cuban peso as sole legal tender. From 1921 until the Revolution, no bank failed.

The experience of the crash had left its mark on the entire private banking system in generating highly conservative bank policies and the desire to maintain the highest degree of liquidity possible. The narrow scope of credit operations, the relatively small expansion in loans, and the strong reserve position of the banks were characteristic of the commercial banking system.

Until nationalization there were forty-nine commercial banks having 204 branch offices throughout the island. The fifteen principal banks were centered in Havana, and about half of all bank branches were in La Habana Province. Six banks were foreign owned: the National City Bank of New York, the Chase National Bank (later the Chase Manhattan Bank), the First National Bank of Boston, the Royal Bank of Canada, the Bank of Nova Scotia, and the Bank of China. The nine principal Cuban banks, together with the foreign banks, furnished most of the sugar and commercial loans and accounted for almost all the total bank assets. The many smaller Cuban banks catered to some of the local needs of professional people, small merchants and manufacturers, and storekeepers.

In addition to the commercial banks, there also existed eleven savings banks, which financed private home loans; five government credit institutions; a postal savings bank; and the National Bank, which was the central bank.

Private commercial banks were subjected to increasing pressure after 1954 to purchase government bonds. In January 1955 they were required—if they wished to be eligible to hold government, semiofficial, and other nonprivate deposits—to hold public bonds up to at least 10 percent of their total deposits.

By December 1959, however, the burden of the private commercial banks had become so great that many found themselves with reserves well below legal requirements, a condition contrasting greatly with those of earlier years. Many had been forced to carry large sugar loans that were not liquidated because of reduced sugar exports; on top of these came new applications for the 1960 crop. Import regulations and the tightening of sales terms by foreign suppliers had further aggravated the banks' plight. Finally, there had been large withdrawals of private savings deposits, and the government, either to curb inflation or to discourage private capital investment, had raised the rediscount rate on all loans except those for production. In some cases the banks refused to extend loans. In other cases they found that there were fewer loan applications because of the growing doubts of private businessmen over future business conditions. By mid-1960 many bankers assumed that, as the government's financial position worsened, it would seize the remaining private accounts.

In September 1960 the government began the first seizures of private banks, which culminated in the acquisition of the entire banking system. The first banks to be nationalized were the United States banks and the Bank of China, followed by all Cuban-owned banks. In December the last remaining banks, the Royal Bank of Canada and the Bank of Nova Scotia, were acquired by the government. These two foreign institutions escaped nationalization and were able to sell their assets to the government. All nationalized bank branches became agencies of the National Bank.

The mortgage savings banks were taken over the following year, and their obligations and assets were transferred to the state. The holders of mortgage bonds of these companies were given savings accounts in a similar amount in the National Bank. The final legal dissolvement and liquidation of the savings banks occurred in 1966.

In an effort to provide medium- and long-term funds for diversified investment in industry and agriculture and to provide the small farmer with credit at reasonable interest rates, the government had founded in 1950 the first official credit bank, the Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank of Cuba (Banco de Fomento Agricola y Industrial de Cuba—BANFAIC) (see ch. 18, Agriculture). In 1953, 1954, and 1955 four other official banks were established: the National Finance Agency (Financiera Nacional de Cuba), for financing self-liquidating or revenue-producing public works projects; the Cuban Bank of Foreign Trade (Banco Cubano de Comercio Exterior—BANCEX), to assist exporters, especially those dealing with nonconvertible-currency countries; the Mortgage Insurance Institute (Fomento de Hipotecas Aseguradas—FHA), to insure commercial bank loans for private construction, particularly for low-cost housing; and the Economic and Social Development Bank (Banco de Desarollo Económoco y Social—BANDES), which had virtually unlimited credit facilities and administered the Economic and Social Development Plan begun in 1954. Majority control over all the institutions was held by the National Bank.

In March 1960 BANFAIC was incorporated as the credit department of National Institute of Agrarian Reform (Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agararia—INRA) and was authorized to receive deposits from farmers. The National Finance Agency was dissolved several months later, and its functions were absorbed by the National Bank. BANDES was liquidated, and its liabilities were transferred to the National Bank in March 1960. BANCEX was replaced in April 1960 by the Bank for Cuba's Foreign Trade (Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba—BANCEC), which was given a total monopoly on all foreign trade. One year later, however, BANCEC was absorbed by the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

The National Bank of Cuba was established by law in 1948 as a central bank, but it did not actually commence operations until April 1950. The country was the last in Latin America to create a central bank, and until its creation there was no specific banking legislation in force. Banks had been regulated only by the commercial code. The National Bank was created as an autonomous institution, with 51 percent of its shares belonging to the government. The balance was owned by various commercial banks.

After it was established, the National Bank of Cuba immediately became one of the most influential economic institutions. It had an outstanding research department, which filled a longstanding need that could not be met by a politically oriented administration, and for a time it commanded great respect within the government and outside. The National Bank was given powers and functions ordinarily associated with modern official central banks. It could give advances to the government, limited to 8 percent of the average revenues over the previous five years and payable within the fiscal year, and could rediscount short-term government securities in the open market if the securities had been in circulation for at least a year. It was the sole bank of issue and held the legal reserves of member banks.

Because of the doubt with which Cubans had viewed the formation of a central bank, the operations of the National bank had been hedged with restrictions to make its policies and activities conservative and cautious. After 1952, however, the policies of the National Bank and of the official credit institutions over which it exercised control were changed to meet the policies of the government, which needed cash to spend. The executive leadership of the National Bank was replaced. Between 1950 and 1952 National Bank and commercial bank credit to the public sector had been relatively unimportant, but between mid-1952 and mid-1957 credits granted to the government and official bodies increased almost fourfold. This increase was largely responsible for the monetary expansion during those years. Although the increase in credit to the government during a slump period helped stimulate economic activity, credit expansion apparently continued even when signs of an inflation became increasingly obvious. As the National Bank itself increasingly became an instrument of excessive government spending, it could no longer exercise a regulatory and limiting influence over the operations of the credit banks.

Following the nationalization of private banks, the National Bank was transformed on February 23, 1961, from an autonomous entity to a direct dependency of the executive branch and was reorganized with additional powers. It assumed responsibility for the financing of all capital investment by the government, for all long- and short-term credits, for the administration of foreign exchange (previously a responsibility of the Monetary Stabilization Fund), and for all international and domestic banking operations.

In 1966 the bank was again reorganized with specifically outlined domestic banking, international banking, economic planning, and miscellaneous functions. Its capital was raised to 100 million Cuban pesos. It may retain one-third of any annual profits for emergency reserves, and the balance goes to the state as government income. Under domestic banking functions it receives all the financial resources of the state, the state entities, private enterprises, and private persons. It may grant loans to what is left of the private sector in the economy, organize savings accounts for individuals, and act as a clearinghouse for payments and collections between state enterprises. These enterprises do not make payments between one another. They deposit a payment order at the nearest branch bank, and the amount is transferred to the account of the other state enterprise.

The bank's international banking functions include: administering the country's gold and foreign exchange reserves; fixing the exchange rate for the national currency; controlling all payments and receipts with other countries; obtaining and granting credits in foreign currencies; purchasing and selling foreign currencies, gold, and other precious metals; administering foreign securities controlled by the government; issuing regulations and controlling the holding and export of foreign exchange, securities, precious metals, and gems by individuals.

In its planning functions the bank works closely with JUCEPLAN in drawing up the annual economic plan. It carries out special nationwide studies, such as the inventory in 1966 of stocks of the 300 largest enterprises to plan for improved inventory control. It grants credits to public and private enterprises to carry out their investment plans; establishes regulations for loans; evaluates the management of state enterprises; and controls monetary circulation. Investment loans for construction, acquisition of machinery, and agriculture may be made to state enterprises, private enterprises, and some individuals. Loans are also made to the government to cover budgetary deficits. An annual monetary circulation plan is prepared, which is modified quarterly and which attempts to estimate total cash incomes and expenditures in the country for the coming year. Based upon this plan, the amount of money required to circulate is determined and then regulated. Castro, however, frequently talks of the time when money will cease to be a medium of exchange in Cuba.

The bank's management is headed by a president who is named jointly by the president of the Republic and the prime minister and who has cabinet rank. He is assisted by three vice presidents, one of whom is designated the first vice president and replaces the bank president in his absence. In addition to utilizing the branches of the nationalized banks, the National Bank began to open new branches in every municipality in the country. By 1969 it had over 10,000 employees, six regional offices, and over 250 branches. Most of the personnel of the bank have attended classes at the National School for Banking Training, a three-month boarding school operated by the bank for its own employees and those of INRA. This school has the services of instructors from the Statni Banka of Czechoslovakia. The National Bank maintains correspondent bank operations with banks in Moscow, Paris, Mexico City, Montevideo, Montreal, Prague, London, Cairo, Peking, and Zurich.

Credits and Other Functions

Commercial credit is available from the bank to those enterprises that are permitted to operate from their earnings, to cooperatives, and to private enterprises, which are usually small farmers. Small farmers may borrow between 60 and 80 percent of the anticipated value of their crops. Credit is also granted to cover deficits of enterprises not earning a profit. Consumer credit has been abolished, forcing persons to save funds until they accumulate enough to cover the cost of their larger consumption purchases. There are more than 200,000 private borrowers, of which over 140,000 are farmers who annually obtain credit from the National Bank, but their total borrowings is only about one-thirtieth the amount granted to state enterprises. Total credit for all the small farmers, for example, averages about 100 million Cuban pesos annually, almost evenly divided between sugar, coffee, tobacco, and miscellaneous crops.

Credit is categorized as either planned or specific. Planned credit is that which is preestablished in the economic plan for a particular enterprise. Each enterprise submits to the bank a quarterly credit plan, broken down by monthly needs. The monthly credit may be modified, but the total quarterly plan may not be exceeded. Cooperatives and private enterprises do not submit credit plans. Instead, the bank determines their needs, based upon past experience, current production information, and overall needs of the national economic development plan.

Specific credit is used for an unplanned purpose, such as financing inventories, seeds, and animals. Most credit is short term, payable within one year. Only farm investments may be long term, repayable after one year or more. The bank sets repayments and interest rates for all credit, which may vary from case to case. Private farmers, for example, pay an interest rate of 4 percent, whereas agricultural cooperatives pay only 3.5 percent.

The bank has numerous miscellaneous functions. It collects all taxes and all nontax state income. It services the public debt and issues paper money and coins. It also supervises insurance plans and the International Insurance Enterprise of Cuba, which handles insurance guarantees on foreign trade transactions. Before the Revolution there were over 150 insurance companies, foreign and domestic, operating in the country. More than half were Cuban owned. In the second half of 1960 the government started to take over all companies. Several companies, mostly British and Swiss, were permitted to continue, but in late 1968 and early 1969 they voluntarily ceased operations, since they were conducting little or no business. Some of the insurance policies of the confiscated companies have been canceled and the cash value either returned to the insurees or deposited into special savings accounts in their names. Most of the other policies remain in force, being administered by the government.

Savings

As one method of relieving inflationary pressure upon consumer goods, the government, by means of annual campaigns, encourages wage earners to open savings accounts. The number of accounts and the amount in them continue to increase annually. Before the Revolution savings were concentrated in the hands of a relatively small group of people. Commercial banks, having a total of approximately 334,000 active bank accounts, had been the most important depository of savings. Savings were also deposited with insurance companies, the postal savings system, the mortgage home loan companies, and the numerous pension funds for industrial workers and self-employed professionals. The postal savings system had been in operation since 1936 as a method of reaching the small depositor in rural areas, but total deposits were never very large, stabilizing at about 8 million Cuban pesos annually.

By the end of the 1960s over 1.6 million persons had savings accounts in the National Bank. The total savings was around 800 million Cuban pesos, or about half of all money in circulation. Each bank branch has a savings manager who leads the savings campaign in his jurisdiction. Every factory, business, or other place of employment appoints a savings overseer whose work is voluntary and who collects small sums from each employee. The overseer then deposits the money in the individual accounts for the employees so there is no need for them to go to the bank themselves. In 1966 there were over 10,000 such savings overseers in the country. The labor unions and the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution are also active in encouraging persons to open and maintain savings accounts. The campaigns have been least successful in rural areas, particularly in Pinar del Rio and Matanzas provinces.

All savings are in the form of ordinary savings accounts. Until 1964 long-term deposit certificates were also offered, with a higher rate of interest as an inducement. After 1964 they were discontinued, and existing certificates were converted into ordinary savings accounts. The minimum deposit is 1 Cuban peso, and the account must have at least 5 Cuban pesos before interest accrues. To permit schoolchildren to deposit amounts smaller than 1 Cuban peso, accounts are opened in the name of the school, and the teachers are responsible for collecting the money and maintaining records for the individual students.

To accommodate survivors of deceased account holders, up to 1,000 Cuban pesos may be withdrawn without legal action upon proof of relationship. Elderly persons who are being cared for in state institutions are encouraged to name the state as their savings account beneficiary, rather than a relative.

CURRENCY AND EXCHANGE

The monetary unit is the Cuban peso of 100 centavos. It is one of the few currencies in the world that have never been devalued. It was adopted as the monetary unit on October 29, 1914. Until then only foreign money had circulated.

The United States dollar was used for most official and foreign trade transactions, while the French Louis (20 francs or equivalent to US$5.30) and the Spanish centén (25 pesetas or equivalent to US$4.24) were used in domestic trade. Upon the adoption of the Cuban peso, the circulation of foreign money, except the dollar, was prohibited. Between 1914 and 1934 United States paper money was the only paper currency because the peso was only issued in the form of gold, silver, or nickel coins.

In 1934 Cuban silver peso paper certificates began to be issued, and in 1948 the circulation of United States paper currency became illegal. Many persons continued to use and accept dollars, however, and it was estimated that US$100 million was in the hands of Cubans before the Revolution as precautionary reserves in safety deposit boxes or in private hoards. The symbol for the Cuban peso is the same as that for the dollar—$.

In 1961 new paper currency, printed in Czechoslovakia, was placed in circulation, in exchange for the old paper currency, of which there was an estimated 600 million Cuban pesos in circulation. Holders of the old currency could exchange up to 200 Cuban pesos in paper, with the balance of up to 10,000 Cuban pesos credited to special accounts in their names in the National Bank of Cuba. Holdings of old currency in excess of this amount were, in effect, confiscated. There was only a five-day period in which to exchange currency. The immediate result of the currency exchange was a drop of 60 percent in banknotes in circulation. The new currency is in denominations of 1, 5, 10, 20, 50, and 100 Cuban pesos. They portray national and revolutionary heroes on one side and revolutionary motifs on the other.

Beginning in 1964 new fractional coins, made of aluminum and minted in Czechoslovakia, were placed into circulation, and all silver coins were called in. The new coins are in denominations of 1,

407

5, 20, and 40 centavos. Unlike the paper currency reform, the old coins may be exchanged for new ones at any time without identification, and there is no loss to the holders. The reason for this is the recovery value of the silver in the old coins. In late 1968 it was estimated that between 8 and 12 million pesos worth of silver had been recovered from the old coins turned in through that date.

Residents of Cuba, including foreigners, cannot own, export, or import gold. Neither may they own silver coins, foreign currency, foreign securities, or maintain foreign bank accounts. Further, they cannot export national currency.

As of early 1970 the Cuban peso had been officially at par with the dollar since November 7, 1914. Despite the official rate, there are multiple import rates that are used in foreign trade transactions and vary according to the essentiality of the import. These import rates ranged from 1.32 Cuban pesos to 2.04 Cuban pesos equal US$1. In addition, the various bilateral trade and payments agreements in force between Cuba and other countries use different exchange rates for the Cuban peso (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations). In 1968 there were twenty-one such agreements, each of which specified a different rate of exchange.

Despite the theoretical parity of the Cuban peso with the dollar, there has been a de facto depreciation that is evidenced by a black-market rate. Domestic black-market transactions were known to have been averaging around 100,000 Cuban pesos daily in the early years of the Revolution, but by 1968 the market was very small. The exchange rate reached a high of 25 Cuban pesos to US$1 in 1965 but had dropped to 7 Cuban pesos by mid-1968. Strict control has reduced black-market operations in Cuba, but small dealings are reported to occur in several Western Hemisphere countries.

Foreign exchange has been rationed since December 1960. In an effort to increase its holdings, the National Bank of Cuba purchases not only silver coins but also any gold or silver objects that can be sold abroad for foreign exchange. Prices are set in Cuban pesos based upon the gold or silver content of the article, and purchases are immediate, no identification or proof of ownership being required from the seller. The bank is permitted to accept other precious metals if it so desires. The Committees for the Defense of the Revolution are also authorized to receive gold and silver articles from private persons who are reluctant to go to the bank.

The exchange control authority is the National Bank of Cuba. Any foreign currency obtained by any person must be exchanged for Cuban pesos at the bank within ten days of receipt. Transfers from abroad in favor of persons or enterprises must be made through the bank, which in turn gives the Cuban peso equivalent to the beneficiaries. All remittances going abroad also have to be done through the bank; exports of foreign exchange, checks, or securities may be made if prior approval is obtained. The approval may be granted depending upon the essentiality and urgency of the case. Foreign tourists can export foreign currency only up to the amount registered upon entering the country minus expenditures made in Cuba. Foreign specialists working in Cuba may remit money abroad, but individual limitations are set by the bank.

SECTION IV. NATIONAL SECURITY

CHAPTER 24

PUBLIC ORDER AND INTERNAL SECURITY

The norms of public order and internal security are measured, with some differences, by Communist standards. Public order is concerned with ordinary criminal activity, but much greater emphasis is accorded to adherence to the dictates and regulations of the state. The government controls and regulates nearly all aspects of daily life to the detriment of the personal freedom of its citizens. Internal security means the security of the regime; any opposition, or even disagreement with the government in power, is a criminal offense subject to prosecution.

In the ten years since the 1959 Revolution, sweeping changes have been made in both the structure and operation of the country's security apparatus. The National Police and Rural Guard have been eliminated, and ordinary metropolitan police have disappeared from the scene. In their place the army and the militia perform a variety of police functions, as does the Ministry of the Interior, which operates a number of agencies concerned with surveillance, security, and criminal investigation.

The court system, headed by the Supreme Court, which had served the republic since early independence, has been done away with and has been replaced by revolutionary courts. These courts are casual, ill defined, and presided over by magistrates who are popularly elected in their communities and who have little or no legal training. Guarantees and rights of an accused are largely disregarded and frequently violated. Although they handle ordinary criminal cases, most of the courts' energies are taken up with the prosecution of cases involving deviation from so-called correct Communist thinking.

The citizen is under constant surveillance, not only by the authorities, but by his neighbors as well. A widespread net of security units has been organized since 1960 on a neighborhood basis, and each city block or rural district has its vigilance group. Each is called the Committee for Defense of the Revolution (Comité de Defensa de la Revolucion—CDR), and is charged with observing all activity in its area and reporting any actions that might be suspected of being counterrevolutionary. In 1969 the CDRs were reported to have over 2 million members.

The Constitution of 1940, which was in force at the time of Castro's takeover, has been suspended since 1959. The country is ruled by decree, and the only semblance of a national charter is embodied in Castro's First and Second Declarations of Havana, which outline the regime's basic revolutionary philosophy. Its tenets are enforced by the Fundamental Law of the Republic of Cuba. Many of the statutes and procedures incorporated into the Fundamental Law rely on precedents that go back as far as acts passed under Spanish rule in 1882. International jurists have described the judicial system as archaic, oppressive, and a betrayal of the basic fundamentals of the rule of law.

There are nearly 200 penal institutions, including concentration camps and penal farms, both on the mainland and on offshore islands. Executions of most political prisoners have been carried out at La Cabaña, the old colonial fortress guarding Havana Harbor. Estimates of the number of political prisoners vary widely, but most observers agree that there were probably over 100,000 in 1969.

In spite of the rigid security measures and the punishment accorded offenders, counterrevolutionary activities continue to take place. As recently as mid-1969 there were still many cases of sabotage and attacks on government installations. There were indications of growing dissatisfaction among many of the peasants, and reports of small rebel bands operating from inaccessible mountain hideouts. Castro, nevertheless, has had ten years to consolidate his position; the departure or imprisonment of large numbers of dissidents, along with other increasingly stern repressive measures, appeared in 1969 to have largely eliminated the threat of effective, large-scale opposition.

THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

Historical Background

Before 1959 Cuba's judicial system had presented a dichotomy of probity and corruption. It was respected for its organization and competence but was frequently the subject of debate, criticism, and attempted reform. The career judiciary generally had a reputation for integrity and independence, but the system at large was subject to political manipulation and frequently evolved into an instrument of venality and abuse. An attempt was made in the Constitution of 1940 to remedy the faults by devising an independent and rigidly controlled approach to the appointment and promotion of judicial personnel. Some improvement resulted, but the wide powers in the hands of the executive branch largely negated the progress made, and the administration of justice continued to be subject to the pressures arising out of the patronage system and the country's apathetic standards of political morality.

Spanish penal law, which was based largely on the Napoleonic Code, was not replaced until 1938, when the Code of Social Defense was adopted. The entire legal framework was patterned largely on European concepts and antecedents, with courts relying primarily on the application of codified national statutes rather than on the precedents of prior decisions as emphasized in English common law. The Code of Social Defense liberalized jurisprudence somewhat and, to an extent, modernized the concept of criminal justice. The principal departures from Spanish tradition were the adoption of constitutional guarantees of individual rights and the principle of judicial review. Constitutionality of a law could be challenged directly by organizations or by a group of twenty-five citizens to the Supreme Court, as well as by appeal through a lower court. Many laws were questioned by these means, and a number were declared unconstitutional.

The Constitution of 1940 provided for an elaborate, comprehensive, and nominally independent court system. The national structure was headed by the Supreme Court, which sat in Havana and was authorized from twenty to thirty-eight justices. The court was composed of a number of chambers, each concerned with its respective area of jurisdiction covering civil, criminal, constitutional, or government litigation. The criminal chamber heard appeals in cassation from lower courts, decided cases involving jurisdictional conflict, and had original jurisdiction in cases involving the president, vice president, or Supreme Court justices.

There were seven courts of appeal (*audiencias*), one in each provincial capital with the exception of Oriente Province, which was divided into two judicial districts. Each court was composed of a president and a specified number of magistrates and heard appeals from lower courts or tried original cases referred to it by a Court of Arraignment (Juzgado de Instrucción). Below the courts of appeal, a sizable number of inferior courts of various types were liberally distributed throughout the national territory.

Courts of first instance, courts of arraignment, and police courts were organized territorially for each judicial zone (*partido*), most of which corresponded to a municipality. There were two or three classes of each type, determined by the seriousness of the offenses over which they had competence. First-class courts were found only in Havana. Police courts tried minor criminal cases in first instance, and courts of arraignment conducted preliminary investigations to determine jurisdiction and venue for referral of cases to the proper tribunal. Finally, there were municipal courts in each municipality, with jurisdiction limited to misdemeanors and civil litigation involving sums of money not exceeding 500 Cuban pesos (1 Cuban peso equals US$1—see Glossary).

Outside the regular court framework there also existed specialized tribunals such as electoral courts and labor boards. Urgency courts, first set up during the presidency of Gerardo Machado (1924—33), were a foretaste of the future. These were designed for summary trials of political offenders to eliminate opposition to the dictatorship. They were again organized under a law enacted during World War II and apparently were never abolished. In practice, they were widely used during the last years of the Batista regime in cases of antigovernment activity. One of the more prominent cases tried by the Urgency Court of Santiago de Cuba was that of the captured survivors of the attack on the Moncada fortress, led by Fidel Castro on July 26, 1953 (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Although the function of these courts was to provide speedy trials in times when constitutional guarantees were suspended, they were often used to confirm the arbitrary exercise of police powers.

Before the Revolution the law had provided for entry into a judicial career through examination and selection. Appointments were made by a board made up of three members of the Supreme Court and two from the Havana Court of Appeal. Successful candidates were required to be citizens by birth, be at least forty years of age, and have had a minimum of ten years' experience in the legal profession. Justices of the Supreme Court were appointed by the president. Confirmation, however, had to be made by an electoral committee composed of four justices chosen by the court itself, three members named by the president, and two by the faculty of the University of Havana Law School. Magistrates could not hold an additional post in any other branch of government and could be removed only for serious cause, substantiated at a hearing before a special section of the Supreme Court.

From the start of the Castro regime, it was clear that no reconciliation was possible between the new concept of revolutionary law and what was called the old law. The new government promptly set about to reconstitute the judicial system and to infuse it with the new revolutionary philosophy and structure. One of the first actions of the new government was the establishment of a number of revolutionary courts to deal with the followers of former President Batista. These operated under emergency laws, hastily drawn up to apply so-called revolutionary justice to those convicted of criminal acts under the old regime. These laws were soon extended to apply to any opposition to the new government.

In the first few months the traditional courts attempted to maintain the integrity of constitutional jurisprudence, but they soon found themselves in conflict with the new tribunals. The government acted swiftly and implacably—the Constitution was replaced by the Fundamental Law—the authority of the Supreme Court was undermined and later abolished, military tribunals which precluded any appeal on the grounds of constitutionality were organized, and untutored militiamen were authorized to function as magistrates.

Starting in 1960, the Supreme Court was purged of all recognized jurists, who were accused of counterrevolutionary activities and charged with "manifestly immoral conduct." In one day, February 3, 1961, the regime dismissed one Supreme Court magistrate (seventeen of twenty had already been ousted), six presidents of the seven provincial courts of appeal, twenty-six appellate magistrates, and eighty-seven lower court judges.

Court Structure

In 1969, after ten years of revolutionary government, the Cuban court structure was just beginning to take on some semblance of a formal cast. It still could not be classified as a conventional juridical framework, but there were signs that it was being standardized and given an official status backed by formal law.

The first courts set up by the new government had all been of an emergency, military nature. They were organized to perform a specific task—to punish the wrongdoers of Batista's regime. There was no time to train or develop qualified judicial personnel, and as the country's professional jurists of former years were rapidly eliminated from the system, the administration of justice increasingly devolved on unqualified laymen. As a result, trials were frequently a travesty of legal form or procedure.

A Military Tribunal of the early period was composed of a chairman and two members. An accused could name his defense counsel or have one assigned by the court, and a complete investigation of the facts surrounding the case was required. When the court had been constituted and the judges, prosecutor, the accused, and his counsel were present, the case was heard. The secretary read any conclusions submitted by both sides, as well as the findings of the investigating judge; then the prosecution and the defense presented their cases, calling on witnesses as required. When arguments had been heard, both sides presented their final conclusions; the prosecution was followed by the defense. When these submissions were completed, the accused was given a final opportunity to add his own testimony in his defense. When he had concluded his statement, the chairman closed the court, which would reconvene when the verdict was to be announced. By 1969 the military tribunals had been superseded by the revolutionary tribunals but continued to operate as courts-martial for military personnel. The courts of 1969 were the outgrowth of these early emergency tribunals. They are still in the process of being formally organized and settling into an established pattern, and there still remains considerable confusion as to their nomenclature, makeup, and mode of operation.

Early in the formalization of the new court system, the Ministry of Justice outlined the aims and tasks expected of the judiciary. A Ministry of Justice decree listed them as:

> contributing to the process of establishing the new socialist state; defending the revolutionary state against attacks from internal and foreign enemies; defending the social property of all people against counterrevolutionary attacks; defending revolutionary legality; and educating the masses through judicial decisions.

In 1967 the regime inaugurated an extensive program to train judicial personnel and to give instruction in legal matters to its magistrates and judges. By mid-1969 only a small percentage of the country's magistrates had received this training, but quotas were being selected for attendance at special schools as rapidly as the facilities permitted.

There are basically three types of courts in operation: revolutionary tribunals, people's courts, and municipal courts. Judicial activity is focused primarily on the prosecution and punishment of political and counterrevolutionary offenses. All courts, however, are competent to deal with ordinary criminal matters. As dissident elements are gradually eliminated, court routine is becoming increasingly concerned with conventional crime, although much of the criminal activity, such as that in the economic sphere, is of a nature that would not constitute an offense in most other Latin American countries.

The revolutionary tribunals are the highest courts in the structure. These tribunals are still technically considered emergency courts, but they are rarely dissolved and are becoming permanently established tribunals in name as well as in fact. They are composed of three magistrates, in contrast to the five that made up a prerevolutionary Court of First Instance, and usually include one or two members of the militia. They are competent to try all offenses and impose any recognized penalty, including the death sentence. The court's findings on nonpolitical crimes may be appealed to the Higher Council of Social Defense, an informal group composed of officers and officials that is convened as required. There is usually no appeal from convictions for political offenses.

There is at least one revolutionary tribunal in each province. Many have no permanent quarters but conduct their trials in a theater, sports arena, or other area that can accommodate a large number of spectators. One case, reported by Havana Revolutionary Tribunal No. 2 in April 1969, was held in a local theater, with over 800 people attending. An accused murderer was found guilty and sentenced to death by a firing squad. An appeal hearing was held the same evening at 7:00 P.M.; the sentence was confirmed, and he was executed that same night.

People's courts are at times also called popular courts or popular tribunals. They are the outgrowth of the revolutionary summary tribunals established when the Castro regime first came to power, to replace the traditional courts in political cases. After about two years of operation it was considered that their work was done, and they were suspended for a short time. They were reestablished in 1963, however, and formally adopted the name of people's courts.

The country is divided into judicial districts that cover its entire territory, and there is a people's court in most municipalities. The court is composed of three magistrates popularly elected to serve in the community where they reside. Most judges are local workers or farmers, and few have any training in the law. Candidates are nominated in each area by the local municipal assembly; there must be at least ten, but not over fifteen, for each vacancy. Nominees must be twenty-one years of age or over and have a minimum of a sixth-grade education. They must also "have a good attitude toward work and enjoy local respect for morality and integration into the revolutionary process." Judges serve without pay and continue to work at their regular occupation. There is no security of tenure, and they may be dismissed by municipal officials or party chiefs for wrongdoing or for inadequacy.

The court's jurisdiction is limited to minor infractions, and it may impose a maximum punishment of six months' confinement. Its competence is defined as "those acts which, without being serious, affect the norms of social life." Among some of the offenses delineated are: threats or minor injuries; annoying one's neighbors; and failure to abide by sanitary regulations. Also included are noncriminal acts that could be a danger to the community, such as alcoholism and vagrancy. People's courts are specifically barred from dealing with labor disputes, which are the responsibility of local labor councils.

Other penalties that may be imposed are public admonition, fines, labor on public works, deprivation of rights such as attendance at recreational facilities, house arrest, deprivation of property, and indemnification to an aggrieved party. Judges are enjoined to train and become adept at publicly reprimanding wrongdoers, pointing out the antisocial nature of their conduct and its threat to the principles of the Revolution.

The lowest level courts in the hierarchy are the single magistrate municipal courts. Their jurisdiction is limited to misdemeanors, and they are supposed to operate on a neighborly basis, correcting, rather than punishing the offender. They may, however, impose more stringent penalties, and their authority closely parallels that of the people's courts, with a maximum allowable penalty of six months' imprisonment. A common sentence is assignment to a rehabilitation center.

Municipal courts are found in virtually every community. Justices are selected by collective assemblies in work centers in their localities; they receive no pay but continue with their regular occupation. In some of the larger centers the courts occupy quarters of the former municipal courts. Elsewhere, they meet in any convenient and adequate location, including the judge's home. There is little formality in their proceedings and, although some instruction is being conducted, few magistrates have any legal training.

Several provincial schools for judges have been opened since 1967, and the government hopes that eventually every magistrate will be able to receive formal training. The schools conduct a three-week course that is preceded by a ten-day indoctrination period. In March 1969 the Ministry of Justice inaugurated a Magistrate Training School on a national, rather than on a provincial, basis. Located at Guane, some fifty miles from Pinar del Rio, the first group of eighty-three magistrates, both men and women, was admitted to the first session.

A "Manual for People's Courts" has been prepared by the Ministry of Justice, outlining briefly the country's judicial regulations, offenses and punishments, and court procedures. The manual is used as a textbook in the judges' schools and is made available for study to magistrates who have not yet been able to attend a formal course.

Penal and Procedural Codes

Criminal matters, and particularly political offenses, are covered by a wide range of regulations, acts, laws, and directives. Starting immediately after the Castro takeover, criminal law became progressively more harsh, especially as it concerned counterrevolutionaries or opponents of the regime.

The first series of laws in 1959 started off as amendments to the Constitution of 1940, but this fiction was soon dropped, and a new revolutionary directness promulgated a mass of legislation. The early trends of criminal legislation under the Castro regime demonstrated the nature of revolutionary concepts of criminal justice. The scope of the death penalty was expanded to include a variety of political offenses; criminal legislation could be applied retroactively to the detriment of the accused; total confiscation of property could be ordered against political offenders by extrajudicial administrative proceedings as well as by court order; those indicted for political offenses were denied the right of habeas corpus; and political prisoners were deprived of their right of appeal on grounds of infringement of constitutional guarantees.

The judicial principles incorporated in the Code of Social Defense of 1938 serve as the basis of a penal code. Also still in force in mid-1969 was Regulation No. 1, issued by the high command of the Rebel Army in the Sierra Maestra in February, 1958. This regulation was never published in the *Official Gazette*, but on January 29, 1959, Act No. 33 was issued amending Regulation No. 1, thus amending by law a statute that did not officially exist. The next day, however, Act 39 ruled that all laws and regulations proclaimed by the Rebel Army would remain in force.

The content of Act No. 39 was subsequently incorporated into the Fundamental Law, which implements and enforces the revolutionary philosophy of Castro's First and Second Declarations of Havana, which to an extent serve as a national constitution (see ch. 13, the Governmental System). This Fundamental Law, in its Additional Transitory Provision (numbers 1 and 2), relies on historically antiquated precedents with respect to the framework applicable to criminal law and procedures. It recognizes and declares force of law for those statutes in force during the War of Independence in the Republic of Cuba in Arms, dated July 28, 1896, and with the same supplementary power, without prejudice to Regulation No. 1, retains the Code of Social Defense of 1938, and the Criminal Procedure Act of 1882.

In practice, Act No. 33, amending Regulation No. 1, is the instrument that, in effect, serves as the detailed substantive penal code. It contains provisions relating to both substance and form. It comprises eighteen articles; six referring to offenses and the penalties attached thereto, and the other twelve concerned with questions of jurisdiction, competence, and procedure.

Article 12 provides that the death penalty shall be applied in cases of murder, treason, espionage, and rape. Article 13 permits the imposition of the death penalty for robbery, burglary, desertion, serious insubordination, and firing a weapon negligently in such a manner as to alert the enemy or wound a companion. Article 14 defines the offenses of spreading false or adverse rumors, divulging classified information, and negligence in handling arms or equipment.

The offenses covered by the act were originally included in Regulation No. 1 to deal with circumstances arising under combat conditions, but they continue to apply, with no modification, to conditions of everyday life. The act provides only a narrow judicial frame, and its basic provisions are widely expanded and interpreted by subsequent supplementary legislation. This has given rise to a great number of acts and regulations, most of them aimed at the extermination of any political opposition. The broad extension of the death penalty has given jurisprudence a terroristic character. The distinction between political and common law offenses has been eliminated, further aggravating the application of justice and progressively increasing the rigorous character of the regime's repressive machinery.

Criminal procedures continue to follow largely emergency military lines, based principally on nineteenth-century preindependence codes and on special procedures instituted by the revolutionary army. Castro's forces adopted the 1896 Procedural Law of the Republic of Cuba in Arms, which remains in force as supplementary legislation; the procedural provisions of Act No. 33 derive from this law. The act categorizes a broad spectrum of offenses and assigns competence to revolutionary courts, called military tribunals, or to ordinary courts. Those assigned to the revolutionary courts are basically of a political nature and include offenses against the integrity and stability of the nation, misappropriation of public funds, and frauds and illegal exactions.

Relatively few ordinary courts remain, and their jurisdiction is limited to criminal offenses of a nonpolitical nature. Military tribunals are now confined to the armed forces, and the revolutionary tribunals fulfill their function with respect to the population at large. The procedures set forth in Act No. 33 apply to all courts except the municipal courts, which are summary in nature. They are generally observed in revolutionary tribunals and people's courts with varying degrees of formality, often depending on the knowledge and capability of the presiding judge. In many cases they are ignored completely.

The legal process is continually violated and affords no protection or rights to the accused; the courts are clearly designed to impose the will of the regime and to eliminate counterrevolutionary activities and every vestige of opposition. The administration of justice in Cuba has been condemned by the International Commission of Jurists in Geneva, Switzerland, which in its 1962 publication, "Cuba and the Rule of Law," states:

> If any one particular action by Fidel Castro were to be pointed out as especially reprehensible, it would be the betrayal of the trust of the Cuban people, the uprooting of their best traditions and the breaking of their spirit of freedom. By subjecting the country to the rule of a totalitarian machine based on alien ideology, the Castro regime suppressed by violence the very principles which it promised to uphold. Foremost among them, the rule of law has disappeared from the Cuban scene.

INCIDENCE OF CRIME

The country's judicial and penal system places its greatest emphasis on the detection and punishment of counterrevolutionary activities, but ordinary crime continues to exist. The incidence of lawbreaking in pre-Castro Cuba was about average for Latin America, but for the most part there was an inherent respect for authority, and a general attitude responsive to an order code of behavior. The felon was an outcast from society, and the value of human life was highly regarded.

The new revolutionary philosophy has added a wide category of punishable offenses that did not exist before. Not only active opposition to the regime, but also failure to support the so-called socialist creed is subject to prosecution and imprisonment. Political and economic offenses, such as violation of price controls, profiteering, or black-marketing, are subject to severe penalties, and an individual who is not employed can be jailed for what is termed criminal tendencies. The scope of the death penalty has been broadened to include not only a variety of political crimes, but also certain types of robbery, burglary, and insubordination. Observers suggest that thousands have been summarily executed for political opposition to the state, many of them with no other charge than having served the old regime.

Little information on recent criminal activity in the political field reaches the outside world. Reports from emigres are often of questionable accuracy, and observations by occasional visitors are usually biased, depending on their sympathies for or against the regime. In the area of ordinary crime, some data are available, and periodic reports released by the government provide reasonably wide coverage of crime statistics. There is no way to judge the reliability of these reports, but they are published and issued as official government statistics.

The latest of these, dated 1969, is a comparative treatment of several categories of crime in the years since the Revolution through 1968. The government claims a significant decrease in criminal activity, attributing this to improved social conditions that have largely eliminated the causes of wrongdoing. Crimes of violence, in particular, such as homicide or assault, are reported to have had marked decreases; it is claimed that begging has disappeared and that prostitution has been eliminated. Such common lawbreaking as is acknowledged still to exist is imputed to parasitic elements and to the so-called bourgeois mentality of many citizens.

The government report shows the total for all crimes to have been reduced from 197,901 in 1959 to 96,693 in 1968. This decrease is characterized by a steady reduction each year, with the exception of 1963 and 1966, when slight increases from the preceding year were recorded. Crimes of violence are shown to have decreased from about 36,000 in 1960 to about 10,000 in 1967. The rate for murder and homicide is shown to have been reduced from 3.37 per 100,000 inhabitants to 1.14 in this period. Roughly 500 cases are reported for 1968, as against approximately 2,600 in 1959.

Criminal offenses against property are conceded to be high, and the government attributes this to the economic embargo with its resultant shortage of consumer goods. Totals are available only through 1964, when there were 10,000 crimes against property, as compared with 36,000 in 1960. The rates per 100,000 of the population are reported through 1968 as 27.5 recorded, against 37.0 in 1959. The low, however, was in 1964, when offenses against property showed 11.0 per 100,000. A small increase has been noted since, with 20.0 in 1965, 24.0 in 1966, and 26.0 in 1967. The only other classification covered by the report is drug traffic and addiction. A total of 257 cases are reported for 1968, contrasting with 1,464 in 1959.

A matter that has been of increasing concern to the authorities is the problem of vehicular traffic. There has been a steady rise in the number of accidents and in the volume of traffic violations. This is due in large part to the poor condition of most automobiles and trucks. Virtually no new private vehicles have been imported since 1959, and most cars are in marginal operating condition, with frequent breakdowns that are often irrepairable. There are no tires or spare parts other than those that can be improvised by local manufacture, and the situation is aggravated by the absence of mechanics who are off in the canefields much of the time.

The National Transit Commission has blamed poor driving habits and excessive speed for the high accident rate. The commission reported in late 1969 that pedestrian deaths and injuries had reached a total of over 125,000 since the Revolution. During 1969 there were 911 traffic fatalities and over 18,000 injuries. The government launched an all-out drive for better observance of safety standards and obedience to traffic regulations by both drivers and pedestrians.

INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

The Ministry of the Interior is the country's principal agency for the enforcement of law and order and the maintenance of internal security. Comprising a number of directorates and subordinate departments concerned with all phases of security and investigation, it has supplanted the prerevolutionary National Police and Rural Guard. The ministry directs the activities of the CDRs—the neighborhood surveillance groups that guard against counterrevolution—and works closely with the militia, or Popular Defense. This is limited, however, to coordination and cooperation, as the militia is subordinate to the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (see ch. 25, The Armed Forces).

The Ministry of the Interior

The Ministry of the Interior is organized into five operational directorates and one miscellaneous administrative unit. The administrative unit handles personnel and general administration and is also charged with propaganda activities. There is a General Directorate of Penal Establishments, which has charge of prisons, concentration camps, and penal farms. A Directorate of CDR Activities supervises the work of the CDRs and serves as staff headquarters element for the chiefs of the provincial CDRs. The other three directorates constitute the hard core of the national security apparatus. They are: the General Directorate of Intelligence; the General Directorate of Public Order; and the General Directorate of Security of the State (Dirección General de Segurided del Estado—DSE) (see fig. 4).

The DSE is known familiarly as the Department of State Security, and is commonly called G—2. It is, in effect, the national secret police and serves as the headquarters element that guides the activities of the provincial DSE chiefs. Its three main operational functions are patrol, intelligence, and legal. These activities are limited to the domestic territory and do not conflict with the activities of agencies of the same name in the General Directorate of Intelligence, which operate exclusively outside of the country.

The department's overt activities consist of roving patrols that conduct surveillance day and night in their areas of assignment. They may be on foot or in vehicles, and they are authorized to arrest or detain individuals they consider suspicious and to search persons or premises. Personnel assigned to patrol duty wear uniforms and use military rank.

Covert activities are carried out by the intelligence element, which is composed of agents and informants. Agents are assigned as regular employees to different public institutions, such as ministries, schools, or stores. They also try to infiltrate suspect organizations and report any suspicious or threatening actions. Agents may wear civilian clothes or militia uniform. When they have completed an assignment, they are designated informants, and revert to agents with their next assignment.

The legal section of the DSE has a primary function of preparing charges for revolutionary courts and delivering the accused for trial. A secondary duty is supervision of the program for rehabilitation of political prisoners, which is conducted at most of the country's penal institutions.

The General Directorate of Public Order (Dirección General de Orden Público—DGOP) is to all intents and purposes a national police. It was formed in 1961 by combining all the acceptable police and investigative forces then in existence, and it has assumed all of their functions on a national basis. It is also charged with fire fighting and fire prevention. The directorate's security functions are subdivided into three subordinate departments, designated public order, technical investigations, and port and coast surveillance.

The Department of Public Order is the staff element that directs and guides the nation's normal police activities in maintaining law


MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
ADMINISTRATION
DIRECTORATE OF CDR ACTIVITIES
PROVINCIAL DIRECTORATES (6)
GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF PUBLIC ORDER
PUBLIC ORDER
TECHNICAL INVESTIGATIONS
PORTS AND COAST
GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF STATE SECURITY
PROVINCIAL DEPARTMENTS (6)
GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
SPECIAL SCHOOLS DEPARTMENT
LEGAL DEPARTMENT
ILLEGAL DEPARTMENT
EXPORT OF THE REVOLUTION
GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF PENAL ESTABLISHMENTS
PRISONS
CONCENTRATION CAMPS
PENAL FARMS

NOTE: CDR (COMITES DE DEFENSA DE LA REVOLUCION) - - COMMITTEES FOR DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION

Figure 4. Organization Structure of the Cuban Ministry of the Interior

and order, protecting life and property, preventing and detecting crime, and bringing offenders to justice. It is also responsible for a number of corollary activities such as traffic, issue of licenses, and inspection of vehicles. In the late 1960s it organized a force of policewomen for assignment to traffic duties.

The Technical Investigations Department is responsible for all investigations in the criminal field. It has no responsibility for political inquiries, which are under the jurisdiction of the DSE. It maintains criminal fingerprint files and a crime laboratory, and its plainclothes agents operate much like any large municipal detective force in other countries. The department is broken down into a number of specialized sections, each handling a specific area of criminal activity, such as homicide, robbery, or narcotics.

The Port and Coast Surveillance Department was formerly the Maritime Group of the National Police that, until 1962, had been the Revolutionary Maritime Police under the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. It was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior and given its new name in 1963. Its functions include protection of maritime zones and harbors, guarding warehouses and ships in port, controlling smuggling, registering sailings, and providing defense against commando raids by anti-Castro exiles.

One of its principal functions has become the prevention of escape of nationals from the island. In this it has met with mixed success; in a typical year, 1965, figures published by the Cuban Refugee Center in Miami for the last two weeks of July reported that 8,016 refugees had arrived in the United States in 840 separate sailings. No estimate was given as to the reported large number who died or were killed in unsuccessful attempts to escape. Increased training and additional personnel and equipment, however, have tightened the grip of the authorities, and escape has become increasingly difficult with the passage of time.

The General Directorate of Intelligence (Dirección General de Inteligencia—DGI) has the mission of exporting the Revolution and directing intelligence and subversive activities outside the country. From all indications it, along with the DSE, is heavily backed in its activities by the Soviet Union as an instrument for furthering international communism. Particular emphasis is given to the penetration of Latin American countries. The directorate consists of four operating departments designated: the legal, the illegal, the export of the Revolution, and the special schools.

The Legal Department is in charge of Cuban agents who overtly hold official or semiofficial posts in foreign countries. This includes personnel attached to embassies, members of joint boards and commissions, or visiting delegations. They contact local dissidents and try to recruit agents to carry out sabotage, subversion, and espionage. The Illegal Department performs the same function with respect to Cuban agents placed covertly in foreign countries.

The Export of the Revolution Department is the general coordinating agency for all foreign operations and is considered the most important element of the DGI. It works closely with all other agencies concerned with overseas activities and formulates plans for subversion, coups, or revolts. It uses trained nationals of a target country and furnishes support and assistance for conducting guerrilla operations or undermining and subverting a government in power.

The Special Schools Department runs the many training facilities for instructing agents, particularly foreign nationals, in terrorist tactics, guerrilla warfare, sabotage, communications, and other subversive activities. There are over 100 such centers spread throughout the country, and though they have been largely used for training Latin Americans, they have trained a number of Africans, Algerians, and other nationalities. The only measure of their scope is a 1962 report that indicates over 8,000 men and women were trained in the two previous years. Some instructors from the Cuban armed forces are used in these schools, but most of them are from Soviet-bloc countries. Trainees spend from four months to a year in the country and, after completion of their training, are usually given weapons and an amount of cash before returning to their own countries to take up their revolutionary activities.

Committees for Defense of the Revolution

The CDRs are probably the most pervasive facet of control, intruding into the daily life of the citizen. Organized in 1960 as a neighborhood spy ring to report local attitudes and activities, the committees have increased the scope of their interests and grown steadily in numbers to the point where one out of every four persons in the country is a CDR member.

The basic mission of the CDRs is vigilance for protection of the regime. They maintain day and night observation of their neighborhoods and report to the DSE any threatening or suspicious activity. In addition, they have been assigned seven basic tasks for furthering the aims of the Revolution. The government defines these as local power, public health, growth and strength, education, urban reform, sports and recreation, and propaganda and solidarity.

To carry out these responsibilities, an elaborate organization structure has been created that sets up a progressive hierarchy that covers the entire nation. Government-published figures show that directly subordinate to the National Directorate in Havana there are 6 provincial CDR directorates, 197 district directorates, and 4,300 section directorates. In July 1969 the National Directorate reported an operational breakdown of 36 municipal and district committees, 737 zone committees, and 9,931 block committees. Also reported was the formation of new Neighbor's Councils in each of Havana's 2,782 apartment houses, to supplement the work of the block committees. A new membership drive that ended in mid-1969 recruited over 175,000 new members, bringing the total strength to over 2 million, and had set a future goal of 3 million.

The committees have broad authority, and they become involved in almost every aspect of a neighborhood's daily routine. Members are authorized to search cars, open packages, and enter premises to investigate any questionable actions. They note visitors and times of visits, question absences of neighbors, and report church attendance or interest in exile-sponsored radio programs. The committees are charged with the control and supervision of ration books, and a member is stationed in all food stores to check on and ensure proper distribution. They are responsible for the administration of housing taken over by the government from departing nationals, or otherwise confiscated. They inventory contents and maintain charge of the building until it is reassigned to a new tenant. They take part in a number of "volunteer" activities, such as collecting bottles and used postage stamps, and they recruit volunteers for cane cutting and other agricultural labor. They also check on school attendance at state-run institutions.

To carry out their public health responsibilities the CDRs have set up Popular Schools of Public Health, which occupy the time of some 20,000 committee members. There were 1,294 of these reported in 1966, giving neighborhood instruction in sanitation, first aid, and trash disposal.

The CDRs are also charged with the Marxist indoctrination of the public. Cadres of CDR members are trained in this work at the National School of Political Instruction in Havana and return to their home areas to take up the instruction of their neighbors. This is done through the medium of small groups called family circles, which meet in neighborhood residences. Last reports in 1966 indicated that there were over 10,000 of these circles.

The committees themselves are not without supervision with respect to their own operations, and most include undercover DSE agents whose identities are unknown. These are placed in selected units to maintain surveillance and to report on the unit's activities. This pattern is followed even through the higher level directorates. Although every individual committee does not necessarily have its state security agent, assignments are made on a rotating basis so that spot coverage is in time assured for virtually every group.

PENAL FACILITIES

The number of penal establishments in the country has proliferated significantly since 1959. The increased severity of the law and the broadened scope of new offenses that subject a lawbreaker to incarceration have required enlargement of existing facilities and the construction of many new ones. Little publicity is given this aspect of the socialist state, but some information does trickle through to the outside world and presents a general impression of the situation.

From government reports available for 1967 it was indicated that there were 56 prisons and jails, 23 concentration camps, and 108 penal farms. They were distributed geographically throughout the entire island, but the principal concentrations were in Havana and Oriente provinces and on the Isle of Pines. Three of the prisons were for women; seven camps or farms, located on small islands off the southern coast, were used mainly for youthful offenders. Among some of the principal prisons were La Cabaña, the model prison on the Isle of Pines; the Castillo del Príncipe; and the facilities at Boniato, Santa Clara, Guanajay, and Oriente Province.

The Directorate General of Penal Establishments, under the Ministry of the Interior, is in charge of penal facilities of all types. Its three subordinate departments are in charge of prisons, camps, and farms. As part of the directorate itself there is a Department of Scientific Application, which is concerned with the indoctrination and possible conversion of counterrevolutionaries. As of 1969 it was under the charge of a psychiatrist who was president of the Medical College of Cuba. A long time Communist, he had been sent to the Soviet Union for special training in brainwashing techniques.

Most penal institutions were reputedly crowded, with squalid quarters, poor food, and inadequate facilities completely lacking sanitation. Most reports come from opponents of the regime, and it is difficult to evaluate their validity. The government, however, has not permitted the Red Cross or any other disinterested international body to visit or inspect any of its detention facilities.

In spite of the evidence on the harshness of the system, Castro has stated that he hopes eventually to be able to eliminate prisons. Several different approaches to penology have, in fact, been initiated and continue in operation. Among these are the labor camps, which were first established in early 1964. Although a number of these camps have barracks of permanent wood construction, most are tent compounds within a fenced enclosure. They are used mainly for the more tractable prisoners who do not require maximum security restraint.

In 1965 a number of different type work camps, called Military Units for Aid to Production (Unidades Militares para Ayudar la Producción—UMAP), were set up. These combined military training with fieldwork and reeducation and were stricter in their discipline than the other labor camps. Most of the inmates were political prisoners, but minor criminals, nonconformists, and sex deviates were also assigned. The first emphasis on the rehabilitation of youth began in 1967 with the establishment of a program of "Youth Reeducation Centers." Designed for offenders under sixteen years of age, these were paramilitary camps that housed inmates in barracks, but without fences. The centers are limited to minor offenders, and the emphasis is on rehabilitation and salvaging, with a full day of work, military drill, and "revolutionary instruction." An effort is made to create a noninstitutional atmosphere, and prisoners are permitted to visit their homes once a month.

In 1966 an extensive program of political rehabilitation was launched in an effort to win converts to socialism among the counterrevolutionary prisoners. This was put on a volunteer basis, and those who accepted rehabilitation were issued blue denim uniforms and given special privileges and improved conditions. Reports indicate that those who refused to participate were given no clothing and came to be called *desnudos*, or naked ones.

In addition to the regularly assigned work in the fields, the program consists of indoctrination and instruction in Marxist and revolutionary ideology and offers an opportunity for eventual acceptance into the socialist ranks. The largest of the several institutions where the program is being conducted is the ancient Boniato Prison in Oriente Province, which houses over 5,000 inmates. In 1968 only 20 percent of the prisoners, however, had accepted rehabilitation.

ANTIGOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES

In spite of constant vigilance, an elaborate security apparatus, and strenuous repressive measures, antigovernment activity continues to exist. Castro has a strong charismatic hold on a major segment of the population, but all elements have not been converted to the Communist way of life, and considerable dissatisfaction and disaffection continue to exist beneath a seemingly placid exterior.

The activities of the counterrevolutionaries were disruptive but did not reach threatening proportions. The consolidation of the regime over the years had made it more difficult to organize concerted opposition, and by 1969 most subversive activity was the work of individuals or very small groups. Raids by exile bands had been discouraged by lack of support, and emigration or imprisonment had greatly reduced the number of potential dissidents. Considerable damage was still being done and was causing work stoppages and financial losses, but the government, while perturbed, was not seriously concerned for its security.

There appeared to be no known organized antigovernment resistance. There were reports of small rebel bands operating in the mountain areas of Las Villas and Oriente provinces, but these were independent groups that occasionally made bandit raids on remote government installations and retired to the hills. Although elusive and disturbing, their number was small, and they were considered more an annoyance than a threat. Most insurgent activity was limited to sabotage, but this was widespread and was proving costly to the regime. It was usually the work of individual malcontents or disillusioned workers, who were difficult to identify and harder to apprehend.

The government did not hesitate to acknowledge the extent of the damage resulting from opposition action. Official releases in mid-1969 listed over 28,000 acts of sabotage against government properties in the preceding year. The rate for 1969 was reported to be even higher. Castro, in a speech at a CDR rally in Havana in 1969 reported serious economic losses from fires set in sugar and coffee warehouses, a nitrate plant, a number of ships and trucks, and over thirty-five schools. The chief of the Camagüey fire department reported in one instance losses of over a million pesos resulting from arson in his city in one day.

There are known to be exile groups operating from several neighboring or nearby countries, but they are few and their capabilities are limited. Forays from outside the country have decreased significantly since 1963—lack of support and questionable successes have discouraged the participants, and the increased effectiveness of Castro's security forces has made such ventures increasingly difficult and risky. In some cases exile groups have been accused of claiming credit for actions that have in fact been results of natural disasters, but there is no doubt that some real successes have been scored by these foreign-based units.

One of the most active exile organizations as of 1969 called itself Cuban Power. It made no secret of its terroristic activities and, in fact, has a habit of cabling the Cuban government to announce its part in raids and sabotage. It has claimed credit for extensive destruction ranging from Havana to Santiago de Cuba and has struck indirectly, by planting bombs in ships in foreign ports that were destined for Cuba with supplies. This was done in Panama and in Puerto Rico, and the resulting blast damage was announced in cables to the Cuban government signed by the group's exile leaders. Cuban Power also claimed credit for bombing various offices in the United States of countries trading with Cuba. The location of the organization's home base is unknown, and an effort is made to mislead the Cuban authorities by sending communications from a number of surrounding countries.

Since identifying with communism, Cuba has not been subject to the usual Communist subversive pressures; there has been some conflict, however, between the Cuban brand of Marxism and the more orthodox Soviet views. In 1963, when relations with the Soviet Union were at a relatively low ebb, forty-three Cuban

Communists were arrested as "traitors to the revolution" and accused of plotting against Castro. The alleged conspiracy was led by Aníbal Escalante, an old-line Cuban Communist who had fallen from favor in 1962. It was claimed that the movement reached into the University of Havana, several ministries, and even into the party's Central Committee. At the ensuing revolutionary trial, Escalante and thirty-six others were found guilty and were given prison terms ranging from one to fifteen years, with the leader receiving the maximum sentence (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

CHAPTER 25

THE ARMED FORCES

The first ten years of the Castro regime witnessed a sweeping change in the nature, composition, and quality of Cuba's military establishment. Called the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias—FAR), the defense forces in 1969 consisted of an army of 90,000 men, a navy of 6,000 and air force of 20,000. These regular forces are supported by a number of paramilitary organizations, the principal element of which is the popular militia. Redesignated the Civil Defense in January 1969, it was estimated to number over 250,000 men and women.

Cuba has followed the usual Communist pattern of integrating political supervision and control into its military structure. Party cells have been incorporated into units as far down as company level, with political leaders being in effect commissars who are charged with surveillance, propaganda, and Marxist education of the troops. Communist discipline, however, is not as severe as in the Soviet counterpart, and the armed forces lack many of the traditional earmarks of professionalism. The FAR is, nevertheless, adapted and well-suited to its mission and probable areas of operation. Armed with a generous supply of bloc weapons that include aircraft, missiles, and armor, it has developed into what is potentially one of the most formidable military establishments in the Western Hemisphere.

Compulsory military service was introduced in 1963. All citizens between the ages of sixteen and forty-five are subject to call-up for a three year period, after which they are placed on reserve status in organized units. There was no actual need for conscription to maintain the services at desired strength levels, but it did provide a sizable trained reserve and furnished a source of low-cost manpower for needed agricultural and construction programs. All of the armed forces, but particularly the conscripts, are used extensively in civic action projects; in addition to working in the canefields, they have built a large number of schools, hospitals, barracks, and other installations.

The country is almost entirely dependent on bloc aid, principally Soviet, for its armament, equipment, and material. It has relied on Soviet instructors and technicians for much of its military training, and the FAR reflects this dependence in its operational doctrines and concepts. Close association has not, however, created a Soviet-type military atmosphere. In general outlook and physical externals, such as uniforms and insignia, the environment more closely resembles that of the prerevolutionary army, when United States influence was dominant, than that of the new Soviet mentors.

The military atmosphere pervades and dominates the country's daily life, filtering into virtually every phase of normal activity. A uniform is a more standard garb than civilian clothes; and a major percentage of the population, particularly government workers and officials, hold a military rank and title. Military training is part of nearly every civic action or endeavor and is standard routine for men and women, not only for paramilitary organizations such as the militia, but for youth groups, labor organizations, school children, and prisoners as well.

In late 1969 there were tentative indications that the armed-camp environment of the country was beginning to be tempered somewhat, and the wearing of militia uniforms when not on duty was being discouraged. A start was made on controlling the indiscriminate carrying of weapons, and some of the auxiliary military services were being reduced slightly in strength. The FAR itself was still in a period of transition from a rebel army of guerrillas to a regularly constituted military establishment. As it gained in professionalism and firmly established its role in the nation's defense, there was the possibility of an eventual return to a condition where there was a clear and recognizable distinction between the military and the civilian.

MILITARY BACKGROUND

Violence, and the years of armed conflict, during the struggle for independence fostered a martial spirit that readily responded to a call-to-arms in pursuit of a patriotic cause. Cubans fought long and hard to gain their freedom from Spain and for the most part acquitted themselves creditably as fighting men. After independence, when the country organized its own forces, military service proved extremely popular, and for years the regular army maintained an exceptionally high rate of re-enlistment. The security of a military career was a factor in attracting peasant-farmers accustomed to underemployment, but a large number were drawn simply by an inherent bent for the profession of arms.

The first national army was organized in 1909 under the administration of the second president, José Miguel Gómez. During the American occupation following the end of the Spanish-American War, United States authorities had formed and trained a Rural Guard to maintain law and order in the new republic, but this was a police constabulary rather than a military force. Gómez built up the army to 5,000 men, founded a military academy at Morro Castle in Havana, and undertook the formation of a small navy.

The army developed steadily in quality and effectiveness over the years, but also began to be used increasingly as a tool of politicians. American military advisers supervised most of the equipment and training, and a number of Cubans attended United States military schools and academies. Efficiency was often impaired, however, by patronage appointments of wealthy and influential persons to high rank. Cuba declared war on Germany in 1917 immediately following United States entry into World War I. The first conscription law was passed in the summer of 1918, but the war ended before it could be implemented.

The army reached a high peak of efficiency under President Gerardo Machado who, starting in 1925, increased its strength and acquired quantities of modern arms and equipment from the United States. In August 1933, however, the army turned against him and forced his resignation, the first time a Cuban government had been overthrown by a revolt of the army. This was followed in September of the same year by the sergeant's revolt led by Fulgencio Batista. Batista, a regular army sergeant at army headquarters in Camp Colombia, near Havana, led a group of noncommissioned officers in a mutiny that resulted in the overthrow of the government that succeeded Machado, and the expulsion of the officer corps from the army (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

With the beginning of World War II Cuba declared war on Japan on December 9, 1941, and on Germany on December 11. Two bases were granted to the United States, one near Havana and one in Pinar del Río Province, to be used for air patrols of the Gulf of Mexico and as training centers for the Cuban air force. The United States in turn transferred ten submarine chasers to the Cuban navy, which later sank a German submarine off the northern coast. A few Cubans were permitted to join the United States armed forces, and hundreds volunteered. In early 1942 a conscription law was again enacted but was not put into force, as the United States indicated it would not call on Cuba for troops.

Batista's career—his rise to the rank of general and to the presidency, his permitting free elections that surprisingly cost him the country in 1944, and his second seizure of power in 1952—all had a significant impact on the armed forces and largely determined their course of action and ultimate defeat (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). After 1954, as opposition to Batista grew, the army was used with increasing ruthlessness to suppress opposition to the existing regime. Unable to cope with elusive guerrilla bands in the Sierra Maestra and other mountain areas, the army resorted to indiscriminate arrests, brutality, and executions that resulted in widespread revulsion against Batista and an unsavory reputation for the army.

In late 1958 the collapse of the army in the face of the smaller and weaker forces of Fidel Castro was as much the result of moral disintegration as of military defeat.

Batista had turned the regular army into a personal force loyal to him rather than to the nation. To replace the ousted officers he commissioned over 500 former associates in the ranks; this resulted in a sharp lowering of standards in professional competence and performance. The former officer corps had always been identified with the country's ruling elite, and their removal divorced the military from the traditional power structure. As repressive activities continued, the army's arbitrary brutality alienated it more and more from the people, and it became a predatory army of professional soldiers with no class loyalties. Lacking links with either rich or poor, and with no strong roots in the country's socioeconomic structure, it was distrusted by the middle class and feared and hated by the mass of the people.

The Revolutionary army is a new breed of military organization that has severed all links with the past. It is built around a nucleus of the rebel army that followed Castro from the Escambray Mountains to his final victory, and as of 1969 it was in the early stages of settling into a more professional mold. Basically an irregular guerrilla force, experience, improved armament, and better training have dictated a traditional approach to a more conventional military form and structure. Like the army, the navy and air force are also products of the Revolution. None of the prerevolutionary professionals remain in the services, and the new generation considers itself to be building its own new traditions.

THE ARMED FORCES AND THE GOVERNMENT

The armed forces and the government are so closely integrated in concept and operation that it is difficult to distinguish between the two. Since 1965 the Communist party has entered increasingly into the country's power structure, adding a third facet to its politico-military organization. Fidel Castro holds the dominant position in all three elements and is the leader of the nation; he is prime minister, commander in chief of the FAR, and first secretary to the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party.

With no constitution to delineate the different functions and responsibilities of government, areas of authority and channels of command are not always clearly defined. General guidelines are provided by the Fundamental Law, which was promulgated in 1959 and is a national charter in effect, though not in name. Article 129 of the Fundamental Law makes the president of the republic the supreme commander of the FAR. It provides that he is to be assisted in their direction by the Council of Ministers and by a minister of the FAR. The president is charged with providing for the defense of the national territory and the maintenance of internal security. The law also empowers the Council of Ministers to fix the strength of the armed forces, to determine their organization, to declare war, and to approve peace treaties negotiated by the president.

The designation of the president as "supreme commander" is a fiction, as it has not been observed. Prime Minister Castro was named commander in chief by governmental decree in early 1959 and has held the post continually, with the exception of a few months in 1959 when his brother, served as acting commander. Castro named his brother, Major Raúl Castro, minister of the FAR in October of the same year, and in late 1969 he continued to serve in that capacity.

In reality the armed forces are directly subordinate to the prime minister, who may on occasion delegate a modicum of authority to the armed forces' ministry. Customary operating procedure has been direct contact between the commander in chief and his units in the field, usually ignoring any formal chain-of-command through service chiefs, general staffs, or intermediate commanders. Although the process of formalization of the armed forces is slowly correcting these practices, it is this one-man rule that has managed to maintain a structural relationship that could otherwise have been susceptible to overlap, duplication, and controversy.

The customary relationship between a country's civilian and military elements is meaningless in the Castro government. With the exception of the president, who is largely a figurehead, there are virtually no upper echelon leaders who do not hold military rank. Although none of these leaders are career military men in the strictest sense, they consider themselves as such and are always identified by their rank and title. The Political Bureau of the Communist party's Central Committee, for example, consists of six officers and two civilians, one of whom is the president. The committee itself consists of fifty-eight officers and twenty-seven civilians (five of the civilians being women). In effect, civilian control of the military is nonexistent, and in late 1969 there were few indications of any developing civilian leadership that might alter the situation.

Communist Party Cells

Since 1965, Communist party cells have formed part of the military organizational structure. Each of these units is headed by a party official whose authority in the political field parallels that of the unit commander in the military sphere. He defers, however, to the commander in matters affecting strictly military operations.

The mission assigned to the party cell is "to assure military loyalty and efficiency, and help leaders in the strict fulfillment of their assigned duties."

The company-level cell is the basic operational party unit and is the one that has direct contact with the men. There were originally 1,304 of these cells set up, each one including all party members in a company, regardless of rank. At higher levels the units are called political bureaus, and there is one or more in each battalion and group. These are staff level supervisory units that direct and control the activities at company level.

The cells have been given a number of functions that elaborate considerably on their basic mission; they are authorized to call troop meetings for propaganda purposes and to conduct instruction in Marxist principles; they are also charged with guarding against defeatism, preventing deviation from the socialist line, and helping and encouraging personnel. Some effort has been made to prevent too much interference with a unit's normal operations, and there are safeguards to ensure military integrity. Regulations governing cell activities prescribe that any questionable orders by an officer are not to be discussed at his own level but are to be referred to a higher level bureau. Chain-of-command is not to be violated, and there is to be no impairment of discipline or the authority of leaders.

The Military Budget

Cuba's military expenditures have traditionally been relatively high, even in tranquil times. Before the 1959 Revolution, defense allocations customarily ranged from 15 percent to 25 percent of the national budget, and on occasion caused substantial deficits, as in the last year of the Batista regime, when a 90-million-peso deficit was incurred (1 Cuban peso equals US$1—see Glossary). Typical years were fiscal year 1953/54, when the Ministry of Defense accounted for 19 percent of the national budget and fiscal year 1956/57 when it ran to 16.6 percent.

Defense budgets under the Castro regime have declined significantly in the percentage of the overall budget devoted to military expenditures, although they have risen substantially in terms of absolute totals. Two factors, however, affect the evaluation of figures officially released by the Castro government. First, national budgets have risen astronomically since 1959; second, the reliability of the figures is questionable in view of traditional Communist security and secretiveness. Furthermore, military entries, in addition to defense, include allocations for public order activities that are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior. As a result, the figures are speculative and can give only a relative idea of defense funding.

Military expenditures during the first year of the Castro government were not excessively high and generally conformed to the pattern of previous years. In 1959, out of a total budget of 569 million pesos, the Ministry of National Defense (later known as the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces) was allocated 88.9 million pesos, or less than 16 percent. Even in that year, however, defense military expenditures, exceeded those of every other ministry except the Ministry of Public works. In the mid-1960s, although military expenditures had risen some 400 percent over 1959, they were considerably lower than the funds allocated to the Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of Social Services, which included education.

Latest figures available are for 1965, which were released on the basis of a calendar year rather than a fiscal year. Of a total national budget of 2.5 billion pesos, defense and public order were allocated 213 million pesos, or 8.4 percent. This compared with 878 million pesos for economic development and 696 million pesos for social services. In 1964, defense had received 221 million pesos, or 9.3 percent of an overall budget of 2.4 billion pesos. The last pre-Castro national budget had totaled 330 million pesos (see ch. 23, Fiscal and Monetary Systems).

It appeared fairly certain that the sums budgeted for defense were actually being used for that purpose. The emphasis on honesty and rectitude and a new spirit of service in the armed forces had gone far in eliminating the graft and corruption of the Batista years. The country was satisfied that its public funds were going for legitimate military expenses rather than for the subsidizing of absentee officers who reported for duty only to collect their pay.

Several other factors affect the overall impact of the military on the national economy. Indications are that the transactions involving foreign aid and the purchase of arms and equipment from the Soviet bloc have normally been handled outside the budget and have involved sizable sums; there is no way to judge how much of a drain these transactions may constitute on national resources. On the positive side, the country has been deriving some economic gain from the use of the armed forces in civic action projects. Constituting a low-cost and readily available labor force, the services are as much engaged in public works as in military duties. The armed forces built roads, schools, camps, public buildings, and other installations throughout the country; they have participated in agricultural programs, cutting sugarcane and harvesting tobacco and other crops; they have served as teachers and instructors in furthering education and literacy programs. Most men and women, whether draftees or regular, learn trades or skills in the service that serves them well in later years and equips them for a productive role in the economic life of the nation.

MANPOWER

Manpower for the armed forces, which includes womanpower, has never been a problem. Military service has been popular since the birth of the Republic, and it has never been necessary to resort to conscription to maintain the services at desired strength levels. The Castro government, nevertheless, instituted compulsory military service in 1963. This was done more for the purpose of providing a low-cost labor force than from any military necessity, but it was in keeping with the militant revolutionary atmosphere that has been maintained in the country since 1959.

The quality of the personnel of the FAR has been undergoing a steady change since the Revolution and in 1969 was still in a state of transition. The rebel guerrillas who joined Castro in the Sierra Maestra were mostly peasant farmers of limited education; many were illiterate, even among the officers, but they were able to meet the limited requirements and performed capably as irregulars. After Castro's victory, as the rebel army developed into a more conventional force and acquired new armament, the need was recognized for a higher educational level to master the complex weapons and equipment of modern warfare.

Although many rebel veterans remain in the armed forces, illiteracy has been largely overcome through in-service instruction. Literacy has been made a minimum requirement for entry into the regular forces, and current emphasis is on the procurement of men with higher levels of education. In 1969 most military men were being drawn from the middle class segment of society rather than from the peasantry. The militia, on the other hand, did not require the skills and aptitudes necessary in the regular services. Drawing no pay and performing the simple basic functions of guard duty, the militia could still accommodate large numbers of untutored and even illiterate recruits.

In the pre-Batista army, the officer corps had been composed almost exclusively of socially elite members of the country's prominent and wealthy families, whereas the enlisted men stemmed mostly from the peasant class. This social stratification was done away with by Batista, who replaced the upper echelons with a group of professional noncommissioned officers. Castro, in turn, eliminated the professionals and installed his revolutionaries—men who had demonstrated leadership qualities in combat against Batista's forces.

Castro has called his army an "army of the people," and he has largely succeeded in eliminating social distinctions, not only of class, but of rank as well. Many traditional officers' privileges and prerogatives have been abolished, and rank is professedly based exclusively on capability. The military services have, nevertheless, become a favored sector of the society. Whether commissioned or in the ranks, the prestige, security, and benefits of a military career continue to attract large numbers of young men from all social-economic levels of life.

Procurement and Training of Officers

Procurement of officers is officially on the basis of direct appointment, voluntary application, or selection from the ranks. In consonance with the formalization process of the FAR, direct appointments have virtually ceased, and ever increasing emphasis is being placed on formal schooling as a qualification for candidates to the commissioned ranks. Volunteering is difficult because a young man generally becomes involved in some type of military activity at such an early age that he rarely finds an interlude when he is not already connected with military service. As a consequence, selection from a unit has in effect become the only path to officer training. The procedures and criteria for women are practically the same as those for men, except that some military specialties are not open to female personnel.

To qualify for selection as a cadet a young man must be over sixteen, but under twenty-one years of age; he must meet the prescribed intellectual and physical standards; and he must "possess the political and moral qualities required for the permanent cadres of the FAR." This last condition means adherence to the socialist philosophy and, in practice, most of the young men selected are members of the Communist party or the Communist Youth Organization (Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas—UJC).

There are two integrated steps leading to a commission, the military preparatory school and the academy. The prep schools are for boys or girls between the ages of ten and sixteen. Courses range from one to four years in the lower level schools to three and a half years in the academies. Successful completion of a preparatory school curriculum enrolls selected students as cadets in one of the military academies. Once commissioned, there are a number of advanced schools and institutes providing professional and technical training at the higher grades.

There are five basic academies that turn out regular officers for the respective services. In addition to the Military Academy and the Naval Academy, there is an Artillery School, an Interservice Cadet School, and a School for Aviation Cadets. The Military Academy, located outside Havana, trains officers for the Revolutionary Army and covers general ground force instruction with emphasis on infantry and guerrilla tactics. The Naval Academy occupies the site of the pre-Revolutionary naval facility at Mariel, about thirty miles west of the capital. In addition to basic naval courses, its curriculum includes deck and nautical engineering, electronics, and communications.

The artillery academy has been named the Major Camilo Cienfuegos Artillery School, in honor of one of the early heroes of the Revolution. It trains officers for both field and anti-aircraft artillery. The interservice academy, designated the Antonio Maceo Interservice Cadet School, qualifies army officers for assignment to mechanized units and armor, communications, and engineering. The School for Aviation Cadets trains pilot officers for the air force, officially designated the Revolutionary Air and Air Defense Force (Defensa Anti-aérea y Fuerza Aérea Revolucionaria—DAAFAR), as it includes antiaircraft artillery. In 1969 the school was not yet a fully accredited air academy and offered only primary and basic flight training. Although there were plans to expand its capabilities, cadets were meanwhile receiving their advanced training outside of the country, usually in the Soviet Union.

Several of the academies conduct advanced study courses in addition to their normal undergraduate cadet instruction. Higher grade officers are regularly rotated to attend these courses, which are usually taught by Soviet military personnel. Raúl Castro, the minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, attended the advanced military studies course at the Military Academy in 1968, taking leave of absence from his ministerial duties. The navy and air academies also offer advanced phases of instruction for senior officers of their respective services, and there are other war-college-type schools for a variety of military specialties. A number of selected officers are sent abroad for advanced instruction in Soviet-bloc military and technical institutions.

At the highest level, the Military Technical Institute trains specialists in a number of technical fields. Founded in 1966 it is located in Marianao, outside of Havana and is open to qualified men and women. The institute consists of three schools: radio engineering; mechanics; and geodesy. Each school is made up of a number of component departments that include electronics, ordnance, and construction. It accommodates graduates of lower level technical schools or personnel with equivalent qualifications. Age requirements for enrollment are sixteen to thirty years.

Some military instruction is given in nearly all public schools, starting as early as the primary grades. At the secondary level, certain preparatory schools combine their regular curricula with military instruction designed to qualify selected graduates for admission to a military academy. There are many of these preparatory schools throughout the country, and in 1968 a program was launched to effect a consolidation of a number of these institutions into a uniform national pattern. Construction was begun to provide at least one military preparatory school for each province, and by late 1969 most of these first prototypes were nearing completion. Called Camilo Cienfuegos military schools, their students, who range from ten to sixteen years of age, are known as "Camilitos," after a rebel leader who lost his life shortly after Castro came to power.

Camilo Cienfuegos schools were reported to be in operation in all six provinces, some of them with a capacity of up to 2,000 students. They were of prefab-type construction, erected by the FAR's Construction Enterprise, with participation by the students themselves. Along with standard high school-level subjects, they offered a comprehensive program of military training, sports, and political instruction. Sons of farmers and workers were particularly encouraged to enter these schools, and liberal scholarships were set up for this purpose.

The government announced that by early 1970 it expected to have 16,000 youths enrolled in military preparatory schools. Although it is asserted that 97 percent of the students graduate, only those considered outstanding are selected to attend a military academy. At the time of selection they are also given membership in the UJC. The number of officers being turned out by the academies is substantial. The 1969 class at the Camilo Cienfuegos Artillery School numbered 163, and at the Antonio Maceo Interservice Cadet School, 251. It was anticipated that all the academies would graduate a total of 1,200 new officers in 1969. At one of the graduation exercises FAR Minister Raúl Castro claimed that these additions to the armed forces would bring the national total to over 5,300 trained officers.

Procurement and Training of Enlisted Personnel

Although no official statistics are made public, it is estimated that approximately half of the personnel of the armed forces are volunteer regulars. Conscription was in its sixth year as of late 1969. The annual influx of recruits is counterbalanced by an equal number who complete their military obligation and are released from active duty to enter the reserve forces. The term of compulsory service is three years and is performed, for the most part, under army auspices, although the navy and air force began taking a share of the conscripts in 1967.

The government has asserted that conscription was initiated in order to keep idle youth out of trouble and to provide a labor force for the nation's wide range of agricultural tasks. Conscripts spend from one-fourth-to-one-third of their time in service on civic projects and the balance on military training. Conscription is applied universally throughout the country, and the inductees are a representative cross section of the nation's youth. This has proven to be an unexpected dividend in improving the quality of armed forces personnel and a challenge to the untutored guerrilla veterans who made up the Revolutionary Army.

The annual call-up for Compulsory Military Service (Servicio Militar Obligatorio—SMO) takes place in the spring, usually in April or May. Regional and provincial military committees, made up of ranking regular officers from local garrisons, are charged with supervising the program and ensuring compliance with prescribed procedures. The mechanics of examination and classification are delegated to specially convened recruitment commissions that are attached to the committees. They are composed of local officers and civil officials, and their recommendations are submitted to the Military Committee. Once selected by the committee, qualified conscripts are sent to a Recruit Training Center. There are three of these centers, one in each of the country's eastern, central, and western provinces.

A conscript's introduction to military life is concentrated and demanding. Until he has completed his basic training and subsequent schooling to qualify as a specialist, he receives none of the benefits or privileges of the regular cadres. Once qualified and assigned to a unit, however, he can volunteer for enlistment in the regular forces and become a Military Specialist. He does not have to complete his three-year tour of obligated service. Although enlistments in the regular services are open to civilians, most new volunteers stem from the conscript ranks or from regulars already in service. Original enlistments or reenlistments had been permitted for terms of two, three, or four years, but new regulations announced in December, 1968 required reenlistment to be for a minimum of five years.

About 50 percent of the draftees are reported to volunteer for enlistment, and this high ratio permits careful selectivity of the applicants. Selection boards pass on their qualifications, and only those applicants with acceptable records of performance and proper socialist attitudes, are accepted. Upon completion of their military service persons who do not reenlist enter the organized reserves, where they are committed until the age of forty-five. At the time of their release they fill out unsigned questionnaires, giving views on their period of service and evaluating the quality of the leadership they had encountered.

Higher ranking noncommissioned officers are all regulars, some of whom are veterans of the Revolution. In the main they are selected on the basis of proven capability, and are generally experienced and competent. For years the ranks of noncommissioned officers were perennially short of competent technicians, as few recruits from rural areas had any technical or mechanical aptitudes. This handicap is being steadily overcome, and significant progress has been made through overseas schooling or local training provided by Soviet instructors. There is a wide variety of opportunities for specialized and advanced schooling, and a large number of noncommissioned officers attend one or more formal training courses.

Training of the rank and file is continuous and thorough. A man's training continues throughout his military career; he receives on-the-job instruction and participates in periodic field exercises. Each service conducts its own training and has an extensive system of schools and facilities for instruction in its own specialties. Considerable time is devoted to civic action projects in agriculture or construction work, as well as to political and academic instruction where this is needed to raise literacy levels. Although women in the services are used primarily for clerical and administrative duties, they are given basic combat training and receive instruction in weapons, marksmanship, and small-unit tactics.

Men assigned to the army generally follow their basic training with attendance at a branch school of the arm or service of assignment. Army training meets a demanding standard and brings the men to a high level of professional competence, particularly in guerrilla tactics and irregular warfare. Navy men generally go from basic training to a shipboard assignment, and thereafter every effort is made to alternate shore duty with duty at sea. When not at sea, many attend a variety of navy schools that offer courses in armament, stores, seamanship, and other naval specialties. Air force training is devoted primarily to developing groundcrew support specialists. Following basic training, most men enter a technical school, where they are trained in aviation mechanics, radio, ordnance, aerial photography, or other air force specialty. They are then assigned to a unit, where training continues under individual unit commanders.

MISSION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES

In mid-1969 the FAR was completing a period of readjustment and reorganization, and was settling into a more professional mold from the informal rebel force that had fought the revolution. Firm spheres of responsibility and interservice relationships were not yet fully defined in all cases, but generally the command structure appeared to have attained a degree of stability.

The mission of the FAR is to defend the country's territorial integrity against external aggression, ensure internal security, and participate in civic action projects. This entails the traditional responsibility of maintaining a state or readiness to defend the nation and implement its military policies. The navy is specifically responsible for defense of the national coastline and for policing of territorial waters; the air force, in addition to the air defense of the country, is charged with providing air support to the army and navy.

The Fundamental Law designates the president as supreme commander and authorizes the Council of Ministers to fix the strength of the armed forces and determine their organization. The minister of the FAR is responsible for administering the armed forces, but is subordinate to the commander in chief, who is also prime minister. By government decree Prime Minister Castro has been commander in chief since 1959, and it is clear that he is, in fact, the real head of the entire military establishment.

Directly subordinate to the ministry of the FAR there is an Armed Forces General Staff, headed by a vice minister who serves as chief of staff. A number of other vice ministers are charged with a variety of service and administrative functions, one of them being the chief of the Services of Supply. The administrative channel extends from the chief of staff down to the chiefs of services, such as armor and artillery, and to the chiefs of Civil Defense and other paramilitary organizations. There is also a chief of the Political Section at this level who exercises staff supervision over the activities of the political cells attached to military units.

The Armed Forces General Staff serves as the headquarters for all elements, and the operational chain of command extends from the chief of staff through a chief of operations to all tactical components. These comprise the army, the navy, the air force, and the Pinar del Rió Military Region. Although the paramilitary forces are subordinate to the chief of staff, their direction is considered a special, rather than a general, staff function. In addition to the Civil Defense, the former Popular Defense Militia (Milicia de la Defensa Popular), these forces include an organization called an Anti-Bandit Force (Lucha Contra Bandidos—LCB), a Workers' Militia, a Frontier Battalion, a Frontier Guard Corps, and a number of centenary youth columns.

The Revolutionary Army (Ejército Revolucionario) consists of three field armies, designated the armies of the east, of the west, and of the center. It is primarily an infantry force, but it includes strong elements of armor, artillery, and engineers. Its 90,000 men are organized into nine infantry divisions (of brigade size), an armored corps, two motorized brigades, and one artillery brigade, as well as administrative and support troops. Arms inventory in 1969 included some tanks, assault guns and armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces of various calibers. In addition, there were substantial quantities of heavy infantry weapons, vehicles, and short range surface-to-surface missiles used mostly for coastal defense. Equipment was virtually all up-to-date from Communist-bloc sources.

The Revolutionary Navy (Marina de Guerra Revolucionaria) is a small striking force designed primarily for coastal patrol, antisubmarine defense, and tactical support of ground force operations. The Navy is also responsible for the security of maritime ground defense installations. Directly subordinate to the FAR chief of staff, it comprises two major commands: the Coastal Command; and the Anti-Submarine Command, headed by a small naval staff.

Navy personnel strength totals about 5,000 men. Ship inventory in 1969 comprised over sixty-five vessels, the principal element of which consisted of three frigate-type patrol craft. The balance of the fleet included twelve submarine chasers, twelve patrol missile craft, twenty-four motor torpedo boats, and two patrol escorts. In addition, there were a number of small service and support craft, and the navy was being furnished with helicopters for antisubmarine duty. Nearly all the vessels were of Soviet origin, but some ships were under construction in the country itself, where five major shipyards had been opened for ship construction and repair.

The Revolutionary Air and Air Defense Force (Defensa Anti-aérea y Fuerza Aérea Revolucionaria—DAAFAR) is one of the best equipped in Latin America, with a total inventory of over 350 modern aircraft. It is charged with the additional mission of the nation's antiaircraft defense and controls a sizable arsenal of ground-to-air missiles. There is a small air staff, and the force is organized into fighter, bomber, and transport commands. Personnel strength in mid-1969 was approximately 20,000 men.

The aircraft of the DAAFAR included jet interceptors, fighter-bombers, transports, and helicopters. It was estimated that there were close to fifty modern fighters, twenty-five fighter-bombers, and at least thirty helicopters. There were over thirty transports and about an equal number of older fighters, as well as a number of miscellaneous administrative aircraft. The air-defense network consisted primarily of twenty-four SA—2 Guideline AAMs.

The Civil Defense

The country has a number of paramilitary auxiliary organizations that support the FAR and serve as a ready reserve available for immediate call-up in the event of national emergency. Lightly armed and trained in guerrilla tactics and irregular operations, most are unpaid volunteer organizations that perform their military duties in their free time from their regular occupations. The largest and most significant of these is the Civil Defense, which, until January 1969, was called the Popular Defense Militia (Milicia de la Defensa Popular). It has varied considerably in strength over the years and in 1969 was estimated to number over 250,000 men and women.

The militia was organized in late 1959 as the National Revolutionary Militia. It was a volunteer home-defense and home-guard force and was created by Castro as an instrument to counter any political threat to his position by the Rebel Army, which was beginning to disagree with many of his actions trending toward establishment of a socialist state. Composed largely of peasants and workers who were his most ardent supporters, Castro felt that he could rely on this group to nullify any disaffection on the part of the army. Enlistment was urged of all citizens as a patriotic duty, and considerable pressure was applied to ensure maximum participation. At one time membership was reported as high as half a million.

The militia is subordinated to the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces but works closely with the Ministry of the Interior through the committees for defense of the revolution (see ch. 24, Public Order and Internal Security). Its stated mission is "to guard the interests of the people by protecting the manufacturing and commercial installations of the country, and be prepared to defend the nation's cities in the event of hostilities while regular forces are away at the front." Civil Defense is primarily an urban force, and there is a separate organization called the Workers' Militia that is made up of the rural peasantry.

In 1963 the militia's name was changed to the Popular Defense Militia. It comprised two types of units: combat companies, which were for men and women under thirty years of age; and guard companies, for those of ages thirty to fifty. The combat units emphasized training in weapons and guerrilla tactics, whereas the guard units were used largely for interior guard at government and industrial installations. Rifle ranges were set up at most major cities (Havana had twelve), and an effort was made to have recruits attend a one-week indoctrination and training course before being assigned to regular duties. These often included police work such as area patrols and direction of traffic. Members received no pay unless called to full-time active duty and had to purchase their own uniforms, which were distinguished from the army's by a blue rather than an olive-green shirt.

At first, service in the militia served the purpose of giving the average citizen a feeling of participation in the country's revolutionary development. Over the years, however, it has been difficult to maintain the early high pitch of enthusiasm, and the performance of militia duties has become increasingly desultory. As the Castro regime stabilized, an effort was made to work toward a greater state of normality, and beginning in 1965 the government began a deemphasis of the militia's role that resulted in a definite downgrading of its status. Government decrees prohibited the wearing of the uniform during off-duty hours. All civilians, whether militiamen or not, were required to turn in all their weapons to central depots and the arms were to be issued only for specific duties. Although the militia, now known, as the Civil Defense, was still active in 1969, it had been relegated to secondary importance, and the regular services had regained the former prominence that they had relinquished for a time to the popular forces.

Paramilitary Auxiliary Forces

Estimates on the number of men and women enrolled in the country's numerous auxiliary organizations vary widely and range from 100,000 to over 300,000. There are five of these organizations; all are under the guidance and supervision of the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces but each is independent and designed for a specific purpose. Although most of them were formed primarily to augment the nation's work force, they are paramilitary in their structure, discipline, uniforms, and basic military training.

The Workers' Militia is the rural equivalent of the urban Civil Defense. It is composed mostly of agricultural workers, chiefly those in the canefields, and its strength is reported to be between 100,000 and 150,000. It is organized into units called Workers' Brigades, which are spread throughout the country on a geographical basis. The established militia program calls for members to work for twenty days each month at their agricultural jobs, and then devote ten days to military training. The demands of special planting or harvest loads, however, do not always permit strict adherence to this schedule. Military training received by militiamen is rudimentary but includes drill and instruction in guerrilla warfare.

As Castro's Communist leanings began emerging early in his regime, considerable anti-Castro opposition developed, and a number of dissident groups initiated a campaign of sabotage and harrassment. They were small and poorly equipped, however, and had to limit their operations to the protective mountains where Castro himself had long evaded the Batista forces. Castro called these rebels, "bandits," and in 1962 organized a special unit called the Anti-Bandit Force (Lucha Contra Bandidos—LCB) in order to combat their forays.

The LCBs were recruited from men and women normally ineligible for regular military service; those between twelve and fifteen years of age, or over fifty, most of them familiar with the local mountain areas. Starting as local sector and zone platoons, they spread rapidly throughout threatened rural communities and soon developed a formal organization that covered the entire country. They wore army uniforms with distinctive green berets and had regular FAR and political officers attached to assist and supervise their activities. Although aided by other security elements and by the army, the LCBs proved an effective factor in Castro's campaign to crush his opposition. By 1969 little organized threat remained in the outlying mountains, and LCB personnel were being used mostly on civic action and agricultural projects.

A special Frontier Brigade was organized in 1961 in Oriente Province for the sole purpose of guarding the perimeter of the United States Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay. Formed as a battalion, it has since grown to brigade size, and is composed of three battalions and a communications company. It is bivouacked in the area surrounding the base and maintains twenty-four hour interior guard surveillance of the installation. The brigade is made up mainly of volunteer adolescents, who man posts along a border that extends some twenty-five miles. In addition to guard duties, units engage in routine military training and political instruction conducted by attached Communist party cells.

Another completely independent organization is the Frontier Guard Corps. This unit was formed in 1964 as an auxiliary force to protect ports and harbors and is, in effect, a customs guard. Army-type uniforms are distinguished by a small patch inscribed "Customs" (Aduana) worn over the left breast pocket. Corps members are not armed and are usually accompanied in their rounds by an armed solidier of the FAR. In addition to routine surveillance to ensure port security, they check on incoming cargoes and on vehicles entering or leaving the pier areas. Corps strength totals some 1,000 men and women.

In 1968 another approach to furnishing additional labor for agriculture was launched with the formation of paramilitary work battalions called centenary youth columns. These units were set up nationwide and organized along military lines under command of regular officers of the FAR. Enlistment was urged as a patriotic duty, and young men and women completing their compulsory military service were particularly urged to join for terms of one year. The Communist Youth Organization (Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas—UJC) was particularly active in appealing to the nation's youth and has claimed great success for the program.

The name of the organization derives from a Castro speech in which he stressed "a hundred years of struggle." The columns are composed of work battalions broken down into companies and platoons, and following the army pattern, all units include a Communist party cell. Special camps were constructed in various agricultural areas, and the first cadres reported for duty in July 1968. After a short indoctrination the regular schedule went into effect, consisting of work in the fields alternating with military training. The only figures made public have been from Oriente Province, where it was reported that over 8,000 youths were taking part in the program. The first female participation began in September 1968, with the arrival of a contingent of 500 women recruits.

CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

Military service has become a way of life for a large segment of the population, and the daily activities of the average citizen are colored by a pervasive military atmosphere; uniforms are the order of the day, and military organization, drill, and combat training are part of the most routine activity, from school attendance to harvesting the sugar crop. For the militiaman or member of an auxiliary volunteer group, military duty is a corrollary function that calls for a contribution of extra time and effort but does not interfere with his regular occupation. For a member of the expanded regular forces, it is a full-time and demanding career that taxes his energies and requires his entire application and dedication.

Since the Revolution the government has consistently emphasized the importance of the armed forces and has taken steps to make the professional services attractive. The regular soldier has security and status in the community, and the benefits and prerogatives of a military career compare favorably with those available on the civilian economy. Pay, housing, and rations are good by local standards, and other benefits, such as medical care, periodic leave time, and retirement plans further add to the advantages of regular service. At the same time, much is demanded of a member of the armed forces and he is expected to live up to the standards of behavior that were developed in the early idealism of the Revolution stressing austerity, rectitude, and exemplary conduct.

The duties and obligations of a member of the armed forces were outlined in the June 1969 issue of *Verde Olivo*, the official organ of the FAR. He is expected to:

> Be alert, honorable and loyal to the cause and interests of his fatherland, and to the ideals of the Cuban Communist Party.
>
> Carry out fully, promptly, and without discussion, the orders he receives.
>
> Respect his superiors and observe the rules of military courtesy and behavior.
>
> Wear the uniform correctly and maintain good military bearing; keep his uniform and his shoes clean.

It was noted that these requirements were in addition to those normally expected of a military man (or woman), which include the mastery of his particular job, exemplary conduct, study of the military profession, and obedience to official rules and regulations.

The standard daily routine of a member of the FAR is similar to that of most other military establishments. There is the normal cycle of training, drill, weaponry, guard, study, specialized duties, and recreation. The soldier is occupied with the use of his weapons in ground combat, the sailor with his ships, and the airman with his planes. New aspects, however, have been injected into military life, some resulting from the need for manpower and others stemming from the Marxist nature of the regime. Participation in civic action projects has become a significant phase of the military man's activity, and off-duty study—ranging from primary and secondary education to political discussion groups—takes up much of the soldier's otherwise spare time.

Both regulars and conscripts take part in civic action and have continuing programs of political instruction. When engaged in construction or agricultural projects they usually have a ten-hour work day, and are urged to put in an extra hour of "volunteer" time. Military personnel have built roads, schools, barracks, hospitals, and even clubs and theaters. Most civic action, however, is in agricultural work, with the military augmenting the seasonable shortage of the agricultural labor force. Armed forces participation in the sugar harvest in the summer of 1969 was put on a competitive basis, and rivalry was reported keen among the services to meet the announced goal of cutting 12,000 tons of sugarcane. In late July the armed forces ministry announced that the quotas had been attained, and particularly praised the Army of the Center, the Armored Corps, and the Revolutionary Navy.

Political instruction was started in the armed forces in 1965 and has been extended to all units down to company level. Conducted by assigned party cell members, it is designed to indoctrinate the men in Marxist principles and to promote Communist ideology. The program stresses the usual Communist line, emphasizing solidarity with other socialist peoples, particularly with North Vietnam, and taking a strong "anti-imperialist" position, specifically against the United States. One of the principles advocated has been approval and support of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Political courses have been supplemented by voluntary discussion groups and study clubs that meet during off-duty time to correlate the political and cultural phases of the socialist state. Their activities cover a broad field, and in addition to political study branch out into such areas as art, literature, music, and the theater.

RANK, UNIFORMS, AND INSIGNIA

The rank and grade structure of all three services follows standard conventional lines and generally conforms to the pattern of the United States Army, but with some notable exceptions. There is a grade of sublieutenant ranking below second lieutenant, a grade of first captain above captain, and there is allegedly no grade higher than major. This is largely a fiction, for since 1963 there have been three recognized higher levels of major in addition to commander in chief. As the Spanish word *comandante* means both major and commander, the new grades of division commander (or division major), corps commander, and army commander fit readily into the structure while technically retaining the limitation of major. All are addressed simply as "major."

Army and air force ranks are identical, and although naval officers have been given distinctive designations, they continue to use their equivalent army titles. All services use the same insignia of rank for officers, consisting of small bars, chevrons, or stars in gold-colored metal. They are worn on shoulder loops or on the shirt collar in the army and air force, and on the collar or olive-green shoulder boards in the navy. Noncommissioned officers' grades are the same for all services, but the navy wears reversed (points down) chevrons in red instead of the standard gold (points up) of the army and air force (see table 15).

Basic dress for all services is the two piece cotton-twill uniform of olive-green shirt and trousers. This is used for service and garrison wear and becomes the field uniform with the addition of sidearms and equipment. Trousers are worn loose for garrison duty and are tucked into combat boots for the field. Navy men wear the same uniform but change to traditional white for the hot weather months. Accessories, such as belts and shoes, are brown for the army and air force, and black for the navy. Women's uniforms are the same as the men's, substituting an olive-green skirt for the trousers, except for service in the field, when slacks are worn.

There is a wide range of headgear of which the most prevalent is the blocked field cap with peak, which is worn by the army and the air force. The navy wears an overseas-type garrison cap, and changes to a navy flat hat worn with the white uniform. Berets are optional for all officers and may be worn by certain designated units. The steel helmet is widely used for parades and for combat training.

Extensive use is made of patches and tabs to distinguish arms, services, and branches. Navy personnel wear a rectangular patch over the left breast pocket with the initials MGR (Marina de Guerra Revolucionaria) in black letters on a white background. The air force has a circular shoulder patch, bearing a white star on a red triangle with stylized wings. Pilot wings are of conventional design, with a central shield of the national coat-of-arms over a scroll inscribed FAR. All conscripts wear a shield-shaped shoulder patch of alternating diagonal blue and white stripes, with the letters FAR in white on a red chief. Castro has abolished all awards and decorations, and recognition of outstanding service is effected through promotion or public commendation.

Table 15. *Cuban FAR Officer Ranks and Insignia**

Rank	Spanish Designation	Insignia
Army and Air Force		
Commander in Chief	Comandante en Jefe	Gold star on red and black lozenge
Army Commander	Comandante de Ejército	Gold star framed in a shield
Corps Commander	Comandante de Cuerpo	Gold star framed in a pentagon
Division Commander	Comandante de División	Gold star framed in a circle
Major	Comandante	Gold star
First Captain	Primer Capitán	Four gold chevrons
Captain	Capitán	Three gold chevrons
First Lieutenant	Primer Teniente	Two gold chevrons
Lieutenant	Teniente	One gold chevron
Sublieutenant	Subteniente	One gold bar
Navy		
Ship Captain (Corps Commander)	Capitán de Navio	Gold star framed in pentagon
Frigate Captain (Division Commander)	Capitán de Fragata	Gold star framed in circle
Corvette Captain (Major)	Capitán de Corbeta	Gold star
Fleet Lieutenant (First Captain)	Teniente de Flotilla	Four gold chevrons
Ship Lieutenant (Captain)	Teniente de Navio	Three gold chevrons
Ship Ensign (First Lieutenant)	Alférez de Navio	Two gold chevrons
Frigate Ensign (Lieutenant)	Alférez de Fragata	One gold chevron
Ensign (Sublieutenant)	Alférez	One gold bar
Noncommissioned (all services)		
First Sergeant	Sargento de Primera	Three chevrons and two arcs
Second Sergeant	Sargento de Segunda	Three chevrons and one arc
Third Sergeant	Sargento de Tercera	Three chevrons
Corporal	Cabo	Two chevrons

***FAR (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias—Revolutionary Armed Forces).**

Uniforms and equipment are issued to both officers and men, and include personal items such as underclothing, shoes, and towels. Uniforms closely resemble United States models and are manufactured locally. They are simple, well adapted to the climate, and are of reasonably good quality. Increasing emphasis is being placed on the proper wearing of the uniform, and for the most part the serviceman and servicewoman presents a neat, smart appearance.

MILITARY JUSTICE

The normal judiciary functions of the armed forces are under the jurisdiction of the judge advocate general whose mission is to prevent crime, judge offenders, and rehabilitate the sentenced. All penal activities of the FAR are administered under a new "Manual of Military Justice," which was promulgated in late 1968. It covers all aspects of military jurisprudence, and serves as a manual for courts martial supplementing the Military Penal Code and Military Procedure Law adopted in 1966.

The military court structure consists of three levels: the prosecutor, who serves as a permanent summary court; the Military Tribunal, composed of a president and two voting members; and the Supreme Military Tribunal, which is attached to the Armed Forces General Staff, and is presided over by the commander in chief. All units, beginning with the battalion level, have either a permanently assigned prosecutor or a Military Tribunal. In addition, unit commanders are given fairly wide latitude in dispensing summary justice for minor offenses without resorting to formal trial.

Court martial procedures follow traditional lines, progressing through the standard steps of reading the charges, examination of witnesses, arguments, findings, and sentence. All prisoners must be represented by a defense counsel, and the prosecutor or president of a court must be of the same rank as the accused. The accused's commanding officer must approve the sentence, which he may modify in favor of, but not against, the prisoner. All findings of guilty may be appealed to the next higher echelon.

The avowed purpose of the military penal system is the rehabilitation of prisoners, and the judge advocate general has stated that his aim was to produce good soldiers. In line with this philosophy, punishment for convicted offenders takes one of two forms; either confinement in a military prison or assignment to a penal labor battalion. Imprisonment is restricted to the more serious cases, but these are offered an opportunity to qualify for a labor battalion through reeducation and exemplary "socialist" conduct.

All prisoners, whether incarcerated or in the somewhat less restricted confinement of a work group, are organized into military formations; part of their time is devoted to drill and military training. All prisoners also receive instruction in Marxist principles, and daily classes are held in political and cultural subjects.

Labor battalions are usually housed in temporary camps and are used locally on projects of agricultural labor or public works. There is a system of rotation in which one company undergoes military training while the others work. Their confinement is not overly strict, and they are run largely by self-discipline through Disciplinary Commissions elected from among the prisoners themselves. These groups handle most of the camp's management and resolve its problems; they can even recommend parole, for which a prisoner becomes eligible after serving one-third of his sentence. All such recommendations, however, must have the approval of the battalion commander before final action.

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GLOSSARY

arroba—A measure of weight, used in agriculture, particularly sugar. Equivalent to twenty-five pounds.

bagasse—Residue of crushed sugarcane used as fuel or raw material for a type of paper.

batey—An urban community surrounding a large sugar mill.

bohío—A typical Cuban rural house having an earth floor and constructed of poles, palm bark, and palm leaves.

caballería—An old Spanish measure of land still utilized in Cuba. Equivalent to 33.2 acres.

cabildos—Negro social clubs having both religious and recreational aspects.

CDR—Comité de Defensa de la Revolución (Committee for Defense of the Revolution). Vigilance group formed on local level; thousands of such committees exist.

ciboneyismo—A type of Cuban literary romanticism concerning the preconquest life of the Ciboney Indians.

colonos—Small farmers who rented land from sugar mills.

criollo—Originally meant a person of Spanish parentage born in a Spanish colony. As used in Cuba, means a person, usually of mixed parentage who identifies himself with Cuba.

CTC—R—Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba Revolucionarios (Confederation of Revolutionary Workers of Cuba). A federation of all labor unions in the country.

guajiro—A Cuban peasant.

ICAIC—Instituto Cubano del Arte e Industria Cinematografica (Cuban Institute of Cinema Art and Industry). Government entity responsible for film production, distribution, importation, and exhibition.

INAV—Instituto Nacional de Ahorros y Vivienda (National Institute of Savings and Housing). Government organization responsible for urban housing.

INRA—Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (National Institute of Agrarian Reform). Organization that operates state-owned farms.

JUCEPLAN—Junta Central de Planificación (Central Planning Board). Has responsibility for coordinating various elements of the economy.

mestizo—In most Latin American countries, means a person of mixed Indian and white parentage but, as word is used in Cuba, denotes a person of any racial mixture.

municipio—An administrative division equivalent to a township in the United States.

PCC—Partido Comunista de Cuba (Communist Party of Cuba).

peso—Unit of currency. Equivalent to US$1 as of early 1970. Divided into 100 centavos.

PURS—Partido Unido de Revolución Socialista (United Party of the Socialist Revolution). Name of Communist Party of Cuba from 1963 to 1965.

UJC—Union de Jovenes Comunistas (Communist Youth Organization). Created by merging all of the country's youth groups.

UNEAC—Union Nacional de Escritores y Artistas Cubanos (National Union of Writers and Artists of Cuba).

viandas—No English equivalent. Means tubers, such as squash, malanga, yucca, and green bananas, all of which are an important source of carbohydrates in the Cuban diet.

INDEX

Abakuá: 194-195
ABC revolutionary group: 42, 44, 46, 48
Abreu, Rosalía: 139
absenteeism: 99, 103, 245, 297, 367
Acosta, Agustín: 163
administration and management: problems and personnel, 296, 297, 300, 318, 320, 323-324, 326-327, 329, 341
administrative divisions: vii, 70, 221
Adrian VI, Pope: 179
adult education (*see also* literacy campaign): 5, 133, 142, 144, 151, 155
Africa: cultural influence, 73, 77, 86, 157, 161-162, 163, 164-165, 168, 175
African cults: vii, 5, 88, 126, 177, 178, 180, 192-196 *passim*
African languages: 88-89
Afro-Asian-Latin American People's Solidarity Conference (Tricontinental Conference): 57, 258, 274
Agence France Presse: 268
Agencia Prensa Latina: 261, 268, 269, 285
Agramonte, Roberto: 50
agrarian reform: 95, 184, 185, 349, 354
Agrarian Reform Laws: (1959), 53, 55, 95, 256, 290, 315, 320, 326, 385; (1963), 54, 214, 316
agreements and treaties, international: viii, 35, 36, 37, 45, 57, 253, 255, 256, 292, 293, 294, 326, 328, 344, 384, 386, 388, 389, 390, 394, 395-397, 414
Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank (BANFIAC): 315, 326, 408
agriculture (*see also* agrarian reform; Agrarian Reform Laws; crops; farmers; farms; land: reform; land: tenure; livestock: National Institute of Agrarian Reform): 42, 294; capital investment, 307, 308, 318-319; diversification effort, 3, 293, 299, 319; education and schools, 97, 138, 148, 152, 318; government control, 306-307, 315-317, 354-355; methods, 308; policy, 319-322, 330; private sector, 316-317; production, 299, 300, 303, 307-314; resources, 296; workers, 101, 129, 130, 300, 307, 353-355, 363, 364, 456
agrupaciónes: 291
Aguilar, Luis: v
aid and credit, foreign (*see also* under Communist countries; Soviet Union): viii, 285, 330, 397-399
air force. *See* Revolutionary Air and Air Defense Force (DAAFAR)
airfields: viii, 69, 378-379
airlines and service: viii, 21, 253, 376, 378
Albania: 252
Aleman, José B.: 139
Algeria: 252, 253
Almeida, Juan: 79
Alonso, Alicia: 171
Alonso, Fernando: 171
Alvarez, Santiago: 278
anthem, national: 243
Anti-Bandit Force (LCB): 452, 455-456
architecture: 173-174
Ardévol, José: 171
area: vii, 9, 61
Argentina: 253, 255
armed forces (*see also* budget: military; paramilitary forces): viii, 2; aid, 439; civic action, 154, 353, 355, 439, 445, 451, 456, 458; courts, 421, 426, 461; organization, 451-457; and the PCC, 443-444; personnel procurement and training, 447-451; and politics, 232-233; rank and insignia, 458-460, 461; strength, viii, 439, 452, 453
arms inventory: 452
Arrufat, Antón: 168, 172
Arteaga, Manuel: 182
Artillery School: 448

Associated Press (AP): 268, 269
Association of Cane Planters: 236
Authentics: 48, 49, 50, 225, 226, 228, 230, 233, 234, 238, 239, 240, 352

bagasse: 337, 338, 345, 346, 347
balance of payments: 328
banks and banking: viii, 370, 406-413; nationalization, 407
Bantu language: 77
Baptists: 184, 187, 190
barrios: 70
barter: 294, 373, 383, 390, 395, 396, 397, 398
Batista, Fulgencio: 1, 2, 23, 24, 44, 45, 46-48, 49, 79, 111, 140, 141, 182, 183, 225, 226, 228, 229, 234, 236, 238, 239, 240, 248, 352, 420; and the army, 232-233, 441-442, 446; periods of rule, 24, 50-52, 227, 441; and political parties, 237
Bay of Pigs: 56, 124, 186
Belgium: 252
beverages: 342
birth control. *See* family planning
birth rate: 59, 62, 63, 109
black market: 130, 371, 373, 374, 402, 414, 427
Bohemia (periodical): 262, 274
Bohemia Libre (periodical): 286
bohío: 85, 116
Bolivia: 253, 255-256
bonds, government: 406, 407
Book Institute: 166, 216, 275, 276, 290, 328
book publishing: 275-277
Boorstein, E.: 320, 329
botella system: 262-263
boundaries, national: 9
Bozo Masvidal, Eduardo: 184, 185, 186
Brazil: 253, 255
Brooke, Gen. John R.: 35
Brú, Laredo: 46, 47
budget (*see also* debt, public; taxes): 134, 324, 401, 402-404; expenditures, 404-405; military, 444-446; revenue, 401, 403-404
Bulgaria: 252, 287, 328, 388
Bulgarian Telegraph Agency: 268

cabildos: 95, 180, 181, 193
Cabot Foundation: 314
Cabrera, Lydia: 164, 194
Cabrera Infante, Guillermo: 166, 167, 168
Camagüey (city): airport, 379; population, 69
Camagüey Province: agriculture, 302, 305, 306; oil, 336; population, 65-66; power, 380; sugar industry, 338
Camagüey region: 13-14
Canada: 384, 388, 394; relations with, 251
canning: 341
Capablanca y Graupera, Aquiles: 174
Carabalíes: 77
Caracas Pact: 228
Cárdenas, Agustín: 174
Caribbean Legion: 49
Carlos V, King of Spain: 179
Carpentier, Alejo: 165, 166, 167, 275
Carreno, Mario: 175
Casa de las Américas (periodical): 262, 274
Casa de las Américas. *See* House of the Americas
Castro, Angel: 230
Castro, Fidel (*see also* politics: opposition to present regime): 1-6 *passim*, 2, 24, 49, 54, 55, 56, 57, 74, 78, 79, 80, 86, 87, 90, 94, 107, 111, 154, 167, 188, 200, 201, 207, 263, 276, 280, 396, 410, 418, 434, 436; alleged plot against, 437; and the army, 442, 443, 446, 452, 454; character and personality, 230-232; and the churches, 178, 183-187, 237; and governmental system, 209, 213, 217, 221; and the intellectuals, 165-166, 167; and international relations, 247-258 *passim*; and labor, 351-355 *passim*, 364; as leader, 52, 225-226, 230, 242-245 *passim*, 258, 435; and the PCC, 219, 223, 230, 240, 241, 242; revolt (1953), 51, 420; Revolution (1959), 227-230
Castro, Lina Ruz: 230
Castro, Raúl: 54, 183, 184, 185, 219, 448, 449
Catholic Action: 182, 186
Catholic Youth: 183
cattle (*see also* meat; dairy products): 14, 16, 28, 32, 295, 299, 306, 312-313, 320, 321, 340
Caturla García, Alejandro: 170
Cauto River: 14, 16
census: 6, 32, 60, 66, 71, 109, 116, 353, 366
Center of Automotive Technical Services: 216
Centoz, Luis: 186

Central Organizations: 215, 216
Central Planning Board (JUCEPLAN): 54, 291, 292, 321, 371, 372, 395, 402, 410
Central University: 122, 143, 152
Cervantes, Miguel de: 158
Céspedes, Carlos Manuel de: 32, 42, 44, 46
Chadbourne Plan: 42
Charles III of Spain: 28, 29
chemicals: 344-345
Chibas, Eddy: 230, 238, 240
children: 105-110 *passim*, 123, 124, 126, 130, 135
Chile: 286
China, Communist: 118, 265, 279, 287, 328; aid and credit, 398, 399; relations with, 3, 214, 223, 247, 249, 252, 255, 257-258; trade, 253, 388, 390, 394, 396
Chinese (people): 62, 63, 71, 80-82, 182
Chinese language: 89
Chinese Nationalist Party: 81
Christian Social Democracy Movement: 181
chromite: 332
church-state relations: 179, 180-189 *passim*, 191
ciboneyismo: 159, 160, 161
Cienfuegos: airport, 379; population, 69
cigarettes: 340
cities (*see also* urbanization): population, 68, 69; social structure, 93-95
Civic Front against Racial Discrimination: 79
Civic-Military Institute: 141
Civic Resistance Movement: 228
Civil Aeronautics Institute: 216
Civil Defense: viii, 439, 452, 453-455
civil rights: 105, 106, 211-215 *passim*, 229, 359, 417
climate: vii, 16-17
clothing: 130, 345-346
Club Aténas of Havana: 79
CNOC. *See* National Labor Confederation of Cuba
cobalt: 332, 397
coffee: 11, 15, 16, 29, 32, 299, 302, 310, 372, 391
colegios: 235
Colombia: 253
Columbus, Christopher: 1, 25, 84
Columbus, Diego: 25
commerce: 370-376, 411; state control, 3, 369-370
Committees for Defense of the Revolution (CDR): 412, 414, 417-418, 428, 429, 432-433, 454
communications: viii, 294, 381
communism: and the churches, 185-186; Cuban, 3, 209, 223, 257, 436; international, 431
Communist countries: 279, 289, 328, 329, 376; aid and credit, viii, 257, 405, 406, 439; debt to, 406; relations with, 223, 249, 250, 251, 252, 256-259; subversive activity instructors in Cuba, 432; trade, 54, 249, 292, 380, 383, 385, 386, 390, 395, 397
Communist Party of Cuba (PCC): 1, 2, 43, 44, 47, 48, 79, 91, 92, 100, 206, 235; and the armed forces, 233, 443-444, 447, 456; Central Committee, 219, 220, 241, 437; development, 54-55, 240-241; and labor, 357, 367; membership, 220, 242; mission, 241; official organ, 265; organization, 219-220, 241, 443-444; Political Bureau, 443; state-party relationship, 209, 210, 219-220, 223, 237, 241-242
Communist Party of the Soviet Union: 55
Communist Youth Organization (UJC): 91-92, 100, 101, 102, 153, 207, 220, 265, 266, 363, 447, 449, 456
Communists: 2, 43, 46, 48, 49, 54-55, 79, 81, 227, 229-230, 233, 234, 238, 239, 240, 351, 352
Compulsory Military Service (SMO): 450
concentration camps: 418, 434
Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC): 269, 352, 357
Confederation of Revolutionary Cuban Workers (CTC-R): 234, 349, 357-358, 359, 363, 367
Conservative party: 38, 39
Consolidated Electric Enterprise: 348
consolidated state enterprises: 291, 327
Constituent Assembly: 35-36, 47, 211, 239
constitutions (*see also* Declarations of Havana; Fundamental Law): vii, 24, 33, 35; (1901), 75, 137, 181, 210-211; (1940), vii, 48, 50, 51, 79, 111,

141, 210, 211-213, 217, 218, 238, 239, 418, 419, 424
construction: 114, 115, 295, 356; materials, 342-343
consumer goods: 5, 289, 294, 325, 350, 369, 374, 375, 376
Continental Organization of Latin American Students: 275
contract and trust relationships: 199, 206-207
cooperatives: 96, 120, 121, 314, 316, 411
copper: 333
copyright: 262, 275
Cortazar, Octavio: 278
Cortina, José Manuel: 47
Costa Rica: 49
Council of Ministers: 2, 210, 213-217 passim, 223, 241, 249, 442, 452
counterrevolutionary activities: 15, 56, 184, 187, 218, 418, 421, 422, 426, 434, 435-437
courts (*see also under* armed forces): vii, 218, 359, 417; municipal, 423-424, 426; people's courts, 219, 423; pre-1959 Revolution, 419-420; qualifications, selection, and training of officials, 417, 421-424 *passim;* revolutionary tribunals, 217, 218, 219, 417, 420, 421, 422
Covarrubias, Francisco: 172
credit (*see also* aid and credit, foreign): 411
crime: 426-428
criminal law and procedures: 424, 426
criollos: 30, 31, 32, 34, 72, 73-74, 174, 175, 181
crops (*see also* coffee, fibers, fruit, rice, sugar, tobacco): 11-16 *passim*, 23, 292, 293, 299; nonexport, 322; prices, 290; production and production areas, 301-304, 308-312
Crowder, Gen. Enoch: 40, 41
Cuba (periodical): 274
Cuban Academy of Sciences: 216
Cuban Aviation Enterprise: viii, 378
Cuban Broadcasting Institute (ICR): 216, 278-279, 282, 370
Cuban Chamber of Commerce: 216
Cuban Coffee Enterprise: 372
Cuban Council of Evangelical Churches: 185, 186, 187, 190
Cuban Electric Company: 347
Cuban Export Enterprise: 291, 394, 395
Cuban Federation of Evangelical Youth: 191
Cuban Institute of Cinema Art and Industry (ICAIC): 166, 172, 173, 216, 262, 277, 278, 279
Cuban Institute of International Friendship: 216
Cuban Labor Federation: 79
Cuban Language Institute: 87
Cuban People's Party: 49, 50, 51, 230, 231, 232, 238, 240
Cuban Power (exile group): 436
Cuban Refugee Center (Miami, Fla.): 64, 431
Cuban Revolutionary Party: 34, 48
Cuban Sugar Enterprise: 394
Cuban Tobacco Enterprise (CUBATABACO): 216, 290, 327, 340, 372, 394
Cuban Traffic and Freight Enterprise: 394
CUBATABACO. *See* Cuban Tobacco Enterprise
culture (*see also under* Negroes): activities, 7, 94, 96, 101, 168-175; exchange programs, 287; influences, 29, 72-77 *passim*, 83, 85, 86, 157-158, 159, 168-171
currency: viii, 293, 413
customs duties. *See* tariffs
Czechoslovak News Agency: 268
Czechoslovakia: 279, 287, 328, 348, 379, 388, 411, 413; Soviet invasion, 251, 458

dairy products: 295, 340-341
dance: 171
day care centers: 108, 129, 133, 144-145, 363
de Soto, Hernando: 85
death rate: vii, 59, 63, 124, 125
death penalty: 424, 425, 427
debt, public: foreign, 383, 388, 398, 401, 405-406, 411
Declarations of Havana: 209, 213, 214, 418, 425
del Casal, Julián: 162
democracy: 227, 243
Democratic party: 48, 228, 238, 239
Denmark: 252
Desnoes, Edmundo: 168, 173
development plans: 292, 321, 354, 355
Dewart, Leslie: 182
Díaz, Evelio: 184
Díaz Ballart, Mirtha: 231

dictatorship: 38, 209, 215, 225, 226, 227, 230, 420
diet: 118
Directorate for National Development of Agriculture and Cattle: 216
Directorate of University Students: 185
diseases: 113, 124-125; leading causes of death, vii; livestock, 312, 313; plant, 311, 391
distribution system: 67, 374-376
divorce: 105, 107, 110-111
doctors: 120, 121, 122, 126
Dominican Republic: 49, 231, 286; invasion, 254
Dorticós, Osvaldo: 2, 53, 167, 217, 219, 229
DSE. *See* General Directorate of the State

Eastern University: 122, 143, 152
Echeverria, José Antonio: 161
Economic Society of Friends of the Country: 29, 31, 33, 135, 158, 163
economy (*see also specific sector*): viii, 1, 3, 4, 26-34 *passim*, 40, 41, 42, 49, 50, 223, 225; characteristics, 289-290; since 1959 Revolution, 53-54; planning and policy, 291-293, 396; problems, 295-297; state control, 290-291
Ecuador: 253
Editora Júvenil: 275
education (*see also* adult education, scholarships, schools, teachers, technical and vocational training, universities): vii, 30, 35, 37, 47, 52, 72, 90, 94-99 *passim*, 294, 350; elementary, 137-138, 140, 141, 145-146, 148; history, 134-143; medical, 121-122; military instruction, 448-449; preschool, 103, 108, 138, 144-145, 374; principal goal, 134; reform, 5; secondary, 133, 138, 140, 141, 146-147, 148
Eírez, Antonia: 175
elections: 35, 38, 39, 46-50 *passim*, 209, 223, 229, 239, 240, 244, 263; local, 221
electricity. *See* power
emigration (*see also* exile groups, refugees): 5, 24, 59, 63, 64-65, 71, 76, 83, 98, 105, 108, 121, 133, 134, 204, 250, 296, 318, 327, 435
English language: vii, 73, 86, 87, 88
Entralgo, Elías: 205
equipment (*see also* machinery *and under* United States): capital, 383, 386, 393
Escalante, Aníbal: 54, 55, 173, 230, 437
Espín, Vilma: 102
Estopiñán, Roberto: 174
Estorino, Abelardo: 172
Estrada Palma, Tomás: 33, 34, 37, 38, 138
ethnic groups: 6, 71-85
Europe: 252, 279, 285, 319, 398, 406
Europe, Eastern: 399; trade, 386, 388, 390, 393, 394, 396
Evangelical Theological Seminary: 190
Ex-Army Officers Group: 228
exile groups: 286, 361, 431, 435, 436
expenditures. *See under budget*
exports (see also under nickel, sugar, tobacco): viii, 292, 299, 342, 376, 379, 383, 384, 386, 388, 389-392; earnings, 391, 392

factories: 328, 329, 330, 340, 343, 345
family (*see also* children, divorce, man, marriage, women): 105-111
family planning: 109
farmers: 4, 116, 291, 309, 317, 354, 365, 372, 408, 411
farming youth brigades: 92, 101
farms: 306-307; state, 95, 291, 299, 309, 316, 354
fauna: 18-19
Federation of Cuban Women (FMC): 7, 91, 92, 102-103, 107, 108, 122, 125, 131, 145, 207, 274, 359, 363, 364
Federation of University Students: 228, 234, 235
Fernández, Pablo Armando: 167
Fernández Casas, ______: 240
Fernández Retamar, Roberto: 167
fertilizers and fertilization: 291, 308, 317, 318, 319, 344, 372, 393, 398, 399
fibers: 311
Figueredo, Pedro: 243
films: 173, 262, 277-279
finance (*see also* banks and banking; budget; currency; debt, public; foreign exchange): viii, 402-415
Finlay, Carlos: 35, 163

fishing: 295, 314-315
five-year plan. *See* development plans
flag: 242, 243
flour milling: 341-342
FMC. *See* Federation of Cuban Women
folk beliefs and practices: 125-126, 196-197
food: 130, 311, 321, 341-342, 350, 362, 373; imports, 118, 289, 299, 383, 393-394
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO): 252
foreign aid. *See* aid and credit, foreign
foreign exchange: 129, 130, 292, 299, 321, 323, 343, 376, 390, 394, 395, 398, 410, 414
foreign policy: 248-251
foreign relations: 247-259
forests and forestry: 14, 301, 305-306, 314
Fornairs, José: 162
foundry: 344
France: 252, 388, 393
Franco, Francisco: 83, 185
freedom: 79, 80; artistic, 7, 167; of expression, 53, 158, 166, 167, 168, 173, 359; guarantees, 215; personal, 199, 349, 417, 426; of the press, 53, 229, 262, 264; and the worker, 354-355
Freemasonry movement: 180, 181
Frei, Eduardo: 286
Frontier Brigade: 452, 456
Frontier Guard Corps: 452, 456
fruit: 305, 311, 391
Frye, Alexis: 137
fuel: 289, 290, 323, 326, 338, 347, 348, 378, 381, 392-393
Fundamental Law of the Republic: vii, 106, 110, 209, 213-215, 216-218 *passim*, 249, 418, 421, 425, 442, 452

gambling: 7, 130, 203
gasoline: 374, 378
General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT): 384
General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI): 429, 431; Export of Revolution Department, 432
General Directorate of Public Order (DGOP): 429, 431
General Directorate of Security of the State (DSE): 429, 431, 433
Germany, East: 252, 328, 388
Ghana: 252
Gillin, J. P.: 201
Gómez, José Miguel: 38, 39, 440
Gómez, Máximo: 33, 34, 37
Gómez, Miguel Mariano: 46
Gómez de Avellaneda, Gertrudis: 159
Gómez-Sicre, José: 174
González, Reynaldo: 167
government: vii, 223, 224-225; institutions under Spain, 26; local, 70, 221-222; national, 209-219; under Platt amendment, 37-45; power, source and sanction of, 209; relation of armed forces to, 442-446; training for local officials, 222
Granma (newspaper): 168, 261, 265, 266, 267, 375
Grau San Martín, Ramón: 43, 44, 45, 48, 51, 226, 233, 238, 239, 240, 254
Great Britain: 28, 384, 388, 390, 393, 397; aid, 344, 399
gross national product: 293, 337, 392, 403, 404
Guantánamo (city): 69, 377
Guantánamo: U.S. base, 16, 37, 256, 280, 282, 286, 456
Guantánamo Bay: 16, 37
Guerra, Ramiro: 171
guerrilla: as ideal, 201
guerrilla activity: 51-52, 227-228, 253, 255; training for, 432, 451, 453
Guevara, Alfredo: 172, 173
Guevara, Ernesto (Che): 3, 54, 57, 166, 184, 253, 254, 276, 327, 365
Guillen, Nicolas: 163, 164, 167, 170
Guiteras, Antonio: 43
Gutíerrez Alea, Tomás: 173

Habanilla River: 348
Haiti: 83, 84, 85, 89, 170, 286
Hanna, Mathew: 137
Harding, Warren: 40
Hardware Import Enterprise (FERRIMPORT): 372
Hatuey (Indian hero): 85
Havana: 27, 28, 50, 80, 89, 94, 110, 113, 143, 182, 187, 191, 328, 370, 371, 377; air service and airport, viii, 253, 378; newspapers, 82, 266; population, 65, 68, 81, 82, 83; port, viii, 379-380; power, 381; radio and television, 280, 281, 285; water supply, 117

health: vii, 35, 53, 103, 113, 118-120; facilities and services (*see also* doctors, hospitals), 6, 113, 127, 142, 294, 350, 355; schools of public health, 433
Heredia y Heredia, José María: 159
Higher Education Reform Law: 152
Hitler, Adolph: 83
Holguín: 69, 75, 141, 379
holidays: 131, 195-196, 360, 363
hospitals and clinics: 27, 113, 120, 121, 123, 290
hotels: 374
House of the Americas (Casa de las Américas): 166, 167, 168, 173, 275-277 *passim*
housing: 6, 75, 96, 97, 113, 290, 350, 355, 362-363; construction, 114, 115, 362; ownership, 115, 362
Hungary: 287, 388
hurricanes: 17, 300, 309
hydroelectric plant: 348

Iberia Airlines: viii
illiteracy: 137, 154, 446
immigration and immigrants: 37, 40, 41, 59, 60, 62-63, 72, 74, 76, 80, 82, 83
immunization: 103, 120, 123, 125
imports: viii, 34, 118, 289, 297, 299, 318, 319, 328, 337, 341, 343, 346, 347, 348, 372, 379, 383, 384, 388, 392-394
income, personal (*see also* wages and salaries): 294, 361; average annual, 130
independence: 23, 45; movement, 30-34 *passim*, 161, 181
Independent Color Party: 78
India: 252
Indians (*see also ciboneyismo*): 25-26, 71, 84-85, 164
Indonesia: 252
industrialization campaign: 3, 292, 328-330, 397
industry (*see also specific sector*): nationalization, 326-327, 347, 349, 370; organization and policy, 324-328
infant mortality rate: vii, 124
information, public (*see also specific medium*): 261-287
Institute of Applied Science: 101
Institute of Fuel Technology: 147
Institute of Phytosanitation: 148
insurance: 411-412
Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI): 54, 55
intellectual activities: 7, 53, 158-168
intellectuals: 7, 30, 51, 72, 94, 158-163 *passim*, 173, 177, 202, 224, 225, 242; relationship to Castro government, 165-166, 167
interest rates: 411
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, World Bank): 49, 396
International Coffee Agreement: 391, 397
International Coffee Organization: 391, 397
International Commission of Jurists: 215, 426
International Insurance Enterprise of Cuba: 411
International Labor Organization: 129, 252
International Monetary Fund (IMF): 293, 361, 397
International Sugar Agreement: 308, 390, 397
International Sugar Conference: 50
International Union of American Republics: 254
Interservice Cadet School: 448
investments: foreign, 37, 45, 224, 324, 325, 384, 385, 397
iron: 332
irrigation: 253, 308, 318, 319
Isle of Pines: 12, 19, 36, 37, 84, 101, 305, 311, 335, 363, 380, 434
Isle of Youth: 101
Israel: 252
Italy: 252

Jamaica: 251-252
Jamis, Fayad: 167
Japan: 252, 369, 384, 388, 390
Japanese Society: 84
Jehovah's Witnesses: 5, 177, 178, 182, 183, 187, 192
Jewish Committee for Cuba: 82
Jews: 71, 72, 82-83, 177, 178, 182, 184, 187, 191
Jiménez, Cardinal: 179
Jiménez, José M.: 77
John, Pope: 186
JUCEPLAN. *See* Central Planning Board
justice (*see also* courts): vii, 35, 218-219, 418-426, 461-462

juvenile delinquency: 101, 103
Juventud Rebelde (newspaper): 261, 265, 266

Kiel, Leopoldo: 138
kindergartens. *See* education: preschool
kinship: 206-207

la Concepción Valdés, Diego Gabriel de: 159
la Cruz, Ramón de: 172
La Habana Province: 221, 222, 434; crops, 301, 302, 305; population, 65, 66, 77; social work program, 103
la Luz y Caballero, José de: 136, 159
labor (*see also* absenteeism; agriculture: workers; labor force; labor unions; pensions, retirement; strikes; sugar: workers; technical brigades; unemployment; wages): 47, 50, 62, 63, 76, 80, 99; benefits, 350, 362; conditions of work, 360, 366; councils, 423; government control, 365-367; migratory, 116; nonagricultural, 355-356; productivity, 297, 307, 317, 318, 350, 366, 367, 403; relations, 350, 365, 367; shortages, 296, 300, 307, 317, 318, 324, 327, 356, 369; skilled and unskilled, 297, 307, 339; state farm, 116; tribunals, 359; voluntary, 7, 92, 101, 130, 131, 296, 317, 318, 363-365
labor force: 44, 45, 92, 101, 323, 338, 340, 345, 346, 353-356
Labor Justice Administration: 359
labor unions (*see also* Confederation of Revolutionary Cuban Workers): 43, 48, 94, 95, 127, 207, 349, 357-360; and politics, 225, 228, 233-234, 240, 351-353
Labor Unity Organization: 228
Lam, Wilfredo: 175
land: arable, 296, 300; reform, 3-4, 49, 53, 75, 229, 316, 354; tenure, 46, 306-307, 315; use, 49, 300-301, 305, 307, 309
landowners: 93, 306
languages (*see also* English, Spanish): vii, 85-90
las Casas, Don Luis de: 135, 158
Las Villas Province: 222; agriculture, 301, 302, 305, 306; sanitation, 117
Las Villas region: 12-13
Latin America: broadcasts to, 285-286; exportation of revolution to, 56, 253, 255; relations with, 3, 248, 250, 251, 253-256; revolutionary movement, 57; subversive activity, training in Cuba for, 432; trade, 388
Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA): 396
Latin American Solidarity Organization (OLAS): 57, 258, 286
Law of Union Organization: 358, 365
Lecuona, Ernesto: 170
legislature. *See* Council of Ministers
Lence, Father Germán: 185
Léndez, Lorenz: 135
Lezama Lima, José: 165, 168
Liberal party: 38, 39, 40, 46, 48, 238, 239
Liberia: 252
libraries: 155, 158, 262, 277
literacy: 143, 446, 451; campaign, 5, 73, 79, 150, 154, 361
literature: 77, 89, 157, 158
livestock (*see also* cattle): 312-314, 391
Livestock Registry Office: 312
living conditions: 91
Lockwood, Lee: 264
López, Narciso: 31
lower classes: 23, 67, 74, 76, 79, 81, 92-97 *passim*, 106, 109, 114, 127, 178, 181, 182, 184, 187, 192, 202
Lozano, Alfredo: 174
Lucumís: 77, 88, 192
Lumumba, Patrice: 251

Maceo, Antonio: 34, 78, 201
Machado, Gerardo: 24, 41, 42, 43, 140, 212, 226, 232, 235, 239, 240, 351, 420
machinery (*see also* spare parts, tractors, vehicles): 289, 296, 308, 318, 319, 325, 340, 344, 348, 369, 384, 385, 393
machismo: 173, 200
McKinley, William: 34, 35
Magistrate Training School: 424
Magoon, Charles E.: 38
Maine (ship): 34
Makarenko Teachers Institute: 149, 150, 151, 155
man: new (Communist) type, 6, 99, 134, 199, 200, 203; personal qualities, 200-206

Mañach, Jorge: 159, 164
manganese: 332-333
Mantanzas Province: sugar, 302
manufacturing: 323, 325, 328, 337-346
Manzanillo: 69
Mao Tse Tung: 276
Marinello, Juan: 165
marketing: 373-376
marriage: 79, 81, 82, 105, 106, 109-110, 181, 201
Martí, José: 33, 34, 52, 78, 136, 157, 159, 160-161, 162, 180, 242, 276, 277, 278
Martín Villaverde, Alberto: 182, 184
Martínez, Raúl: 175
Marxism: 162, 163-165, 223, 224, 225, 230, 240, 244, 248, 255, 257, 350, 433, 435, 436, 439, 444, 458, 462
Marxism-Leninism: 1, 92, 214, 240, 244, 256
Maximo Gorki Institute: 149
meat: 295, 312, 313, 320, 340
medical schools: 113, 121, 122
Mendieta, Carlos: 45, 46
Mendive, Rafael María: 160
Menocal, Mario García: 39-46 *passim*
merchant fleet: 380
Merchant Marine: viii, 369, 380
Mesa, Bernardo de: 179
mestizos: vii, 71-72, 74, 164
metallurgy: 344
Mexican News Agency: 268
Mexicans: 83
Mexico: 253, 279, 381, 388; relations with, 56, 248, 251, 253
Meza y Suárez Inclán, Ramón: 161
Miami, Florida: 282, 286, 431
middle class: 5, 24, 53, 64, 67, 71, 91-97 *passim*, 106, 114, 127, 162, 164, 177, 178, 181, 184. 189, 196, 235, 243, 446
migration, internal: 65-69, 93
Military Academy: 447-448
Military Penal Code and Military Procedure Law: 461
Military Technical Institute: 448
Military Units for Aid to Production (UMAP): 434
militia (*see also* Civil Defense, Workers' Militia): 92, 98-99, 440, 454
minerals: 10, 11, 14, 15, 19, 331; exports, 392; nonmetallic, 333, 334, 335-336
mining: 323, 330
ministries (as of 1970, list of): 217
Ministry of: Agriculture, 306, 315; Basic Industry, 290, 327; Commerce, 265; Construction, 114; Domestic Trade, 370, 371, 372, 373; Economic Development, 445; Education, 134, 137, 142-146 *passim*, 149, 153, 156, 263, 364; Foreign Relations, 247; Foreign Trade, 269, 290, 291, 372, 373, 394, 395, 408; Interior, 251, 417, 428-432, 444, 454; Justice, 110, 422, 424; Labor, 107, 114, 128, 349, 350, 353-359 *passim*, 365, 366; Light Industry, 290, 327; Mining and Metallurgy, 290, 328; National Defense, 444; Physical Education, 201; Public Health, 108, 122; Public Works, 174; Revolutionary Armed Forces, 445, 454, 455; Social Services, 445; Sugar Industry, 290, 327, 372; Transport, 20, 372, 376; Treasury, 402
missile crisis: 2, 57, 186, 257
Moncado Barracks attack: 51, 183, 185, 420
monetary unit. *See* peso
Mongolia: 252
Monroe Doctrine: 252
Montecristi Group: 228
Montoro, Rafael: 39
Morel de Santa Cruz, Pedro Augustín: 180
Morocco: 252, 390
mulattoes: 60, 72, 135
municipios: 70
music and musicians: 77, 140, 168-171

National Academy of Ballet: 171
National Association of Private Farmers (ANAP): 291, 316-317, 372
National Ballet: 171
National Bank of Cuba: viii, 49, 216, 290, 401, 402, 405-414 *passim*
National Conservatory: 140
National Council of Catholic Action: 183
National Council on Culture: 149, 166, 168, 277
National Economic Council: 319
National Federation of University Students: 100, 153

National Fisheries Institute: 216
National Foreign Trade Bank: 394
National Forestry Institute: 216
National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA): 53, 95, 96, 114, 185, 216, 269, 278, 290, 315, 316, 317, 320, 326, 327, 354, 370, 372, 373, 408
National Institute of Savings and Housing (INAV): 97, 114
National Institute of the Tourist Industry: 216
National Institute of Veterinary Medicine: 216, 313
National Labor Confederation of Cuba (CNOC): 43, 352
National Library: 262, 275, 277
National Publishing House: 262, 264, 275
National Revolutionary Militia: 454
National School of Art: 149, 174
National School for Bank Training: 410
National School for Local Government Cadres: 222
National School of Political Instruction: 433
National Service for Eradication of Malaria: 125
National Symphony Orchestra: 171, 282
National Theater of Cuba: 171, 172
National Tourist Commission: 370
National Transit Commission: 428
National Union of Artists and Writers of Cuba (UNEAC): 166, 168, 172, 173, 274, 275
National University: 140, 143
nationalism: 23, 30, 45, 243
Nationalist party: 35, 37, 45, 46
nationalization: 3, 97, 110, 134, 186, 245, 314, 326, 349, 376, 379, 405; U.S. properties, 53, 56, 256, 347, 370
Nationalization of Education Law: 214
"naturalist circles": 97
Naval Academy: 448
navy: viii, 439, 448, 451, 452, 453, 459
Negroes: vii, 6, 30, 32, 39, 44, 59, 62, 63, 71, 72, 76-80, 93-99 *passim*, 136, 180, 192, 232; attitude toward Castro, 80; culture, 157-158, 161-165 *passim*, 170, 175
Neighbor's Councils: 433
New China News Agency: 268
New York City: 33, 34, 286
news agencies: 261, 268-269
Newspapermen's Association: 263
newspapers: 53, 88, 89, 261, 262-269
nickel: viii, 397; exports, 295, 323, 383, 391-392; production, 295, 330, 331
Nico Lopez National Party School: 222
nightclubs: 130, 374
Nin, Joaquín: 171
North Korea: 252, 287
North Vietnam: 252, 458
Novosti News Agency: 268
Nuevitas (city): viii, 328, 348, 380
Núñez Jiménez, Antonio: 84, 164
nursery schools. *See* education: preschool
nutrition. *See* diet

Ordoqui, Joaquín: 47
Organization of American States (OAS): 56, 252, 254, 255
organizations (*see also cabildos*): exile groups, 436; interest groups, and politics, 232-237; international, membership in, 252-253; mass, 98-103; professional and business, 235-236; social and cultural, 79, 94, 95, 97-98, 127, 166
Oriente Province: 76, 79, 221, 380, 381, 434, 435; agriculture, 302, 305; health and sanitation, 117, 123, 125; industry, 331, 335; population, 65-66; power, 348, 380; roads, 377; sugar industry, 37, 65, 338
Oriente region: 14-16
Ortiz, Fernando: 163, 170
Otero, Lisandro: 168

Padilla, Heberto: 167, 168
Palma y Romay, Ramón de: 161
Pan American Union: 254
Panama: 253, 436
paper: imports, 394; industry, 346; shortages, 262, 265, 269
paramilitary forces (*see also* Civil Defense): 452, 453, 455-457
Parro, Ricardo: 174
patronage: 207
PCC. *See* Communist Party of Cuba
peasants: 96, 98
Pedroso, Regino: 164
Peláez, Amelia: 174, 175
penal institutions: 418, 433-435

penal and procedural codes: 424-426
pensions: 128, 129, 235, 405
People's Technological Institute: 282
Pérez Serantes, Enrique: 182, 184, 185, 186
periodicals: 262, 269-275
personalismo: 200, 226
Peru: 253, 255, 286
peso: 293, 395, 402, 413, 414
petroleum: 11, 290, 323, 329, 330, 336, 337; refining and refineries, 343-344, 348, 385, 392
Pinar del Rio Province: agriculture, 301, 302, 305; minerals, 333, 335; power, 380; sanitation, 117
Piñera, Virgilio: 165
Pioneers Union: 91, 92, 101-102, 131, 207
Placido (poet): 159
Platt Amendment: 24, 36, 37-45, 211, 249
poets and poetry: 90
Poey, Felipe: 163
Poland: 252, 287, 328, 388
police. *See* General Directorate of Public Order, General Directorate of Security of the State
political bureaus: 444
political parties (*see also* Communist Party of Cuba, Cuban People's party, Democratic party, Nationalist party, Unity Action party): 35, 37, 38, 39, 46-49 *passim*, 54-55, 207, 228, 237-242
political prisoners: 418, 424, 429, 434
politics (*see also* political parties; political prisoners; students: political activity; values and attitudes: political): 38-40, 95, 223-230, 232-237; background, 224-227; indoctrination, 52, 99, 102, 350, 357, 433, 434, 435, 444, 458, 462; opposition to present regime, 56, 229-230, 245, 417, 418, 425, 426, 427, 435-437, 455, 456
Popular Schools of Public Health: 433
Popular Socialist Party (PSP): 48, 54, 55, 237, 238
population (*see also* census, emigration, ethnic groups, immigration and immigrants, settlement patterns, urbanization): vii, 5, 6, 40, 59-69; distribution, 61; estimated, 59, 60, 61; growth and density, 59, 61-64
Port and Coast Surveillance Department: 431
ports and port facilities: viii, 20, 315, 328, 330, 369, 379-380, 384, 385
Power: 323, 330, 347, 348, 380-381; potential source, 15
Presbyterians: 184
president, office of: 216-217, 249
prices (*see also under* crops, sugar): black market, 373; control, 371, 373, 395; vital goods, 294
Prío Socarrás, Carlos: 48-50, 51, 226, 233, 238, 239
professionals: 42, 43, 64, 93, 235-236
propaganda: 261, 268, 278, 285-287, 350, 359, 444; responsibility for activities, 429
prostitution: 7, 130, 427
Protestantism (*see also* Protestants): 177, 178, 181, 183-187 *passim*, 189-191
Protestants (*see also* Baptists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Presbyterians): vii, 5, 177, 178, 182, 186, 190; schools, 140
public order (*see also* Committees for Defense of the Revolution; counterrevolutionary activities; courts; crime; security, internal): 417-428
Puerto Rico: 381, 436
Pujol, Alonso: 239
race, discrimination: 78, 79, 80, 82, 98
radicalism, beginning of: 227
radio: viii, 185, 188, 261, 279, 282; stations, 280, 281
Radio Havana Cuba: 261, 285-286
Radio Rebelde: 280
railroads: viii, 20, 37, 67, 376-377
rainfall: 16-17, 302
Ramírez, Don Alejandro, 135
Ramos, José Antonio: 172
Ramos Blanco, Teodor: 174
rationing: 4, 54, 97, 113, 118, 119, 129, 130, 294, 330, 346, 350, 362, 369, 371, 373, 375, 378, 392, 433
raw materials: 289, 292, 325, 327, 328, 338, 342-346 *passim*, 384, 385, 386; imports, 393
Reciprocity Treaty: 37, 45
recreation: 7, 21, 64, 71, 94, 95, 96, 99, 102, 130, 169, 201, 431

Red Cross: 434
Reed, Walter: 35
refugees: 64, 431
regions, geographic: 10
religion (*see also* Protestantism, Roman Catholic Church): vii, 5-6, 177-187
religious orders: 27, 135, 140, 179
rents: 53, 97, 114, 115, 229, 362, 374
Republic Authentic Alliance: 48
Republican party: 35, 37, 46, 48, 238, 239
resistance. *See* counterrevolutionary activities
retirement (*see also* pensions): 127, 128, 355, 360
revenue. *See under* budget: revenue
revolution (*see also* Revolution of 1959): (1933), 32-34, 42-43, 51, 225; (1953), 51, 183, 185, 225, 420
Revolution of 1959: v, 1, 23, 52, 64, 165-168, 227-230, 245; export, 3, 248, 250, 253, 254, 255, 259, 431, 432
Revolutionary Air and Air Defense Force (DAAFAR): 439, 448, 453, 459
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR). *See* armed forces
Revolutionary Cuban Party: 228
Revolutionary Directorate: 52, 228
revolutionary tribunals. *See under* courts
rice: 302, 310, 388, 394
Rigali, Rolando: 168
rivers: viii, 10
Roa, Raúl: 250
roads: viii, 20-21, 42, 67, 93, 290, 377-378
Roca, Blas: 47, 54
Rodríguez, Carlos Rafael: 54
Rodríguez, Marcos: 55
Roldán, Amadeo: 170
Roman Catholic Church (*see also* Catholic Action, Catholic Youth, church-state relations, religious orders, Roman Catholics): 26, 27, 75, 76, 85, 106, 109, 110, 134, 160, 177, 178; background, 179-182, 183-187 *passim*; organization, 187; and politics, 236-237; restriction of activities, 188; schools, 140, 143
Roman Catholics: vii, 5, 83, 177, 183
Romanach, Leopoldo: 174
Romania: 388, 396
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano: 12, 45
rubber industry: 346
rural areas: distribution system, 375; education, 133, 140-141, 146; folk beliefs and practices, 126; health facilities and services, 120-123 *passim*, 126; housing, 116; religion, 177, 178, 190; roads, 378; sanitation, 117
Rural Medical Service: 121, 122

sabotage: 418, 432, 436
Saco y López, José Antonio: 159
Saladrigas, Carlos: 48
Salas, Brindís de: 77
salt: 16
Sanchez de Fuentes, Eduardo: 171
sanitary brigades: 92, 96, 103
sanitation: 35, 37, 113, 117-118
Santamaría, Haydée: 167, 168
Santería: 89, 192-194
Santiago de Cuba: 16, 69, 143, 187, 377, 379, 380
Sardinas, Father Guillermo: 183
savings: 412-413
scholarships: 134, 138, 141, 143, 155-156, 449
School for Agrarian Technification: 102
School for Aviation Cadets: 448
School of Agronomic Engineering: 138
School of Fishing: 148
schools: 108, 135-136, 138-143 *passim*, 147, 148, 149, 290; absenteeism, 103; construction, 96, 140, 142; enrollment, 134, 145, 152; military, 447, 448, 449; nationalization, 134, 186; of public health, 433; rural, 140-141; for subversive activity training, 432; television in, 282
sculpture: 174
Second Front of the Escambray: 52
security, internal (*see also* Committees for Defense of the Revolution): 417, 428, 433
services: commercial, 369-370, 374; free public, 294
settlement patterns: 65-69
sharecroppers: 93, 307, 316, 354
shipping: 376, 379-380
shoes: 346, 374
shrines: 196
Sierra Maestra: 14, 51
slaves: 6, 26, 29-33 *passim*, 62, 76, 78, 85, 89, 161, 177, 179, 180
social security. *See* welfare, social

Social Security Bank: 370
Social Security Law of 1963: 128
Socialists: 43; emulation principle, 366-367
society: new, 95-98; social mobility, 67, 75, 96; structure, 1, 6, 29, 91-98
Society for Afro-Cuban Studies: 163
Society of Cuban Folklore: 163
Society of Friends: 190
soils: 10-17 *passim*, 65, 301
Solas, Humberto: 173
South China News: 81
South Vietnam: 252
Soviet Union (*see also* missile crisis): 54, 55, 153, 274, 275, 279, 286, 287, 329, 337, 344, 379, 381, 405, 448, 453, 458; agreements, 57, 253, 293, 326, 328, 344, 386, 388, 389, 396, 398; aid, viii, 2, 4, 56, 247, 253, 259, 297, 336, 344, 348, 397, 398, 439; debt to, 383, 398, 405; economic dependence upon, 254; relations with, 23, 24, 52, 55, 214, 223, 244, 249, 252-259 *passim*, 436; trade, 4, 54, 57, 289, 290, 383, 386, 388, 389, 390, 392, 393, 397
Spain: 63, 252, 388, 390, 393, 397; cultural influence, 75, 157, 158, 168-175 *passim*; education under, 134-136; rule by, 23, 25-34
Spaniards: 74-76
Spanish-American War: 34-35
Spanish language: vii, 6, 72-73, 85-88
spare parts: 148, 296, 300, 325, 328, 329, 344, 369, 376, 378, 384, 393, 428
sports: 99, 101, 102, 107, 201, 294, 374
standards of living: 6, 50, 91, 93, 95, 97, 113, 129-130, 204, 294
state farms. *See* farms: state
steel and iron production: 344
strikes: 43, 44, 46, 79, 352
Student Christian Movement: 191
Student Directorate: 43, 44
students: 91, 99, 108; military training, 131; political activity, 42, 43, 51, 140, 234-235; recreational and cultural activities, 131; volunteer labor, 364
Suárez y Romero, Anselmo: 161
sugar: viii, 23, 28-34 *passim*, 37, 41, 42, 69, 130, 292, 372, 377; agreement with Soviet Union, 396; cane, 11, 13, 41, 301-302, 308, 321, 372, 377; and the economy, 3, 24, 41, 45, 289, 292-293, 299, 308, 325; exports, 249, 379, 383, 386, 388, 389-391; milling and refining, 323, 337-339; mills, 29, 33, 35, 41, 67, 68, 95, 96, 291, 306, 326, 329, 338; prices, 41, 390, 398; production, 3, 11, 38, 40, 47, 54, 65, 293, 295, 299, 300, 308-309, 320, 321, 322; and the public debt, 406; quotas, 50, 56, 289, 320, 325, 384, 385, 389, 397; workers, 95, 201, 317, 338, 349, 352, 354, 355, 364
Sugar Stabilization Fund: 50
Sun Yat Sen: 81
Sweden: 252
Switzerland: 65, 406

Tacón, Miguel: 31, 172
Taft, William H.: 38
tariffs: 34, 37, 42, 45, 289, 325, 384, 395
taxes: 46, 215, 361, 401, 403-404, 411
Taylor, Gen. Maxwell: 276
teachers: 5, 98, 102, 133, 134, 141, 142, 144, 156; training, 138-139, 143, 149-151, 152, 154
teaching brigades: 154
technical brigades: 100
Technical School for Geology: 147
technical and vocational training: 96, 100, 102, 133, 138-139, 142-148 *passim*, 360, 448, 451
technicians: 233, 257, 296, 300, 318, 327, 329, 369, 384, 386, 398, 399, 451
Telegrafnoye Agentstvo Sovietskova Soyuse (TASS): 268
telephones and telegraph: viii, 374, 381
Tele-Rebelde: 282
televisión: viii, 185, 188, 261, 279-280; programs, 278, 282, 285, stations, 282, 283
Televisión Nacional: 282
Ten Years' War: 32, 33, 74
textbooks: 275, 276
textiles: 345, 374, 394
theater: 171-172
Toa River: 15
tobacco: 13, 15, 28, 29, 32, 299, 302, 309-310; exports, 383, 391; industry, 339-340, 372; workers, 339, 340, 351, 352
topography: vii, 10

tractors: 318, 319, 393
trade, domestic: 294
trade, foreign (*see also* agreements and treaties, barter, exports, imports, tariffs, *and under* China, Communist countries, Soviet Union, United States): 4, 290, 292, 383, 386-389; balance, 292, 388, 397, 398; government control, 394-395
transportation (*see also* airlines, railroads and service, roads, shipping): 19-21, 294, 314, 369, 374, 376, 380
Treaty of Paris: 28, 35
Trujillo, Rafael: 49, 231
26th of July Movement: 2, 51, 52, 54, 228, 263-264, 265, 349

Uhrbach, Federico: 162
UJC. *See* Communist Youth Organization
unemployment: 38, 41, 42, 114, 317, 350, 356, 360
Union of Cuban Journalists (UPEC): 266, 268
Union of Latin American Universities: 152
United Arab Republic: 252, 390, 397
United Bible Societies: 190
United Nations: 57, 67; Development Programme, Administrative Council, 252; Economic Commission for Latin America, 252; Security Council, 254
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 143, 154, 252
United Party of the Socialist Revolution (PURS): 55
United Press International (UPI): 268, 269
United States (*see also* Guantánamo: U.S. base; missile crisis): 1, 5, 25, 31, 34, 86, 87, 88, 269, 275, 276, 277, 279, 286, 296, 318, 369, 378, 381, 413, 440, 441, 458, 461; airlift for refugees, 64-65; Armed Forces Radio and Television Service, 280; attitude toward, 244, 458; bombings in, 436; economic quarantine of Cuba, 253; equipment made in, 296, 318, 324, 325, 369, 386, 393; Information Agency, 286; intervention, 24, 38, 39; investments, 37, 41, 45, 224, 324, 325, 331, 384, 385; Marines, 40; occupation of Cuba, 35-37, 137, 189; Platt Amendment, 24, 37-45 *passim*; property, seizure of, 53, 56, 256, 326, 347, 370, 385, 406, 407; relations with, 23, 24, 36, 45, 52, 55-57, 248-251 *passim*, 255, 256, 292, 299, 397; and the Revolution of 1959, 55-57; trade, 4, 289, 320, 325, 376, 383-386; Voice of America, 286
Unity Action party: 230
Universal Copyright Convention: 262, 275
universities: 133, 143, 152-154, 202, and the PCC, 235
University of Havana: 42, 43, 50, 52, 121, 136, 140, 143, 152, 235, 263, 274, 437; Law School, 420
upper class: 5, 24, 53, 64, 67, 71, 74, 75, 84, 87-94 *passim*, 97, 106, 109, 114, 116, 127, 162, 177, 178, 201, 202, 235, 243, 244, 250
Urban Reform Law: (1960), 54, 95, 97, 113, 115, 214; (1967), 115
urbanization: 59, 66-69
Urrutia, Manuel: 52, 53, 217, 228, 229

Valázquez, Diego: 25
values and attitudes: political, 24, 48, 242-245; social, 107, 108, 109, 199-207, 244
Van Horne, William: 37
Vanguard Workers: 99
Varela y Morales, Father Félix: 159
Varona, Enrique José de: 136, 162
Vatican: 252
Vega, Lope de: 158
vehicles: 369, 376, 378, 384, 393, 428
Venezuela: 253, 286, 384
Verde Olivo (periodical): 168, 269, 274, 457
Vermay, Jean Baptiste: 174
Villaverde, Cirilo: 161

wages and salaries: 97, 151-152, 294, 349, 350, 355, 361-362; minimum wage, 130
water supply: 113, 117, 125
welfare, social: 6, 113, 114, 127-129, 213, 355
Welles, Sumner: 42
western region: 11-12
Western University: 143, 152, 153
Weyler, Gen. Valeriano: 34
White, José: 77
Wilson, Woodrow: 40

women (*see also* divorce, Federation of Cuban Women, marriage): education and training, 102, 133, 155, 156; franchise, 46, 211, 236; ideal qualities, 200; in labor force, 92, 101, 105, 106, 107, 353, 355, 356, 359; maternity benefits, 129; military and para-military service and training, 440, 446, 447, 451, 453, 455, 457; rights and role, 105, 106, 107, 200; shortage, 60, 73, 75, 80, 81, 85; volunteers, 364
Wood, Gen. Leonard E.: 35, 37
wood products: 394
Worker-Farmer Education: 151, 152, 155
Workers Catholic Action: 183
Workers' Brigades: 455
Workers' Militia: viii, 452, 455
World Council of Churches: 191
World Health Organization: 123, 124, 252

Yiddish: 89
Yoruba: language, 77, 88-89; religion, 192
Young Christian Workers: 186
Young Cuba party: 43, 46
youth (*see also* students): 91, 97; organizations, 99-102
Youth Reeducation Centers: 435
Yucatan: 85
Yugoslavia: 279

Zacchi, Monsignor: 188, 189
Zayas, Alfredo: 38, 39, 40, 41
Zenón, Rev. Father: 135

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